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ABSTRACT 
The Nigerian judicial system is currently in a state of distress. Not only has the judiciary been 
trailed by allegations of corruption, incompetence and god-fatherism amongst others, the 
wheels of justice in Nigeria are slowly grinding to a near halt. This is because of the large and 
growing case list of courts as well as the recurrent industrial strike actions embarked upon by 
court staff. As a solution to this crisis, stakeholders have put forward a number of suggestions, 
one of which is the use of alternative dispute resolution methods like domestic arbitration, as 
a solution to the problems of the judiciary and as a viable alternative to the court system. 
As we will however come to see in this thesis, Nigeria’s Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1988 
(“Arbitration Act”), which is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law 1985, is not only outdated, 
it is also for many reasons not suitable and relevant to a developing country as Nigeria.  
For example, the existing Arbitration Act fails to take the legal and social idiosyncrasies of the 
Nigerian nation into consideration. Furthermore, the Act fails to incorporate the pre-existing 
and judicially recognized customary arbitration practice into the Act. In addition, the Nigerian 
Arbitration framework contains a number of anti-arbitration provisions, which have clearly 
inhibited the growth of domestic arbitration in Nigeria. Moreover, between 1988 and now, a 
number of beneficial changes have occurred within the sphere of arbitration and from which 
the Nigerian arbitration framework can draw lessons. All these among others, make the 
Nigerian Arbitration Act an unsuitable alternative to the court system in Nigeria.  
This thesis therefore recommends a bespoke domestic arbitration framework, which takes 
account of the legal and social idiosyncrasies of the Nigerian nation as well as recent but 
relevant domestic arbitration practices in similar jurisdictions as Nigeria. Among other 
recommendations, the proposed framework borrows a leaf from the deeply rooted and 
judicially recognised customary arbitration practice in Nigeria. Furthermore, in a bid to 
identify and incorporate relevant provisions and practices that have emerged within the 
sphere of domestic arbitration between 1988 and now, we undertake a comparative analysis 
of the Ghanaian Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010, the UNCITRAL Model Law 2006, 
the English Arbitration Act 1996 as well as the Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999 of OHADA.   
It is believed that this modern but tailored framework will encourage the use of domestic 
arbitration in Nigeria and by extension ameliorate the problems in the judicial system.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0  BACKGROUND 
The Nigerian judicial system is currently in a state of distress. Indeed, calls for urgent 
intervention must be heeded if complete breakdown is to be avoided.1 The crisis 
within the system has been catalysed by the series of allegations and unfortunate 
incidents involving the judiciary both at the Federal and State levels.2 As we will come 
to see in Chapter Two of this thesis, there has been an increase in allegations and cases 
of corruption and dereliction of duty levelled against members of the judiciary.3 In 
fact, a number of Judges have been known to live far above their means.4   
Nigerian Judges have also been accused of giving controversial and very absurd 
decisions.5 Court cases in Nigeria have been known to last well over thirty years.6 
These has resulted in a significant loss of confidence in the effectiveness of the judicial 
system.7 The situation has been further compounded by the delays often encountered 
in the resolution of domestic disputes in Nigerian courts. The former Chief Justice of 
                                                          
1 We discuss this in more detail in Section 3.0 of Chapter Two. 
2 Douglas Anele, ‘Criticisms and Growth of Democracy in Nigeria’ The Vanguard (16 June 2013) 
<www.vanguardngr.com/2013/06/criticism-and-the-growth-of-democracy-in-nigeria-3/>  accessed 
5 April 2014. 
3 Tobi Soniyi, ‘NJC Retires Justice Olotu, Inyang for Gross Misconduct’ Thisday (6 March 2014) 
<www.thisdaylive.com/articles/njc-retires-justices-olotu-inyang-for-gross-misconduct/172577/> 
accessed 5 April 2014.  
4  Kunle Olasanmi, ‘Corruption: Justice Olotu, 2 Others Still Under Investigation – EFCC’ Leadership (6 
July 2014) <http://leadership.ng/news/377040/corruption-justice-olotu-2-others-still-investigation-
efcc> accessed 25 May 2016. 
5 A recent case is that of the former governor of Delta State, James Ibori who was discharged and 
acquitted under questionable circumstance in Nigeria. However, when a similar charge was instituted 
in the United Kingdom, he was found guilty of fraud totalling over fifty million pounds and was 
sentenced to thirteen years in prison.  See Editorial ‘Former Nigeria governor James Ibori jailed for 13 
years’ BBC News (17 April 2012) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17739388> accessed 19 January 
2016. 
6Only recently, Nigeria was awash with news of the Supreme Court of Nigeria’s judgement on an oil 
spillage dispute involving Shell Petroleum Development Company, a proceeding spanning thirty-two 
(32) years. See Editorial, ‘Court orders Shell to pay 30 million’ Punch (6 June 2015) < 
http://www.punchng.com/news/oil-spill-32-years-after-scourt-orders-shell-to-pay-n30m-
compensation/ accessed 6 June 2015. 
7 As we will come to see in Chapter Two, there has been a rise in incidences of jungle justices (that is, 
citizens seizing suspected criminals and setting them ablaze right on the street). It is believed that if 
these criminals are handed over to the authorities, they are able to evade justice either in connivance 
with the police or by virtue of a corrupt and incompetent judiciary.  
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the Federation, Dahiru Musdapher in a speech delivered at the Nigerian Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies Fellows Lectures Series, submitted that even if litigants were 
stopped from commencing appeals at the Supreme Court, it will still take the apex 
court many years to clear the existing backlog.8 The former President of the 
Commonwealth Lawyers Association, Mrs Boma Ozobia, also opined that even if all 
panels of the Court of Appeal in Nigeria were made to sit every day of the week 
(including Saturdays and Sundays) for the next seven years, they would still not be 
able to conclude all currently pending appeals before the Court.9 
As we will see in Chapter Two, there is no doubt an urgent need for reforms within 
the Nigerian judiciary. In recognition of these problems, the immediate past President 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Dr Goodluck Jonathan, recently charged the 
judiciary to as a matter of urgency come up with a solution to these problems. He cited 
the growing disapproval of the judiciary by Nigerian citizens as justification.10 
Without prejudice to current efforts being taken by the Nigerian government and 
judiciary,11 it is high time stakeholders explore and encourage the use of alternative 
(to litigation) but viable methods of resolving disputes as a solution to the crisis within 
the judiciary. Further to this, my PhD thesis suggests domestic arbitration as a suitable 
solution to the many problems of the Nigerian court system, as well as an effective 
and viable alternative to the litigation practice in Nigeria.12 
 
                                                          
8D.Musdapher, ‘The Nigerian Judiciary: Towards Reform of the Bastion of Constitutional Democracy’ 
(Fellows’ Lectures Series, Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Lagos, 2011). 
9 Innocent Anaba, ‘CJN, CJ can address problems of Court by Practice Directions’ Vanguard (January 
10, 2013) <http:// http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/01/cjn-cjs-can-address-problems-of-courts-
by-practice-directions-boma-ozobia/> accessed 5 April 2014. 
10 Omosile Ola, ‘Jonathan Reaffirms Commitment to Judicial Reform’ Metropole (20 November 2014) 
<http://www.metropole.ng/index.php/promo/item/3077-jonathan-reaffirms-commitment-to-
judicial-reforms > accessed 3 June 2016. 
11 We examine some of these efforts in Section 4.0 of Chapter Two of this thesis. 
12 Domestic Arbitration is fast becoming a popular method of resolving disputes in many jurisdictions. 
According to Redfern and Hunter, many countries ‘have modernised their laws so as to be seen to be 
‘arbitration friendly’; firms of lawyers and accountants have established dedicated groups of arbitration 
specialists…’  See: Nigel Blackaby et al, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th ed, OUP 2009) 
1. 
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2.0     STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
In the course of this thesis, we will see that Nigeria lacks a suitable domestic 
arbitration framework. This is notwithstanding the existence of the Nigerian 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act (“the Act”),13 which has been in existence for well 
over twenty-eight years.14 Nigerian lawmakers in their wisdom have chosen to model 
the Nigerian Act after the UNCITRAL Model Law 1985,15 a model which is said to 
have been put into place to administer international commercial disputes.16 
 
Baron de Monstesquieu has rightly argued that every law “should be adapted in such 
a manner to the people for whom they are framed, that it should be a great chance if 
those of one nation suit another…It should be in relation to the nature and principles 
of each government…They should have relation to the degree of liberty which the 
Constitution will bear; to the religion of the inhabitants, to their inclination, riches, 
number, commerce, manners and custom…It should be in relation to the climate of 
each country, to the quality of its soil, to its situation and extent.”17 Unfortunately this 
is not the situation in Nigeria. Rather than adapt the UNCITRAL Model Law to the 
Nigerian situation, the said Model Law was wholly adopted in Nigeria. 
 
As we will come to see in this thesis, the legal and economic situation in Nigeria clearly 
does not support a total adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Ironically, a more 
developed country like the United Kingdom found a total adoption of the Model Law 
to be unsuitable and instead tailored it and developed a bespoke arbitration law, in 
line with her needs, practices and pre-existing law.18 
                                                          
13 Chapter A18 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
14 The Act came into operation in 1988. As we would come to see in Chapter Four of this thesis, by 
virtue of the change in government from Military to Civilian rule in 1999, Section 315 of the 1999 
Constitution converted pre-existing Decrees of the Military government to Acts of the National 
Assembly. In other words, the Arbitration and Conciliation Decree 1988 is what is now known as the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2004.  For the purposes of this thesis and in general arbitration practice 
in Nigeria, the 1988 and 2004 framework is one and the same.  
15 A revised edition was introduced in 2006. 
16 UNCITRAL Model law 1985, article 1(1); See also James O’Rodner, ‘International and National 
Arbitration: A Fading Distinction’ (2002) 19(5) Journal of International Arbitration 491,492. 
17 Charles De Secondant and Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the laws (Thomas Nugent Trans. J.V. 
Prichard rev) 7 1914.  
18 We examine this in Section 3.1 of Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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Furthermore, the Act fails to take into consideration the legal and social idiosyncrasies 
of the Nigerian nation.  For example, the Act fails to incorporate the pre-existing and 
judicially recognized customary arbitration practice into the Act.  In fact, going by the 
implication of several provisions in the Act, it is virtually impossible for the customary 
arbitration practice to operate within the framework of the Act.19 As we will come to 
see in the course of this thesis, Ghana a country with a similar colonial and legal 
history as Nigeria, in a bid to tackle problems similar to the ones plaguing the Nigerian 
judiciary, incorporated her customary arbitration practice into the recently enacted 
Ghanaian Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010.20  
 
In addition, the Nigerian Arbitration framework contains a number of anti-arbitration 
provisions, which arguably inhibit the growth of domestic arbitration in Nigeria and 
which should be removed. For example, Section 2 of the Nigerian Act gives courts wide 
and unlimited power to revoke arbitration agreements without parties’ consent. 
Furthermore, Section 5 of the same Act grants courts the discretion to decide whether or 
not to grant an order of stay of proceedings even in the face of a validly made 
arbitration agreement. These two provisions are clearly antithetical to arbitration. 
 
Between the year 1988 (which is when the existing Nigerian Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act was introduced) and now, a number of beneficial changes have 
occurred within the sphere of arbitration and from which the Nigerian arbitration 
framework can draw lessons.  For example, the English Arbitration Act 1996 allows 
parties to consolidate arbitrations with similar issues.21 The Revised Model Law 2006 
also redefines an arbitration agreement in a way that accommodates oral 
agreements.22 Furthermore, the Uniform Act on Arbitration 199923 also imposes a time 
                                                          
19 Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2004, sections 1&57. 
20 See Section 1.0.1 of Chapter Six of this thesis. 
21 English Arbitration Act 1996, section 35. 
22 See the Revised Model Law 2006, article 7. 
23 Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999, article 12. 
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limit of six months on arbitrations conducted within the Organisation pour 
l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit de Affaires (OHADA) region.24 
 
All these among others, have made the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act an 
unsuitable alternative to the litigation practice in Nigeria, thus increasing the pressure 
on the courts as well as emphasizing the other problems of the Nigerian court system. 
In addition to efforts being made by the government to revamp the judiciary therefore, 
it is necessary for stakeholders to revisit the said Nigerian Arbitration Act. 
 
3.0  OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The major objective of this study is to come up with a bespoke domestic arbitration 
framework, which takes into consideration the peculiarities of the Nigerian nation and 
relevant aspects of the pre-existing arbitration frameworks in Nigeria, as well as any 
recent but applicable changes that have occurred within the sphere of arbitration 
between now and when the Nigerian Act was originally introduced in 1988.  
In order to develop a suitable domestic arbitration framework for Nigeria, it is 
necessary to start by examining the existing arbitration frameworks in Nigeria by way 
of a background. This allows us to critically assess the situation on ground as well as 
justify our call for arbitration reforms.  We will therefore examine the existing but very 
old Arbitration and Conciliation Act in Nigeria as well as the home grown arbitration 
practice in Nigeria called customary arbitration. In recommending a model 
framework, efforts will be made towards incorporating the case law on the existing 
home grown customary arbitration practice into our eventual recommendation.  
In recommending a suitable domestic arbitration framework for Nigeria, it is 
submitted that the frameworks of other countries with established, more developed 
and relevant arbitration practices, would also prove to be a useful guide. Specifically, 
                                                          
24 OHADA was conceived in 1993 to encourage the development of commercial relations as well as 
encourage legal certainty through the unification of business laws in Africa. Despite the fact that the 
treaty opens up its membership to the whole of Africa, only seventeen African countries, all of which 
are former French colonies, have signed on to the treaty. We discuss this in detail in Section 4.0 of 
Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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we will consider the Ghanaian Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010, the revised 
version of the UNCITRAL Model Law introduced in 2006, the English Arbitration Act 
1996 as well as the Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999 of the OHADA region. 
4.0  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research work will generate and seek to answer the following questions:  
1. How suitable is the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2004 in the 
resolution of domestic disputes in Nigeria? 
2. What improvements can be made to the existing Arbitration Act in Nigeria, in 
order to make it more effective and functional in the resolution of domestic 
disputes? 
5.0  THESIS STRUCTURE 
Chapter Two discusses the problems of the Nigerian judicial system in a bit of depth 
and very importantly provides a basis for this thesis. For example, we highlight the 
problems of delay in the administration of justice and perennial backlog of cases, long 
and very regular industrial strike actions, a largely incompetent and corrupt judiciary, 
bad and antiquated laws as well as poor court infrastructure amongst others.  
We conclude this chapter by making a few suggestions, all in a bid to improve the 
effectiveness of the Nigerian judicial system. For example, we advocate for the 
financial autonomy of the judiciary, a more transparent appointment process of 
Judges, improved and continuous training for new and old Judges.  Very important 
especially to this thesis is the fact that we recommend arbitration as a solution to many 
of the problems of the judiciary and as a viable alternative to litigation. 
In Chapter Three, we introduce the reader to basic concepts and principles of 
arbitration, most of which would be useful in the course of this thesis. We also 
establish the viability of the arbitration mechanism as against popular dispute 
resolution mechanisms like mediation, conciliation and negotiation, which are 
classified under the umbrella head of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).   
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We discuss the inability of the courts to adapt to the evolving commercial realities as 
well as justify our selection of arbitration as a viable alternative to litigation and as a 
solution to some of the problems plaguing the Nigerian judicial system.  We conclude 
Chapter Three by introducing the reader to the existing domestic arbitration practices 
in Nigeria: the Nigerian Arbitration Act and the customary arbitration practice. 
Chapter Four takes our discussion a step further by introducing the reader to the 
domestic arbitration practice in Nigeria. Specifically, we argue that contrary to 
popular opinion, domestic arbitration is not necessarily limited to purely national or 
domestic matters.  We opine that not only is the idea of domestic arbitration many 
times dependent on an understanding of international arbitration, knowledge of 
domestic arbitration is also a relevant aspect of the practice of international arbitration.  
Furthermore, we critically analyse the domestic arbitration practice in Nigeria with 
the aid of case law and statutory provisions as embedded in the Arbitration Act. 
The aforementioned analysis is significant as it provides an insight into the domestic 
arbitration framework in Nigeria, accentuates the gaps in the said framework as well 
as justifies our call for reforms in the light of the Nigerian situation. In addition, it 
provides a framework by which Nigeria’s domestic arbitration practice can be 
compared with the customary arbitration method as well as other more developed but 
relevant arbitration frameworks, thus highlighting any significant developments that 
have occurred within the sphere of arbitration between 1988 and date. 
We also critically examine a report by a committee set up by the Federal Government 
of Nigeria for the reform and harmonization of arbitration and ADR laws in Nigeria.  
Drawing from discussions and conclusions made in the course of this chapter, we 
conclude Chapter Four by making a case for reforms. 
Chapter Five examines the existing customary arbitration practice through the eyes of 
the court, which unlike its Ghanaian counterpart, is unable to operate under the 
existing arbitration statute. Specifically, we examine arguments surrounding the 
existence and validity of the practice in Nigeria. This chapter critically examines the 
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Nigerian Supreme Court’s decision in Agu v Ikewibe,25 a locus classicus on customary 
arbitration in Nigeria, as well as address arguments arising from this decision.   
In addition, we critically analyse recent decisions of the Nigerian Supreme Court on 
customary arbitration in the light of general principles of arbitration. We would at the 
conclusion of this analysis submit that customary arbitration has in the last two 
decades systematically evolved from a quasi-arbitration practice to a full arbitration 
practice. We conclude this chapter by making a case for reforms. 
In Chapter Six, we examine the domestic arbitration framework in jurisdictions with 
more developed but relevant arbitration frameworks.  This is in a bid to learn from 
the successes and failures of these more developed frameworks. Specifically, we 
consider the Ghanaian Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010, the revised 
UNCITRAL Model Law 2006, the English Arbitration Act 1996 as well as the Uniform 
Act on Arbitration 1999 of the OHADA region. This analysis also provides a useful 
insight into developments that have occurred between 1988 and now, and from which 
the proposed arbitration framework can pick a thing or two.  
Chapter Seven closes this thesis. Drawing from arguments and conclusions made in 
previous chapters, we among other recommendations, advocate for a bespoke 
domestic arbitration practice for Nigeria. In arriving at the model framework, we in 
some instances advocate for a total repeal of existing statutory provisions. In some 
other situations, we advocate for more flexible provisions and procedures, in line with 
the level of development in Nigeria. In other instances, we introduce new structures 
or institutions in order to aid the development of the domestic arbitration practice in 
Nigeria. We also in some other cases borrow a leaf from the customary arbitration 
practice in Nigeria. In many places, we recommend new processes and structures 
independent of all the frameworks which we consider. 
                                                          
25 (1991) 3 NWLR PT 180. 
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The result of all these is a specially tailored arbitration law that takes into 
consideration both the legal and social idiosyncrasies of the Nigerian nation as well as 
established and proven arbitration principles as practised in other jurisdictions.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN NIGERIA: THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, the performance and reputation of the Nigerian judiciary has 
come under intense scrutiny and criticism. Not only has the judiciary been trailed by 
allegations of corruption, the courts at various levels have been unable to decide cases 
at the same speed at which they are being instituted. This has resulted in a backlog 
that dates as far back as three decades.1 In addition, the Nigerian judiciary continues 
to suffer from periodic and very lengthy industrial strike actions, which have not only 
contributed to the already existing backlog, but more importantly denied citizens of 
their constitutional right of access to the courts.2 
Furthermore, the laws governing the jurisdiction of many of the superior courts in 
Nigeria have been enmeshed in a lot of controversy. This has resulted in conflicting 
and very questionable decisions, thus complicating an already bad situation. As we 
will in the course of this thesis come to see, the inefficiency of the Nigerian judiciary 
has led to dissatisfaction among the Nigerian citizenry, which in many instances has 
encouraged the total breakdown of law and order.3  As at the time of writing this 
chapter of the thesis, the Nigerian judicial system is in a state of crisis.  
Jim O’ Neill, the BRICS proponent, recently identified Nigeria as one of the next 
economic giants.4 Following the recent rebasing of her economy, Francisco Ferreira, 
the Chief Economist (African Region) of the World Bank, has speculated that the next 
couple of years will witness an unprecedented increase in investment activities in 
                                                          
1 Osita Ogbu, ‘The Judiciary in a Polity: A force for Stability or Instability?: The Nigerian Experience’ 
(1999) 11 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 724, 735. 
2 As at the time of writing this part of the thesis in March 2015, the various Superior Courts in Nigeria 
had been on strike for periods ranging between five months and eight months. 
3 BBC editorial, ‘Nigeria's vigilante 'jungle justice' BBC News (28 April 2009) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8021468.stm> accessed 20 November 2015. 
4 According to this Economist, the other giants include Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey, hence the 
popular acronym MINTS. ‘The Mint countries: Next economic giants?’ BBC News (6 Jan 2014) 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-25548060> accessed 20 March 2015. 
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Nigeria.5 This will of course result in a plethora of specialised and technical disputes,6 
thus emphasizing the need for an efficient dispute resolution system.7 In view of the 
existing and very many problems of the Nigerian judiciary, one is forced to question 
her physical and technical capacity to accommodate this new and varied workload. 
This chapter discusses the problems of the Nigerian judicial system in depth and very 
importantly, serves as one of the basis for this PhD thesis.  In this chapter, we justify 
the need to devise a new and bespoke means of resolving domestic disputes in 
Nigeria, and so while we highlight as well as critically discuss some of the major 
problems of the Nigerian court system (like the heavy workload of the courts, the 
recurrent industrial strike actions, incompetent and/or corrupt staff, among many 
others), among other recommendations, we conclude this chapter by suggesting 
arbitration as a solution to the aforementioned problems and as a viable and practical 
alternative to the existing litigation practice in Nigeria. 
In terms of structure, this chapter is divided into three major parts. By way of 
background to the existing judicial system, Part One highlights and examines very 
briefly, the pre-colonial mechanisms of resolving disputes in traditional Nigeria; the 
traditional court system, customary arbitration as well as the customary mediation 
and reconciliation mechanisms. By these, we establish that prior to colonization, the 
geographical location now known as Nigeria had its own local methods of resolving 
domestic disputes.8 Unfortunately, these mechanisms which arguably have the 
capacity to take off some of the burden from the courts, have gradually faded into 
oblivion mainly because of their lack of recognition by Nigerian law.9 
                                                          
5 Ndubuisi Francis, ‘W’Bank: Rebased GDP Has Exposed Nigeria to Global Businesses’ Thisday Live (13 
April 2014) <www.thisdaylive.com/articles/wbank-rebased-gdp-has-exposed-nigeria-to-global-
investors/176037/> accessed 20 March 2015. 
6 B.A Bukar, ‘Legal Framework for the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes: An 
examination of Nigeria’s Arbitration Laws’ (1999) 16(1) Journal of International Arbitration 47, 48. 
7 Koyinsola Ajayi, ‘Nigeria’s New Arbitral and Conciliatory Process’ (1989) 7(9) International Banking 
Law 140. 
8 This discussion and distinction will also be useful when we discuss the customary arbitration practice 
in Nigeria in Chapter Five of this thesis.  
9 As we will come to see in Section 1.0 of this Chapter and also in Chapter Five of this thesis, currently 
only the customary arbitration mechanism is legally recognized and binding. 
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In Part Two, we examine the judicial structure in modern Nigeria. We highlight the 
various Superior Courts of Record in Nigeria and briefly discuss the scope of each of 
their jurisdictions. In the third and final part of this chapter, we critically discuss the 
major problems of the Nigerian judiciary. We conclude this chapter by making 
recommendations to improve the efficiency and standard of the courts.10 Most 
important of these recommendations, is the introduction of a new, bespoke and viable 
domestic arbitration practice in Nigeria. 
1.0 BACKGROUND 
Prior to the colonization of Africa, the geographical area now known as Nigeria was 
made up of independent groups of people, each having its own and somewhat unique 
culture.11 This culture encapsulated the different institutions and practices with which 
the people administered the various aspects of their life.12 One of the most important 
of all these was a very successful dispute resolution system, which the people used to 
administer economic and social disputes.13 As Dr Laibuta rightly noted, conflict is an 
integral feature of human relations and so the existence of suitable and efficient 
dispute resolution mechanisms was critical to the maintenance of social order.14 
According to Dr Oluduro, “to deny the fact that Africans had their own ways of 
resolving conflicts that differ from that of the English is to swim in the ocean of 
misconception which is polluted with the waters of ethnocentrism and cultural 
shock.”15 It was agreed that disputes were inevitable.16 Traditional Nigeria had such 
                                                          
10 For example, we advocate for the financial autonomy of the judiciary, the introduction of a more 
transparent appointment and training process for Judges, the provision of an enabling working 
environment for Judges, amongst others.  
11 Restatement of Customary Law of Nigeria as adopted and promulgated by the Nigerian Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies (Nigeria, 20 April 2013) 3. 
12 These different institutions and practices shared similar characteristics. 
13 Akintunde Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System (Sweet and Maxwell 1979) 17; L.A. Ayinla, ‘ADR and 
the Relevance of Native or Customary Arbitration in Nigeria’ (2009) 5 The University of Ilorin Law 
Journal 254, 255; Andrew Chukwuemerie, ‘The Internationalisation of African Customary law 
arbitration’ (2006) 14(2) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 143. 
14 K.I. Laibuta, ‘ADR in Africa: Contending with Multiple Legal Orders for Wholesome Dispute 
Resolution’ (2016) 82(1) Arbitration, 63,67.  
15 Olubayo Oluduro, ‘Customary Arbitration in Nigeria: Developments and Prospects’ (2011) 19(2) 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 307, 321. 
16 A number of Nigerian proverbs emphasize the importance of dispute resolution mechanisms. A 
common (Yoruba) one is ‘Agbe maja kan osi, a ja matan ni o da’ (translated it is not possible to live 
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dispute resolution mechanisms as litigation, arbitration and the ADRs such as 
mediation, conciliation and negotiation.17 However as the learned Professor 
Chukwuemerie rightly submitted, these systems certainly did not go by any of the 
aforementioned English names. Each of these systems went by different native names, 
depending on the community in question.18 At the head of these systems was the 
Kings’ Traditional Court (“Kings’ Court”).19 This court was supreme to the customary 
arbitration and customary mediation mechanisms.  All these mechanisms differed in 
terms of jurisdiction, the process of initiating proceedings, personnel, parties’ 
autonomy and involvement in the proceedings, as well as the enforcement process. 
For example, the Kings’ Court had jurisdiction over criminal matters as well as matters 
which affected and were likely to disrupt the corporate existence of the community as 
a whole.20 Dr Oluduro submitted that “the King (Oba) and his council, who 
constituted the Supreme Court, handled serious cases like rape, murder, 
manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, putting dangerous medicine in a public place, 
assaulting a Chief or Oba’s wife, adultery with an Olori (Oba’s) wife, land cases etc.”21 
The Kings’ Court also entertained appeals arising from the other dispute resolution 
methods 22 and was the final “bus stop” for disputes arising within the community.23 
Customary arbitration was however used to resolve private and trade disputes 
between members of the community as well as disputes arising between two 
independent communities. Customary mediation on the other hand was used to 
administer domestic disputes in smaller social orders like the family.24 It must be 
                                                          
together and not have disagreements, not finding solutions to the constant conflict is what is 
condemnable). 
17 Andrew Chukwuemerie, ‘Salient Issues in the Law and Practice of Arbitration in Nigeria’ (2006) 14 
African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1, 4. 
18 D.A Offiong, ‘Conflict Resolution among the Ibibio of Nigeria’ (1997) 53 Journal of Anthropological 
Research 423, 431; Olubayo Oluduro (n 15) 331. 
19 This was the central and Supreme Court of the land. 
20T.O Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law (1st edn, Manchester U.P 1956) 213. 
21 Olubayo Oluduro (n 15) 312. 
22 Martin Chukwuka Okany, The Role of Customary Courts in Nigeria (Fourth Dimension Publishing Co 
ltd 1984) 3. 
23 Ben Nwabueze, Machinery of Justice in Nigeria (1st edn, Butterworth’s, 1963) 45; Olubayo Oluduro, 
‘Customary Arbitration in Nigeria: Developments and Prospects’ (n 15) 312. 
24 O Adekile, ‘Legal Frameworks for Settling Marital Disputes through Reconciliation in Nigeria’ 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1503384> accessed 22 June 2014. 
14 
 
pointed out that the African idea of family is more inclusive than the western idea.25 
For example, a marriage between a man and a woman is said to be a marriage between 
their families and in certain instances, their communities.26 
In concluding this section, it is important to emphasize that of all the pre-colonial 
methods; only the customary arbitration mechanism is legally recognised by the 
current Nigerian law.27 Today, the Kings’ Court is of no legal and/or binding 
significance in modern Nigeria. This is attributable to the advent and use of the 
English styled laws and courts in Nigeria. Section 6(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria28 (“the Nigerian Constitution”) expressly vests all forms of 
judicial power in what it refers to as Superior Courts of Record. Section 6(5) of the 
Constitution goes on to list these courts, which does not directly or indirectly include 
the Kings’ Court.29    
In replacing the Kings’ Court, many States have through their legislative bodies 
established Area or Customary Courts in the remotest communities.30 This power is 
exercised pursuant to Section 6(5) (k) of the Nigerian Constitution, which empowers the 
State House of Assembly to create lower courts as they may deem necessary.31 These 
Area and Customary Courts take the place of the Kings’ Court within these societies.  
Any attempt by any King or Chief to exercise any form of binding judicial power in 
modern Nigeria is therefore inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution and 
to the extent of this inconsistency, null and void.32 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 Nonso Okoreafoejeke, Law and Justice in Post-British Nigeria: Conflicts and Interactions between Natives 
and Foreign Systems of Social Control in Igbo (1st edn, Greenwood Publishing 2002) 128. 
26 African Marriage <www.africanmarriage.info/> accessed 6 April 2016. 
27 The mechanism is integral to this thesis and is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five. 
28 This is the Constitution currently in force in Nigeria. 
29 We highlight and discuss these courts in Section 2.0 of this Chapter. 
30 Charles Mwaluma, The Nigerian Legal System (Vol 1, Peterland Publishers 2008) 32. 
31 The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
32 Section 1(3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
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2.0 THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN MODERN NIGERIA: Scope and Jurisdiction.33 
Section 6 (1) and (2) of the Nigerian Constitution34 vests the judicial powers of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria in what it refers to as Superior Courts of Record.35 In describing 
these Superior Courts, Professor Obilade rightly opined that they “have minimal 
jurisdictional limits with respect to the type of subject-matter but they are not limited 
in jurisdiction with respect to the mere value of the subject-matter of a case.”36 The 
Superior Courts of Record in Nigeria are: 
1. The High Court of the States and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja; 
2. The Federal High Court; 
3. The National Industrial Court; 
4. The Customary and Sharia Court of Appeal of the States and the FCT, Abuja; 
5. The Court of Appeal; and 
6. The Supreme Court of Nigeria.37 
We would at this point briefly discuss the jurisdiction of these courts. 
2.1     High Court of the State and the FCT 
Sections 270 and 255 of the Nigerian Constitution established a High Court for the 
thirty-six (36) States of Nigeria38 and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).39 Each State 
High Court is divided into as many judicial divisions as is deemed necessary by the 
Chief Judge. This is mainly for administrative purposes. 
                                                          
33 These English-styled courts were introduced as part of the colonial policies of the British colonial 
government. See K.I. Laibuta, ‘ADR in Africa: Contending with Multiple Legal Orders for Wholesome 
Dispute Resolution’ (2016) 92(1) Arbitration 63. For a more detailed discussion on the introduction of 
the English-styled courts in Nigeria, see Akintunde Obilade, The Nigerian Legal System (Sweet and 
Maxwell 1979) 17. 
34 1999. 
35 Section 6(5) of the Constitution goes ahead to list the Courts that make up the Superior Courts of 
Record in Nigeria. 
36Akintunde Obilade, The Nigerian legal system (Sweet and Maxwell 1979) 169. 
37 See section 6(5) of the Nigerian Constitution. 
38 Section 3 of the Nigerian Constitution lists the thirty (36) States of Nigeria. 
39 The FCT is the capital of Nigeria and is based in Abuja. 
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The High Court40 has what can be best referred to as a general jurisdiction41 to “hear 
and determine any civil proceeding in which the existence or extent of a legal right, 
power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and 
determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, 
punishment or other liability in respect of any offence committed by any person”.42 
The court is usually constituted by at least one Judge43 and is only bound by decisions 
of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Nigeria.44 
2.2     The Federal High Court 
Section 249 of the Constitution established one Federal High Court with jurisdiction 
throughout Nigeria.45 In order to effectively administer Nigeria however, the Federal 
High Court has judicial divisions in all the major cities in Nigeria.  
In the previous subsection, we saw that the State High Court has general jurisdiction 
over civil disputes in Nigeria. This jurisdiction has however been said to be subject to 
any exclusive jurisdiction bestowed upon any other court by the Constitution.46 One 
of such exceptions is Section 251 of the Constitution, which provides for the jurisdiction 
of the Federal High Court.   
By virtue of Section 251(1)(a)-(s) of the Constitution, the Federal High Court has 
jurisdiction (to the exclusion of all other courts) in civil causes and matters relating to 
taxation, banking, intellectual property, carriage of goods by sea, bankruptcy and 
insolvency, among other listed issues. The Supreme Court has held in People’s 
                                                          
40 By High Court, we mean both the High Courts of the FCT and the State High Court in each of the 
thirty six States. 
41 Under the former 1979 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the State High Court was regarded as 
unlimited. 
42 Section 272 of the Nigerian Constitution. 
43 ibid section 273. 
44 ibid sections 230, 241, 242, 243.  
45 The Federal High Court was formerly called the Federal Revenue Court. It was established by the 
Federal Revenue Court Act No 13 of 1973 but was restyled by Section 230(2) of the 1979 Constitution 
as the Federal High Court.  
46 Section 271 of the Nigerian Constitution 1999. 
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Democratic Party v Timipre Sylva & 2 Ors47 that all other items not listed in Section 251 
of the 1999 Constitution are to be heard and determined by the State High Court.48 
The Federal High Court is duly constituted if it consists of at least one Judge49 and is 
only bound by decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Nigeria. 
2.3     The National Industrial Court (“NIC”) 
Section 254A of the Constitution established the National Industrial Court50 to 
exclusively administer civil causes and matters related to or connected with any 
labour, employment, trade union, industrial relations and matters arising from 
workplace, the conditions of service including health, safety, welfare of labour, 
employee and worker. The court also has exclusive jurisdiction in civil matters relating 
to or arising from the Factories Act, Trade Disputes Act, Trade Unions Act, 
Workmen’s Compensation Act or any other Act or Law relating to labour, 
employment, industrial relations, workplace or any other enactment replacing the Act 
or Laws.51 
One interesting thing about the NIC as against the other courts, is that except in cases 
relating to the fundamental rights of parties (or any other situation prescribed by the 
National Assembly in the future), Section 243(2) of the Constitution makes the decision 
of the NIC on any civil matter, final on parties.52 In an exceptional situation where a 
matter proceeds on appeal, the decision of the Court of Appeal is final.53 Decisions of 
the Supreme Court as it relates to general issues like practice and procedure, are 
however still binding on the NIC with no exceptions whatsoever. 
                                                          
47 (2012) 4-5 SC 36. 
48 This decision of the Court is to an extent faulty since the Constitution in Section 272 subjects the 
jurisdiction of the State High Court not only to that of the Federal High Court but also to “others”. In 
Section 3.5 of this chapter, we interpret “others” to include issues involving customary law and sharia 
law, which should be within the jurisdiction of the Customary and Sharia Court of Appeal respectively.  
49 Section 253 of the Nigerian Constitution. 
50 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act 2010. 
51 ibid section 254C.  
52 ibid section 243(2). 
53 ibid section 243(4). 
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The NIC is duly constituted if it consists of at least one Judge and is only bound by 
decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Nigeria.54 
2.4     Customary and Sharia Courts of Appeal of the FCT and the State 
In our earlier discussions, it was pointed out that prior to the colonization of the 
geographical location now known as Nigeria, her people had their own unique system 
of law, which is today known as customary law.55 This law even though completely 
overshadowed by common law, Nigerian statute and case law, is still in existence and 
remains a part of the Nigerian law. 
The Customary Court of Appeal and the Sharia Court of Appeal have appellate and 
supervisory jurisdiction over disputes involving questions of customary and sharia 
law respectively.56 Notwithstanding the foregoing, in reality, the practice is to submit 
any dispute involving customary law to the State High Court.  This practice is further 
to the general jurisdiction of the State High Court provided for in Section 271 of the 
Constitution. This has resulted in a number of bad decisions on issues relating to 
customary law. We discuss this issue further on in this chapter.   
These courts are duly constituted by at least three Judges57 and is of coordinate 
jurisdiction with the State High Court, the Federal High Court and the National 
Industrial Court. They are therefore only bound by the decisions of the Court of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court of Nigeria.  
2.5 The Court of Appeal (“COA”) 
The Court of Appeal was established by Section 237 of the Constitution. It is the 
penultimate in the hierarchy of courts in Nigeria and is divided into divisions.58 
  
                                                          
54 ibid section 254E. 
55 Sharia law has been regarded as a genre of customary law. Many people have argued very 
vehemently against this categorization. We do not however dwell on this controversy as it is beyond 
the purview of this thesis. 
56 Section 282 and 267 of the Nigerian Constitution. 
57 See ibid section 268. 
58 These divisions are usually based at the State capitals in Nigeria. 
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The jurisdiction of the COA is both original and appellate. The original jurisdiction of 
the COA empowers it to hear and determine any question as to whether; 
1. any person has been validly elected to the office of President or Vice President 
under the Nigerian Constitution;59 or  
2. the term of office of the President or Vice-President has ceased; or  
3. the office of President or Vice-President has become vacant.60 
The appellate jurisdiction of the COA enables it to hear and determine (to the 
exclusion of any other court of law in Nigeria), appeals from the Federal High Court, 
National Industrial Court, the High Court of the FCT and the States, the Sharia Court 
of Appeal of the FCT and the States, the Customary Court of Appeal of the FCT and 
the State and the decision of a Court Martial.61 
In order to exercise its jurisdiction, a COA panel must be constituted by at least three 
Justices. In a dispute involving the application of sharia or customary law, the three 
Justices must be knowledgeable in these respective areas of law.62 
2.6    The Supreme Court (“SC”) 
The Supreme Court of Nigeria was established by Section 230 of the Constitution. It is 
the apex and final court in the hierarchy of courts in Nigeria. Accordingly, any 
decision emanating from the Supreme Court on any issue is by the doctrine of stare 
decisis binding on all other courts in Nigeria.63 
The jurisdiction of the SC is mainly appellate.64 The SC is however empowered to 
exercise original jurisdiction in limited and specific situations. This includes disputes 
between: 
1. the Federal and State governments; 
2. any of the Thirty (36) States in Nigeria;65 
                                                          
59 Dikko Yusuf & Anor v Olusegun Obasanjo & 2 Ors (2004) 5 SCM 174. 
60 Section 239 of the Nigerian Constitution. 
61 ibid section 240. 
62 ibid section 247. 
63 Nigeria Airport Authority v Chief Dick Celestine Okoro (1995) 7 SCNJ 1. 
64 Peter Nemi & Ors v The State (1994) 10 SCNJ 1. 
65 Section 232(1) of the Nigerian Constitution. 
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3. the National Assembly and the President; 
4. the National Assembly and one of the thirty-six (36) States in Nigeria; and 
5. the National Assembly and a State House of Assembly.66 
 
In relation to the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, an appeal can only lie from the 
decision of the COA to the SC.67 The SC’s decision is final and binding on every court 
in Nigeria including itself.68 The apex court has however held that it is allowed to 
revisit or overrule any of its previous decisions seen to be impeding the proper 
development of law, or any decision that has led to results which are unjust or which 
is seen to be contrary to public policy.69 In situations where any lower court is the final 
court in regards to a particular issue, any decision emanating from such lower court 
is not binding on the Supreme Court.70 
In order to exercise its jurisdiction, a Supreme Court’s panel is generally expected to 
be constituted by not less than five Justices of the Supreme Court. 71 However, in order 
to be lawfully seised of a matter falling within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, the panel must be constituted by seven Justices.72 
3.0 THE NIGERIAN JUDICIARY: A Dysfunctional Institution 
As we mentioned in the introduction, the performance of the Nigerian judiciary has 
in the past few years come under intense scrutiny. It would seem as if the sanctity of 
                                                          
66 Supreme Court (Additional Original Jurisdiction) Act 2002, Chapter S16 Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria; See also Attorney General of the Abia State v Attorney General of the Federation & Ors (2007) 2 SCNJ 
305; Attorney General Rivers State v Attorney General Akwa Ibom & Attorney General of the Federation (2011) 
3 SC 1. 
67 SPDC (Nig) Ltd v. Chief Tigbara Edankue & Ors (2009) 6-7 SC 74; Prince Oyesunle Alabi Ogundare & Anor 
v Shittu Ladokun Ogunlowo & 3 Ors (1997) 5 SCNJ 281.  
68 Francis Asanya v The State (1991) 4 SC 42; University of Lagos & Anor v Aigoro (1984) NSCC 745; Prince 
Yahaya Adigun & 2 Ors v Attorney General of Oyo State & 18 Ors (1987) 4 SC 272; Associated Discount 
House Ltd v Amalgamated Trustees Ltd (2007) 7 SCNJ 419; Alhaji Muhammadu Maigari Dingyadi & Anor v 
Independent National Electoral Commission & 2 Ors (2011) 4 SC (Pt 1) 1. 
69Akinsanya v U.B.A ltd (1986) 17 NSCC (Pt II) 968; Basinco Motors ltd v Woemann line (2009) 5-6 {Pt II) 
123; Bashir M. Dalhatu v. Ibrahim S. Turaki (2003) 10 SCM 153. 
70 Brig. General Mohammed Buba Marwa (RTD) & Anor v. Admiral Murtala Nyako (RTD) & 9 Ors (2012) 1 
SC (Pt III) 44. 
71 Section 234 of the Nigerian Constitution. 
72 ibid proviso to section 234. 
21 
 
the courts has been rubbished.73 Judicial officers have been trailed by accusations of 
corruption and dereliction of duty74 and Judges have been known to give bad 
decisions.75 In fact, the courts as a whole have been portrayed as underperforming.  
According to Dr Ibrahim Abdulahi, “that the nations’ judiciary is currently passing 
through a difficult and traumatic phase in its annals is quite obvious and certainly not 
in doubt. It is a phase which is inevitably marked by deep loss of faith in the judicial 
process and the courts. Claims of ethnic lop-sidedness in the constitution of the 
Federal judiciary, serious allegations of corruption, ineptitude, laziness, incompetence 
against judicial officers, charges of abuse of office even against the Supreme Court 
judges…”76 seem to be the normal situation in Nigeria.  
Theophilus Aver and Justin Orba paint a more detailed picture when they write that 
“it is a plain truth that Nigerian courts of justice have varying operational difficulties, 
ranging from inadequate infrastructure, insufficient number of judicial and non-
judicial personnel, debilitating delay in hearing and determination of civil, criminal 
and electoral cases and appeals, inadequate emolument, and lack of a reliable research 
resource to decide cases. The judiciary is also beset by serious ethical problems, 
including an increasingly nepotistic mode of appointment of judges and elevation to 
the higher judicial benches and cases of corruption and perversion of justice…The 
image of the judiciary in Nigeria today is that of an institution where anything 
goes…”77 Professor Okechukwu Oko goes on to state that “trials often turn into 
charades where powerful litigants aided by unethical lawyers and faithless judges, 
manipulate the judicial process to achieve preordained outcomes”.78 Dr Osita Ogbu 
                                                          
73 Douglas Anele, ‘Criticisms and Growth of Democracy in Nigeria’ Vanguard (16 June 2013) 
<www.vanguardngr.com/2013/06/criticism-and-the-growth-of-democracy-in-nigeria-3/>  accessed 
5 April 2014. 
74 Tobi Soniyi, ‘NJC Retires Justice Olotu, Inyang for Gross Misconduct’ Thisday (6 March 2014) 
<www.thisdaylive.com/articles/njc-retires-justices-olotu-inyang-for-gross-misconduct/172577/> 
accessed 5 April 2014. 
75Okpuruwu v Okpokam (1988) 4 NWLR pt 90, 554; Agu v Ikewibe (1991) 3 NWLR pt 180. 
76 Ibrahim Abdullahi, ‘Independence of the Judiciary in Nigeria: A myth or reality’ (2014) 2(3) 
International Journal of Public Administration and Management Research 55, 56. 
77 Theophilus Aver and Justin Orba, ‘Judiciary and Democracy, Issues in Contemporary Nigerian 
Society’ (2014) 2(1) Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Society 85, 86, 90. 
78 Okechukwu Oko, ‘Seeking Justice in Transnational Societies: An Analysis of the Problems and 
Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria’ (2005-2006) 31 Brooks Journal of International Law 9, 16. 
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points out that “the level of official corruption and moral degeneracy in Nigeria is 
alarming and agonising. The ills are not only deep, but also pervasive, covering all 
social institutions and private lives. The value system of Nigeria has been completely 
devastated…Corruption has become a way of life in Nigeria and since the Nigerian 
judiciary is composed of Nigerians, the story cannot be expected to be different”.79 
The Judges have in many instances come up with very controversial decisions, which 
have called to question their credibility and/or their ability and understanding of 
basic legal principles.80 
Unfortunately, all attempts at devising, effecting and implementing reforms have 
been “at the level of abstraction and total unseriousness”.81 Generally, while the 
Nigerian government is always quick to set up reform committees, many of the 
resultant reports unfortunately never see the light of day for mostly political reasons.82 
The implications of a failed judiciary are many and very varied, chief of which is the 
loss of confidence in the administration of justice system. This according to the former 
Chief Justice of Nigeria, Aloma Mukthar, “rubbishes our often brandished favourable 
investment climate and translates to a huge disincentive to potential foreign investors 
in Nigeria."83 This is sad especially at a time when the investment climate in Nigeria 
seems to be at its best.84 Furthermore, Professor Paul Idornigie rightly submitted that 
“in a developing and developed economy, it is well recognised that the availability of 
a prompt, effective and economical means of dispute resolution is an indispensable 
                                                          
79 Osita Ogbu (n 1) 724. 
80 A good example is James Ibori, a former Governor of one of the oil producing States in Nigeria, 
accused of embezzling over 250 million pounds of State money. James was acquitted of accusations of 
corruption and money laundering under very questionable circumstances at a Nigerian Court. 
However, when a similar case was filed at the English courts, he was found guilty and sentenced to jail 
for 13 years in 2012. See Editorial, ‘Former Nigeria state governor James Ibori receives 13-year sentence’ 
The Guardian (17 April 2012) <www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/apr/17/nigeria-
governor-james-ibori-sentenced> accessed November 29 2015. 
81 Josef Omorotionwan, ‘Nigerian Judiciary: Most need, most neglected’ Vanguard (23 April 2015) 
<www.vanguardngr.com/2015/04/nigerian-judiciary-most-needed-most-neglected/> accessed May 
25 2015. 
82 In Chapter Five for example, we will see that in 2005, there was a failed attempt to reform the existing 
Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act.  
83Editorial, ‘Lethargy and Delayed Justice in Nigerian Courts’ Daily Independent  (6 June 2012) 
<http://dailyindependentnig.com/2012/06/lethargy-and-delayed-justice-in-nigerian-courts/> 
accessed 07 January 2016.  
84 See BBC News (n 4).  
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element in the ordinary growth and encouragement of international investment and 
trade.”85 The implications of a dysfunctional judiciary therefore affect the 
development of any economy since foreign investment no doubt remains a major 
economy booster especially in developing countries. Potential investors are likely to 
be wary of a country where their legal rights cannot be guaranteed.  
Furthermore, the failure of the judiciary has resulted in a significant loss of confidence 
by Nigerian citizenry in the judicial system. In recent years, there has been an increase 
in incidences of jungle justice,86 arising mostly as a result of the dissatisfaction with 
the quality and efficiency of the Nigerian judicial system.87 It has been alleged that 
known criminals, who have been discharged and/or acquitted by the courts have 
returned to exert revenge on their accusers. Today, the average Nigerian on the street 
has become a law to himself, because it is assumed that justice is never obtained at the 
courts.  Rather than turn suspected criminals over to be tried within the judicial 
system, citizens have established vigilantes who without any formal trial, set 
suspected criminals ablaze right on the streets and in broad daylight.88 
The failure of the judiciary has been attributed to different factors. We would at this 
point discuss some of the problems of the Nigerian judiciary.  
 
 
                                                          
85 Paul Idornigie, ‘The 1988 Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act: Need for Review’ (2003) 6(3) 
International Arbitration Law Review 50,51. 
86 This refers to a situation where people take the law into their hands and punish suspect criminals for 
alleged crimes without resort to the State’s judicial system. This may involve the setting ablaze of a 
suspect right on the street.  
87 BBC News (n 3). 
88 Editorial, ‘Jungle Justice! Armed Robber Burnt To 'Ashes' In Owerri (Graphic Scene)’ Nigeria News 
(21 October 2015) <http://news2.onlinenigeria.com/headline/437020-jungle-justice-armed-robber-
burnt-to-ashes-in-owerri-graphic-scene.html>; Isaac Dachen, ‘Angry mob burn suspected robber alive 
in Port Harcourt’ Pulse ng (8 September 2015) http://pulse.ng/gist/jungle-justice-angry-mob-burn-
suspected-robber-alive-in-port-harcourt-id4147263.html; Editorial ‘Suspected Kidnapper burnt to 
death in Lagos’ TVC News <http://tvcnews.tv/?q=article/nigeria-suspected-kidnapper-burnt-death-
lagos>; Bukola Idowu and ors, ‘Jungle Justice: Mob Burn Suspected Kidnapper’ Leadership (8 May 2014) 
<http://leadership.ng/news/369957/jungle-justice-mob-burn-suspected-kidnapper>; Joe Odumakin, 
‘Rituals, Kidnaps, Jungle Justice: Enough of Horror in Nigeria’  Sahara Reporters (4 April 2014) 
<http://saharareporters.com/2014/04/04/rituals-kidnaps-jungle-justice-enough-horror-nigeria-joe-
odumakin>  all accessed 30 November 2015. 
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3.1     Industrial Strike Actions, Perennial Backlog of Cases and Delay in Proceedings. 
In the last few years, there has been a rise in the number of cases being instituted at 
the Nigerian courts. Unfortunately, the courts at various levels have been unable to 
determine cases at the same rate at which they are instituted.89 This has resulted into 
a backlog and by extension, a delay in the administration of justice, which has not only 
increased the cost of litigation in Nigeria,90 but has also in some other instances 
resulted in a total loss of rights.  
Honourable Justice Dahiru Musdapher (former Chief Justice of the Federation), in a 
speech delivered at the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies Fellows 
Lectures, submitted that even if litigants were stopped from commencing appeals at 
the Supreme Court, it will still take the apex court many years to clear the backlog of 
cases.91 The President (as she then was) of the Commonwealth Lawyers Association, 
Mrs Boma Ozobia, also opined that even “if all panels of the Court of Appeal (in 
Nigeria) sit for seven days a week for the next seven years, they would still not be able 
to conclude all currently pending appeals before the Court....”92 Only recently, Nigeria 
was awash with news about the Supreme Court of Nigeria’s judgement on an oil 
spillage dispute involving Shell Petroleum Development Company, a proceeding 
spanning thirty-two years.93 During this period, some of the beneficiaries and 
witnesses to the proceedings were reported to have died. One wonders what would 
have happened if after all the time and resources expended on the case, the Supreme 
Court had ordered the matter to be retried, which was a legal possibility.  
                                                          
89 B.A Bukar, ‘Legal Framework for the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes: An 
examination of Nigeria’s Arbitration Laws’ (1999) 16(1) Journal of International Arbitration 47,48. 
90 Johnson Amadi, ‘Enhancing Access to Justice in Nigeria with Judicial Case Management: An evolving 
Norm in Common Law Countries’ (2009) Available at SSRN 1366943. 
91D.Musdapher, ‘The Nigerian Judiciary: Towards Reform of the Bastion of Constitutional Democracy’ 
Fellows’ (Lectures Series, Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Lagos 2011).   
92Innocent Anaba, ‘CJN, CJ can address problems of Court by Practice Directions’ Vanguard (10 January 
2013)<www.vanguardngr.com/2013/01/cjn-cjs-can-address-problems-of-courts-by-practice-
directions-boma-ozobia/> accessed 5 April 2014. 
93Editorial, ‘Court orders Shell to pay 30 million’ Punch (6 June 2015) < www.punchng.com/news/oil-
spill-32-years-after-scourt-orders-shell-to-pay-n30m-compensation/ accessed 6 June 2015. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that Section 36 of the Nigerian Constitution94 provides for 
speedy trials, Professor Phillip Aka argues that there is hardly any case that is 
conducted with any real urgency and that “undue delay remains an obstacle for 
parties who seek to do business with or via Nigerian Courts”.95 In all fairness to the 
Nigerian Judiciary (and as we will come to see), some of the contributing factors 
extend beyond the actions or omissions of the courts. 
In a survey conducted by the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (“NIALS”), 
it was revealed that the Lagos and Port Harcourt divisions of the Federal High Court, 
which as we have previously seen have jurisdiction over a selected range of technical 
subjects, have about fifteen thousand cases pending in each of their courts. The Lagos 
and Port Harcourt divisions of the Federal High Court under consideration make up 
only two of the several divisions of the Federal High Court.  In another survey 
conducted by NIALS, it was revealed that in the years 2008, 2009 and 2010, the 
National Industrial Court was only able to complete 1.9%, 3.3% and 8.4% respectively 
of cases pending before it. The Court of Appeal fared much better as it was able to 
determine 11.4%, 10.3%, 12.6% and 24.3% respectively of cases pending before it 
between 2008 and 2011.  For the years 2009 and 2010, the Federal High Court was only 
able to determine 14.8% and 10.6 of the cases pending before it.96 The present Chief 
Justice of Nigeria, Mahmud Mohammed was on February 2015 quoted to have said 
that “the (Supreme Court) registry is currently burdened with over 5000 appeals…this 
situation is indeed disturbing and sobering”.97 This situation is truly very disturbing 
especially when we consider the fact that the Supreme Court presently consists of only 
sixteen Justices.98 
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The situation at the State’s High Court is not any better.  For example, it is on record 
that between 2008 and 2010, twenty-five thousand, eight hundred and seven (25,807) 
new cases were filed at the High Court of Lagos.99 One must quickly point out in 
passing that it is unfortunate that while the courts have handwritten records of the 
new cases instituted at each division, there is no consolidated record of all the cases 
instituted in the State. Furthermore, very important is the fact that there is no official 
record of successfully completed cases.100 
These problems of backlog and delay of cases have been compounded by long and 
recurring industrial strike actions, which seem to have become a permanent feature of 
the Nigerian judiciary.  During an informal visit to the Nigerian courts in April 2015, 
this writer found a totally paralysed judiciary. Investigations conducted revealed that 
the courts in many States had at various times and for different reasons, proceeded on 
industrial strike actions. For example, judiciary staff of the Rivers State’s High Court, 
as at the time of writing this chapter, had been on strike for almost nine months.101  
Rivers State plays host to one of the most commercially vibrant cities in Nigeria, Port 
Harcourt. One can only imagine the implications of this strike on commercial relations 
and disputes arising within the State. 
Further investigation revealed that as of the time of writing this chapter in April 2015, 
almost twenty (20) out of the thirty-six (36) State High Courts in Nigeria were on strike 
and had been in that state for almost five (5) months.102 This strike dates back to a 
nationwide strike declared on the 5th of January 2015 by the Judiciary Staff Union of 
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Nigeria (“JUSUN”),103 in a bid to secure fiscal autonomy from the executive arm of 
government.104 
Not only do the strikes compound the existing backlog and delay problem, litigants 
are during the period of strike denied their constitutional right of access to the courts, 
which in many cases can lead to a total loss of rights. For example, a party who 
ordinarily may have been entitled to an interim or interlocutory injunction against an 
illegal act perpetuated against him, may very well find himself without any remedy 
during the period of strike. No wonder citizens have continued to complain of the 
increasing number of delayed trials.105 
It is clear that there is need to devise methods of curtailing and then reducing the large 
backlog of cases.106 The Chief Justice of Nigeria, Mahmud Mohammed, rightly opined 
that the current reality paints a sobering picture. The number of cases pending before 
the court has reached critical proportions and stakeholders must use all appropriate 
means to stop it from spiralling out of control.107 This thesis aims to respond to and 
address these problems appropriately.  
3.2     Lack of Financial Autonomy and Independence 
In our previous discussion, we mentioned that the majority of the State High Courts 
in Nigeria had been on a prolonged industrial strike as at the time of writing this part 
of the thesis. This strike dates back to a judgement delivered on the 13th of January 
2014 by Justice Adeniyi Ademola of the Federal High Court, which upheld the 
judiciary’s right to fiscal autonomy.108 
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The said action was instituted in protest of the present practice where the various 
heads of the courts have to go cap in hand to the executive before they can perform 
even their most basic duties.109 This practice by the executive arm of government 
arguably infringes the ability of the judiciary to independently and efficiently perform 
its function.110 As Professor Olowofoyeku rightly noted, the Nigerian judiciary can 
only “administer justice according only to law, disavowing all irrelevant 
considerations, and without pressure from or deference to the views of government, 
or any other person,”111 when it is given free rein over all its affairs.  
Unfortunately and contrary to the aforementioned judgement of the Federal High 
Court, as well as the provision of Section 162 (9) of the Constitution, which provides that 
“any amount standing to the credit of the judiciary in the Federation Account shall be paid 
directly to the National Judicial Council for disbursement to the heads of court established for 
the Federation and the States…”,112 the Federal and State Governments continue to 
disburse funds to individual courts like it will do to any of its Ministries.  In response, 
JUSUN vowed not to call off their industrial strike action until the 13th of January 2014 
judgement of the Federal High Court is obeyed and implemented.  
The Punch Newspaper in one of its editorials noted that the Nigerian judiciary has 
been emasculated by the government since the country returned to democratic rule in 
1999. While the executive and legislature have enjoyed financial autonomy based on 
the Constitution, the reverse has been the case for the third arm of government.113 
Professor Okechukwu Oko submitted that “hubristic politicians who cavil at the 
notion of judicial independence continue to display the capacity and the inclination to 
manipulate and control the judiciary.”114 The State Chairman of the Edo State chapter 
of the Nigerian Bar Association, Mrs Priscilla Iyomo, rightly noted that the 
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unwillingness of many State Governors to obey the 13th of January 2014 judgement of 
the Federal High Court stems from their reluctance to lose their control over the 
judiciary. At present, the practice is seemingly trying to actualise the adage “whoever 
pays the piper, calls the tune.” 
This action by the executive arm of the government clearly negates the operation of 
Baron Montesquieu’s separation of powers doctrine,115 which has also been 
incorporated in the Nigerian Constitution.116 Furthermore, Section 17(1) (e) of the 
Constitution also provides that the “the independence, impartiality and integrity of courts 
of law…shall be secured and maintained”.117 As Duru rightly noted, “at the core of the 
concept of judicial independence is the theory of the separation of power: that the 
judiciary, which is one of the three basic and equal pillars in the modern democratic 
state, should function independently of the other two; the legislature and the 
executive”.118 This is fundamental to the good working of any democratic society.119 
As we will come to see, this issue of funding affects the operation, efficiency and 
infrastructure of the judiciary. 
3.3     Lack of Modern Infrastructure 
Interestingly, many of the problems of the Nigerian judiciary can arguably be traced 
to the problem of fiscal autonomy. Professor Phillip Aka rightly noted that “the lack 
of fiscal autonomy has led to gross underfunding, which complicates the ability of 
Nigerian Courts, especially at the non-federal levels, to secure the infrastructure that 
Judges and other court officials need to do their jobs well”.120 The late Justice C.A 
Oputa of the Supreme Court paints a very disheartening picture when he wrote that 
“the court halls and Judge’s chambers, the record books and other stationery, the 
judicial libraries, all these cannot be provided for without the necessary release of 
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funds by the executive to the judicial branch”.121 Unfortunately and as former Chief 
Justice of Nigeria Aloma Mukhtar pointed out, “over the years, funding of the courts 
has remained a challenge as evidenced in the condition of many courts in Nigeria 
today. Statistics have shown that funding from the Federal Government has witnessed 
a steady decline since 2010…”122 
Despite little or no financial encouragement from the government, the Nigerian courts 
continue to work under very abysmal conditions. The judiciary is the arm of 
government from which much is expected but to which very little is given, the arm of 
government that is shut out of the budgetary process and yet is expected to perform 
the magic of keeping the society safe and crime free.123 The majority (if not all) of the 
High Court Judges in Nigeria continue to record court proceedings in long hand.  
Judges grapple to understand the intricacies and complexities of emerging areas of 
law, areas that did not exist at the time of their legal training. They do this under very 
poor and uncomfortable conditions. Nigeria continues to battle with the problem of 
electricity while Judges and lawyers alike are expected to be fully robed in a wig and 
gown during court proceedings under the hot Nigerian weather.124 
3.4     Corrupt and Incompetent Staff 
When barely two years after Nigeria received her independence in 1960, the then Chief 
Justice of Nigeria, Sir Adetokunbo Ademola predicted that in about a decade, there 
would be an acute personnel problem, he probably did not contemplate a situation as 
dire as the present one.125 Fifty three (53) years down the line, the Nigerian judiciary 
has with all due respect, almost been taken over by charlatans and people of 
questionable character.126 Rather than being guided by a few of the quality ensuring 
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measures put in place in the various establishing provisions of these courts, issues like 
ethnicity, quota system, federal character127 and the Nigerian “man know man” 
syndrome have become the more important consideration in the appointment of 
Judges.   
Commenting on the incompetence of judicial officers in Nigeria, the former Director 
General of the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Professor Epiphany 
Azinge, S.A.N in a recent article opined that “It is sad however to note that in reality, 
sometimes the process of appointment of persons into the Nigerian Bench has been 
fraught with several difficulties. The common perception is that persons unsuitable 
for such lofty ideal of dispensing justice have by omission or commission found 
themselves in the corridors of justice, holding the scales unevenly and determining 
the fates of mortals through unworthy extraneous considerations....Persons who in the 
arena of law can hardly tell B from a Bull’s eye have strayed into the Bench. The sad 
fact is there are several Judges on the Nigerian bench who are not versed in the 
rudimentary matters of the law let alone tasking matters of judex and this have easily 
succumbed to subtle manipulations of very crafty and brilliant members of the bar”.128 
This has resulted in very bad decisions and a loss of confidence in the Nigerian 
judiciary.  
In his submission on the level of corruption within the Nigerian judiciary, Dr Osahon 
Guobodia also opined that “unfortunately, there are many quacks and rotten eggs in 
the system. For instance, some Judges have regrettably compromised their judicial 
oaths and undermined the sanctity of the judicial process…Some Judges have in a 
brazen display of judicial rascality, exhibited utter contempt for their exalted offices 
and thereby subjected the judiciary and the legal profession in Nigeria to public 
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ridicule”.129 Dr Wahab Egbewole and Dr Ibrahim Imam point out that corruption 
within the judiciary goes beyond bribing Judges; it also involves situations where 
court personnel are paid off to slow down the process or make complaints go away.130 
Theophilus Aver and Justin Orba emphasise the importance of a capable and credible 
staff when they wrote that “no matter how well structured, properly staffed, and 
adequately funded the judiciary is, and no matter how good the rules governing its 
operation and practice are, once its actors are not regarded as credible men and 
women of integrity, the judiciary can hardly act as the guardian of Nigeria’s 
democracy, let alone operate creditably as an honest enforcer of rights and a just 
redresser of wrongs…”131 
In a report prepared on behalf of both the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (“EFCC”) and the National Bureau of Statistics, it was revealed that of 
all the public institutions in Nigeria, the corruption within the Nigerian judiciary is 
the highest.132 Some people have however opined that it is in fact difficult to measure 
the level of corruption within the Nigerian judiciary. This as Professor Okechukwu 
Oko rightly submits is “because of the mutual benefit of corruption, the corrupt Judge 
and the bribe giver have no interest in reporting the crime. Corruption only gets to the 
surface when one of the parties feels cheated or chooses to display an uncommon 
sense of duty and comes forward to report on corruption. It is therefore difficult to 
estimate the actual extent of judicial corruption”.133 
The rot and incompetence within the judiciary can to a large extent be attributed to 
the flawed process of appointing judicial officers, a process which we have previously 
pointed out is guided by nepotism, ethnicity as well as one that promotes the “who 
                                                          
129 Osahon O. Guobodia, ‘The relevance of the Judiciary in a Democratic Nigeria’ (2012) 20, Afri. J. Int’l 
& Comp. L 301, 318. 
130 Wahab Egbewole and Ibrahim Imam, ‘The Concept of Judicial Integrity in Dispensation of Justice in 
Nigeria’ (2014) 19(2) Coventry Law Journal 44, 51. 
131 Theophilus Aver and Justin Orba (n 77) 90. 
132 Gafar Ayodeji and Samuel Odukoya, ‘Perception of Judicial Corruption: Assessing its implications 
for democratic consolidation and sustainable development in Nigeria’ (2014) 16(2) Journal of 
Sustainable Development in Africa 67, 72. 
133 Okechukwu Oko (n 78) 9,15. 
33 
 
you know” philosophy rather than the “what you know philosophy”.134 Furthermore, 
a factor like the federal character principle,135 which is in operation in Nigeria because 
of her very diverse population, has proven to be a breeding ground for a deficient and 
very substandard judiciary. According to Professor Phillip Aka, “it has resulted in the 
appointment to the bench of some individuals demonstrably ill qualified to serve as 
Judges”.136  In the process of “mixing” the court, very good and intelligent individuals 
are passed over in order to portray a semblance of fairness,137 which ironically is in 
many ways a threat to Nigeria’s budding democracy.  
In addition, the absence of a good and consistent welfare package also contributes to 
the problem of corruption presently ravaging the Nigerian judiciary. Take for example 
the situation in Benue and Plateau States, where judiciary workers as at the time of 
writing this chapter in April 2015, are reported to be owed over five (5) months of 
salary, one wonders how the fight against bribery and corruption can be won under 
such working conditions.138 As the late Justice C.A Oputa of the Supreme Court also 
suggested,139 a poor and irregular salary structure will no doubt discourage successful 
and experienced members of the bar, who notwithstanding their interest and 
suitability for the bench, will rather stick to the bar, where their sources and size of 
income are limitless.140 
The system unfortunately provides very minimal training both immediately before 
the appointment of judicial officers and in the course of their work on the bench. The 
National Judicial Institute (“NJI”), the body established by statute to ensure the 
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quality of the judiciary in Nigeria,141 has failed in its duty of ensuring continued 
training.   
The “system” seems to rely very heavily on the law school training, which 
unfortunately is inadequate and geared towards training barristers and solicitors, and 
not Judges. It is difficult to understand why and how the one (1) year law school 
training, which has already been overstretched to train both barristers and solicitors, 
would be deemed adequate training for potential judicial officers. The law school 
training in Nigeria, like many other jurisdictions, pays little or no attention in 
inculcating students with the knowledge and skills needed to make a good judge.142 
Besides, the job of a Judge requires much more than the standard law school training. 
For example, potential Judges need classes on judicial ethics and practical training 
sessions on how to observe witnesses. Judges also require special writing skills among 
many others. Dr Omaka, a former Magistrate turned academic, found the three (3) day 
training process for new judicial officers in Nigeria to be very inadequate.143 In his 
opinion, it was clear that the system was relying heavily on his law school training, 
one he completed almost a decade before his appointment as a judicial officer.  
Flowing from the above and in the light of recent developments in the international 
commercial world, it is pertinent that the NJI lives up to its statutory expectation. 
Professor Okechukwu Oko rightly opined that “the complexity of legal controversies 
and the passage of new laws present challenges that Judges may not be well equipped 
to handle without the benefit of education programmes”.144 Unfortunately the 
management of the NJI is made up of senior Judges (retired and serving), who with 
all due respect, are out of tune with the realities of the international commercial world. 
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3.5     Unsuitable, Uncertain and/or Outdated Laws 
In many ways, the number of bad laws existing within the polity has to a large extent 
contributed to the existing problems within the judiciary, especially the problems of 
delay and bad decisions. This has mainly been as a result of ambiguous and/or badly 
worded laws. Unfortunately, a number of these ambiguities can be traced to the very 
constitutional provisions that define the jurisdiction of some of the courts.  
As we will see in Chapter Five, one area of the Nigerian law which has been subject 
to a series of bad decisions is customary law. The usual practice is for parties to submit 
any dispute involving customary law to the general jurisdiction of the State High 
Court.145 Unfortunately, the State High Court has proven to be incapable of 
adequately handling disputes involving customary law.  
Section 272 of the Constitution makes the aforementioned general jurisdiction of the 
State High Court  ”subject to the provisions of Section 251 and other provisions of this 
Constitution”.146 It is submitted that Sections 265- 267 and 280-282 of the Constitution are 
one of the anticipated exceptions to the general powers of the State High Court.  
Section 280 of the Constitution provides that “there shall be for any State that requires it 
a Customary Court of Appeal for that State”. Regrettably, not many States have 
exercised the option given to them by the Nigerian Constitution to constitute a 
Customary Court of Appeal. In fact, only the Federal Capital Territory, Imo State and 
Osun State have a fully functioning Customary Court of Appeal. This has in turn 
increased the burden on the State High Courts, as they find themselves saddled with 
the responsibilities involved in the proof of customary law even when the law makes 
provision for a special court with the requisite knowledge to administer issues 
involving this technical aspect of Nigerian law.147 This has affected the quality and 
certainty of judgements relating to customary law. 
Section 282(1) of the said Constitution clearly defines the jurisdiction of the Customary 
Court of Appeal when it provides that it “shall exercise appellate and supervisory 
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jurisdiction in Civil Proceedings involving questions of customary law”. The word 
“supervisory” was defined in the Oxford English Dictionary148 as “to look over, to 
oversee or direct the execution of (a task, activity, etc.); to have charge of or 
responsibility for (a business, institution, department, etc.); to preside over, to 
superintend...” It is therefore clear that the Customary Court of Appeal has 
jurisdiction over issues involving customary law (and by extension customary 
arbitration) and their jurisdiction should mandatorily take precedence over the State 
High Court’s general jurisdiction.  
The Nigerian Constitution in recognition of the technicality involved in the 
interpretation and application of customary law, mandates that in appointing the 
forty-nine (49) Justices of the Court of Appeal, six (6) of these must be knowledgeable 
in customary and Islamic law respectively. As we also see later on in this chapter, the 
Constitution mandates that any dispute involving customary law must be decided by 
a panel of the Court of Appeal constituted by customary law experts. The Constitution 
also makes it mandatory for the FCT to have these special types of courts. 
It is therefore difficult to understand the rationale behind the position taken by the 
Nigerian Constitution to make the existence of a Customary Court of Appeal optional 
for States. This is especially (as previously alluded to) due to the fact that customary 
law still remains a major source of law in Nigeria.149 In fact, every community in 
Nigeria has its own version of customary law, which operates in Nigeria. Every other 
issue or dispute involving land in Nigeria has a tint of customary law embedded 
therein. The need for a Customary Court of Appeal should therefore not be an option.  
Again when we talk about the problem of delay, Nigerian lawyers have in certain 
instances taken advantage of the loose words of some areas of the Nigerian law to 
prolong judicial proceedings, to the benefit of their clients. A good example which 
comes to mind is Section 148 of the Electoral Act 2006, which provides that “an election 
petition and an appeal, arising from under this Act shall be given accelerated hearing and shall 
have precedence over all other causes or matters before the Tribunal or Court”. While the said 
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law provides for accelerated hearing, it does not define a specific period within which 
election matters should be completed.  Because State power cannot be left in vacuum, 
under this legal dispensation, the person against whom a petition has been brought 
was left to occupy the position pending the decision of the court on the election 
petition, which in a number of instances was almost the entire term of office being 
contested.150 It therefore made business sense for a lawyer representing a State official 
to prolong the petition for as long as possible, since he not only provided reprieve for 
his client, albeit for a short time, he was also assured of his enormous legal fees at the 
expense of tax payers.151 
4.0 A CASE FOR REFORMS: Towards an Efficient Judicial System. 
It is obvious from our previous discussions that the judicial system in Nigeria is in a 
state of crisis. Professor Okechukwu Oko rightly submitted that “the Nigerian 
judiciary that admirably discharged its duties during the early post-independence 
years, now shows signs of weakness, inadequacy and corruption”.152 As it is, the 
Nigerian judiciary is struggling under the weight of the country’s domestic disputes 
as well as engulfed in a lot of controversy. 
Unless something drastic is done and very fast, we should expect to see a worse 
situation, possibly a total collapse of the judiciary in the next couple of years. This is 
especially in view of the recent rebasing of the Nigerian economy, which places 
Nigeria ahead of its closest rival, South Africa, with a GDP of 80.2 trillion naira ($509 
billion).153 It is projected that the rebasing of the economy will attract investors both 
to the highly performing sectors as well as areas that have not experienced 
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astronomical growth.154 Of course, one cannot rule out the fact that a number of 
disputes will result from this new wave of very technical transactions. The question 
that arises at this point is simple: can a country which does not have the physical and 
intellectual capacity to cater for its own domestic disputes, adequately administer the 
new wave of technical disputes that will arise from expected foreign investment?   
The need for judicial reforms especially at this time can therefore not be over 
emphasized. In order to avoid a total collapse of the Nigerian judiciary, restore the 
confidence of the Nigerian citizenry in the judiciary, strengthen Nigeria’s budding 
democracy and very importantly, project a formidable dispute resolution system to 
prospective investors, there is an urgent need for what Professor Phillip Aka refers to 
as “bold and persistent experimentation coupled with a willingness to adapt with 
respect to judicial reforms”.155 This should be comprehensive and not piecemeal.156 
A good starting point will be to develop and encourage an open, credible and 
independent recruitment process as well as a merit based system in the appointment 
of judicial officers.  The move to sanitise the judiciary must involve the appointment 
of only persons with the professional character and competence as Judges.157  In 
addition and as Dr Abdullahi rightly points out, there is a “…need to diversify the 
pool from which judicial appointments are made in view of the declining intellectual 
depth and overall quality of the judgements of some Judges in Nigeria, which are 
conflicting.”158 This will not only improve the quality of work being done by the 
judiciary, it will by extension improve her image. 
In recognition of the flawed process of appointing judicial officers in Nigeria, former 
Chief Justice of Nigeria, Aloma Mukhtar, in her capacity as Chairman of the National 
Judicial Council (“NJC”) put together a revised version of the National Judicial 
                                                          
154Editorial, Rebased GDP has Exposed Nigeria to Global Investors’ Nigeria Indepth (18 April 2014) 
<http://nigeriaindepth.com/2014/04/rebased-gdp-has-exposed-nigeria-to-global-investors-world-
bank/> accessed 4 June 2016. 
155 Phillip C. Aka (n 95) 71. 
156 Douglas Webb, ‘Legal and Institutional Reforms, Strategy and Implementations: A World Bank 
Perspective’ (1999) 30 Law and Policy International Business 16, 162. 
157 Wahab Egbewole and Ibrahim Imam (n 130) 44. 
158 Ibrahim Abdullahi, ‘Independence of the Judiciary in Nigeria: A myth or reality’ (2014) 2(3) 
International Journal of Public Administration and Management Research 55, 63. 
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Council Guidelines and Procedural Rules for the Appointment of Judicial Officers of 
All Superior Courts of Record in Nigeria (“the Revised Rules”).159 The first 
appointment under the Revised Rules was made on the 14th of May 2015.160 While it 
is still too early to comment on the success of the rules, one must commend a number 
of introductions made by the Revised Rules into the appointment process.   
The first is that it introduces and encourages a recruitment process that is open to 
every qualified member of the Nigerian bar. Rule 3 of the Revised Rules mandates any 
Judicial Service Commission (“JSC”)161 seeking to appoint new Judges, to advertise 
same on its website, the notice board of the concerned Court as well as through the 
relevant branch of the Nigerian Bar Association.162 The Commission is also mandated 
to write to the Head of every other superior court in Nigeria as well as serving Judges 
within the State, asking for the nomination of suitable candidates.163 This is an 
improvement on the former practice, which like we have previously discussed, was 
usually shrouded in secrecy and nepotism. By this very practice, the pool from which 
judicial appointments are made is widened and deepened, which if strictly adhered 
to, has the potential to improve the quality of the Nigerian bench.  
The Chief Justice or Judge in his/her capacity as Head of the Judicial Service 
Commission (and in line with the former practice) is expected to shortlist from the 
number of applications received and forward same to the relevant Judicial Service 
Commission for approval.164 It is submitted that the aforementioned shortlisting 
process is open to abuse by the Head of the Court as he/she is able to shortlist his/her 
cronies for approval by the Judicial Service Commission. Unfortunately the 
Commission is unlikely to be any wiser as the Revised Rules do not envisage the 
                                                          
159 The Rules came into force on the 2nd of November 2014. 
160 Justice Amiru Sanusi was appointed as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria on this date. See 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/judges-now-to-be-appointed-through-advertisement-
njc/209311/ accessed 14 June 2015. 
161 Every State has its own Judicial Service Commission. There is also a Judicial Service Commission at 
the Federal level. 
162 Rule 3(1)(a)(i) of the Revised National Judicial Council Guidelines and Procedural Rules for the 
Appointment of Judicial Officers of All Superior Courts of Record in Nigeria 2014.  
163 Rule 3(1)(a)(ii) of the Revised National Judicial Council Guidelines and Procedural Rules for the 
Appointment of Judicial Officers of All Superior Courts of Record in Nigeria 2014. 
164 Rule 3(4) & (5) of the Revised National Judicial Council Guidelines and Procedural Rules for the 
Appointment of Judicial Officers of All Superior Courts of Record in Nigeria 2014. 
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Commission to be privy to the calibre of applications or nominations made in respect 
of the position. It is suggested that the process of shortlisting be made more 
transparent to all stakeholders or at the very least, should involve more than one 
individual in order to prevent abuse of power. 
The Revised Rules also introduce an interview session for potential judicial officers, 
which is to be conducted by the National Judicial Commission.  This way, the 
commission is able to test the applicant’s knowledge of the law as well as probe to 
ascertain their suitability for the position of a Judge.165 Anybody found to be of a 
questionable character is to be barred from re-applying within a space of two years.  
The Revised Rules also allow members of the academia to be appointed as Judges of 
Superior Courts of Record. This aforementioned provision should be vigorously 
pursued in order to improve the intellectual capacity as well as the quality of 
judgements of the Nigerian bench.166 This suggestion is given in light of the great 
development of the law that must occur in the next couple of years. There is a need to 
enrich the judiciary with legal professionals who possess the much needed training 
and experience required to take a profound and analytical view of the law.167 
Notwithstanding the fact that the operation of the Federal Character in principle is 
fertile ground for a deficient and substandard system, it can unfortunately not be done 
away with in view of the multifarious nature of the Nigerian nation. The Revised 
Rules provide that in applying the Federal Character principle, stakeholders must 
ensure that the independence of the judiciary (and not necessarily the quality of 
personnel) is not compromised. It is opined that stakeholders in the appointment 
process have the duty to ensure that in the application of the Federal Character 
principle; only the best from each of the geographical regions in Nigeria are appointed 
                                                          
165 Rule 6(1) & (3) of the Revised National Judicial Council Guidelines and Procedural Rules for the 
Appointment of Judicial Officers of All Superior Courts of Record in Nigeria 2014. 
166 Some of Nigeria’s foremost Judges like Professor T.O Elias, G.B.A Coker and Chief Justice Aguda 
were appointed from the academia to the Nigerian bench. 
167 Epiphany Azinge and Judith Fumnanya Rapu, ‘Roadmap to Judicial Transformation: Through the 
Lens of Retired and Serving Jurists of the Supreme Court’ (2012) <www.nials-
nigeria.org/journals/Azinge%20and%20JudithRoadmap%20to%20Judicial%20Transformation.pdf> 
accessed 4 September 2014. 
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as judicial officers. The training, experience, personal integrity and knowledge of 
candidates should be given precedence over sentiments and extraneous factors.   
Moving away from the Revised Rules, there is the obvious need to encourage a 
relevant and periodic training process for both potential and serving judicial officers. 
A good start may be to introduce a judicial training module at the Nigerian law school, 
which may very well be optional.  Buhai, Kumari, Omaka et al rightly opined that “by 
creating a system of education that starts in law school, we can better prepare 
Judges”.168 Judge Marc T. Amy has in fact gone as far as advocating for a special LLM 
programme for potential and/or prospective judicial officers.169 A national training 
process for potential judicial officers is also an additional option.170 
In India, potential and/or newly appointed Judges are expected to undergo a training 
process ranging between four months and one year at the Delhi Judicial Academy.171 
During this period, this training focuses on inculcating judicial officers with the right 
knowledge, attitude, skills and ethics.172 This is as against the three days training 
session in Nigeria. Newly appointed judicial officers should be made to undergo a 
comprehensive training process, in order to prepare and equip them with the right 
skills and etiquette needed to make a good and fair Judge.  
There is need for the NJI to organise and coordinate trainings at both the State and 
Judicial division levels, as against the present practice where training is done at the 
National level, with the participation of only one or two representatives from each 
State. Furthermore, bespoke training should be conducted for each State as they all 
have varying needs.173 The NJI may also make use of periodic educative pamphlets 
that will highlight recent developments in Nigerian law and indeed other similar 
                                                          
168 Buhai, Kumari, Omaka et al (n 142) 199. 
169 Marc T. Amy, ‘Judiciary School: A proposal for a Pre-Judicial LLM Degree’ (2002) 52  Journal of Legal 
Education 130,139. 
170 Steven Zeidman, ‘Careful What You Wish for: Tough Questions, Honest Answers and Innovative 
Approaches to Appointive Judicial Selection’ (2007) 34(1) Fordham Urban Law Journal 473, 481 
171Official website of the Delhi Judicial Academic <http://judicialacademy.nic.in> assessed 7 June 2015. 
172 Buhai, Kumari, Omaka et al (n 142) 170. 
173 For example, while a High Court in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria may need more training in the 
area of oil and gas, the High Courts in Lagos State may require more training in areas relating to 
international commercial law in general. 
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jurisdictions. The judiciary at the State level should also take up the responsibility of 
improving itself. In addition, Judges should be encouraged to attend international 
conferences and trainings.174 
Very important is the need to introduce more academics into the management of the 
NJI as against the present practice where it is run by senior and retired Judges who 
themselves need further education. Professor Okechukwu Oko rightly pointed out 
that, “as litigation becomes increasingly complex and lawyers attain greater 
proficiency and sophistication as a result of technological advancements in society, it 
is essential that Judges be trained to cope with or match the expertise of lawyers”175 
An influx of vibrant law researchers and law teachers in the management of the NJI 
will assist them to fulfil their statutory obligation of continued education.  
The Nigerian government also needs to provide an enabling environment for judicial 
officers. Judges are not magicians. They are human beings and they have their limits. 
There is a need to improve the conditions of service for members of the judiciary 
because as Dr Osita Ogbu rightly noted, “generous conditions of service will also 
attract the right calibre of men and women to the bench and reduce the tendency of 
corrupt practices. A person who is not financially secure is more susceptible to 
corruption”.176 Furthermore, successful members of the bar with the right experience, 
knowledge and interest in joining the bench, will not be reluctant to leave their 
successful practices if a generous welfare package is attached to the position of a 
Judge. Allowing the judiciary free rein over its finances will be a step in the right 
direction.  Furthermore, a good and regular welfare package will no doubt go a long 
way in the fight to eliminate corruption within the judiciary. 
There is an urgent need to create more courts, appoint more Judges and provide better 
infrastructure. A situation where eight Judges administer fifteen thousand (15,000) 
cases without a recording system or electricity, is to say the least, unacceptable. There 
is also a need to keep proper and computerised records of incoming and outgoing 
                                                          
174BBC News (n 4). 
175 Okechukwu Oko (n 78) 70. 
176 Osita Ogbu (n 1) 728. 
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cases especially at the State level. This is the only way to properly measure 
performance and by extension, improve performance.  
Finally and very important to this thesis, is the need to develop and encourage the use 
of viable alternatives to litigation (like arbitration), in a bid to address some of the 
problems of the judicial system in Nigeria.177 For example, it is submitted that 
providing a viable alternative will reduce the existing pressure on the Nigerian 
court.178  As Dr Emilia Onyema rightly pointed out, “the inadequacies of litigation are 
evidenced by the congestion of their courts, which invariably leads to delays in the 
delivery of justice to their citizens. These inadequacies can largely be attributed to the 
retention of a mono-track dispute resolution process (litigation). One way of 
overcoming these inadequacies is the provision of a multi-track dispute resolution 
system which incorporates litigation and other alternative dispute resolution 
processes. This is based on the premise that litigation is not the only mechanism for 
resolving disputes.”179  Dr Laibuta recently submitted that “the ensuing complexity of 
social economic relations was characterised by competitions and friction generating 
new demands, claims and wants overwhelming the conventional judicial systems 
which are largely viewed as outdated and incapable of expeditious and effective 
management and resolution of conflicts. This has resulted in a crisis in litigation hence 
the urgent call for strategic review and reform to recreate a competent, efficient and 
effective judiciary backed by ADR.”180 
Using Lagos as an example, it is on record that since the introduction of the Lagos 
State Arbitration Law 2009 as well as the Lagos Multi-Door Court House Law 2007, 
which provides and encourages litigants to resolve their disputes through an 
alternative dispute resolution structure provided for by the State High Court,181 the 
State’s High Court has witnessed a reduction in the number of cases filed. In statistic 
                                                          
177 We discuss this in more detail in Section 5.2 of Chapter Three. 
178 B.A Bukar, ‘Legal Framework for the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes: An 
examination of Nigeria’s Arbitration Laws’ (1999) 16(1) Journal of International Arbitration 47,48. 
179 Emilia Onyema, ‘The Multi-Door Court House (MDC) Scheme in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Lagos 
MDC’ (2013) 2(7) Apogee Journal of Business, Property and Constitutional Law 96. 
180 K.I. Laibuta, ‘ADR in Africa: Contending with Multiple Legal Orders for Wholesome Dispute 
Resolution’ (2016) 82(1) Arbitration 63, 64. 
181 We discuss the Lagos State Arbitration Law 2009 in more detail in Section 4.2 of Chapter Four. 
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released by the Lagos Island Division of the Lagos State High Court in April 2015, it 
was revealed that in year 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and January–April 2015, the 
court received 2585, 2322, 2052, 1207, 1592 and 490 new cases respectively.182  
It is therefore not out of place to submit that providing practical and alternative 
methods of resolving disputes, will reduce the pressure on the Nigerian courts in 
general, as this will provide litigants with alternatives. The bulk of the pressure which 
the courts seem to carry on their own will be shared with these alternatives. At a time 
when Nigeria seems to be attracting a lot of foreign attention in technical and 
emerging areas of law, this call for alternatives cannot have been timelier. This PhD 
thesis therefore suggests arbitration as a viable alternative. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We will in the next chapter of this thesis not only justify our selection of arbitration as 
against mechanisms like mediation, conciliation and negotiation, we will more 
importantly highlight the many ways in which the arbitration mechanism makes up 
for some of the problems of the litigation practice, which we have highlighted in this 
chapter.  As Lord Langdale, M.R rightly noted in the famous case of Earl of Mexborough 
v Bower,183 “many cases occur in which it is perfectly clear that by means of a reference 
to arbitration, the real interests of the parties will be much better satisfied than they 
could be by any litigation in a court of justice”. For example, in addition to reducing 
the pressure on the Nigerian courts by providing a viable alternative to disputants, 
parties are able to select persons with the requisite knowledge and expertise as well 
as the time and integrity needed to effectively decide their dispute.184 In arbitration, 
decision makers are careful to act with integrity as their professional success is hinged 
                                                          
182  See the Lagos States Court website: <https://lagosjudiciary.gov.ng/jis_new/programs.aspx> 
accessed on 3 April 2015. This writer was also able to confirm the veracity of these figures during an 
informal visit to the Lagos State High Court in April 2015. 
183 (1843) 7 Beau 132. 
184 The benefits of arbitration especially in tackling these problems in Nigeria are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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on an unblemished conduct.185 Parties are also able to select all or parts of any law of 
their choice, thus avoiding some of the controversies associated with Nigerian law.186 
It behoves stakeholders and policy makers to encourage citizens to explore arbitration, 
by providing the enabling environment for a successful arbitration practice. In 
subsequent parts of this thesis, we will critically analyse the existing domestic 
arbitration frameworks in Nigeria. This include the customary arbitration practice as 
well as the outdated Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which was introduced 
in 1988.  Drawing from arguments which we make in the course of this thesis, we 
conclude same by suggesting a more relevant and practical domestic arbitration 
framework for Nigeria.  
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186 We discuss this in more detail in Section 5.2 of Chapter Three. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ARBITRATION: A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO LITIGATION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Two of this thesis, we examined litigation as a method of resolving 
disputes in Nigeria. We mentioned that litigation was and still remains the traditional 
and principal method of resolving disputes in Nigeria. We went ahead to highlight 
some of the problems encountered in the administration of justice in Nigerian courts. 
Specifically, we discussed in detail the voluminous caseload of the Nigerian courts, 
which has to a large extent contributed to the delay in the administration of justice in 
Nigeria. We also highlighted the problems of incompetent and/or corrupt Judges as 
well as the lack of basic court infrastructure.  
In order to tackle some of these problems, especially that of delay, commentators have 
advocated for the use of other viable methods of resolving disputes.1 This suggestion 
has become pertinent in view of the rigidity and inability of the litigation mechanism 
to cater for the unfortunate realities.2 By way of a solution to these problems therefore, 
we concluded Chapter Two by proposing the use of arbitration as a viable alternative 
to litigation; this proposal is the focus of the current chapter.3 
Arbitration refers to a process in which parties agree to opt out of their right of access 
to the court and instead submit their dispute to a specially constituted tribunal, for a 
                                                          
1 R. Blench, S. Longtau, U. Hassan and M. Walsh, ‘The Role of Traditional Rulers in Conflict Prevention 
and Mediation in Nigeria: The final report’ (Report prepared for DFID 2006) 75  
<www.rogerblench.info/Conflict/TR%20Interim%20Report.pdf> accessed 1 December 2015. See also 
Adewale Olawoyin, ‘Charting New Waters with Familiar Landmarks’ (2009) 26(3) Journal of 
International Arbitration 373, 374. 
2 Besides, depreciation of court infrastructure will be reduced if the workload of the court is lessened.  
3  There are four major arbitration theories: the contractual theory, the jurisdictional theory, the hybrid 
theory and the autonomous theory. As Professor Bantekas noted in his book, “…all of these theories 
find a degree of application, although some are more prevalent than others”. As we go along, we will 
notice that this thesis strikes a balance between parties’ right to determine their dispute resolution 
mechanism and the role of the State in providing support for the mechanism as encapsulated in the 
hybrid (mixed) theory. For a more detailed discussion on the theories, see Ilias Bantekas, An Introduction 
to International Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 2015) 2-4; Julian D.M Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis, 
et al, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2003) 74 -81. 
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final and binding decision.4 The idea of arbitration is a simple one:5 basically parties 
to an arbitration process choose to exercise a right bestowed upon them by law to 
determine the process by which their dispute will be administered.6 They both submit 
their dispute to an individual or a group of individuals, whose experience, reputation 
and credibility they trust who then considers the facts as against parties arguments 
and then makes a binding and final decision on the issues in dispute.7 
In this chapter, we establish the viability of the arbitration mechanism first as against 
popular “Alternative Dispute Resolution” (“ADR”)8 mechanisms like mediation, 
conciliation and negotiation.  For example, unlike arbitration where a person is bound 
by a validly executed agreement and award, parties to any of the aforementioned 
mechanisms can technically still resile from the result of the other mechanisms.9 More 
important to this thesis is the fact that this chapter points out the many ways in which 
the arbitration mechanism makes up for the deficiencies of the judicial system in 
Nigeria. For example, parties to technical disputes are obviously able to avoid the 
incompetence associated with the court system by appointing individuals with the 
requisite knowledge and experience to administer their dispute.  
In terms of structure, this chapter is divided into five major parts. In the first part, we 
briefly examine the history as well as the arguments surrounding the origin and 
development of arbitration in general.  We argue that arbitration developed in 
                                                          
4 Jan Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration ( 1st edition, Oxford University Press 2013) 1; Olakunle Orojo and 
Ayodele Ajomo, Law and Practice of Arbitration in Nigeria, (Mbeyi and Associates (Nig) ltd, 1999); Paul 
Idornigie, ‘The Relationship Between Arbitral and Court Proceedings in Nigeria’ (2002) 19(5) Journal 
of International Arbitration 443; Janet A. Rosen, ‘Arbitration Under Private International Law: The 
Doctrine of Separability and Competence de la Competence’ (1993-1994) 17 Fordham International Law 
Journal 599; Paul Idornigie, ‘The 1988 Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act: Need For Review’ 
(2003) 6(3) International Arbitration Law Review 50,57. 
5Nigel Blackaby et al, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (6th Edition, Oxford Press, 2015)1-2  
6 Thomas E. Carbonneau, ‘The Exercise of Contractual Freedom in the Making of Arbitration 
Agreements’ (2003) 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1189,1193; Alison Overby, 
‘Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act’ (1985-1986) Iowa Law Review 1137, 1146 
7Nigel Blackaby et al (n 5) 1-2. 
8 We acknowledge the controversy as to whether arbitration is an ADR mechanism. For the purpose of 
this thesis (except where otherwise stated), we adopt the practical approach by referring to ADR as any 
other mechanism apart from litigation, which can be used to resolve disputes. 
9 Admittedly they may be liable to pay damages. The court also has the discretion to grant the equitable 
specific performance order especially in situations where the court is of the opinion that damages may 
not be sufficient.  
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response to the deficiencies of the court system.10 Specifically, we disagree with the 
suggestion in some academic quarters that the very first arbitration proceeding can be 
traced to the Biblical story of King Solomon and the two warring mothers. This is in 
view of the nature of the King’s powers in those days, which included judicial 
functions, as well as the lack of parties’ consent in such arrangements. Instead we 
adopt the argument that the exact origin of arbitration has been lost in history.  
In order to properly define the scope of arbitration, Part Two of this chapter goes 
ahead to identify the other ADR methods and in Part Three, we submit that arbitration 
is the most viable of the available options and adduce reasons in support of this 
position.11 In Part Four, this writer argues that the concept known as ADR has since 
lost its relevance and that it is in fact incorrect practice to continue to label a particular 
set of dispute resolution mechanisms as “ADRs” when in actual fact, and depending 
on the angle from which one views it, all the known methods of dispute resolution, 
including litigation, are in one way or another alternatives to another method. Gone 
are the days when the court system was the principal method of resolving all types of 
disputes. Today, the principal method of resolving disputes depends to a large extent 
on the nature of the dispute in question.12 We argue that by implication, the definition 
of ADR is not fixed as it to a large extent depends on the nature of the dispute in 
question. Indeed, the dispute resolution process has evolved from a one size fits all 
regime (litigation) to a more flexible regime where the principal method of resolving 
disputes depends on the nature and issue in question.  
We however argue that assuming, without conceding, that litigation still remains the 
principal method of resolving all types of dispute, the dispute resolution procedure in 
many jurisdictions has evolved from the idea of an “either/or” practice, which the 
word alternative seems to imply, to a more inclusive and complementary process, 
                                                          
10 This justifies our approach in this thesis as it shows that arbitration has been successfully used to 
tackle the problems of the court system. 
11 We acknowledge the argument in some quarters as to whether or not arbitration is an ADR. While 
we agree that arbitration is in many respects different from ADR mechanisms like mediation, 
negotiation and conciliation; for the purposes of this thesis, we adopt the pragmatic approach by 
defining ADR as any other mechanism apart from the most commonly used method, litigation.  
12 For example, arbitration has been said to be the principal method of resolving international 
commercial disputes. See Nigel Blackaby et al (n 5) 1. 
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since it is in fact impossible to undertake the litigation process without a resort of some 
sort to the so called ADR mechanisms.13 In other words, the Rules of Civil Procedure 
in many jurisdictions of the world have adopted an approach that incorporates these 
so-called ADR procedures into the litigation process, and so they are in reality no 
longer strict alternatives but complementary to litigation.  
In Part Five, we discuss the inability of the litigation process to adapt to the evolving 
realities both in Nigeria and beyond, as well as highlight how the arbitration practice 
has been able to make up for the inadequacies of the litigation process, especially as it 
relates to some of the problems discussed in Chapter Two. 
1.0 BACKGROUND 
It is difficult to state the origin of arbitration with exact certainty. According to Earl 
Wolaver, “…what time or place man first decided to submit to his chief or to his 
friends for a decision and a settlement with his adversary, instead of resorting to 
violence and self-help, or to the public legal machinery available, is not known…”14 It 
will seem that the practice originated in response to developments within the society15 
and its origin dates as far back as over a thousand years.16 Henry de Vries has opined 
that resolving disputes by agreeing to abide by the decision of a third party has existed 
long before law was established, courts were organised or Judges had formulated 
principles of law.17 
                                                          
13 As we will come to see, the civil procedure in many jurisdictions mandate parties to explore ADR 
procedures before instituting court actions. This position is based on the notion that many of the court 
actions which can be resolved by mediations or negotiations are clogging the courts list. This no doubt 
will be an effective way of decongesting the courts if successful. The problem however with this 
approach is that you cannot force parties who are unwilling to compromise, to negotiate and so while 
you may be able to force them to initiate negotiation proceedings, this does not in any way guarantee 
the success of the process. 
14Earl S.Wolaver, ‘The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration’ (1934) 83 U.pa. L.Rev 132  
15Micheal Lord Mustill, ‘Arbitration: History and Background’ (1989) 6 (2) Journal of International 
Arbitration 1. 
16 Pierre A. Karrer (ed), Introduction to International Arbitration Practice (Kluwer Law International 2014) 
233; Lucy Greenwood, ‘The Rise, Fall and Rise of International Arbitration:  A view from 2030’ (2011) 
77 Arbitration 435 (Published by Sweet and Maxwell). 
17 Henry P. de Vries, ‘International Commercial Arbitration: A Transnational View’ (1984) 1(1) Journal 
of International Arbitration 7. 
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Several writers18 have made attempts to pin down the first arbitration proceeding to 
the Biblical story of King Solomon and the two mothers.19 However, this assertion 
cannot be true for many reasons. For one, it is clear from a general perusal of historical 
records as presented in the Holy Bible that Kings in those days exercised ultimate 
authority within their jurisdiction.20 Unlike what proponents of this theory seem to 
suggest, the King had inherent judicial powers and functions.21 He was the Supreme 
Court of the land and had the duty to maintain peace22 as well as to administer justice 
within his territory.23 By virtue of his position, the King possessed and exercised 
mandatory jurisdiction (equivalent to that of the modern court) over his subjects. By 
implication of this jurisdiction, parties had no choice but to submit to the King’s Court 
when the circumstances demanded, therefore the much needed consent required to 
validate arbitration was lacking here.   
Other writers seem to have rightly concluded that the exact origin of this very 
successful practice has been lost in history24 and so have instead limited their 
discussions on this issue to specific jurisdictions.25 There is however evidence which 
suggests that arbitration existed from as early as 350 BC; Plato is quoted to have stated 
that “wherever someone makes a contract and fails to carry it out…an action may be 
brought to the tribal courts if the parties have been unable to resolve it before 
                                                          
18Frank D. Emerson, ‘History of Arbitration Practice and Law’ (1970) 19 Clev St L. Rev 155;  Grace 
Xavier, ‘Evolution of Arbitration as a Legal Institutional (sic) and the inherent powers of the Court: 
Putrajaya Holdings SDN, BHD v. Digital Green SDN. BHD’ (Asian Law Institute Working Paper, No. 
009, December 2009). 
19 An account of this story can be found in 1st Kings 3: 16-28 of the Holy Bible (King James Version). 
20 ibid 1 Samuel 8; 11-18. 
21 ibid 1 Samuel 8; 5; 1 Samuel 9: 15-17 and 1King 3:9.  
22 ibid 1 Samuel 8; 11-12.  
23 ibid Proverbs 20; 8.  
24Earl S.Wolaver (n 14) 235. 
25 For a detailed discussion on the development of arbitration in England, France, USA, Germany, 
amongst others, see Gary Born, International Arbitration: Cases and Materials (2nd Edition, Kluwer Law 
International 2015) 14-25. See also O. Ezediaro, ‘Guarantee and incentives for Foreign Investment in 
Nigeria’ (1971) 5 International law 770, 775; Grace Xavier, ‘Evolution of Arbitration as a Legal 
Institutional (sic) and the inherent powers of the Court: Putrajaya Holdings SDN, BHD v. Digital Green 
SDN. BHD’ (Asian Law Institute Working Paper, No. 009, December 2009); Frank D. Emerson, ‘History 
of Arbitration Practice and Law’ (1970) 19 Clev St L. Rev 155 (1970).  
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arbitrators or neighbours”.26 There is also evidence that shows arbitration being used 
to administer commercial disputes from as far back as 1249 AD.27 
Notwithstanding these varied accounts, one thing is undisputed and that is that 
arbitration emerged mainly in response to the inadequacies of the State-run dispute 
resolution system.28 Lord Mustill puts it very nicely when he opines that “the official 
system was too slow; the dispute could not always wait for the justiciar to arrive on 
circuit, or for the lord to return from the wars. It was too expensive; there would be 
court fees or stamp duties to pay, and a formalised legal system invariably breeds 
professional lawyers, who have rarely undercharged. Its methods were unsuitable; 
compurgation and trial by battle could not yield reliable results where the issues 
concerned transactions rather than truth. The proceedings were public, a feature 
which traders have never cared for. The tribunal would often lack the necessary 
qualifications. Judges who were admirable for dispensing public justice might be 
incapable for reasons of temperament and upbringing, or unfitted by unfamiliarity 
with current practice to rule on questions involving the technicalities of trade. 
Moreover, the impartiality of the tribunal could not be guaranteed, particularly if one 
of the parties was a stranger.”29 From the foregoing, it is safe to state that the role of 
the State in the initial arbitration practice was limited; it was a self-help mechanism of 
some sort used to mitigate the problems of the court system. This explains the 
continued emphasis on party autonomy in the modern version of the practice.  In 
addition, it is clear that the idea of successfully using arbitration to address the 
problems of the court system (which is our approach in this thesis), is well founded 
and rooted in history.30 
                                                          
26 Albert Fiadjoe, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Developing Worlds Perspective (Cavendish Publishing 
Limited 2004) 2. 
27ICCA, ‘Historic Documents in Arbitration’ <www.arbitration-icca.org/historic-
treasures/historic_documents.html> accessed 12 September 2014. 
28 Lord Micheal Mustill, ‘Arbitration: History and Background’ (1989) 6 (2) Journal of International 
Arbitration 1. 
29 ibid.  
30 For this to work however, the government needs to ensure that it is tailored or well suited to the 
jurisdiction in question. The question of checking suitability did not apply in the older days because 
the practice itself arose from among the people and their practices.  
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As we come to see later in this chapter, many of these problems became more apparent 
and perhaps unbearable with the development of international trade, which in turn 
led to the interaction between people from different jurisdictions. International trade 
also resulted in competition, the development of new and sophisticated transactions, 
which in turn resulted in technical disputes. It soon became pertinent that people with 
specialized knowledge of the subject area in dispute administer same. Furthermore, 
time suddenly became of essence.31 
Jean-Francois Guillemin opined that “conflict is an integral part of business life. It 
arises in the course of most business operations, during negotiation and performance 
of agreements, and as part of the interrelation between various contracts which deal 
with the same overall project, but which have perhaps been entered into by other 
parties and are governed by other legal systems or contractual terms”.32 Mustill also 
noted that “successful trade must have a means of dispute resolution other than force. 
From the start, it must have involved a neutral determination and an agreement, tacit 
or otherwise, to abide by the result, backed by some kind of sanction.”33 In order to 
ensure the economic development of the State and its people as well as to prevent the 
breakdown of law and order, it was and is still necessary to ensure the availability of 
a successful dispute resolution process.34 
As soon as society became sufficiently complex and the social units became large 
enough to give room for alternatives, parties began to explore other methods of 
resolving their dispute, resulting in the rise and spread of what is now known as 
                                                          
31 For example, disputes arising from the carriage of perishable goods by sea could not afford to be left 
indefinitely. 
32 Jean-Francois Guillemin, ‘Reasons for Choosing Alternative Dispute Resolution’ in Jean-Claude 
Goldsmith, Arnold Ingen-Housz et al (eds) ADR in Business Practices and Issues across Countries and 
Cultures  (Kluwer Law International 2006) 23. 
33Micheal Lord Mustill, ‘Sources for the History of Arbitration, Arbitration International’ (1998) 14 (3) 
LCIA: Kluwer Law International 235. 
34 Initially, awards were enforced through communitarianism norms, but as society became more 
sophisticated and the use of arbitration expanded, the state had to get involved. See Richard C. Reuben, 
‘Towards a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution’ (1997) 85(3) California Law Review 
577,599. 
53 
 
arbitration.35 Even though the courts were initially threatened by the emergence and 
growth of arbitration, they have come to accept the practice with time.36 
2.0 MODERN DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS  
2.1     A Brief Overview 
Notwithstanding our discussion on the development of arbitration, the State-run 
system which is now known as litigation remains the traditional method of resolving 
domestic disputes in many jurisdictions. In fact, it is seen in many jurisdictions as the 
superior method of resolving civil disputes.37 It has also been referred to as the most 
obvious dispute resolution method,38 as it involves the resolution of disputes through 
apparatuses provided by the State.39 
Julian D.M Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis, et al rightly submitted that it involves the 
“manifestation of State power and the responsibility of the State to ensure that courts 
exist, that appropriately qualified Judges are appointed, that there are procedural 
rules to regulate the basis of jurisdiction and the conduct of cases before the court.”40 
In other words, unlike the other methods of dispute resolution, which as we will soon 
see revolve around party cooperation and require the active participation of both 
parties to initiate and in some other cases to conclude, litigation requires the active 
involvement of the State and its apparatuses as well as the  compulsory jurisdiction of 
the State.41 
                                                          
35 ibid. 
36 Ernest Lorenzen, ‘Commercial Arbitration-International and Interstate Aspects’ (1934) Yale Law 
School Scholarship Series, Paper 4588  <http://dogotalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4588>  
716,717; Herbert Syme, ‘Arbitrability of Labour Disputes’ (1951) 5(3) Rutger Law Review 45, 458; Janet 
Rosen, ‘Arbitration under Private International Law: The Doctrine of Seperability and Competence de 
la Competence’ (1994) 17(3) Fordhams International Law Journal 599, 617; V.S  Deshpande, ‘How 
International Arbitration can always Prevail over Litigation’ (1987) 4(4) Journal of International 
Arbitration 9. 
37 Susan Blake et al, A practical approach to Alternative Dispute Resolution (Oxford University Press 2011) 
3. 
38 Julian D.M Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis et al, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 
Law International 2003) 4. 
39 We discussed this method as it operates in Nigeria in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
40 Julian D.M Lew (n 38) 4. 
41 Admittedly, this is subject to the right of parties to opt for other ADR methods. 
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Apart from litigation, we also have other methods of dispute resolution which have 
developed over time. These methods include mediation, negotiation, conciliation and 
of course arbitration. We similarly have other methods like the Med-Arb, which fall 
into a hybrid category. All of these methods are popularly known under the umbrella 
heading of Alternative Dispute Resolution.42 Early advocates of ADR include the 
former American President Abraham Lincoln, who is quoted to have said that 
“discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbours to compromise whenever you can. 
Point out to them how the nominal winner is often the loser in fees, expenses and cost 
of time”.43 This is possible because of the non-contentious approach of ADR systems.44 
Apart from arbitration,45 the most popular of the other ADR mechanisms is said to be 
mediation.46 In a mediation proceeding, parties appoint a third party, known as a 
mediator, to manage and resolve their conflict by helping them arrive at a mutually 
acceptable position.47 The mediator does not therefore issue any form of binding 
decision.48 According to Paul Newman, the mediator assists the parties to focus on 
their real interests and strengths as opposed to their emotions, in an attempt to draw 
them together towards possible settlement”.49 
                                                          
42 Simon Roberts, ‘Mediation in the Lawyers Embrace’ (1992) 55(2) The Modern Law Review 258; Robert 
Mnookin, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis’ (1998) Harvard Law School, John 
M. Olin Centre For Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series, Paper 232, 1; Alexander 
Bevan, Alternative Dispute Resolution (Sweet & Maxwell 1992)  1; Richard C. Reuben, ‘Towards a State 
Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution’ (1997) 85(3) California Law Review 577,581; Jenkins, 
International Construction Arbitration Law (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2014), Brown and Marriott, ADR 
Principles and Practice (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters, 2011), Boulle and Nesic, Mediation 
Principles, Process and Practice (Butterworths, 2001), Newmark and Monagahan, Butterworths Mediators 
on Mediation (Tottel, 2005), Kendall Freedman and Farrel, Expert Determination (4th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2008). 
43See <www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/lawlect.htm> accessed 18 March 2015 
44 This point may not apply to arbitration, which is every bit as contentious as litigation. 
45 For a definition of arbitration, please refer to the introductory section of this thesis. 
46 For a detailed and comparative discussion on mediation, see Nadja Alexander (ed), Global Trends in 
Mediation (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International, 2006); Jay Folberg, ‘A Mediation Overview: History and 
Dimension of Practice’ (1983) 1 Mediation Quarterly 3; Nadja Alexander, International and Comparative 
Mediation (Kluwer Law International, 2009). 
47United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation, 
<www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/UN%20Guidance%20for%20Effectiv
e%20Mediation.pdf> accessed 23 October 2014. 
48 For detailed reading on mediation within the United Kingdom, United States, China amongst others, 
see Association for International Arbitration (ed), The New EU Directive on Mediation: First Insights 
(Maklu 2008). 
49 Paul Newman, Alternative Dispute Resolution (CLT Professional Publishing Ltd, 1999) 9. 
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William E. O’Brian rightly noted that mediation proceedings especially at the initial 
stages of the dispute might actually help to prevent a prolonged litigation proceeding 
since in the process of mediating; parties are also able to realistically assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of their case as against that of the other party.50 Admittedly 
such an assessment may also make a party determined to litigate if he realises that he 
has a better case and that he can secure a better deal at trial.51 
Conciliation is in many ways very similar to the mediation process. In fact some 
people categorize mediation and conciliation under the general umbrella of mediative 
processes.52 According to Susan Blake et al, “the mediation process is more likely to 
involve some level of helping the parties to evaluate their cases, while conciliation is 
more likely to be purely facilitative in helping parties to reach agreement on disputed 
issues”.53 Paul Newman opines that a “conciliator may be more interventionist than a 
mediator, and the accompanying process less structured, but he still endeavours to 
bring disputing parties together and to assist them to focus on the key issues”.54 
Negotiation on the other hand is an informal process in which parties’ meet to discuss 
areas of conflict, in a bid to reach a mutually agreeable outcome.55 It usually involves 
parties making offers, rejections and counter offers. The end result of a negotiation is 
usually a mutually agreed compromise between the parties.56 
An escalation clause or hybrid practice, which combines multiple mechanisms in one 
dispute resolution clause has also emerged.57 For example, we have the Med-Arb 
                                                          
50 William E O’Brian Jr, ‘Lessons For the European Union From Mediation in the United States’ in 
Association for International Arbitration (ed), The New EU Directive on Mediation: First Insights (Maklu, 
2008) 59. 
51  The development, awareness and practice of mediation has to a large extent been boosted by the new 
ICC Mediation Rules 2014. The EU has also in 2008 released the Directive 2008/52/EC to encourage 
the use of mediation within the EU. See Philippe Billiet and Ewa Kurlanda, ‘An Introduction to the 
Directives on Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters’ in Association for 
International Arbitration (ed), The New EU Directive on Mediation: First Insights (Maklu, 2008) 9. 
52 Albert Fiadjoe (n 26) 22. 
53 Susan Blake et al, A practical approach to Alternative Dispute Resolution (Oxford University Press, 2011) 
31. 
54 Paul Newman ( n 49) 3. 
55 Simon Roberts, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution and Civil Justice: An Unresolved Relationship’ (1993) 
56(3) The Modern Law Review, 452; Collins Namachanja, ‘The Challenges facing arbitral institutions 
in Africa’ (2016) 82(1) Arbitration 44, 45. 
56 Albert Fiadjoe (n 26) 38. 
57 Ilias Bantekas (n 3) 9-10. 
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mechanism, which merges the mediation and arbitration practice into one 
mechanism.58 This practice usually requires parties to insert a dispute resolution 
clause into their contract, with the effect that parties must first explore mediation 
proceedings, after which parties may proceed to a full-fledged arbitration process if 
the former process fails.59 This process may also be inverted in the sense that the 
disputants present their case to an arbitrator who mid-way into the proceedings, 
assumes the role of a mediator. Another approach is to use the mediation aspect of the 
mechanism to resolve issues which can easily be resolved by parties’ agreement, while 
using the arbitration aspect of the mechanism for intractable disputes.60 This hybrid 
method raises ethical issues, which are dealt with later on in this thesis.61 
2.2     Factors that have contributed to the Rise of ADR 
Many commentators have argued that the continued development of ADR is a 
response to problems encountered in the litigation process.62  Not only is litigation 
expensive, time consuming and chequered with unnecessary delays,63 it many times 
falls short of the required level of fairness. Alexander Bevan submits that “…the lack 
of fairness from various factors; poor, unspecialised or idiosyncratic judging can make 
the result a lottery depending on arbitrary points. If one party has a restricted purse, 
then the contest is immediately weighed against him. The richer party can pay for 
more skilled lawyers to exploit the intricacies of the system or simply hang on 
longer…Finally, delay is exacerbated by the poor communication engendered in turn 
by the combat mentality of litigation…Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is a term 
                                                          
58 For a discussion on hybrid mechanisms, see William H. Ross and Donald E. Colon, ‘Hybrid Forms of 
Third Party Dispute Resolution: Theoretical Implications of Combining Mediation and Arbitration’ 
(2000) 25 The Academy of Management Review 416; Robert Mnookin, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution: 
An Economic Analysis’ (1998) Harvard Law School, John M. Olin Centre For Law, Economics and 
Business Discussion Paper Series, Paper 232, 1, 10. 
59 This system is popularly referred to as Med-Arb, a model draft of this clause can be found in the 
Mediation rules of the ICC <www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-
adr/mediation/rules/> accessed 23 October 2014. 
60 Paul Newman ( n 49) 68. 
61 See Section 1.1.2 of Chapter Six. 
62 Henry T. Edwards, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema’ (1986) 99(3) Harvard Law 
Review 668; ‘Dispute Resolution’ (1979) 88 (5) The Yale Law Journal 905, 907 
63 Zeb-Michael Curtis, ‘Rethinking Prima Paint Separability in Todays Changed Arbitration Regime: 
The case for Inseparability and Judicial Decision Making in the Context of Mental Incapacity Defences’ 
(2004-2008) 90 IOWA Law Review 1905, 1910. 
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which refers to various procedures developed…in an attempt to overcome some of 
the weaknesses in the litigation…”64 Ironically like Susan Blake et al rightly noted, 
within the very strength of the litigation mechanism lies weaknesses. In a bid to be 
fair, the law and rules of procedure have become complex, thus extending the time 
and cost of court actions.65 
Albert Fiadjoe also submits that “one of the main driving forces towards ADR is public 
dissatisfaction with litigation. It is not a secret that the search for alternatives to the 
adjudication model through courtroom litigation has been fuelled by the growing 
client dissatisfaction with traditional legal methods”.66 We have seen in Chapter Two 
that the efficiency of the court system in Nigeria has been hampered by factors like 
lengthy industrial actions, delay and incompetent staff, with litigants being the 
ultimate losers in the whole process, thus emphasising the need for alternatives. 67 
Jean-Francois Guillemin is however right to add that there is no single explanation for 
the growing popularity of ADR, “not even the convenient or simplistic argument that 
ADR is a way of avoiding a lengthy, complex and costly litigation…”68 In other words, 
the emergence and development of ADR is as a result of factors beyond the failings of 
litigation. Carita Wallgren-Lindholm also submits that “increased interest in ADR can 
hardly be interpreted at this point as a passing trend or merely as a response to 
negative factors attached to litigation, such as length and cost of legal 
proceedings…One reason for ADR being considered by the business community as 
an increasing alternative complement to litigation is that there are many situations 
today where the true object of a commercial dispute is not adequately resolved by a 
                                                          
64 Alexander Bevan, Alternative Dispute Resolution (Sweet & Maxwell 1992) 1. 
65 Susan Blake et al (n 37) 6. 
66 Albert Fiadjoe (n 26) 8; See also Richard C. Reuben, ‘Front Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the 
Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice For Contracts with Arbitration Provisions’ (2003) 56 
SMU Law Review 819,822. 
67 See also Austen Sarat, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution: Wrong Solution, Wrong Problem’ (1988) 37(1) 
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 162, 163. 
68 Jean-Francois Guillemin (n 32) 21. 
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court ruling…”69 Under any of the ADR mechanisms however, parties are able to 
tailor their proceeding to suit the needs of their dispute.70 
For example, parties are able to design a dispute resolution mechanism that fits nicely 
around the contours of specialised transactions like Islamic Finance.71 In addition, in 
modern times, commercial relations have the tendency to develop into real 
relationships, which many times extend beyond the contractual relationship between 
the parties.72 Parties to a large extent therefore want to avoid the irretrievable break 
down of their relationship, which results from the winner-takes-all approach of the 
court system.73 In addition, in Nigeria for example, local parties are said to be reluctant 
to participate in litigation proceedings74 because it is believed that litigants can never 
be friends after litigation.75 It has therefore proven to be useful in community issues 
where it is important to preserve the relationship between parties.76 
Despite the varying but to a large extent valid arguments made to explain the 
development of ADR, one thing is clear and that is “…conflict resolution, through the 
processes of negotiation, mediation and arbitration, has become an acceptable and, 
indeed, inevitable part of creative lawyering in the 21st century…Today ADR 
processes are being applied worldwide to a universality of situations hitherto 
governed by litigation…From business controversies to labour management disputes, 
ADR is becoming the preferred choice for the resolution of conflict and 
disagreement…”77 ADR mechanisms have proven to be particularly useful in 
                                                          
69Carita Wallgren-Lindholm, ‘ADR and Business’ in Gerald H. Pointon, Arnold Ingen-Housz et al (eds), 
ADR in Business and Issues across Countries and Cultures ( Kluwer Law International 2006) 3. 
70 Robert Mnookin, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis’ (1998) Harvard Law 
School, John M. Olin Centre For Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series, Paper 232, 1. 
71 Aisha Nadar, ‘Islamic Finance and Dispute Resolution: Part 2’ (2009) 23(2) Arab Law Quarterly 
181,192. 
72 Walter Mattli argues that parties in long term relationships have a strong preference for settling 
disputes through ADR; See Walter Mattli, ‘Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to 
Arbitration’ (2001) 55(4) International Organisation 919, 934. 
73 Anthony Ogin, Michael Jones-Lee et al, ‘Evaluating Alternative Dispute Resolution: Measuring the 
Impact of Family Conciliation on Costs’ (1990) 53(1) The Modern Law Review, 57. 
74 Andrew Chukwuemerie, ‘Salient Issues in the Law and Practice if Arbitration in Nigeria’ (2006) 14 
African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1,16. 
75 There is a Yoruba proverb that says ‘Aa Kii ti Kootu de dore’ translated; ‘Friends who go to court never 
return as friends’.  
76 G.B.A Coker, Family Property among the Yorubas (Sweet and Maxwell 1966) 58. 
77 Albert Fiadjoe (n 26) 1. 
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situations where, for example, parties have and want to maintain a commercial 
relationship, since both parties have a mutual interest in the quick resolution of the 
dispute.78 These mechanisms are also useful in instances where neither party wishes 
to have the publicity associated with litigation,79 as well as many other situations.80 
Needless to say, at the root of every ADR procedure is parties’ intention to resolve 
their dispute via the said mechanism.81 
3.0 ARBITRATION: THE MOST VIABLE ADR 
Arbitration remains the most viable, effective and practical ADR mechanism, 
especially in relation to commercial disputes.82 In this part of the chapter, we will be 
adducing reasons in support of this assertion.  This section therefore justifies our 
selection of arbitration (as against the other ADRs) as a viable alternative to litigation.  
A fundamental difference between arbitration and the other ADR mechanisms, and 
from which the viability of the arbitration mechanism over the other mechanisms 
stems, is the involvement of the law in the process and administration of arbitration. 
Many countries provide legal frameworks expected to govern any arbitration 
involving their jurisdiction.83 For example, the validity of a party’s arbitration 
agreement and claim is determined through the lens of these said frameworks. 
                                                          
78 Janet A. Rosen, ‘Arbitration Under Private International Law: The Doctrine of Separability and 
Competence de la Competence’ (1993-1994) 17 Fordham International Law Journal 599,600; Richard 
Hill, ‘Non-Adversarial Mediation’ (1995) 12 (4) Journal of International Arbitration 135,137. 
79 Robert Mnookin (n 70) 3. 
80 Paul Newman (n 49) 29. 
81 Kenji Tashiro, ‘Conciliation or Mediation during the Arbitral Process- A Japanese View’ (1995) 12(2) 
Journal of International Arbitration 119,120. 
82 Kaj Hober and Annette Magansson, ‘The Special State of Agreements to Arbitrate- The Separability 
Doctrine: Mandatory Stay of Litigation’ (2008) 2 Dispute Resolution International 56,57. 
83In fact, as we will come to see in subsequent chapters, institutions like the United Nations have 
introduced model laws which embody some of these conclusions and from which many jurisdictions 
can take a cue. 
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By virtue of the doctrine of party autonomy,84 parties have full control over their 
proceedings.85 This is said to be one of the major selling points of the arbitration 
mechanism.86 They are able to choose the legal system, or even the parts of a legal 
system that is most favourable to their transaction, thereby avoiding the rigidities 
associated with the strict application of a particular law.87 In other words, parties are 
not only able to choose different laws to govern their head contract and arbitration 
agreement respectively; they are also able to specify the aspects of the law that may 
apply.88 For instance, parties are able to choose to apply English law to their dispute, 
while also excluding the operation of the English Conflict of Laws rule. They may on 
the other hand decide to allow their arbitrators decide their dispute strictly by the 
rules of what is deemed to be fair and equitable as against the provisions of the law.89 
This is in contrast to many of the other ADR practices, which mostly revolve around 
facts and/or compromises of the parties. Parties to arbitration proceedings are 
therefore able to get the best of both worlds: the flexibility that defines ADR 
proceedings as well as the certainty that comes with the application of the law in 
litigation, if they so choose.   
Certain core practices and principles have also been established and codified, which 
distinguish arbitration from the other dispute resolution mechanisms.90 Taking this 
point from the very beginning, parties’ decision to opt for any of the ADR proceedings 
                                                          
84 The doctrine of party autonomy has been said to be the cornerstone of arbitration. It is the right of 
parties to opt for arbitration as well as determine the process of their arbitration proceeding. See 
Christopher Lau and Christen Horlack, ‘Party Autonomy-The turning Point’ (2010) 4 Dispute 
Resolution International 121; Thomas E. Carbonneau, ‘ The Exercise of Contractual Freedom in the 
Making of Arbitration Agreements’ (2003) 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1189,1193; 
Collins Namachanja, ‘The Challenges facing arbitral institutions in Africa’ (2016) 82(1) Arbitration, 44, 
45; Alison Overby, ‘Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act’ (1985-1986) Iowa Law 
Review 1137, 1146. 
85 Walter Mattli (n 72) 925. 
86 Ehin Omereghi, ‘Taking Evidence in International Arbitration’ (2015) 20(2) Coventry Law Journal 1,7 
87 Lord Collins of Mapesbury, et al, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflicts of law (15th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2012) para 16.006. 
88 By virtue of Article 3 of the Rome 1 Regulation, this is also possible in litigation. In other words, 
parties are able to choose the law that will be applicable to either all or part of their contract. However 
unlike arbitration, in litigation, parties are unable to choose non-State law to apply to their contract.  
89 For example, Section 21(3) of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act allows arbitrators decide 
disputes in line with what is considered fair and just.  
90 Admittedly there seems to be a rise in the number of mediation frameworks. Some examples are the 
ICC Mediation Rules 2014 and EU Directive 2008/52/EC. 
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is, in theory, binding on all the parties. The English courts in Cott v Barber91 have for 
example held that it will recognize any agreement reached by parties to resolve their 
dispute via any mechanism of their choosing.92 
In practice however, we see that with the exception of arbitration, parties can in fact 
avoid and/or frustrate a pre-agreed contract to resolve their dispute via any of the 
ADRs since, as Carita Wallgren-Lindholm noted, all the parties must “be willing to 
commit themselves fully to the process and provide the neutral with relevant 
information.”93 No wonder Jean-Francois Guillemin opines that “the key players in 
ADR are therefore not the neutrals, legal adviser, witnesses or any of the other people 
usually involved in litigation, but the parties themselves”.94 A party to a mediation, 
conciliation or negotiation proceeding is therefore able to frustrate the process by 
making unnecessary or unreasonable demands in a bid to encourage a deadlock. So 
while technically parties may be bound by their agreement to resolve their dispute, 
they cannot be forced to complete the process if they choose not to do so.95 This is 
because the aforementioned agreement is an obligation to attempt to reach a 
compromise and not in reality an obligation to actually reach a compromise.   
This is in contrast to arbitration, where the framework and practice in many 
jurisdictions have prescribed steps which may be taken where one party tries to 
frustrate the process by failing to participate.96 In other words, going by the 
aforementioned decision of the court in Cott v Barber,,97 the courts will not only enforce 
an arbitration agreement, the law has also put into place systems to circumvent any 
attempt made by any of the parties to frustrate the arbitration process. For example, 
Section 17 of the English Act provides that “where each of two parties to an arbitration 
                                                          
91 (1997) 3 All ER 540. 
92 See also the following Nigerian cases; K.S.U.D.B. V. Fanz Construction. Co Ltd (1990) 6 SC 103; Royal 
Exchange Assurance V. Bentworth Finance (Nig.) Ltd. (1976) 11 SC 107. 
93Carita Wallgren-Lindholm (n 69) 12. 
94 Jean-Francois Guillemin (n 32) 21. 
95 Paul Newman (n 49) 12. 
96 For example, see Section 5 of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act as well as Section 9 of the 
English Arbitration Act, which mandate the court to stay proceedings when a party initiates 
proceedings in breach of an arbitration agreement. In addition, see the Nigerian case of The Owners of 
the M.V. Lupex V. Nig. Overseas Chartering & Shipping Ltd (2003) 10 SCM 71. 
97 (1997) 3 All ER 540. 
62 
 
agreement is to appoint an arbitrator and one party (“the party in default”) refuses to 
do so, or fails to do so within the time specified, the other party, having duly 
appointed his arbitrator, may give notice in writing to the party in default that he 
proposes to appoint his arbitrator to act as sole arbitrator”.98 Similarly as mentioned 
previously, in many jurisdictions, any attempt by any of the parties to initiate 
litigation proceeding in breach of a valid arbitration agreement, will be liable to an 
order of stay of proceedings by the court.99 
While parties’ input and cooperation remain pertinent in the conduct of all the other 
ADR proceedings, arbitration strikes a balance between the parties’ input and 
cooperation needed during ADR processes, and the need for a defined and binding 
process, which is usually found in litigation proceedings.  In an arbitration 
proceeding, one can arguably assert that unless parties are able to reach an agreement, 
they have little or no say in procedural decisions. Unlike his counterparts in a 
negotiation, mediation or conciliation proceedings, who are seemingly limited, an 
arbitrator’s role is pronounced, defined and definitely more authoritative.100 In Carlisle 
Place Investments Ltd v Wimpey Construction (UK) Ltd, the English Court opined that 
there was no requirement that an arbitrator must allow each party to call all the 
evidence which he wishes to call. It must depend on the circumstances of the 
particular case and whether or not the arbitrator decides in the exercise of his 
discretion, to conduct the arbitration in a particular way.101 An arbitrator is able to 
make procedural decisions when parties have not been able to come to an agreement. 
He is also able to request for an expert’s opinion before making a decision; for 
                                                          
98 English Arbitration Act 1996.  
99 See for example Section 5 of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act and Section 9 of the English 
Arbitration Act 1996. This has been referred to as a method or policy of indirect enforcement. In other 
words, it is an indirect method of preventing a party to a valid arbitration agreement from avoiding his 
obligation to arbitrate. See Nigel Blackaby et al (n 5) 17. 
100 Different Acts give arbitrators varying degrees of discretion to administer the arbitration. For 
example, Article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law; Section 12 of the Nigerian Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act 2004; Article 11 of the Uniform Act on Arbitration and the Section 30(1) of the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 allows the arbitrators entertain and deal with any application relating to its 
jurisdiction.  
101 (1980 15 BLR 109, 117. 
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example, the English Act allows the arbitration tribunal to appoint experts, legal 
advisers and/or assessors to advice on issues of a technical nature.102 
Similarly important is the fact that in arbitration, the success and conclusion of the 
process does not depend on parties’ agreement and/or compromise.103 Section 58 of 
the English Arbitration Act clearly states that “…an award made by the tribunal 
pursuant to an arbitration agreement is final and binding both on the parties and on 
persons claiming through or under them”.104 This final decision can even be based on 
the case of one party but only after proof of such a case and after reasonable 
opportunity has been given to the other party to defend same.105 This was the decision 
of the Nigerian Supreme Court in N.O. Motanya & Ors V. Elijah Elinwa & Ors, where it 
held that an arbitrator may proceed with a reference in the absence of one of the 
parties, if he choose not to attend. The party ought to have notice that the arbitrator 
will proceed ex parte in the case if he does not attend.106 On the other hand, the end 
result of an ADR proceeding can at best be regarded as a contractual term, which 
parties can technically still resile from, but of course, with consequences. In other 
words, the result of any of the other ADR proceedings can only be as an outcome of 
the cooperation of both parties. 
Finally, the decision of the arbitral tribunal is not only binding, it is also enforceable 
on both parties, subject to certain judicial procedures.107 The Nigerian Supreme Court 
has held that once an award has been made and not challenged in court, it would be 
entered as a judgment and given effect accordingly.108 This is unlike the end products 
of a negotiation, mediation and conciliation, which like many contractual terms, 
parties can technically, still, resile from and so there is no guaranteed finality.109 Nadja 
Alexander admits that the major limitation of mediation is its lack of finality as well 
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as its uncertainty in relation to enforceability.110  In other words, unlike arbitration, 
where a person will be held bound by the award, under any of the other ADRs, a party 
is able to avoid any agreement reached by paying damages for the effect of his 
breach.111 This is one of the underlying factors behind the rise of the Med-Arb practice: 
the ability to convert a mediation agreement to an award.112 Therefore, it is little 
wonder that under the other types of ADR, upon reaching a compromise, parties still 
approach the court for a consent judgement or a judgement on the terms of an 
agreement, in order to protect themselves from the implications of a sudden breach.113 
The Nigerian Supreme Court has held in Star Paper Mill Ltd & Anor v Bashiru Adetunji 
& Ors that “when terms of settlement or…compromise agreement become an order of 
court on the application of the parties, it in legal parlance becomes a consent 
judgement.”114 The Nigerian Supreme Court went on in another decision115 to state 
that “it is inconceivable that one of the parties to a compromise judgement should be 
at liberty to contend in subsequent proceedings between the same parties that he is 
not bound by the order to which he had previously consented.“116 This practice has 
also been incorporated into arbitration practice.  
 
4.0 ABANDONING THE CONCEPT KNOWN AS ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
In a previous part of this chapter, we highlighted the fact that there is a debate as to 
whether arbitration is indeed an ADR.  Proponents of this theory opine that it is every 
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bit as contentious as litigation and unlike the other ADR mechanisms, an arbitration 
like litigation, results in a binding and enforceable decision.117 We have however 
adopted the more pragmatic approach to this debate by accepting the approach which 
views ADR as any method of resolving disputes apart from litigation.118 This idea 
implies that there is a principal and/or traditional method of resolving dispute, that 
is litigation and that any other method is an alternative to the traditional method.  
However, recent developments, especially in the area of international commercial law, 
clearly suggest that litigation is no longer the principal method of dispute 
resolution.119 According to Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 
“international arbitration has become the principal method of resolving disputes 
between States, individuals and corporations in almost every aspect of international 
trade, commerce and investment”.120 This is because, as we will see later on in this 
chapter, litigation has proven to be an unsuitable method of resolving international 
commercial disputes. It is safe at this point to submit that arbitration and not litigation 
is the principal method of resolving international commercial disputes.   
If we therefore adopt the earlier argument that ADR refers to all other methods of 
resolving disputes apart from the principal method of resolving disputes, which for a 
long time happened to be litigation, since arbitration has become the principal method 
of resolving international commercial disputes, we must also be open to the argument 
that every other method that can be used to resolve international commercial disputes 
(including litigation) is indeed an alternative dispute resolution method to arbitration.  
The problem is that this leads to confusion as to the real definition and scope of ADR, 
since depending on the angle from which it is being viewed, ADR could in one breath 
refer to arbitration, mediation, negotiation and conciliation and in another refer to 
litigation, mediation, negotiation and conciliation. It would seem as if the definition 
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of ADR depends to a large extent on the nature of the dispute in question. An 
alternative argument is that litigation is the default method, that is the option that 
applies unless otherwise agreed.  It is therefore a wrong and very outdated practice to 
refer to only a specific set of dispute resolution mechanisms as ADRs when in actual 
fact and in one way or the other, all the methods of dispute resolution are indeed 
alternatives to each other.    
Even if we assume that the concept popularly referred to as ADR has a definable scope 
and that it refers to arbitration, mediation, negotiation and conciliation, it is submitted 
that the title ADR is very misleading because it obviously does not reflect the current 
reality of civil procedure. The word alternative implies an “either / or” 
interpretation,121 but modern legislations in many jurisdictions clearly show that 
litigation as a method of dispute resolution is no longer an exclusive process.122 In 
practice, many rules of civil procedure have incorporated these so-called “alternative” 
processes as part of the litigation process, where they serve more of a complementary 
role rather than an alternative one.123 This practice especially when contained in an 
agreement is known as a multi-step or escalation clause.124 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill rightly opines that “conventional litigation processes and 
ADR are not enemies, but partners. Neither can ignore developments in the other”.125  
As Fiadjoe notes, “at present, it is perhaps more accurate to include in these processes, 
some aspects of litigation, such as case management. In any case, primarily in the USA, 
ADR has developed as an adjunct to the legal systems, rather than in direct contrast 
to litigation”.126  Furthermore, Richard Hill submits that “while mediation can at times 
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help to resolve disputes before they are litigated, it is often used to resolve them 
during the course of litigation, before the final award is rendered. Indeed mediation 
can also be used at the early stages of arbitration…”127 For example, the High Court of 
Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2012 mandates parties to participate in “ADR” 
proceedings, subsequent upon which they may then be allowed to initiate proper 
court proceedings.128 Article 197 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code clearly provides that 
“litigation shall be preceded by an attempt at conciliation”.129 However parties are 
allowed to opt for mediation (instead of conciliation) under appropriate 
circumstances.130 In fact, the English courts in Dunnet v Railtrack131 penalised a party 
for failing to heed the court’s advice to consider ADR.132 It is therefore clear that 
litigation has evolved from a stand-alone process to a more inclusive process.133 
Even in arbitration proceedings, the foremost dispute resolution institutions 
encourage parties to explore mediation proceedings, after which they may then 
institute arbitral proceedings. In its recently released Mediation Rules, the ICC 
recommends a mediation clause, which provides that “in the event of any dispute 
arising out of or in connection with the present contract, the parties shall first refer the 
dispute to proceedings under the ICC Mediation Rules. If the dispute has not been 
settled pursuant to the said Rules within forty-five days following the filing of a 
Request for Mediation or within such other period as the parties may agree in writing, 
such dispute shall thereafter be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in 
accordance with the said Rules of Arbitration.”134 We therefore see the ICC allowing 
parties explore the non-contentious mediation process before opting for the 
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contentious arbitration process. In a situation where parties have agreed to explore 
ADR mechanisms before arbitration, they must exhaust the former before a 
subsequent arbitration proceeding can be validly initiated by any of the parties.135  
Likewise, it is virtually impossible to rule out the litigation process from arbitration 
proceedings. At various times and depending on the statutory framework in question, 
we see the involvement of the court in the arbitration process. For example, an award 
creditor is allowed to initiate enforcement proceedings in the court in order to enforce 
an award against an unwilling party in a foreign jurisdiction.136 We therefore see 
litigation by virtue of the authority of the New York Convention “stepping up” to 
make up for this “shortcoming” of arbitration. 
The question then is, if indeed the various procedural laws of the court make it 
mandatory for parties to explore these so called ADR procedures and if the different 
alternative dispute resolution rules of the foremost dispute resolution institutions also 
encourage parties to participate in other dispute resolution systems by way of a 
complementary process, is the definition of ADR still relevant or valid?  
Admittedly, this concept may have been relevant at a time when litigation was the 
traditional and principal method of resolving all disputes. At that time, it made sense 
to refer to all other methods of resolving disputes as being alternatives to litigation. 
However, in an era where the principal method of resolving a dispute depends on the 
nature and type of dispute in question, restricting the scope of ADR to a particular set 
of dispute resolution methods amounts to unreasonable dogma. It completely 
counters all the efforts made by stakeholders to promote arbitration, mediation, 
negotiation and conciliation when we still tag these methods with a name that 
arguably implies that they are second-rate to litigation despite recent trends 
suggesting otherwise. The fact that this has always been the practice is no reason to be 
bound by the shackles of the past.  If we insist on sticking with this very outdated 
acronym known as ADR, the word “alternative” within the concept is very 
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misleading. As discussed above, the modern rules of many dispute resolution systems 
clearly show that these systems are not mutually exclusive.  
In concluding this part of the chapter, a number of questions arise, which we will deal 
with in the concluding chapters of this thesis. We have seen that many jurisdictions 
have made ADR mechanisms a kind of pre-action step to litigation proceedings.137 It 
is however not clear if ADR in this context includes arbitration. In view of Article 7 of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples Right and Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, for example, which seem to guarantee parties right of access to the 
public courts, can the law force parties to arbitrate their disputes? How do we 
reconcile the provisions of the aforementioned international instruments, which seem 
to guarantee parties right of access to the courts, with decisions of the English court as 
in the case of Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust,138 where the Court of Appeal 
held that the courts are able to strongly encourage parties to explore mediation? How 
do we also reconcile the aforementioned decision with decisions of the English courts, 
where a party was penalised for not exploring ADR?139 
Very similar is a recent development in a jurisdiction like Ghana, where the courts 
have been empowered to refer any pending litigation, which in its opinion is more 
suited for arbitration, to arbitration.140 A number of questions arise as regards the 
validity of such an arbitration since the existence of an agreement in such a situation 
is questionable.141 Can a decision of an arbitration tribunal be challenged on this basis? 
We address these questions in Chapter Six of this thesis.  
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5.0    ARBITRATION: A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO LITIGATION 
5.1     Limitations of litigation  
In Chapter Two, we extensively discussed some of the problems of the Nigerian Court 
system. We highlighted delay and backlog of cases, industrial strikes, incompetent 
Judges and bad decisions as some of these problems. In order to tackle them, we 
concluded the said chapter by making a case for reforms especially emphasizing the 
viability of arbitration as a solution and as an alternative method to litigation.  
In addition to the aforementioned points, other factors have emerged, which have 
further emphasised the inadequacies of litigation. Unlike the situation in the past 
where business activities were limited to the confines of a particular jurisdiction, 
business relationships have now developed beyond State boundaries.  Today the 
world has become one big economic village.  Christian Buhring-Uhle submits that “the 
world is becoming smaller as national boundaries are becoming more permeable and 
are gradually losing their economic significance. The volume of world trade is steadily 
increasing modern technology and the continuing shift towards market economies 
and free trade are creating an increasingly globalised world economy”.142  There has 
been an increase in the number of cross-border transactions and relationships existing 
between parties from different jurisdictions. Parties are more adventurous and willing 
to partner with foreign persons, both natural and artificial. 
Unfortunately, this development has also created a multitude of legal problems which 
have had to be reverted to the courts, thus emphasizing some of the inadequacies of 
the court system highlighted in the previous chapter. Neither party may be willing to 
submit to the jurisdiction of a counterpart for fear that it will confer some form of 
advantage on the other party. Furthermore, parties have found themselves having to 
deal with unexpected Conflict of Laws and Renvoi issues arising as a result of the 
many and very different laws involved in a typical international commercial contract. 
Dicey, Morris and Collin illustrate this issue when they submit that, “if an action is 
brought in an English Court for damages for breach of a contract made in England 
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between two Englishmen and to be performed in England, there is no foreign element, 
the case is not a case in the conflict of laws, and the English court will naturally apply 
English internal or domestic law. But if the contract had been made in Switzerland 
between two Swiss and was to be performed in Switzerland, then the case would (for 
an English, but not for a Swiss court) be a case in the conflict of law, and the English 
court would apply Swiss law to most of the matters in dispute before it, just as a Swiss 
court would naturally apply Swiss law to all such matters. If we change the facts once 
more and assume that the contract was made in Switzerland between an Englishman 
and a Swiss but was to be performed in England, the case is a case in the conflict of 
laws not only for an English court but also for a Swiss court and indeed for any court 
in the world in which the contract is litigated…”143 Parties are foisted with 
implications that they may not have foreseen and the courts are also expected to 
decide a dispute through a system of laws with which they may not be familiar or 
conversant with. 
Even when parties are able to agree on a particular national court, the problem of 
enforcing the judgement in a foreign jurisdiction becomes pertinent since under 
international law, the process of enforcing a foreign judgement in another jurisdiction 
is not straightforward. Christian Buhring- Uhle rightly notes that “due to territorial 
limitations of jurisdiction, a court judgement has no force outside the jurisdiction 
where it is rendered”.144 In other words, the judgement is subject to the laws of the 
forum court. This difficulty can be attributed to the principle of sovereignty, which 
recognises the independence of every state from external control. In Nigeria, for 
example, the enforcement of foreign judgements is governed by the Foreign 
Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act.145 Apart from judgements from England, 
Ireland, Scotland and every other country that make up the Commonwealth,146 the 
enforcement of judgements from other jurisdictions is subject to certain requirements. 
A party who has successfully obtained judgement in country P could very well face a 
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situation where country B refuses to recognize and enforce his judgement for failing 
to fulfil certain internal requirements. 
Many jurisdictions have therefore entered into some form of agreement or 
relationship with other jurisdictions in order to bridge this gap. Unfortunately, many 
of the existing conventions and regulations are limited along continental lines. There 
is no encompassing regulation or convention in international litigation that cuts across 
all jurisdictions.  In England for example, the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgement is regulated by the Brussels Regulation,147 the European Enforcement Order 
(“EEO”) Regulation148 and the Lugano Convention,149 among other existing but specific 
bilateral agreements. The Brussels Regulation and the EEO Regulations are limited to 
members of the European Union.  
More recently, commercial relations generally have now assumed a very technical and 
specialised nature, which many national courts, as we mentioned in Chapter Two, 
have proven incapable of properly administering. These emerging and very technical 
areas of commercial law often require special knowledge and experience to 
administer.150 As Gary Born rightly noted, “in some states, local courts have little 
expertise or training in resolving international transaction or disputes and can face 
serious difficulties in fully comprehending the business context and terms of the 
parties dispute”.151  Julian D.M Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis et al in their own contribution 
to this issue opined that the courts in many jurisdictions “do not necessarily have the 
knowledge of, or ability to handle disputes arising from international business 
transactions or even disputes between parties from different countries i.e with 
conflicting legal cultural, political and ethical systems.”152 Judges therefore find 
themselves having to grapple with issues beyond their knowledge and/or 
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comprehension, leaving parties to deal with the effects of their confusion, which can 
often be disastrous.153 
Parties may also find themselves very reluctant (and reasonably so) to submit their 
dispute to the courts of particular jurisdictions, even when it is clear and obvious that 
these courts are properly seised of the dispute.  This can be due to a number of reasons.  
For example, the courts in some jurisdictions have been known to be corrupt, slow 
and overworked,154 thereby making them unsuitable for modern business disputes, 
which are frequently time-sensitive. Another key reason is the need to put an end to 
the dispute resolution process. For example, the two (2) staged appeal process within 
the Nigerian civil litigation system has proven to be a useful tactic to frustrate, delay 
or wear out a judgement creditor.155 
Also, the nature of many international contracts seem to require that business affairs 
are kept discreet and private. Jean-Francois Guillemin submits that “wrong or 
incomplete publicity about a dispute can harm a company, commercial activity, share 
price or ability to raise finance”.156 This explains the rise in the use of Non-Disclosure 
Agreements.157 It therefore completely defeats the whole purpose and effort behind a 
Non-Disclosure Agreement when parties are required to bare all, through a dispute 
resolution system that is open to the public.  
All these reasons among many others, have encouraged the rise of arbitration 
especially in the resolution of international commercial disputes. 
5.2     How does Arbitration come in? 
The structure and practice of arbitration has, in more recent years, evolved from what 
Professor Philippe Fouchard previously referred to as an “an apparently rudimentary 
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method of settling disputes”158 to a more developed and seemingly complicated 
process. Gone are the days when parties submitted their disputes to “ordinary 
individuals whose only qualification is that of being chosen by the parties.”159 Today, 
arbitration has assumed a more developed and defined position. According to 
Redfern and Hunter, “States have modernized their laws so as to be seen to be 
arbitration friendly, firms of lawyers and accountants have established dedicated 
groups of arbitration specialists; conferences and seminars proliferate and the 
distinctive law and practice of international arbitration has become a subject for study 
in universities and law schools alike”.160 Unfortunately, countries like Nigeria are yet 
to update their framework to reflect modern trends and practices.161 
The practice of modern arbitration has its roots in the doctrine of party autonomy,162 
which refers to the “freedom of the parties to construct their contractual relationship 
in the way they see fit”163 and independent of the constraints of national law.164 It is 
the “guiding principle in determining the procedure to be followed in an international 
commercial arbitration. It is a principle that has been endorsed not only in national 
laws, but by international arbitral institutions and organizations.”165 Not only does 
this doctrine provide the foundation for arbitration, it provides the legal basis for the 
decisions taken by the parties throughout the proceedings.166 Gaillard and Savage add 
that “the obligation to submit disputes covered by an arbitration agreement to 
arbitration, results from a straightforward application of the principle that parties are 
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bound by their contracts. This principle, which is expressed as the maxim pacta sunt 
servanda, is probably the most widely recognized rule of international contract law”.167 
This agreement is a conscious exercise of choice and it brings to life a creature 
(arbitration) that owes its existence to the will of parties alone.168 
Section 1(b) of the English Act provides that “parties shall be free to agree on how their 
disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public 
interest”.169 The Model law also states that “...parties are free to agree on the procedure 
to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting their proceedings.”170 It is this 
very principle of party autonomy that gives parties the right to opt out of their legal 
right of access to the court and choose arbitration.171 Julian D.M Lew et al rightly noted 
that “however fulsome or simple the arbitration agreement, the parties have ultimate 
control of their dispute resolution system”.172 In other words, by exercising this right 
of autonomy, parties and their counsel are able to avoid some of the bottlenecks that 
may be encountered in litigation. It enables parties avoid the endemic jurisdictional 
choice of law difficulties that may accompany international contracts, for example 173.  
Of course, one must point out that the seemingly unlimited right of parties to opt for 
arbitration and determine their arbitration process, is not open ended as it is subject 
to the principle of arbitrability. As Professor Bantekas rightly noted, questions on 
arbitrability are usually determined by reference to the relevant domestic law of the 
forum.174 For example, issues relating to environmental law are not arbitrable in 
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Ghana.175 In addition, a jurisdiction like the United Kingdom has compulsory or what 
is known as mandatory provisions, which take precedence over parties’ agreement.176 
According to Redfern and Hunter, “a reference to arbitration means that the dispute 
is likely to be determined in a neutral forum (or place of arbitration) rather than on 
the home ground of one party or the other.”177 The Nigerian Supreme Court in 
Commerce Assurance Limited v Alli held that “…to constitute a proper arbitration, which 
the courts can enforce, there must be an agreement to submit the matter to 
arbitration.”178 As Gary Born rightly noted, “absent a valid agreement to arbitrate, 
there are generally no legal grounds for requiring a party to arbitrate a dispute or for 
enforcing an arbitral award against a party”.179 Rosabel E. Goodman-Everard 
recommends that the agreement be as broad as possible in order to avoid unnecessary 
controversy as to the validity of the agreement as well as the jurisdiction of the 
arbitrators.180 A standard arbitration agreement should determine the following; the 
applicable law, the seat of arbitration, the number of arbitrators, the language of the 
arbitration and the form of arbitration. 
Subject to the applicable law, a valid arbitration agreement can either be oral or in 
writing.181 The revised UNCITRAL Model Law for example provides for both oral and 
written arbitration agreements.182 Piero Bernardini opined that “because of the 
importance of an agreement, which is meant to exclude the jurisdiction of the national 
                                                          
International 391; J. Paulsson, ‘Arbitrability still through a Glass Darkly” in Arbitration in the Next 
Decade’ (ICC Bulletin, Special Supplement, 1999) 95. 
175 Ghanaian Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010, section 1. 
176 See for example, Schedule 1 of the English Arbitration Act 1996. 
177 Nigel Blackaby et al, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, (5th Edition, Oxford Press, 
2009) 32. 
178 (1992) 4 SCNJ 145. 
179 Gary Born (n 151) 1. 
180 Rosabel E. Goodman-Everard, ‘Choosing a Place for International Arbitration: The New York 
Option’ (1985) 2(2) Journal of International Arbitration 39, 47. 
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courts, the arbitration agreement must be writing”.183 The aforementioned is a blanket 
statement, which is subject to considerations. For example, we argue in Chapter Four 
and Six of this thesis that developing countries like Nigeria, Ghana and the OHADA 
countries have no business incorporating and insisting on a strict written requirement 
for their domestic arbitration practice in view of the level of illiteracy in the said 
jurisdictions.  
Admittedly, the aforementioned argument may not apply to international arbitration 
involving these jurisdictions. This is particularly important in cases where it is 
anticipated that the backing of a foreign court will be needed to enforce an arbitration 
award.  Article II of the New York Convention,184 which is the principal convention 
governing the enforcement of international arbitration awards, requires that the 
arbitration agreement be in writing. Writing has been defined to include “an electronic 
communication, if the information contained therein is accessible so as to be useable 
for subsequent reference”.185 This flexible definition given to the concept of writing 
emphasizes the fluid nature of arbitration.186 Parties in different jurisdictions are 
therefore able to enter into a valid international arbitration agreement conveniently.  
Going back to Chapter Two, parties are able to avoid the problems of delay, lengthy 
and periodic industrial strike actions and backlog of cases by appointing arbitrators 
with the time and flexibility needed to properly resolve their disputes. As we will see 
in Chapter Six, many jurisdictions stipulate that a prospective arbitrator provide 
parties with any information likely to affect his ability to effectively discharge his 
duties as arbitrator. In fact, the ICC's Arbitration Rules mandate the ICC court to 
consider the availability of the prospective arbitrator before appointment.187 
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In addition, modern arbitration provisions provide for pre-trial conferences in which 
parties are expected to meet and agree on preliminary issues which ordinarily would 
have stalled the proceedings.188 Any agreement reached at this stage is to be recorded 
in the form of a Terms of Reference189 and/or Procedural Time Table.190 All of these 
measures help to minimize the possibility of delay to the barest minimum. 
Parties can agree to have their arbitration administered either adhoc or via the rules 
of an established arbitration institution. Adhoc arbitration refers to proceedings 
governed by bespoke rules of procedure determined by either parties or their 
arbitrators. Piero Bernardini submits that “in an adhoc arbitration…utmost care 
should be taken as to the drafting of the arbitration clause…”191 Parties must, however, 
ensure that whatever rules they agree upon treat “…the parties with equality and 
allows each party a reasonable opportunity of presenting its case.”192 
Institutional arbitration, on the other hand, refers to any dispute administered via the 
rules and services of an arbitration institution. This could either be via general 
institutions193 or specialized institutions.194 Unlike adhoc arbitration, where parties get 
to determine the rules of procedure governing their dispute, parties who opt for 
institutional arbitration need not worry about such issues as they are usually already 
taken care of by the arbitration institution.  Again, as previously mentioned, parties 
are able to choose and apply part or all of any law of their choice. The aforementioned 
point allows parties determine their disputes via rules and laws of their choice as 
against one foisted on them by the State.  
Furthermore, parties to an international arbitration are able to take advantage of the 
sophisticated and up-to-date frameworks of institutions like the International 
                                                          
188 The ICC Arbitration Rules 2012, article 24. 
189 The ICC Arbitration Rules 2012, article 23. 
190 The ICC Arbitration Rules 2012, article 24. 
191 Piero Bernardini (n 183) 49. 
192 Nigel Blackaby et al, (n 120) 53. 
193 Generalist Institutions are set up to administer all types of commercial disputes. Examples include 
the International Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of International Arbitration, the 
International Centre for Dispute Resolution among many others. 
194 Specialist institutions are set up to administer special types of disputes. Examples include Court of 
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Chamber of Commerce and the London Court of International Arbitration. This 
provision allows parties avoid the problems and ambiguity associated with the flawed 
laws in a country like Nigeria as parties are in fact able to be specific and by extension 
avoid some of the negative effects of parts or all of a particular law.195 
Parties to an arbitration proceeding have the option of appointing a specialized 
arbitration tribunal to administer their dispute.196 This takes care of the issue of 
incompetence and corrupt staff members as highlighted in Chapter Two.197 As 
Professor Andrew Chukwuemerie rightly noted, unlike a Judge, an arbitrator “owes 
the parties a direct responsibility or accountability as it were on how professionally 
and diligently he goes about his work. If he gets corrupt, he can be far more easily be 
challenged than a Judge can be challenged”.198 Furthermore, as was submitted in 
Chapter Two, the average Judge in Nigeria lacks the exposure, knowledge and 
expertise needed to properly administer disputes arising from specialized 
transactions.  
Arbitration therefore affords parties the opportunity to choose adjudicators with the 
requisite skill, training and knowledge needed to properly administer their 
specialized dispute.199 For example, parties to a Nigerian land dispute may appoint 
an arbiter with the skills and knowledge of statutory and customary law200 to 
administer their dispute. Parties could also approach any of the existing specialized 
institutions, appoint specialist arbitrators further to the rules of a general institution,201 
                                                          
195Nigel Blackaby et al (n 5) 30. 
196 Janet A. Rosen, “Arbitration Under Private International Law: The Doctrine of Separability and 
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request that a generalist institution appoints arbitrators with specific skills or even 
appoint a specialist arbitrator further to their ad hoc arbitration.202 
Other considerations that may come into play when appointing an arbitrator include 
“prospective arbitrators’ nationality, residence and other relationships with the 
countries of which the parties or the other arbitrators are nationals and the prospective 
arbitrators’ availability…”203 It has been opined that an arbitrator may be assumed to 
be neutral if he has a different nationality to that of the parties.204 Generally, in a 
domestic arbitration, anybody including foreigners can be appointed as arbitrator.205 
As an aside, it is the position of this writer that the well-established arbitration custom 
which allows parties to nominate their arbitrator (in a three-man tribunal), raises a 
number of ethical issues. For one, it is not unreasonable to assume that parties (or their 
counsel) will go “forum shopping” to select an arbitrator who holds a view that is 
sympathetic to their case. A good example of this can be seen in Locabail v Bayfield 
Properties,206 which involved an insurance company. The court was forced to give 
leave to appeal when it was discovered that the arbitrator had expressed strong views 
in an academic article which went against the defendant and the insurers. Professor 
Martin Hunter acknowledged that in selecting an arbitrator, he is particular about 
selecting an arbitrator that is maximally predisposed to his client’s case as well as one 
that was likely to be persuaded by his clients’ argument.207 The point being made here 
is that with reasonable diligence, a lawyer is able to circumvent the ends of “justice” 
by selecting an arbitrator who may be sympathetic to his case and not necessarily one 
that will be fair and just.  
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The problem then is how to strike a balance between parties’ right to choose their 
arbitrators as against the ends of a fair and just process. Re-echoing Professor 
Paulsson’s words, “I do realise that this genie – the “right” to appoint an arbitrator- 
cannot easily be put back in the bottle. I am ready for pragmatic solutions until my 
position finally prevails. Indeed, there are ways of reducing contamination.”208 
Even though not entirely satisfactory, the position under the English Arbitration Act 
1996 and the Ghanaian ADR Act 2010209 (which as we will see in Chapter Six, seems 
to be the general practice) possibly strikes the much needed balance since it allows 
parties to appoint their arbitrator while at the same time allowing the introduction of 
an independent third party who, by presiding over the proceedings, neutralizes any 
element of bias that may arise.210 We come to this issue in Chapter Seven of this thesis.   
Generally, arbitration proceedings are said to be faster than litigation proceedings.211 
Parties are also able to beat the issue of delay highlighted in Chapter Two by providing 
and abiding by what the ICC arbitration rules refer to as a procedural timetable.212 
Notable again is the fact that proceedings need not be held at the place of arbitration. 
Parties could, for example, opt to hold proceedings at a mutually convenient 
jurisdiction or even via video conferencing.213  
Furthermore, as Professor Ilias Bantekas noted, parties especially in consumer related 
disputes can opt to resolve their dispute via online arbitration.214  This again shows 
the fluidity of arbitration, especially as regards the developments in the commercial 
environment. Parties therefore need not expend unnecessary time and money 
travelling to a particular place just for a few hours of proceedings. This will no doubt 
be very useful in a country covering a total area of 356, 667 square meters (923, 768 
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delivered as Holder of the Michael R. Klien Distinguished Scholar Chair, University of Miami School 
of Law 29 April 2010) 11 <www.arbitration 
icca.org/media/0/12773749999020/paulsson_moral_hazard.pdf> accessed 15 April 2016.  
209 See Section 16(5) (b) of the English Act and Section 14(2) (b) of the Ghanaian Act. 
210 This is the position in practice. 
211 Pierre A. Karrer, ‘Arbitration Saves Costs: Poker and Hide-and- Seek’ (1986) 3(1) Journal of 
International Arbitration 35, 36. 
212 ICC’s International Court of Arbitration Rule 2012, article 24. 
213 International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules 2012, article 18(2). 
214 Ilias Bantekas (n 3) 265 -272. 
82 
 
square meters), with a total of thirty-six states and a population of about 177, 1555, 754 
people with an expected growth rate of 2.47%.215 
Arbitration is, by its very nature, a private arrangement between parties and so parties 
are able to avoid airing their dirty laundry in the public.216 This is said to be a major 
advantage of arbitration.217 It has however been suggested that the confidentiality of 
the process is not necessarily automatic218 and that it in fact has its limitations.219 In 
some instances also, confidentiality can arguably be implied into parties’ 
agreement.220 For example, the English courts seem to have adopted the idea that the 
pleadings, witness statements, transcripts and the award emanating from the 
proceedings are exempted from public view.221 The courts are willing to lift this veil 
of confidentiality in certain instances: in the interest of justice, where there is mutual 
consent of parties or where it is reasonably necessary for the protection of the interest 
of a party to the arbitration.222 
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Upon conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator is expected to render an 
award.223 Unlike most judgements of the court, which can be subject to appeal, 
arbitration decisions are usually final. The English Arbitration Act for example 
provides that “an award made by the tribunal pursuant to an arbitration agreement is 
final and binding both on the parties and on any persons claiming through or under 
them”.224 On the face of it, the Model Law seems to be more flexible than the English 
Arbitration Act as it does not use the word “final”. The Model Law provides that “an 
arbitration award may be set aside…only if…”225 This by implication means that 
except in very rare situations, an award made further to the Model Law is final.  The 
Nigerian Supreme Court has also held in Ras Pal Gazi v FCDA that a valid award on a 
voluntary reference no doubt operates between the parties as a final and conclusive 
judgement upon all matters referred.226 However, as with many other legal provisions, 
this principle of law is subject to exceptions. The Model Law, for example, allows the 
court to intervene in situations where a party can prove that his power of choice has 
been violated227 or when the award in question runs contrary to an applicable state 
law or policy.228 
A fundamental feature of arbitration is a binding decision.229 This feature 
distinguishes it from the other “ADR” mechanisms. The usual practice is for parties 
to abide by the decision of their arbitrators. In a survey conducted by Queen Mary 
University of London in 2008, it was revealed that 89% of the time, an award debtor 
abided by the award voluntarily, albeit reluctantly.230 However, as Micheal Mcilwrath 
and John Savage highlight, “getting a favourable award in an arbitration is sometimes 
the easy part of the dispute resolution process. Where the successful party- the award 
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creditor- has been awarded money damages and the debtors’ resists payment, the 
creditor will need to take further steps in order to actually be paid, with each step 
presenting another opportunity for the award debtor to resist or just delay 
payment.”231 The relevance of the courts at this point cannot be overstated.232 Henry 
P. de Vries submits that arbitration cannot function effectively without the support of 
the courts.233 
The New York Convention234 provides what is arguably the biggest advantage of 
arbitration, especially to international commercial transactions.235 The New York 
Convention was enacted to give recognition and effect to “an arbitral award made in 
the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of 
such awards are sought”.236 In other words, the Convention provides an easy way of 
enforcing foreign awards.237 The Convention has arguably made all signatories of the 
convention one arbitration jurisdiction.238 
It is not enough to check if the country where an award is to be enforced is a signatory 
to the New York Convention, it is also important to confirm that the country has not 
in any way limited the application of the Convention to specific states or situations. 
The New York Convention provides that “any State may on the basis of reciprocity 
declare that it will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards 
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made only in the territory of another contracting State. It may also declare that it will 
apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether 
contractual or not…”239 A country is therefore allowed to limit the application of the 
New York Convention. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The failure of the State-run dispute resolution system has encouraged the search for a 
replacement or better still an alternative. While there are a number of competing 
alternatives, we submitted in this chapter that arbitration remains the most viable 
alternative to litigation. It balances the certainty of the court system with the flexibility 
associated with ADR mechanisms like mediation and negotiation.  In other words, 
arbitration provides parties with the best of both worlds.  
Of course, arbitration is not without its problems.240 For example, it is said to be very 
expensive, it is said not to take into consideration the rights and interests of third 
parties, amongst others.241 However as we will see in subsequent chapters, the 
viability of arbitration definitely outweighs its disadvantages.  Besides as we will see 
in Chapter Six, newer arbitration frameworks like the English Arbitration Act 1996 
have begun to make efforts to mitigate some of these disadvantages. Little wonder the 
mechanism has witnessed a rapid spread across the nations of the world.  
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration242 has no doubt 
played a major role in this development.243 As of today, sixty-seven States are recorded 
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to have adopted the Model Law.244 Examples of African countries which have 
domesticated the Model Law include Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya and Zambia, among 
many others.  The courts and institutions in many African countries have also proven 
to be favourably disposed to arbitration.245 For instance, the Nigerian courts, in their 
very recent decision in Mutual Life and General Insurance ltd v Iheme,246 clearly 
reaffirmed their pro-arbitration stance when they held that they will uphold any 
unequivocal agreement made by parties to submit their dispute to arbitration. The 
Ghanaian Supreme Court in Klimatechnik Engineering ltd v Skanska Jensen International 
has also held that “the courts have a duty to support and give validity to arbitral 
awards properly procured”.247 Generally therefore, the courts in Africa do not view 
arbitration as an affront to their jurisdiction.248 
In Nigeria, we have two major arbitration frameworks: the Nigerian Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act 2004 and customary arbitration practice. In Chapter Four and Five, 
we will examine the extent to which both frameworks provide a practical domestic 
arbitration framework and by extension, a viable alternative to the court system. We 
believe that analysing the suitability of the existing arbitration frameworks provides 
a veritable platform upon which we can achieve the purpose of this thesis, which is to 
build or develop a bespoke domestic arbitration framework for Nigeria.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DOMESTIC ARBITRATION IN NIGERIA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Three of this thesis, we established the viability of arbitration, first as 
against the other ADR mechanisms and also as against the litigation practice.  We 
concluded by highlighting the existing arbitration frameworks in Nigeria: the 
Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 20041 and customary arbitration practice.2 
Chapter Four takes the discussion a step further by analysing the domestic arbitration 
practice as contained in both the aforementioned Act as well as Nigerian case law.  
The significance of this instant chapter cannot be over stated; it not only analyses the 
domestic arbitration practice in Nigeria, it more importantly emphasises the lacunas 
within the law as well as justifies our call for reforms in the light of the Nigerian 
situation. As Dr Olawoyin rightly noted, the importance of an arbitral regime that is 
useful and responsive to the needs of its proposed users, is an indispensable 
component of the developmental activities of any nation.3 Furthermore, it provides a 
framework upon which Nigeria’s domestic arbitration practice can be compared with 
more developed but relevant arbitration frameworks, thus highlighting significant 
developments that may have occurred between 1988 and now.4 
This chapter is divided into five major parts. The first part provides a brief background 
of statutory arbitration in Nigeria. In Part Two, we examine the concept of domestic 
arbitration. Contrary to traditional opinion, this writer argues that domestic 
arbitration is not necessarily limited to purely national or domestic matters. We opine 
that not only is the idea of domestic arbitration many times dependent on an 
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understanding of international arbitration, a knowledge of domestic arbitration law is 
also a relevant aspect of the practice of international arbitration.  
In Part Three of this chapter, we introduce the reader to the practice of domestic 
arbitration in Nigeria. With the aid of Nigerian case law and statutory provisions, we 
critically examine the domestic arbitration practice in Nigeria. In the fourth part of 
this chapter, we analyse the 2005 report of the National Committee on the Reform and 
Harmonization of Arbitration and ADR Laws in Nigeria (“the Committee”).5 In this 
report, the Committee recommended two different bills, the Federal Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act (FACA) and the Uniform State Arbitration and Conciliation Law 
(USAC), to administer international and domestic arbitration respectively.  Using the 
Lagos State Arbitration Law 2009 as a case study, we critically examine the contents 
of the Uniform State Arbitration and Conciliation Law.6 
In the fifth and final part of this chapter, we make a case for reforms.  Specifically, we 
highlight and examine controversial provisions embedded in Nigeria’s domestic 
arbitration practice. For example, this writer argues that in view of the social and 
economic situation in Nigeria, Section 1 of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 
which mandates that an arbitration agreement be written and signed, inhibits the 
growth and practice of the domestic arbitration practice in Nigeria. We also argue 
against Section 2 of the same Act, which allows courts to revoke a validly made 
arbitration agreement as well as criticise Section 5 of the Act, which gives courts the 
discretion to stay litigation proceedings even in the face of a validly made agreement.  
1.0  BACKGROUND 
1.1    Historical Background to Statutory Arbitration in Nigeria 
Despite its very scanty use, Nigeria’s domestic arbitration practice dates back to her 
colonial days.7 The first statutory arbitration framework in Nigeria was the Arbitration 
                                                          
5In September 2005, the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation, Chief Bayo Ojo, FCIArb (as he 
then was), put together a fifteen person committee to review Nigeria’s arbitration and ADR laws. 
6 As we will see, the Uniform State Arbitration and Conciliation Law was put in place as a kind of model 
law, to guide the States in Nigeria in the making of their arbitration laws.  
7 B.A Bukar, ‘Legal Framework For the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes: An 
examination of Nigeria’s Arbitration Laws’ (1999) 16(1) Journal of International Arbitration 47. 
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Ordinance of 1914.  This framework, which was modelled after the English Arbitration 
Act 1889 was introduced on 31st of December 1914, subsequent to the amalgamation 
of the Northern and Southern Protectorate of Nigeria. The 1914 Ordinance was 
however replaced by the Arbitration Ordinance of 1958,8 which was then in force until 
14th of March 1988 when the Federal Military Government introduced the Arbitration 
and Conciliation Decree No 11 of 1988.9 Professor Koyinsola Ajayi pointed out that the 
aforementioned Decree was promulgated as one of the means to improve the 
investment climate in Nigeria.10 
 This Decree was modelled after the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.11 
This was a departure from Nigeria’s usual practice of adopting English law.12 The said 
Arbitration Decree also domesticated the New York Convention 1958 in Nigeria.13 
This UNCITRAL Model Law (“the Model Law”) was introduced by the UNCITRAL,14 
an organization of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 21st of June 1985. 
The Model Law was introduced to provide a unified legal framework for the fair and 
efficient settlement of disputes arising in international commercial relations.15 The 
General Assembly of the United Nation did not however adopt this law until the 11th 
of December 1985, after it had consulted with arbitration experts and institutions. The 
Model Law was nonetheless revised in 2006. 
                                                          
8 Chapter 13 of the Law of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos 1958. 
9 Paul Idornigie, ‘Overview of ADR in Nigeria’ (2002) 73(1) Arbitration 73; Andrew Chukwuemerie, 
‘Salient Issues in the Law and Practice of Arbitration in Nigeria’ (2006) 14 African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 1,6. 
10 Koyinsola Ajayi, ‘Nigeria’s New Arbitral and Conciliatory Process’ (1989) 7(9) International Banking 
Law 140. 
11 The Law also incorporates the UNCITRAL Model Rules. 
12 Gaius Ezejiofor, ‘The Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act: A Challenge to the Court’ (1993) 
January Journal of Business Law 82,84. 
13 See the Second Schedule of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 
14 This body was established in 1966 to among other things, assist the UN to improve the legal 
framework for international trade and non-legislative texts for use by commercial parties in negotiating 
transactions. UNCITRAL legislative texts address international sales of good, international commercial 
dispute resolution including both arbitration and conciliation, electronic commerce, insolvency and 
security interests. 
15UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 (With amendments as adopted 
in 2006) <www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf>  
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By virtue of certain constitutional provisions, the aforementioned Arbitration and 
Conciliation Decree No 11 of 1988 has been converted into an Act of the National 
Assembly and is now known as the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (“the Arbitration 
Act or the Act”).16 This change has however not affected the content, scope and 
structure of the law itself. This conversion arose as a result of the change in 
dispensation from military to democratic rule on 29th May 1999.17 Rather than 
discarding all pre-existing laws, Section 315(1) (a) of the Constitution18 of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria provides that “…an existing law shall have effect…and shall be 
deemed to be an Act of the National Assembly”. Section 315(4)(b) of the Constitution 
goes ahead to define existing laws to mean “any rule of law or enactment or 
instrument whatsoever which is in force immediately before the date when this 
section comes into force or which having been passed or made before that date, comes 
into force after that date…” This way, rather than enact brand new laws for every 
facet, the Constitution converted existing military laws to democratic laws. 
There was a failed attempt to reform the Act in 2005. The Federal Government put 
together a group known as the Reform and Harmonization of Arbitration and ADR 
Laws in Nigeria Committee. In the concluding parts of this chapter, we examine the 
Committee’s report as it relates to domestic arbitration.  
2.0  DEFINING THE SCOPE OF DOMESTIC ARBITRATION 
2.1     Domestic Arbitration in General 
A proper definition of domestic arbitration is very integral to the success of this thesis, 
mainly because we ultimately intend to propose a suitable domestic arbitration 
framework for Nigeria. In order to achieve this objective, it is important to understand 
and properly define the concept of domestic arbitration and its scope in Nigeria.  
                                                          
16 Chapter A18, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
17 After a long Military rule dating back to 1983, General Abdulsalam Abubakar handed over to the 
elected Civilian government of former President, General Olusegun Obasanjo on May 29 1999. Prior to 
the handover, the Military government had come up with the existing 1999 Constitution, which is 
largely based on the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria. 
18 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
91 
 
In defining domestic arbitration, it is easy to assume that it refers to any arbitration 
without a foreign element. A commentator like Charles Manzoni adopted this idea 
when he submitted that domestic arbitration was concerned with purely national or 
domestic matters. In his opinion, it did not matter whether the relevant nation was 
Thailand, England or Germany. If everything relating to the arbitration is connected 
to one specific jurisdiction, then the arbitration is a domestic arbitration.19 Professor 
Paul Idornigie also opines that in distinguishing between international and domestic 
arbitration, a dispute should be categorised as international by virtue of its nature 
and/or the parties involved.20 Even the widely acclaimed Redfern and Hunter noted 
that, “the term international is used to mark the difference between arbitrations which 
are purely national or domestic and those which in some way transcend national 
boundaries and so are international, or in the terminology adopted by Judge Jessup, 
transnational.”21 The popular opinion therefore seems to be that domestic arbitration 
is limited to national or domestic matters.22 
While the aforementioned definitions may in many instances be true, we will in the 
course of this section come to see that it is in fact impossible to give an encompassing 
or generally accepted definition of domestic arbitration. Unlike international 
arbitration, there are no generally accepted model frameworks specifically devoted to 
promote and enforce the practice of domestic arbitration.23 As we will also come to 
see, various jurisdictions have different definitions of what amounts to domestic 
arbitration. Unfortunately, the widely acclaimed text books on arbitration provide 
little guidance as they seem to be more focused on international arbitration.  These 
                                                          
19 Charles Manzoni, ‘International Arbitration: The key Elements’ 
<www.39essex.com/docs/articles/CMZ_International_Arbitration_050504.pdf>  accessed 14 August 
2015.  
20 Paul Idornigie, ‘The 1988 Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act: Need For Review?’ (2003) 6(3) 
International Arbitration Law Review 50,53. 
21 Nigel Blackaby et al, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th Edition, Oxford Press 2009) 9. 
22 See also Hans Smit, ‘A National Law’ (1988-1989) 63 Tulane Law Review 629; Asouzu, International 
Commercial Arbitration in African States: Practice, Participation and Institutional Development (Cambridge 
University Press 2001) 160. 
23 UNCITRAL Model law 1985, article 1(1). 
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provide very little direction for domestic arbitration as both practices arguably 
operate under very different considerations.24 
The International Arbitration and Mediators, Australia Rules (IAMAR) provides a simple 
but very apt definition of domestic arbitration when it defines it “as any arbitration 
which is not an international arbitration”.25 This very simple definition when 
examined critically is both reasonable and practical.  If we assume that arbitration can 
either be international or domestic, it can also be implied that one can define either of 
these two types of arbitration by defining the other.26 In other words, since it is fairly 
easy to actually define the scope of international arbitration, it is safe to assume that 
any arbitration practice that does not fall under the umbrella of international 
arbitration should ordinarily fall under domestic arbitration.  
What then is international arbitration? The Model Law provides what is arguably the 
most comprehensive definition of international arbitration. It provides that “an 
arbitration is international if;   
a. The parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of conclusion of that 
agreement, their places of business in different States or; 
b. One of the following is situated outside the State in which the parties have their 
place of business; 
i. The place of arbitration if determined in, or pursuant to, the arbitration 
agreement; 
                                                          
24 Kenneth Glasner, QC, ‘A lawyers Primer in Drafting Arbitration Claims for a Domestic Arbitration’ 
(2010) 68(2) Advocate Vancouver 869, 870. 
25 Article 2 of the International Arbitrators and Mediators Australia 2007 
<www.iama.org.au/sites/default/files/resources/rules-guidelines/IAMAAR_FastTrack07.pdf> 
accessed 22 November 2014. 
26 Admittedly, in the case of African countries like Nigeria and Ghana, we also have a third type of 
arbitration called customary arbitration. Going by this IAMAR definition, to the extent that 
international and customary arbitration are clearly defined, we can then infer that any residual system 
is known as domestic arbitration. 
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ii. Any place where a substantial part of the obligations of the commercial 
relationship is to be performed or the place with which the subject 
matter of the dispute is most closely connected; or 
c. The parties have expressly agreed that the subject matter of the arbitration 
agreement relates to more than one country. “ 27 
From this definition of international arbitration, one can infer that for the purposes of 
the Model Law (and in any jurisdiction that has adopted this provision of the Model 
Law), domestic arbitration refers to any arbitration in which parties have registered 
and run their business in (or are nationalities of) the same State, have their place of 
business in (or are nationalities of) the same place as the seat of arbitration and the 
subject matter of the dispute is in one way or the other closely related to the place of 
business (or nationality) of both parties.   
Jurisdictions like the United Kingdom have adopted the Model Law’s implied 
definition of domestic arbitration in part. In Section 85 of the English Arbitration Act,28 a 
domestic arbitration agreement was expressly defined as “an arbitration agreement to 
which none of the parties is: 
a. An individual who is a national of, or habitually resident in, a State other than 
the United Kingdom, or 
b. A body corporate which is incorporated in, or whose central control and 
management is exercised in, a State other than the United Kingdom, and under 
which the seat of the arbitration (if the seat has been designated or determined) 
is in the United Kingdom.” 
All these definitions in a way seem to adopt the traditional view mentioned above. 
The confusion however sets in when we critically examine certain provisions of the 
New York Convention. It is generally accepted that the New York Convention is only 
applicable to the enforcement of international arbitration awards.  In defining its 
                                                          
27 UNCITRAL Model Law; article 1(3). 
28 English Arbitration Act 1996. 
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scope, the Convention provides that “it shall apply to arbitral awards not considered 
as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are 
sought”.29 
Two things can be deduced from the aforementioned provision of the New York 
Convention; first is that the definition of what qualifies to be called domestic 
arbitration varies between jurisdictions. For example, Croatia adopts what may be 
considered a very controversial definition of domestic arbitration. The Croatian 
Arbitration Act,30 which clearly limits the scope of its application to domestic 
arbitration31 proceeds to define domestic arbitration as an “arbitration that has place 
in the territory of the Republic of Croatia”.32 This in other words means that any 
arbitration with a seat in Croatia is by virtue of Croatian law domestic, 
notwithstanding any foreign element embedded in the arbitration.33 This definition 
clearly negates the traditional definition of domestic arbitration as defined above. 
Other countries like China have adopted the “more traditional definition” of domestic 
arbitration.34 As we will see in Section 2.2 of this chapter, Nigeria has its own 
completely different definition of what qualifies as domestic arbitration. 
The second point which can be inferred from the said Article 1(1) of the New York 
Convention is that the definition of domestic arbitration could be relevant during the 
recognition and enforcement of an international arbitration award, since the 
aforementioned provision limits the application of the Convention to an arbitral 
award “not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and 
enforcement are sought”. It is submitted that this provision of the New York 
                                                          
29 New York Convention 1958, article 1(1) 
30 Laws on Arbitration, Official Gazette 88/2001 of October 11, 2001.It came into force on October 19, 
2001<www.vsrh.hr/CustomPages/Static/HRV/Files/Legislation__Law-Arbitration-RC.pdf> 
accessed 22 November 2014. 
31 Croatian Arbitration Act 2001, article 1. 
32 ibid, article 2. 
33Hrvoje Bardek, CMS, ‘Arbitration in Croatia’ 
<https://eguides.cmslegal.com/pdf/arbitration_volume_I/CMS%20GtA_Vol%20I_CROATIA.pdf> 
accessed 12 December 2014. 
34Ulrike Glück and Falk Lichtenstein, CMS, ‘Arbitration in the People’s Republic of China’ 
<https://eguides.cmslegal.com/pdf/arbitration_volume_I/CMS%20GtA_Vol%20I_CHINA.pdf> 
accessed 22 November 2014.  
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Convention is very subjective and gives room for problematic interpretations. An 
award debtor can for example oppose an application to enforce a supposed 
international arbitration award by arguing that the said award qualifies as a domestic 
award in the State where the recognition and enforcement is sought even when the 
award meets all other requirements of an international arbitration award, thus 
defeating an otherwise valid arbitration award.  
This particular provision of the New York Convention in a way defeats one of the 
widely acclaimed advantages of the Convention (and by extension, arbitration), which 
is the enforcement of an international arbitral decision in member states. This position 
emphasises the need for an experienced legal practitioner when drafting contractual 
and arbitration agreements in order to avoid this rare but possible pitfall. 
2.2    Nigeria’s Definition of Domestic Arbitration 
Like many other jurisdictions, the Nigerian Arbitration Act does not provide a 
definition of domestic arbitration. It however defines and clearly states the scope of 
international arbitration; a definition of domestic arbitration can therefore be implied 
from same.  In Section 57 of the Nigerian Arbitration Act,35 the draftsman adopts the 
aforementioned Model Law’s definition of international arbitration. The draftsman 
however adds a further sub-section when it provides that an “arbitration is 
international if…the parties despite the nature of the contract expressly agree that any 
dispute arising from the commercial transaction shall be treated as an international 
arbitration.”36 This provision in other words gives parties the autonomy to legally 
convert what qualifies and fits the traditional description of domestic arbitration into 
an international arbitration through a mere agreement. 
                                                          
35 Chapter A18, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. 
36 Arbitration and Conciliation Act; section 57(2)(d). 
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It is difficult to comprehend the idea behind this provision.37 No doubt parties have 
been able to benefit from this conversion process. For example, Akpata and Atake38 
have suggested that this conversion process allows parties to a domestic arbitration to 
avoid the restriction imposed upon them by Article 4 of the Arbitration Rules (“the 
Rules”).39 Article 4 of the Rules provides that “the parties may be represented or assisted 
by legal practitioners of their choice.”40 Section 18 of the Nigerian Interpretation Act 
provides that “in an enactment, the following expressions have the meaning hereby 
assigned to them…legal practitioner has the meaning assigned to it by the Legal 
Practitioners Act”41 The combined effect of Section 24 and Section 2 of the Legal 
Practitioners Act42 defines a legal practitioner as any barrister or solicitor whose name 
is on the Nigerian Supreme Court’s Roll. Commentators have therefore argued that 
parties in an arbitration which is domestic can avoid the restrictions imposed upon 
them by Article 4 of the Rules by stipulating that their arbitration is international.43 
Notwithstanding the usefulness of Section 57(2) (d) of the Nigerian Act in avoiding 
“onerous” provisions like that of Article 4 of the Rules, it is submitted that this provision 
of the Act is taking the concept of party autonomy too far.44  No doubt, there is need 
to allow parties the freedom to decide on issues involving their everyday life. This 
idea is encapsulated in the principle of party autonomy, which like we have seen is 
one of the fundamental ideas behind the practice of arbitration.  
                                                          
37 Okezie Chukwumerejie, Choice of Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Praeger Publishers 1994) 
5. 
38 Oghogho Akpata and Adewale Atake, ‘Domestic Arbitration in Nigeria; Can Foreign Counsel still 
run the course’ 
<www.templarslaw.com/media/DOMESTIC%20ARBITRATION%20IN%20NIGERIA%20%20CAN
%20FOREIGN%20COUNSEL%20STILL%20RUN%20THE%20RACE.pdf> accessed 14 December 2014 
39 See Schedule 1 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Cap A18, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
2004. By virtue of Section 15 of the aforementioned Act, the Nigerian Arbitration Rules is applicable in 
domestic arbitration proceedings in Nigeria. Section 53 of the Nigerian Arbitration Act allows parties 
to choose between the Nigerian Arbitration Rules, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or any arbitration 
rule of their choice.  
40 Dakas Clement Dakas, ‘The Legal Framework For the Recognition and Enforcement of International 
Commercial Arbitration Awards in Nigeria’ (1998) 15(2) Journal of International Arbitration 95,112. 
41 Chapter 123, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
42 Chapter L11, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
43 Oghogho Akpata and Adewale Atake (n 38). 
44 Okezie Chukwumerejie (n 37) 5. 
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This writer however submits that the exercise of this right of autonomy should be 
within prescribed and reasonable legal boundaries.45 Even the principle of party 
autonomy acknowledges the need for boundaries.46 Besides, one of the fundamental 
reasons or objectives behind law in general is to ensure a measure of control and 
standard over a particular people.47 Everyone cannot be expected to act or do the right 
thing all the time. A situation where parties are allowed to administer their life 
without a measure of control will only lead to chaos and confusion.  
By extension, a situation where parties are allowed to convert an arbitration that is 
otherwise domestic by law, into an international arbitration without any form of 
restriction or guidance is open to abuse, especially in a country like Nigeria. 
Experience has shown that even in situations where there is a clear and unambiguous 
law or judgement of the court, Nigeria still struggles with issues involving abuse of 
power and disregard for the rule of law.48 The existence of a provision like Section 
57(2) (d) of the Nigerian Act, especially at a time when the use of arbitration is just 
developing, can only do more harm than good.  
Besides, there is a reason for this distinction between domestic and international 
arbitration and a situation where parties are able to ignore this distinction on a whim 
and more importantly, without any form of legal guidance is unacceptable. This writer 
therefore submits that even if Section 57(2) (d) of the Nigerian Act is to be retained as the 
law, it must be within prescribed parameters.  
3.0 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DOMESTIC ARBITRATION PRACTICE IN NIGERIA 
In discussing the domestic arbitration practice in Nigeria, we would approach this 
discussion from what Redfern and Hunter have regarded as the fundamental 
elements of arbitration.49 These are; 
1. The agreement; 
                                                          
45 We discuss the concept of party autonomy in Section 3.0 of Chapter Three. 
46 Nigel Blackaby et al (n 21) 441. 
47 Twinning and Miers, How to do things with Rules (4th edn, Butterworths 1999) 123. 
48 We highlighted some of these experiences in Section 3.2 of Chapter Two. 
49 Nigel Blackaby et al (n 21) 14. 
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2. The need for a dispute; 
3. Starting an arbitration: the appointment of an arbitral tribunal; 
4. The arbitral proceedings; 
5. The decision of the Tribunal; 
6. Enforcement of the award. 
3.1    The Agreement to Arbitrate 
The Supreme Court of Nigeria has held in Commerce Assurance Limited v Alli50 that 
parties to a dispute have a choice to determine the method by which their dispute will 
be administered. They may resort to the normal machinery for the administration of 
justice by going to the courts of the land. Alternatively, they may choose to appoint 
an arbitrator to act as their decision maker.  In Ras Pal Gazi v FCDA,51 the court held 
that parties to a dispute have a choice, they may go to court and have their dispute 
determined both as to the fact and to law, or they may choose an arbitrator to settle 
their dispute. In exercising their power of autonomy, parties would be expected to 
weigh the pros and cons of both positions before deciding on arbitration.52 When 
parties opt for arbitration, they will not be allowed to unilaterally opt out at a later 
date.53 
To properly constitute a valid arbitration, there must be a clear and unequivocal 
agreement to submit the matter to arbitration.54 According to Nigerian law, this 
agreement must not only be in writing, it must also be signed by both parties.55 The 
agreement can either be made before or after the dispute has arisen. Like many other 
jurisdictions, Nigerian parties may decide to include this agreement as one of the 
                                                          
50 (1992) 4 SCNJ 145. 
51 (2001) 7 SCM 195. 
52 Chukwuemeka E. Ibe, ‘Party Autonomy and the Constitutionality of Nigerian Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act 1988, Section 7(4) and 34 in Commenting on Agip Oil Co ltd c Kremmer and others, 
Chief Felix Ogunwale v Syrian, Arab Republic and Bendex Engineering Ltd v Efficient Petroleum 
(Nigeria) ltd’ (2011) 28(5) Journal of International Arbitration 493,495. 
53The Owners of the M.V. Lupex V. Nig. Overseas Chartering & Shipping Ltd (2003) 10 SCM 71. 
54 Commerce Assurance Limited v Alli (1992) 4 SCNJ 15. 
55 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, section 1 (1). As we argue further in this thesis, this provision is 
unsuitable for a developing country like Nigeria.  
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clauses in their head contract. This arbitration agreement would be construed in the 
light of the circumstances in which it was made.56 
Nigeria’s arbitration law recognizes the principle of separability.57 The Act provides 
that “an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an 
agreement independent of the other terms of the contract and a decision by the arbitral 
tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not affect ipso jure the validity of the 
arbitration clause”.58 In Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation v Klifco Nigeria Limited, 
the Supreme Court clearly reiterated this principle when it stated that the arbitration 
clause is regarded as separate. So where there is novation, purpose of contract may 
fail but the arbitration clause survives.59 In another case, the Supreme Court rightly 
stated that an arbitration clause in a written contract is quite distinct from the other 
clauses, whereas the other clauses in a written contract set out obligations which the 
parties undertake towards each other, the arbitration clause merely embodies the 
agreement of both parties that if any dispute should occur with regards to the 
obligations which the other party has undertaken to the other, such dispute should be 
settled by a tribunal of their own constitution and choice.60 
This written agreement can take different forms. According to the Nigerian 
Arbitration Act, it can either be signed by all the parties involved61 or contained in an 
exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of communication.62 An 
arbitration agreement can also be inferred from an exchange of point of claims or 
defence in which the existence of an arbitration agreement is not disputed.63 
The general position, which has its roots in contract law is that an arbitration 
agreement can only be revoked by a joint agreement of the parties.64 Therefore, the 
death of one of the parties does not release either party from the obligation to 
                                                          
56 The Owners of the M.V Lupex v. Nigerian Overseas Chartering and Shipping Limited (2003) 10 SCM 71. 
57 We discuss this doctrine in more detail in Section 3.2 of Chapter Six. 
58 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, section 12 (2). 
59 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation v Klifco Nigeria Limited (2011) 4 SC (Pt 1) 108. 
60 Royal Exchange Assurance v. Bentworth Finance (Nig) Ltd (1976) 11 SC 107. 
61 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, section 1(1)(a). 
62 ibid section 1(1)(b). 
63 ibid section 1(1)(c). 
64 This is also the position in Nigeria, see ibid section 2.  
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arbitrate.65 Interestingly, the Nigerian Arbitration Act also gives the courts undefined 
and unrestricted powers to revoke an arbitration agreement by providing that “…an 
arbitration agreement shall be irrevocable except by agreement of parties or leave of 
the court or judge.”66 In other words, a judge is able to revoke a validly made domestic 
arbitration agreement.67 Notwithstanding the latter part of the aforementioned 
provision, it is clear from the initial part of that Section 2 of the Nigerian Act that the 
general rule is that an arbitration agreement is binding.  
An interesting provision of the Nigerian Act is Section 5, which in a way qualifies the 
general rule enunciated in Section 2 of the Act. Section 5(1) of the Act provides that “if 
any party to an arbitration agreement commences any action in any court with respect 
to any matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement, any party to the 
arbitration agreement may at any time after appearance and before delivering any 
pleadings or taking any other steps in the proceedings, apply to the court to stay the 
proceedings”.68 In other words, the other party must act timeously. Similarly, in 
Fawehinmi Construction v OAU,69 the Supreme Court held that when parties enter into 
a contractual relationship and there is an arbitration clause which stipulates that the 
parties must first submit to arbitration before trial in court, it is natural for the 
defendant in a case where the other party has filed a suit, to seek for an order of stay 
of proceedings pending arbitration and this does not amount to submission to trial.  
The court therefore has power to stay proceedings in an action brought to it in breach 
of an agreement to settle a matter by arbitration.70 The court will only grant this 
application if it is satisfied that there are no sufficient reasons why the matter should 
not be referred to arbitration and that the applicant was at the time when the action 
was commenced, willing and at the time of application, still willing to properly 
                                                          
65 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, section 3. 
66 ibid section 2. 
67 This is another problematic provision and is discussed in more detail in Section 5.2 of this chapter. 
68 See also the case of M.V Lupex v. Nigerian Overseas Chartering and Shipping Limited (2003) 10 SCMB71 
69 (1998) 5 SCNJ 52. 
70 K.S.U.D.B v. Fanz Construction Co ltd (1990) 6 SC 103. 
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conduct the arbitration proceedings.71 Interestingly, the Act does not prescribe any 
such condition for the recognition of an international arbitration agreement.72 
3.2    The Need for a Dispute 
Under Nigerian law, not every dispute qualifies to be administered by arbitration. It 
can be implied from a general perusal of the Act that certain types of dispute cannot 
be administered via arbitration.73 In other words, it is possible for a disagreement 
arising and existing between parties not to qualify as an arbitrable dispute; this differs 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  It is at this point that the principle of arbitrability 
becomes relevant.   
It is submitted that the issue of arbitrability is one of those arguments that can either 
be made under Section 5(2) (a) of the Act or against the validity of an arbitration 
agreement generally. It should be recalled that Section 5(2) (a) provides that the court 
may grant an application for stay of proceedings if it is satisfied that there is no reason 
why the matter should not be referred to arbitration in accordance with the agreement. 
Flowing from this, it is reasonable to state that the arbitrability (or otherwise) of the 
issues involved in the dispute is one of the considerations which can be put before the 
court and upon which the court may refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement. The 
issue of arbitrability can therefore be decided both by the Superior Courts in Nigeria74 
or by the arbitration tribunal.75 Section 35 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act provides 
that the Act “…shall not affect any other law by virtue of which certain disputes may 
not be submitted to arbitration or may be submitted to arbitration only in accordance 
with the provisions of that or another law”.76 This provision differentiates between 
disputes which are one hundred percent non arbitrable and disputes which are only 
arbitrable when certain conditions are met.  
Unfortunately, the Act does not list the disputes that fall under any of these categories 
neither does it lay down any qualifications that should assist the court in determining 
                                                          
71 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, section 5 (2)(a)(b). 
72 ibid section 4(1). 
73 ibid section 35. 
74 ibid section 5(2)(a), 12(4). 
75 ibid section 12(1). 
76 ibid section 35 (a)(b). 
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questions on arbitrability. This development has led commentators like Professor 
Andrew Okekeifere to argue that virtually all disputes are arbitrable in Nigeria.77 
However, as Professor Paul Idornigie rightly posited, this statement without some 
form of qualification amounts to hasty generalisation.78 For one, it is obvious that non-
commercial disputes are not arbitrable.79 Furthermore the Nigerian courts have in 
Kano State Urban Development Board v Fanz Construction Co held that  an indictment for 
an offence of a public nature cannot be the subject of an arbitration agreement.80 In 
other word disputes relating to criminal law and public policy are non arbitrable. 
Moreover in BJ Exports & Chemical Processing Co. v. Kaduna Refining and Petrochemical 
Co81, the Nigerian Court of Appeal held that disputes or claims bordering on fraud are 
not arbitrable.82 Professor Paul Idornigie has rightly argued that in such a situation, a 
party who opposes an arbitration claim bordering on fraud may successfully institute 
an action further to Section 2 of the Act, seeking for the leave of the court to revoke the 
arbitration agreement.83 Unfortunately, case law provides little guidance on what the 
phrase bordering on fraud means or encompasses and so this is open to abuse since 
all it takes to defeat an arbitration agreement is to allege fraud.84  
In a situation in which only a part of the arbitration agreement is not arbitrable, it is 
submitted that drawing on the idea behind Section 29(2) of the Nigerian Act, it is 
possible for the court to separate the inarbitrable part of the agreement from the 
arbitrable part. The said section provides that “the court may set aside an arbitral 
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award if the party making the application furnishes proof that the award contains 
decisions on matters which are beyond the scope of submission to arbitration so 
however (sic) that if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated 
from those not submitted, only that part of the award which contains decisions on 
matters not submitted may be set aside”. Flowing from the above, either party to an 
application under Section 2 of the Arbitration Act can therefore argue against the total 
revocation of the arbitration agreement by asking the court or the tribunal to separate 
the arbitrable part from the inarbitrable part. 
This writer however disagrees with Professor Paul Idornigie when he opines that the 
limit of what is arbitrable “…is determined by case law”.85 This assertion is clearly not 
true. No doubt and as we have seen above, case law plays an important role in 
defining arbitrability. However, this role is definitely not exclusive. It is clear that the 
aforementioned Section 35 of the Act leaves this open.  Professor Mustapha Akanbi86 
has rightly noted that statutes regulating intellectual property such as the Trademarks 
Act87, Patents and Design Act88 and the Copyrights Act89 provide for administrative 
settlement or litigation, to the exclusion of arbitration.  
Another interesting argument that may arise from this discussion on arbitrability 
relates to certain areas of law that have been placed within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of particular courts.90 For example, Section 251 of the Nigerian Constitution provides that 
the “…the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of 
any other court on civil causes and matters relating to…”specific matters like banking, 
tax, intellectual property, aviation, arms and ammunition, drugs and poison among 
many others.91 The question then is, can an arbitral tribunal properly assume 
jurisdiction in view of the provisions of a law like Section 251 of the Constitution? 
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It is submitted that this provision does not in any way affect the jurisdiction of an 
arbitration tribunal over any of these matters.92 No doubt, by virtue of the nature of 
some of the aforementioned subject areas like tax, ammunition, custom and excise, 
they will in the opinion of this writer, be more suited for the courts. However, Section 
251 of the Constitution does not provide the much needed backing for this opinion. For 
one, it is clear that this provision of the Constitution was made to regulate the 
relationship between the courts as the jurisdiction was bestowed on the Federal High 
Court “to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters…”.93 The 
Nigerian Supreme Court has held in Sunday Ufombo & anor v Wosu Ahuchaogu & ors 
that an arbitral tribunal does not qualify as a court, not even an inferior court. 
According to the court, an arbitration tribunal is only a convenient forum of settling 
parties’ disputes.94 Going by a strict interpretation of the law therefore, this provision 
does not extend to arbitral tribunals.  
3.3     Starting an Arbitration: The Appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal 
Article 3 of the Arbitration Rules states that the claimant initiates an arbitration 
proceeding by giving the other party a Notice of Arbitration. The arbitration 
proceedings shall be deemed to commence on the date on which the Notice of 
Arbitration is received by the respondent. The Rules go ahead to list the contents of a 
Notice of Arbitration.95 Usually, the Notice contains a general summary of the claim, 
an indication of the amount involved and the reliefs or remedy sought.96 
Parties also have the option to include information relating to the constitution of their 
arbitration tribunal and may decide to include this in the Notice of Arbitration.97 
Particularly, a claimant may propose the number of arbitrators if this has not been 
agreed to previously. Article 3(3) (g) of the Rules seems to have limited parties’ choice 
to either one or three. The default number is however three.98 
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Both the Arbitration Act and Rules make a distinction between the process of 
constituting a sole arbitration tribunal and a three-person arbitration tribunal. In 
appointing a sole arbitrator, either party may propose to the other party, the name of 
one or more persons, for agreement or counter proposal.99 However, if parties have 
not been able to reach an agreement, the court assumes jurisdiction and makes the 
appointment on parties’ behalf,100 having regard “to such considerations as are likely 
to secure the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator…”101 If on the 
other hand, parties opt for a three (3) person tribunal (or if the default position kicks 
in), each party is expected to appoint one arbitrator and the two arbitrators are then 
expected to appoint a third who subsequently presides over the proceedings.102 If 
thirty days after the appointment of the first arbitrator, the other party fails to appoint 
his arbitrator or if thirty days after the appointment of the second arbitrator, the two 
arbitrators fail to appoint the third arbitrator, parties are allowed to apply to the court 
to make the necessary appointments.103 This position was reiterated in Royal Exchange 
Assurance v Bentworth Finance (Nig) Ltd,104 when the court held that it had the full 
power and jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator on an application properly made by a 
party, where the other party had been given due notice to act and had been made 
aware of the existence of the present application. The Supreme Court had rightly held 
in Kano State Oil & Allied Products Ltd v. Kofa105 that to be entitled to the appointment 
by the court of an arbitrator, the party applying must be a party to the submission, 
that is, he must be a party to the contract providing for arbitration.  
An arbitrator’s jurisdiction stems from the parties’ agreement106 and like many other 
jurisdictions, a validly constituted arbitration tribunal assumes jurisdiction over 
parties, their dispute and anything arising from the dispute.107 In other words, an 
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arbitral tribunal is competent to rule on questions pertaining to its own jurisdiction 
and on any objection with respect to the existence or validity of an arbitration 
agreement.108 In Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation v Lutin Investments Ltd & 
Anor,109 it was held that the tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide only what has been 
submitted to it by the parties for determination. If it decides something beyond this, 
it will be acting outside its authority. Even if the tribunal in good faith misconstrues 
the provisions giving it power to act and therefore fails to deal with questions remitted 
to it but decides some questions which were not remitted to it, its decision in the 
arbitration proceeding will be a nullity.110 
3.4    The Arbitral Proceedings 
There are two recurring themes under our discussion on this sub head. The first is that 
domestic arbitration proceedings in Nigeria are mandatorily governed by the 
Nigerian Arbitration Rules (the Rules).111 Secondly, we see the Act leaving a lot of 
decision making and discretion to the arbitration tribunal.  It would seem as if the 
position and functions of the arbitration tribunal were to a large extent modelled after 
that of a court.  
Where the Rules make “no provision in respect of any matter related to or connected 
to any particular arbitral proceedings, the arbitral tribunal may subject to this Act, 
conduct the arbitral proceedings in such a manner as it considers appropriate so as to 
ensure a fair hearing.”112 This in other words means that parties have little or no 
discretion or say in the administration of their arbitration proceedings. Interestingly, 
parties to an international arbitration are not under this same restriction, as the Act 
gives them the autonomy to choose between the Nigerian Arbitration Rules, 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or any other international Rule acceptable to them.113 
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The arbitration tribunal also determines the place114 and language of arbitration except 
where parties have a prior agreement.115 If parties were able to decide the place of 
arbitration, the arbitral tribunal determines the locale of the arbitration within the 
place agreed upon by the parties. It may hear witnesses and hold meetings at any 
place it deems appropriate having regard to the circumstances of the arbitration.116 
The tribunal may also meet at any place it deems appropriate, for the inspection of 
goods, properties or documents relevant to the arbitration.117 
The tribunal is to administer the proceedings with due regard to the principles of fair 
hearing. The Arbitration Act mandates every arbitral tribunal to ensure that parties 
are accorded equal treatment and that each party is given full opportunity to present 
his case.118 Article 15 of the Rules also provides that “…the arbitration tribunal may 
conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the 
parties are treated with equality and that at any stage of the proceedings, each party 
is given a full opportunity of presenting his case”. 
The claimant is allowed to include his statement of claim in his Notice of 
Arbitration.119 The Claimant may however submit (to each of the parties and the 
arbitrator) a separate statement of claim within a time frame to be determined by the 
arbitration tribunal.120 The Respondent is allowed to respond via a statement of 
defence within a time frame, which again will be determined by the arbitration 
tribunal.121 The arbitral tribunal also decides if and what other written statements are 
required for the proper administration of the matter and again determines the time 
frame for the submission of these documents.122 
It would seem as if Article 23 of the Arbitration Rules in one breath curtails the seemingly 
unlimited powers of the tribunal to prescribe a time frame for parties, and in another 
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gives the same power back to the tribunal without any form of restriction. Article 23 of 
the Rules provides that “the periods of time fixed by the arbitral tribunal for the 
communication of written statements (including the statement of claim and statement 
of defence) should not exceed forty-five days. However, the tribunal may extend the 
time limits if it concludes that extension is justified” (emphasis added).  
Notwithstanding the initial parts of Article 23 of the Arbitration Rules therefore, the 
tribunal is still able to prescribe whatever time frame it deems fit based on subjective 
considerations.  
The arbitral tribunal is also empowered to issue interim orders which it considers 
necessary to preserve the subject matter of the dispute.123 Since the Act mandates the 
tribunal to decide the dispute in accordance with trade usages,124 the Rules allow the 
tribunal to appoint one or more experts to report to it on specific issues.  
Upon the conclusion of the proceedings, the tribunal may declare the hearing closed 
and then adjourn for the delivery of the award. The tribunal is however empowered 
to reopen the hearing at any time before the award is made if it deems it fit.125 
3.5    The Decision of the Tribunal: the Award 
The end result of an arbitration proceeding is a final and binding award. The court has 
held in Ras Pal Gazi v FCDA126 that once an issue has been decided upon by a validly 
constituted arbitration tribunal, the parties cannot be allowed thereafter to reopen it. 
The reason is that like a judgement of the court, the point so decided via arbitration is 
res judicata between the parties. The Nigerian Supreme Court reiterated in another 
case127 that in a situation in which disputes or matters in difference between two or 
more parties, are by consent of the disputants submitted to a domestic forum, 
inclusive of arbitrators or a body of persons who may be invested with judicial 
authority to hear and determine such disputes and matters in accordance with 
customary law, and a decision is duly given, it is conclusive and unimpeachable.  
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Furthermore, in Commerce Assurance Limited v. Alli,128 the court also held that a person 
who duly submitted to arbitration cannot return to the court to ask it to review an 
award because it is unfavourable. In Chief Benjamin Alibo & ors v Chief Benjamin Okusin 
& ors,129 the court held that once both parties can be proven to have agreed to be bound 
by the decision of the arbitrators, “the resilience of any of the parties after the verdict 
would be immaterial as the decision will properly be treated as constituting an 
estoppel per rem judicatam provided of course that the submission to the body was 
voluntary”. An award arising from a voluntary submission to arbitration, therefore 
operates between the parties as a final and conclusive decision on the matter(s) 
referred.  This as we will come to see is subject to exceptions.  A valid award in Nigeria 
can be a product of either of two different processes: it can be a decision reached by at 
least a majority of the arbitration tribunal130 or a consent agreement submitted to the 
arbitral tribunal for ratification.131 The arbitral tribunal however has the option to 
refuse to ratify this consent agreement reached by parties.  
An award must not only be in writing, it must also be signed by the arbitrator(s).132 
Where the arbitral tribunal consists of more than one arbitrator, the signature of a 
majority shall suffice if the reason(s) for the absence of a signature is stated.133 It is 
important to emphasize that the Act mandates the tribunal to decide the dispute in 
accordance with the terms of the contract as well as the trade usages of the relevant 
transaction.134 Upon the issuance of an award, the tribunal becomes functus officio.135 
In other words, the tribunal ceases to be seised of the matter. 
Parties to a faulty arbitration award are however not without any form of remedy.  In 
Igwego v Ezeugo,136 the court held that while the courts will give effect to decisions of 
arbitrators, this is not the same as saying that the parties are stopped per rem 
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judicatam from contending to the contrary. The court has however held that to be able 
to challenge an award, the error must appear on the surface of the award itself.137 
The Act seems to make a distinction between superficial and fundamental 
irregularities. Section 28(1) (a) of the Act allows a party to bring an application 
requesting the tribunal “to correct in the award any errors in computation, any clerical 
or typographical errors or any errors of a similar nature”.138 This application for any 
of these superficial variations is entertained and handled by the arbitration tribunal 
and must be made within thirty days of the receipt of the award.  
For the more fundamental applications, the Act allows a party who either believes 
(and is able to furnish proof) that the award contains decisions on matters which are 
beyond the scope of the arbitration,139 or believes that the arbitrator has misconducted 
himself or that the award has been improperly procured,140 to approach the court 
seeking that the court sets aside the award. For example, in K.S.U.D.B v Fanz 
Construction Co Ltd, the court held that if the arbitrator even in perfect good faith 
misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act and thereby failed to deal with the 
questions remitted to it but decided some question which were not remitted to it, the 
arbitrators decision in the arbitration proceeding will be a nullity. This decision 
implies that the arbitrator’s award in its entirety, was based on issues that were not 
submitted to the tribunal. It can therefore be implied that the invalidity of any award, 
will be to the extent of its inconsistency with the issues submitted for consideration.  
The Nigerian Arbitration Act also allows the court to separate a fundamentally 
defective part of an arbitration award from the rest of the award.141 This is to prevent 
the proverbial “child from being thrown away with the bath water”. 
In Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation v. Lutin,142 the court held that an award will 
be set aside if it has been improperly procured or where the arbitrator misconducts 
himself. In describing what amounts to misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, the 
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court in Taylor Woodrow of Nigeria Limited v. Suddeutsche Etna-Werk Gmbh,143 held that 
it is misconduct on the part of the arbitrator where there is an error of law which 
appears on the face of the award on a point not specifically referred to the arbitration 
for decision. Because of the fundamental nature of these second type of applications, 
the Act allows parties to bring same within three months of the date of the award.144  
A party who opposes an award especially on a fundamental issue also has a third but 
unorthodox way of challenging an award. The award debtor can simply refuse to 
abide by the award. The award creditor will of course be forced to approach the court 
to seek for the backing of the State. At this point, the award debtor may then oppose 
the application based on Section 32 of the Act, which allows any of the parties to request 
the court to refuse recognition and enforcement of the award.  
The danger in this suggestion however lies in the statutory three months limitation 
period.145 An award creditor who anticipates that the award debtor will refuse to 
abide by the award may decide to wait until after the three months limitation period, 
after which he will then apply to the court for an enforcement order.146 At this point, 
the award debtor loses his right to challenge the award as the court has held in Ras Pal 
Gazi v. FCDA147 that once an award has been made and not challenged in court, it 
should be entered as a judgement and given effect accordingly. Also in Commerce 
Assurance Limited v Alli,148 the court held that “when a person affected by an arbitration 
award wishes to have it set aside, he must apply timeously…” 
3.6     Enforcement of the Award 
The end result of an arbitration proceeding is not just an award but a binding and 
enforceable award. Amazu Asouzu noted that an arbitration agreement or award 
without an effective enforcement mechanism is in practice very useless.149 It is the 
usual expectation that parties abide by the decision of their selected arbitrator. The 
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question that remains unanswered is what remedies are available to an award creditor 
if the award debtor refuses to voluntarily abide by the decision of the arbitration 
tribunal. 
According to the Nigerian Supreme Court in Commerce Assurance Limited v. Alli,150 
there are two different methods of enforcing an arbitration award, namely: 
1. by application directly to enforce the award; or 
2. by application to enter judgement in terms of the award and to enforce the 
judgement by one or more of the usual forms of execution. 
These alternative methods of enforcing an award are fundamentally different. The 
first of the aforementioned methods, which the courts have referred to as a summary 
method, treats the award as an existing judgement so that the award creditor is only 
seeking to enforce the award. In other words, the court more or less recognizes and 
accepts the validity of the decision and enforces it as if it was a decision of the court.  
The other method, which the courts have referred to as enforcement by action, refers 
to a process where the award creditor seeks to first obtain a judgement on the terms 
of the award.151 Unlike the summary method which the courts recognise and treat like 
a valid decision, recognition of the award is not automatic under the second method.  
Instead, the applicant may need to go through the process of proving the contents of 
the award to the court.   
There are three possible ways this method can be used. The first concerns the 
customary arbitration process and award, which we discussed in detail in Chapter 
Five.  As we pointed out in that discussion, a customary arbitration award is not 
enforced summarily as parties more or less have to prove the contents and basis of the 
customary arbitration award. The second possible instance arises when the court is 
suspicious of the award. The Supreme Court has held that where there is doubt and it 
becomes unwise to enforce the award summarily, the court simply strikes out the 
application to enforce the award summarily, leaving the applicant free to commence 
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an action.152 Interestingly, the court is silent on how a doubtful judgement is 
identified. This is open to abuse as a court is able to circumvent the original process 
and idea behind the party’s choice of arbitration by arguing that the award is doubtful. 
If this method is to be retained however, the Act ought to stipulate guidelines on when 
and how this method may be used by the court.  The third and final scenario refers to 
a situation in which an award creditor seeks for the extra protection of his rights by 
converting his award to a judgement of the court before going ahead to seek for 
enforcement. This method is similar to the process in which parties convert their 
agreement into a consent judgement of the court.   
Of the two methods of enforcement enunciated in Commerce Assurance Limited v. Alli, 
the Act only recognizes the summary method. Section 31 of the Act mandates the court 
to enforce an award upon an application in writing.153 Obviously, an application in 
writing is not as serious as the action contemplated in Commerce Assurance Limited v. 
Alli. In addition to a written application, the award creditor is also expected to supply 
the court with a duly authenticated original award (or a duly certified copy) as well 
as a copy of the original arbitration agreement (or a duly certified copy).154 Professor 
Paul Idornigie rightly points out that because arbitration proceedings are not the same 
as negotiations or out of court settlements, courts have no jurisdiction to award 
interest on an arbitral award or to otherwise interfere with the award.155 
Finally, unlike what Professor Andrew Okekeifere156 suggests, there is clearly a time 
limit for the enforcement of awards. According to the Supreme Court in City 
Engineering Nigeria Ltd v Federal Housing Authority,157 an application to enforce an 
award expires six year after the cause of action arises.  The court further held that 
“…the clause to stay access to the court commonly referred to as Scott v Avery Clause 
defers the application of statute of limitation to the date of arbitral award. In the 
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absence of such a clause, time starts to run for the purpose of limitation statute, from 
the date of the breach of contract”. In other words, the position under Nigerian law is 
that the time limitation for the enforcement of an award begins the day the cause of 
action arises and not from the date the implied promise to abide by the award is 
breached.158 
The learned Silk, Olawale Akoni rightly points out that the aforementioned position 
is likely to engender injustice.  Using the limitation rule in Lagos State for example, he 
opines that it is not out of place to foresee a situation where the six-year limitation 
period has expired even before an award has been delivered.159 This position is 
susceptible to abuse as a mischievous party may decide to delay proceedings in order 
to ensure the exhaustion of the limitation period. It completely defeats the purpose of 
arbitration where despite a successfully concluded arbitration, an award creditor is 
unable to enjoy the benefits of his award due to legal technicalities.  
4.0  PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT REFORM 
4.1    The 2005 Reform Committee 
In September 2005, the then Honourable Attorney General of the Federation, Chief 
Bayo Ojo FCIArb, put together a fifteen (15) man committee to review Nigeria’s 
arbitration and ADR laws. This Committee, which was known as the National 
Committee on the Reform and Harmonization of Arbitration and ADR Laws in 
Nigeria (“the Committee”) was under the chairmanship of the late Hon. Justice Dr 
Olakunle Orojo FCI.ARb. According to Dr Gbenga Bamodu, the Committee was set 
up in response to concerns that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act had not only 
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become outdated but also that the Act was being invoked and occasionally applied in 
a manner which undermined arbitration agreements and proceedings.160 
Unfortunately, like many other committees set up by the Federal Government of 
Nigeria, this Committees’ report seems to have been discarded as it is yet to be 
implemented almost ten years after it was submitted.161 
Before discussing relevant aspects of the said report, it is necessary to make general 
comments about it. First is that while the Committees’ terms of reference encapsulated 
both arbitration and other ADR laws,162 the Committee seemed to be fixated on 
international arbitration and the UNCITRAL Model Law.163 In addition, the 
Committee like many other Nigerian writers, seemed to view and approach 
arbitration as a commercial dispute resolution mechanism, whereas the practice 
carries within it more potential than is attributed to it.164 
Rather than recommending a practical and viable arbitration practice that is able to 
cater for both international and domestic arbitration, the Committee suggested the 
generic international arbitration framework as prescribed by the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, for the domestic arbitration practice of a developing country like Nigeria.165 
According to the Committee, after careful consideration, it was of the firm view that 
the law and procedure relevant to a domestic arbitration is substantially the same as 
that of international and interstate arbitration.166 
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This aforementioned position is arguably not true. There is clearly a reason why 
countries like Hong Kong, Scotland and the Canadian Provinces (apart from Quebec) 
amongst others, have chosen to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law for their 
international arbitration practice alone,167 while prescribing another framework for 
their domestic arbitration practice.168 This is not only because the UNCITRAL Law is 
more of an international arbitration law,169 international and domestic arbitration 
clearly have different considerations.170 For instance, an international arbitration will 
not only and most probably involve a multiplicity of laws, the amount in dispute as 
well as the  cost involved in an international arbitration will also in most instances be 
higher than in a domestic arbitration proceeding. Furthermore, the need for specialist 
knowledge and expertise is more probable in international arbitration than in 
domestic arbitration. Thus, for example it may be more efficient to appoint a three-
person panel in an international arbitration and not a domestic proceeding.  
Moreover, the committee seemed to model its proposed bill after the UNCITRAL 
Model Law.171 While this is not in itself a bad approach, the arbitration experiences in 
countries like the United Kingdom and Ghana172 have shown that adopting the Model 
Law hook, line and sinker is generally not the best approach.  At best, there is the need 
to adapt the Model Law to suit the individual idiosyncrasies of each nation. For 
example, in Chapter Six, we highlight the extensive consultation undertaken by the 
Departmental Advisory Committee in England before arriving at its draft bill.173  
Furthermore, as we have seen in Chapter Two of this thesis, ADR has strong roots in 
Nigeria and was in fact the means of resolving disputes before the introduction of the 
English-styled (or formal) court system in Nigeria. It is therefore ironic that in 
preparing a proposal for the reform of arbitration and ADR in Nigeria, none of these 
                                                          
167 James O’Rodner (n 165) 491,492; See also UNCITRAL Model Law, article 1(1). 
168 R.H. Christies, ‘Arbitration: Party Autonomy or Curial Intervention III: Domestic Arbitration’ (1994) 
III African Law Journal 552. 
169 See Article 1(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
170 Kenneth Glasner, QC, ‘A lawyer’s Primer in Drafting Arbitration Clauses For a Domestic Arbitration’ 
(2010) 68(6) Advocate Vancouver 869, 870. 
171ibid 4, 8. 
172 We discuss the Ghanaian and English experience in Section 1.0 and 3,0 of Chapter Six. 
173 See Section 3.1 of Chapter Six. 
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pre-existing methods were considered by the Committee. As we will see in subsequent 
chapters, Ghana having realized the usefulness of customary arbitration, especially in 
the administration of justice among the middle and lower strata of the society, has 
incorporated its customary arbitration practice into its newly enacted ADR Act 
2010.174 Unfortunately, it would seem as if the Committee failed to see that the 
significance and usefulness of arbitration extends beyond its relevance to international 
trade and commercial activities. It is the position of this writer that arbitration when 
properly designed is able to mitigate the crisis in the judiciary.175 
Upon the conclusion of its mandate, the Committee came up with two draft laws: The 
Federal Arbitration and Conciliation Act (“FACA”) and the Uniform State Arbitration 
and Conciliation Law (“USAC”).176 While the purview of the FACA is limited to 
international and inter-state arbitration, the USAC was put in place to administer 
domestic arbitration. In terms of substance, both laws are about the same.177 
The application of the USAC and the extent to which it will apply is left to the 
discretion of each individual State. Till date, only Lagos State has adopted a revised 
USAC in the form of the Lagos State Arbitration Law 2009.178 
4.2     The Uniform State Arbitration Law: The Lagos State Arbitration Law 2009 in View. 
The Lagos State Arbitration Law 2009 (“LSAL”) was introduced on 18 March 2009, to 
administer domestic arbitrations arising in Lagos.179 Section 1(a) (b) of the LSAL, which 
is closely modelled after the English Act180 clearly states the objectives of the Act.181 
Section 1(c) (d) of the LSAL emphasises that an arbitration agreement is binding except 
parties decide otherwise. This is an improvement on the Nigerian Arbitration Act, 
                                                          
174 We examine this in more detail in Section 1.1.3 of Chapter Six. 
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which like we have seen, gives the court the unrestricted power to revoke an 
arbitration agreement.182 Interestingly, the Committee in its report and without reason 
chose to retain this Section 2 of the Nigerian Arbitration Act.183 
In many ways, the USAC and LSAL are similar to the Nigerian Arbitration Act.184 The 
USAC and by extension the LSAL however differ and arguably build on some of the 
perceived weaknesses of the Nigeria Arbitration Act.  For example, while the Nigerian 
Act insists on a written and signed agreement, the LSAL borrowing a leaf from the 
USAC185 incorporates Option one of the revised version of the Model Law by omitting 
the signature requirement and also by adopting a more flexible definition of 
writing.186 We however argue further in this chapter that for arbitration to be a useful 
method of resolving domestic disputes in Nigeria, Option two of the revised Model 
Law (as against Option one) ought to be the default method.187 
Under our discussion on stay of proceedings in favour of an arbitration agreement, 
we mentioned that with regards to domestic arbitration, the Nigerian Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act bestows the court with the discretion to decide whether to grant such 
an application.188 The LSAL however strips the court of this discretion.189 
Furthermore, as against the Nigerian Arbitration Act which provides for three 
arbitrators,190 the LSAL provides for only one arbitrator as a default provision, thus 
encouraging a cheaper arbitration process.191 Onyeama rightly lauds this new 
provision as it takes into consideration the needs of small and medium sized business 
organizations.192 
                                                          
182 Section 2 of the Nigerian Arbitration Act. 
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This writer disagrees with Section 36 of the LSAL, which provides that in the absence 
of parties’ agreement, the arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in English. This 
is unlike Section 18(1) of the Nigerian Arbitration Act, which provides that in the absence 
of parties’ choice of language, the tribunal is to determine the language(s) to be used 
in the hearing, bearing in mind all relevant circumstances.  
While English language may very well be a common denominator between parties, 
other considerations exist which may make another language more suitable for the 
domestic proceedings.  For example, we have in a previous chapter submitted that 
Nigeria is made up of almost 500 different tribes and cultures. Furthermore, as we will 
see later in this chapter, a substantial percentage of Nigerians remains uneducated. As 
we have also seen, the Nigerian law also recognises oral contracts, many of which are 
conducted in local dialects. All these being said, rather than foist a particular language 
on parties, this writer submits that the issue of language especially in regards to 
domestic arbitration proceedings ought to be decided on a case by case basis as 
provided by the Nigerian Arbitration Act. 
In addition, unlike the Nigerian Arbitration Act which mandatorily prescribes the 
Nigerian Arbitration Rules as the applicable procedural rule, the LSAL allows parties 
to opt out of the Lagos Arbitration rules.193 This obviously supports parties’ autonomy 
to decide critical aspects of their arbitration.   
The LSAL also pioneers certain provisions, many of which were borrowed from the 
English Act.194 For example, the LSAL allows parties to agree to consolidate their 
proceedings with existing but similar proceedings.195 Third parties to a proceeding are 
also allowed to make an application to join the proceedings, with the permission of 
the parties. Parties’ approval of this application preserves the contractual nature of an 
arbitration since on a question of privity, the parties to the arbitration agreement need 
to give their consent to any consolidation or joinder request.196 
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Section 9 of the LSAL also introduces the position of an umpire.197 Parties have the 
autonomy to stipulate the powers of this umpire, failure in which the law lays down 
the functions of the umpires. Section 18 of the LSAL also confers an arbitrator, his 
employee or agents with immunity from any act done or omitted in the discharge of 
his functions, subject to any act or omission done in bad faith. The LSAL guarantees 
the payment of the arbitrator fees, failure in which the arbitrator has a lien on the 
award for unpaid fees.198 Section 51(2) of the LSAL however provides that the 
arbitrators’ fees shall be reasonable and should take into consideration relevant 
circumstances like the amount in dispute and the complexity of the dispute.   
5.0 A CASE FOR REFORMS 
The twenty-six-year-old Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act is for many 
obvious reasons in need of urgent reform.199 The need for reforms is based on other 
factors apart from the typographical mistakes which litter the Act.200 Not only is it 
apparently outdated, the arbitration law and framework in its present state is clearly 
unsuitable for a domestic arbitration practice in a developing country like Nigeria. Dr 
Onyeama rightly notes that small and medium scaled businesses in Nigeria are 
potential but untapped arbitration markets.201 Furthermore, the framework from 
which the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act was modelled has since been 
revised to reflect modern realities.202 Admittedly, one may argue that the old age of 
the Act is not enough reason to revise a fully functionally and relevant Act, however 
as we will soon come to see, the Act is neither fully functional nor very relevant.   
                                                          
197 This is also equivalent to Section 21 of the English Arbitration Act 1996. 
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In reviewing the domestic arbitration part of the Act, reference will also be made to 
relevant parts of the Committee’s report.  
5.1    The Issue of Writing 
Section 1(1) (2) of the Act provides that “every arbitration agreement shall be in writing 
contained…in a document signed by the parties”.203 As the reform Committee rightly 
observed, this mandatory writing and signing requirement is anachronistic and is not 
only inconsistent with a significant number of internationally accepted practices, but 
also with contemporary forms of business communication.204 This requirement for 
example, automatically invalidates arbitration agreements contained in specialized 
types of contract like bills of lading, companies’ article of association and negotiable 
instruments, among many others.205 This is because these agreements meet the writing 
but not the signing requirement. As Professor Paul Idornigie rightly noted, it is 
difficult to reconcile this writing requirement with the prevalence of electronic 
commerce.206 The Committee after considering the flexible definition of writing 
adopted in a country like the United Kingdom as well as the provision in the new 
Model Law, chose to remove the signature requirement and adopt a loose definition 
of writing.207 
The question which this Committee however failed to avert its mind to, is whether a 
domestic arbitration agreement should mandatorily be in writing or whether the 
Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act should be revised to adopt an approach 
that also accommodates oral agreements.  
As mentioned in the introductory parts of this chapter, the Committee was so fixated 
on international arbitration and sophisticated business practices that it failed to 
consider the existing situation in Nigeria. No doubt, many modern business 
agreements (and arbitration agreements) are written. However, there still remains a 
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large number of business contracts and relationships which are concluded orally, 
mainly because of the level of education in Nigeria.  
The United Nations Children Fund (“UNICEF”) reports that “forty percent of 
Nigerian Children aged 6-11 do not attend any primary school…Despite a significant 
increase in net enrolment rates in recent years, it is estimated that about 4.7 million 
children of primary school age are still not in school…Increased enrolment rates have 
created challenges in ensuring quality education and satisfactory learning 
achievements as resources are spread more thinly across a growing number of 
students. It is not rare to see cases of 100 pupils per teacher…”208 According to the 
Guardian Newspaper, Nigeria has the highest number of children out of school in the 
whole world.  In fact it has been reported that out of the over fifty seven million 
children who are out of school worldwide, Nigerian children account for over ten 
million of that number.209 In recognition of this problem, international developmental 
agencies like the World Bank have devoted huge sums of money all in an effort to 
tackle this issue.210 
This high number of uneducated Nigerian children, which is said to be an 
improvement over previous figures, is an indication of the number of uneducated 
adults currently in Nigeria. It is therefore difficult to understand the inclusion and 
continued retention of the mandatory writing requirement in the Act. The literacy 
situation in Nigeria clearly does not support this position of the law. By doing this, 
Nigeria is precluding the regular Nigerian business person who may not be able to 
read and write from exercising his power of choice and by extension, from enjoying 
the advantages associated with domestic arbitration. Illiterate Nigerians, indeed local 
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businesses have as much right to the benefits of arbitration as their literate and 
international counterparts.211 
Besides, Nigerian law recognises oral contracts. Every day, Nigerian businessmen 
enter into oral contracts and the law has in many instances expressed its willingness 
to enforce such contracts.212 We have also seen that the Nigerian Arbitration Act 
recognises and validates arbitration agreements contained in contracts.213 It is 
therefore not out of place to expect that the law should recognise oral arbitration 
agreements, especially if they are contained in oral contracts.214   
Interestingly as we will see in Chapter Five of this thesis, Nigeria has its own deeply 
rooted, successful and legally recognized customary arbitration process. This 
judicially recognized system remains largely unwritten and therefore beyond the 
purview of the Arbitration Act. Instead the principles guiding this process remain 
regulated by case law. Allowing the successful customary arbitration practice to 
function within the general framework of the Act will no doubt boost the use of 
arbitration and this will in turn reduce the large caseload of the Nigerian courts. 
Admittedly, questions may arise as to the suitability of the customary arbitration 
framework within a formal statutory framework like the Nigerian Arbitration Act. 
However, drawing from our discussion in this chapter and the preceding one, as well 
as the experience in Ghana (with the introduction of the Ghanaian ADR Act 2010), we 
will see that it is in fact possible to successfully incorporate customary arbitration into 
the formal arbitration framework of Nigeria. This is mainly because there is little or 
no difference between both practices (arbitration in the traditional sense and 
customary arbitration).  For any difference, we argue that just as the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 for example, has a common framework for domestic and 
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international arbitration but makes separate provisions where necessary,215 it is in fact 
possible to apply the same rationale to customary and domestic arbitration.216 
In order to encourage the growth and use of arbitration especially among regular 
Nigerians, lawmakers clearly need to reconsider its mandatory writing requirement. 
Local businesses and the large number of uneducated but very wealthy business men 
in Nigeria constitute a ready and steady market for arbitration.217 
5.2     Court Intervention 
The Act allows the court a lot of discretion to decide the validity of domestic 
arbitration agreements.218 As the reform Committee rightly noted, the Act contains 
defects which permit a high degree of judicial intervention in arbitration proceedings, 
contrary to what is permitted by international standards.219 While judicial 
intervention in arbitration is not necessarily antithetical to arbitration,220 it is 
submitted that by giving the courts an unreasonable amount of discretion and power, 
the Act restricts the very autonomy which it was enacted to provide. 
Interestingly, with regards to international arbitration, the Act more or less curtails 
any discretion the courts may have over international arbitration agreements. For 
example, in Section 4 of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act,221 which applies to 
international arbitration, the Act provides that “a court before which an action which 
is the subject of an arbitration is brought shall, if any party so requests not later than 
when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, order a stay of 
proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration”. On the hand, in its provision for 
domestic arbitrations, Section 5(1) of the same Act allows any party to apply to the court 
to stay proceedings before delivering any pleadings or taking any other steps in the 
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proceedings. The provision however goes on to state that “a court to which an 
application is made under subsection (1) of this section may, if it is satisfied a) that 
there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred to arbitration in 
accordance with the arbitration agreement; and b) that the applicant was at the time 
when the action was commenced, was ready and still remains ready and willing to do 
all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration, make an order staying 
the proceedings”.222 We see the Act use the word “shall” in Section 4, which in general 
legal parlance imposes a mandatory duty on the court,223 while in Section 5 it uses the 
word “may”, which going by legal definition means that the court is allowed to 
exercise its discretion in such a situation.224 The Act goes ahead to list conditions which 
the applicant must prove before the court will grant an order of stay of proceedings. 
Of course, one may argue that the mandatory requirement in regards to international 
arbitration is as a result of the effect of Article 2 of the New York Convention which 
mandates every contracting State to recognize any arbitration agreement. However, it 
is submitted that this very principle enshrined in the New York Convention is one of 
the undisputed hallmarks of arbitration in general and not just international 
arbitration. Furthermore, it is obvious that even the Nigerian courts have moved 
beyond Section 5 of the Act and have instead shown their intention to recognise and 
enforce every valid arbitration agreement without limiting it to either international or 
domestic arbitration.  For example, in M.V. Lupex v. Nigeria Overseas Chartering & 
Shipping Ltd,225 the Supreme Court held that the general policy in cases where the 
parties have contracted to be bound by arbitration, is to hold parties to the bargain 
into which they have entered.226 This provision has therefore lost its relevance and 
should be updated to reflect the present practice.  
Another example of unreasonable court intervention is Section 2 of the Act, which 
provides that “unless a contrary intention is expressed therein, an arbitration 
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agreement shall be irrevocable except by agreement of parties or by leave of the court 
or judge”. The interesting thing about this section is that it gives the Judge unfettered 
jurisdiction to revoke an arbitration agreement.  In Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, the 
courts are also empowered to set aside an award where the arbitrator has 
misconducted himself in the course of the proceedings. Unfortunately, the Act fails to 
provide guidance on what amounts to misconduct, potentially leaving this provision 
open to abuse by the courts.  Professor Akanbi rightly notes that the Nigerian courts 
have tended to adopt a wide definition of misconduct.227 For example, the Nigerian 
Supreme Court held in Taylor Woodrow Nigeria ltd v Suddeutsche Etna-Werk GmbH that 
such matters as ambiguity amount to misconduct.228 The conclusion seems to be that 
the average Nigerian Judge is not well versed in the principles of arbitration.229 
One may argue that there are some situations where it may be necessary for the courts 
to void an arbitration agreement reached by the parties. For example, the court may 
decide to invalidate an otherwise “valid” arbitration agreement where it is obvious 
that there has been undue influence on one of the parties to enter into the said 
agreement. The problem this writer however has with an unfettered court 
intervention is not only that it defeats the entire idea behind arbitration and party 
autonomy but also because it is open to abuse by a corrupt or less knowledgeable 
court. Unfortunately, we have seen in Chapter Two that the Nigerian judiciary is still 
trailed by allegations of corruption.230 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there are still some elements of court intervention 
embedded in the Act that this writer deems necessary. For example, the Act provides 
that an arbitral tribunal shall by default have three members.231 Under our discussion 
on the constitution of the tribunal, we have seen that the court is expected to appoint 
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an arbitrator on behalf of a defaulting party. The Reform Committee in response to 
this provision suggested that “where a party fails to appoint his arbitrator, the other 
party who has appointed his own arbitrator may serve written notice on the defaulting 
party that he intends to constitute his arbitrator into a sole arbitrator. If within seven 
days of receiving such notice, the defaulting party has not appointed his arbitrator, 
the other party may appoint his arbitrator as sole arbitrator and the decision of such 
arbitrator shall be binding on both parties”.232 This writer disagrees with the 
Committees’ conclusion and instead aligns himself with the position of the Act. 
Interestingly, the Committee conveniently ignored the second half of Section 7, which 
deals with a situation when it is in fact the arbitrators selected by the parties that have 
failed to appoint a third arbitrator.  
It is submitted that in specific situations (like appointing an arbitrator), there is a need 
to introduce some kind of third party intervention, in order to ensure that the rights 
and interests of the other party are protected even if that other party is errant. This is 
for many reasons. For example, it is necessary to ensure that the arbitrator nominated 
by the claimant fits basic qualities or characteristics that parties have previously 
agreed to and/or the basic qualities expected of an arbitrator generally. Even an errant 
party should not be stripped of these contractual rights especially when the claimant 
seeks to still rely on the same contract. Furthermore, because the right of access to 
court is a constitutional issue, the process by which parties opt out of that right should 
not be taken lightly. There is need to ensure that the claimant has followed due 
process. For example, he must have taken reasonable steps to inform the intended 
respondent of the arbitration as well as given the said respondent the opportunity to 
either challenge the claim or the validity of the arbitration agreement.  This not only 
protects the rights and interests of the respondent, it also prevents the claimant from 
investing a lot of time and money into a proceeding that will at the end be invalidated.  
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5.3     Constitutionality of Arbitration 
The Nigerian Constitution distinguishes between the legislative duties of the National 
Assembly and that of the State House of Assembly.  The National Assembly, which is 
the Federal legislative organ, has exclusive jurisdiction to “make laws for the peace, 
order and good government of the federation or any part thereof with respect to any 
matter included in the exclusive legislative list set out in Part 1 of the Second Schedule 
to this Constitution”.233 The National Assembly also shares specific powers listed 
under the concurrent legislative list, with the State House of Assembly.234 The latter 
however has sole jurisdiction over matters not listed under the exclusive or concurrent 
legislative list.235 Such matters are said to be on the residuary list. 
Nigeria continues to grapple with the consequences of the architecture of the 1999 
Constitution, especially as regards which of the aforementioned legislative arms has 
competence to make laws on the subject matter of arbitration.236 For example, Ikeyi 
and Amucheazi have argued that while the Arbitration and Conciliation Act may 
apply to international and interstate disputes, it cannot apply to intrastate trade and 
commerce as the settlement of interstate commercial disputes is not one of such 
matters in which the National Assembly is empowered by the Constitution to makes 
laws.237 Professor Paul Idornigie on his part argued that although the Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act is an existing law, arbitration is not one of the matters on which the 
National Assembly is exclusively empowered by the Constitution to make laws and 
that trade and commerce could at best be regulated by both legislative bodies.238 
The reform Committee in its report conceded that by virtue of the fact that arbitration 
is not expressly listed on either the exclusive or concurrent legislative list, it is possible 
to argue that the Federal Government has no constitutional power to legislate on it as 
it is on the residuary legislative list. While some members of the committee advocated 
for a constitutional amendment, the Committee came to the conclusion that in fact, the 
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power of the Federal Government can be implied when one reads Item 62 and 68 of the 
exclusive legislative list. Item 62 empowers the National Assembly to legislate on 
“trade and commerce, and in particular…trade and commerce between Nigerian and 
other countries…and trade and commerce between the States”.  Item 68 of the said list 
also empowers the National Assembly to make laws on “any matter incidental or 
supplementary to any matter mentioned elsewhere in this list”.  
The Committee concluded that by virtue of the combined effect of Item 62 and 68 of the 
list, the Federal Government has power to legislate on arbitral matters touching on 
trade and commerce between Nigeria and other countries as well as on interstate 
issues. They argued that States have legislative power over any other matter not 
within the aforementioned. They suggested that the Federal Government provides a 
Uniform Arbitration and Conciliation Law for the States to adopt as desired.  
Dr Gbenga Bamodu in a way disagreed with the Committees’ opinion as he argued 
that arbitration is in fact a part of and/or encompassed within trade and commerce. 
In other words, unlike the Committee which opined that arbitration is incidental or 
supplementary to trade and commerce, Dr Bamodu was of the opinion that arbitration 
is indeed a type of trade that involves commerce.  He argued that arbitration service 
is a business and that it is a recognisable and potentially lucrative service sector in its 
own right. In his opinion, it is on this basis covered within the meaning of trade and 
commerce as provided for in Item 62.239 
Dr Olawoyin also disagreed with the Committees’ conclusion but for a different 
reason. He made a valid point when he opined that while it is possible to argue that 
arbitration complements trade and commerce, it is wrong to suggest that it is in fact 
incidental or supplementary to trade and commerce as it is not a compulsory 
component of trade or commerce since the arbitration process is not necessary to the 
fulfilment or furtherance of trade and commerce..240 He argued that something is 
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incidental when it is related to or accompanies something important while something 
is supplemental when it is added to a thing to complete a deficiency in it.241 
Dr Adaralegbe also adopted a contrary position to that of the Committee and instead 
argued that a combined reading of Section 4(4) of the Constitution, which grants the 
National Assembly the power to make laws on matters stipulated by the Constitution 
and Section 12(2) of the same Constitution, which enables the National Assembly to make 
laws for the purpose of implementing a treaty, also empowers the National Assembly 
to make a national arbitration law.242 He based his argument on the premise that the 
Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act was enacted in part to give effect to the 
New York Convention and so the said Act is clearly within the jurisdiction of the 
National Assembly.243 
In response to Dr Adaralegbe’s position, Dr Olawoyin contended that the New York 
Convention does not need to be incorporated via a substantive Arbitration Act. He 
further argued that in situations like the Section 12(2) of the Constitution position, the 
Nigerian legislature has in the past enacted a short statute solely for the purpose of 
domesticating a relevant treaty and that in line with this practice, Schedule 2 of the 
Nigerian Arbitration Act, which incorporates the New York Convention is unnecessary. 
He concluded by submitting that to the extent that the Constitution does not stipulate 
which of the legislative bodies is bestowed with jurisdiction over arbitration matters, 
the State House of Assembly is properly seised of same as it is by implication 
considered to be on the residuary legislative list.244 
Notwithstanding Dr Olawoyin’s very convincing argument, this writer points out that 
the New York Convention does not prescribe any specific form by which it should be 
domesticated in signatory countries. Secondly, the fact that the National Assembly has 
                                                          
241 The Committee commissioned by the Lagos State Government to draw up the Lagos State 
Arbitration Law 2009, submitted that the conclusion reached by the Federal Government’s Committee 
was a “contrived solution untenable under our law and Constitution.” See Lagos State Arbitration 
Committee Report, 21. 
242 Adebayo Adaralegbe, ‘Challenges in Enforcement of Arbitral Award in Capital-Importing States; 
The Nigerian Experience’ (2006) 23 Journal of International Arbitration 401, 408. 
243 The New York Convention is contained in Schedule 2 of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation 
Act. 
244Adewale Olawoyin (n 3) 386. 
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always adopted a particular method of domesticating international law is not enough 
reason to insist on it as a general rule. To the extent that there is no law or rule 
requiring that international treaties be domesticated in a particular form or manner, 
the National Assembly has the discretion to domesticate law in any practical way it 
deems fit. In the case of the Nigerian Arbitration Act, since it was enacted after the 
New York Convention 1958,245 it was more practical and definitely more efficient to 
kill two birds with one stone by enacting an Act and domesticating the treaty in the 
same Act rather than enacting two different Acts on similar issues.  
Between the arguments of the Committee, Dr Adaralegbe and Dr Olawoyin, it seems 
that Adaralegbe makes the most convincing argument. However, his position does 
not cover the validity of the domestic arbitration aspect of the Act, since the New York 
Convention is without any doubt an international arbitration instrument. It is 
therefore not possible to extend the implication of Section 12(2) of the Constitution, 
which arguably empowers the National Assembly to enact an international arbitration 
law to also cover domestic arbitration. This brings us back to the controversy as to the 
constitutional basis of at least the domestic arbitration and the conciliatory aspect of 
the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2004. 
This writer is of the opinion that the controversy regarding the validity of the existing 
Nigerian Arbitration Act is unnecessary in the first place. This is in view of Section 315 
of the Constitution, which converts every pre-democratic decree of the Military 
Government to an Act of the National Assembly. In other words, the Nigerian 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act is for all intents and purposes a valid Act of the 
National Assembly. Besides, the Supreme Court held in Attorney General of Ogun State 
v Aderuagba246 that the mere fact that an item is not specifically listed in the exclusive 
list is not enough reason to hold that the National Assembly lacks jurisdiction over 
such a matter.  In the court’s view, all the provisions of the Constitution on the issue 
must be read together and not disjointedly.  This decision implies that the legislative 
jurisdiction of the National Assembly can also be implied from other sections of the 
                                                          
245 As we previously mentioned, while the New York Convention came into existence in 1958, the 
Nigerian Arbitration Act was originally introduced as a decree in 1988. 
246 (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt 3) 395. 
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Constitution. It is within this context that Section 315 of the Constitution is submitted to 
be applicable.  
It is therefore submitted that until such a time as when the existing Act is repealed or 
replaced with a new Act, the National Assembly definitely has the jurisdiction to 
amend the existing Act like it would amend any of its other existing laws. In other 
words, the National Assembly has power to legislate on the existing Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act (which includes domestic and international arbitration) until such a 
time as when it is repealed or deemed to be void by the courts. In any of the 
aforementioned situations, this writer agrees with Olawoyin only to the extent that 
the State House of Assembly has jurisdiction to enact a new domestic arbitration law 
in Nigeria. As it relates to international arbitration, this writer agrees with Adaralegbe 
only to the extent that the National Assembly has jurisdiction to enact a new 
international arbitration law.247 
In view of the foregoing discussion, what then is the status of existing State Arbitration 
laws like the Lagos State Arbitration Law 2009? This writer adopts Olawoyin’s 
submission when he says that because the Constitution is silent on which of the 
legislative bodies has the power to make arbitration laws, the State House of Assembly 
also has the right to legislate on issues relating to arbitration, since the Constitution 
allows the State Houses of Assembly to make laws on matters not within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the National Assembly.248 
However, in a situation in which there is any inconsistency between the Arbitration 
Act and the Arbitration law of any State, the Constitution provides that “the law made 
by the National Assembly shall prevail and that other law shall to the extent of its 
inconsistency, be void.”249  State arbitration laws are therefore valid to the extent of 
their consistency with the Arbitration Act, which is a federal legislature.250 In addition, 
by virtue of the doctrine of covering the field, a State law like the Lagos State 
                                                          
247 In our recommendation chapter, we argue that domestic arbitration is best suited as a Federal law 
and so we make a case for constitutional reforms. 
248 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, section 4. 
249 ibid section 4(5). 
250 Paul Idornigie, ‘The Doctrine of Covering the Field and Arbitration Laws in Nigeria’ (2000) 66(3) 
Arbitration 193 198. 
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Arbitration Law 2009 has jurisdiction over issues not expressly covered by the Act.251 
A good example of such issues will include disputes of a non-commercial nature, since 
the Nigerian Arbitration Act clearly limits its jurisdiction to commercial disputes.  
If we then say that both the laws of the National Assembly and the House of Assembly 
are valid, which of these laws is applicable in any given domestic commercial 
arbitration dispute? Going by the doctrine of party autonomy, parties have a choice to 
choose between any of the applicable frameworks. However, when parties fail to 
clearly choose the applicable law, the Nigerian and Conciliation Arbitration Act is by 
default the applicable law.252 
Another issue for consideration arises from the fact that the Act limits its application 
to the “fair and efficient settlement of commercial disputes.”253 In other words, non-
commercial disputes are not arbitrable under the Act. This therefore in a way 
disqualifies arbitration from providing an all-round “alternative” to litigants.  
The writer submits that a statutory amendment, at least for a start is a more feasible 
and practical solution to this issue since as it is, the validity of the Act is not in 
question.  It is suggested that the scope of the Act be extended beyond commercial 
disputes. This can easily be done by deleting the word “commercial” from the 
preamble. It is easier for the Federal Government to amend this Act, than to convince 
each of the thirty-six (36) individual States in Nigeria to adopt a new uniform law. 
5.4     Party Autonomy 
It is clear from a general perusal of the Act that the draftsman sought to keep a tight 
rein on the domestic arbitration practice in Nigeria. For instance, Section 15(1) of the 
Act254 which governs domestic arbitration proceedings, provides that “the arbitral 
proceeding shall be in accordance with the procedure contained in the Arbitration 
                                                          
251 For a detailed discussion on the doctrine of covering the field in Nigeria, see the case of The Council 
of the University of Ibadan v. Adamolekun (1967) 1 All NLR 213,214; Lakanmi v Attorney General of Western 
Nigeria (1970) 6 NSCC 143 amongst others. 
252 Adedoyin Rhodes-Vivour, ‘Recent arbitration related developments in Nigeria’ (2012) 76(1) 
Arbitration 130,131. 
253 See the Preamble to the Act. 
254 Chapter A18, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
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Rules set out in the First Schedule to this Act”.255 Interestingly, in its provision for 
international arbitration, the Act provides that “Notwithstanding the provisions of 
this Act, the parties to an international commercial agreement may agree in writing 
that disputes in relation to the agreement shall be referred to arbitration in accordance 
with the Arbitration Rules set out in the First Schedule to this Act, or the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules or any other international arbitration rule acceptable to the 
parties”.256 We see the draftsman limiting the options available to parties to a domestic 
arbitration as against their international arbitration counterpart, who more or less 
have the freewill to decide the rules governing the procedure of their proceedings.  
It is submitted that Section 15 of the Act negates the principle of party autonomy. The 
practice of arbitration is built on party autonomy; parties freewill to decide on the 
process by which their disputes will be governed. A situation where the Act 
compulsorily dictates the process by which parties should arbitrate their dispute, 
defeats the very idea behind arbitration and therefore should be removed.  
Proponents of Section 15 may argue that the provision helps to protect weaker parties. 
Assuming without conceding that there is strength in this argument, the Act ought to 
make it a default option from which parties may decide to opt out if they so choose. 
Another approach is for the Act to make only certain fundamental provisions 
compulsory as against the practice of making the whole Arbitration Rules mandatory. 
5.5     Stay of Proceedings 
By virtue of the doctrine of autonomy, parties have the right to choose to determine 
their dispute through arbitration. The Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 
clearly provides that “the court shall not intervene in any matter governed by this 
Act”.257 The effect of this is to more or less oust the jurisdiction of the court to resolve 
any arbitrable issue that parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.  
                                                          
255 Article 1 of the said Rules defines its scope. 
256 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, section 53. 
257 ibid, section 35. 
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This issue of jurisdiction is fundamental and essential to adjudication.258 According to 
the Supreme Court in Odoemena Nwaigwe & ors v. Nze Edwin Okere,259 jurisdiction is 
the life wire or blood that gives life to any adjudication in whatever system of law that 
comes into focus. It rubs on the competence of a court to hear and decide a matter.260 
In fact, the courts have opined that jurisdiction is tantamount to competence.261 
Furthermore, it has been held that it “is the very basis on which any tribunal tries a 
case. It is the life line of all trials. A trial without jurisdiction is a nullity”.262 Where a 
court does not have jurisdiction over a matter and it proceeds to hear and determine 
the matter, the whole proceedings, no matter how well decided, would amount to a 
nullity. This is premised on a position of the law that a judgment given without 
jurisdiction creates no legal obligation.263 In addition, in Hon-Justice Raliat Elelu-Habeeb 
(Chief Judge of Kwara State) & anor v. The Hon Attorney General of the Federation & 2 ors,264 
it was held that the moment a defendant or respondent as the case may be, satisfies 
the court that it has no jurisdiction, the foundation of the case is destroyed. In other 
words, the court is prevented from adjudicating on the matter and cannot hear the 
parties any longer. All these imply that an action brought in disregard of an arbitration 
agreement cannot stand and should not exist under law.  
It is therefore surprising when one sees that in response to an action brought in total 
disregard of an arbitration agreement, the Act mandates the court to make an order of 
stay of proceedings “if any party to an arbitration commences any action in any court 
with respect to any matter which is the subject matter of an arbitration…”265 The 
Supreme Court of Nigeria has held that the main purpose of an order of stay of 
proceedings is to preserve the litigation and its subject matter.266 The court more or 
less “presses pause” on the said action, usually pending the determination of an 
                                                          
258 Dr Taiwo Oloruntoba Oju & 4 ors v Prof. Shuaib O. Abdul Raheem & 3 Ors (2009) 5-6 SC (Pt II) 57. 
259 (2008) 5-6 SC (Pt II) 93. 
260 Forestry Research Institute of Nigeria v. Mr I.A Enaifoghe Gold (incomplete) (2007) 5 SCNJ 302,382. 
261 Hon Donegbue v. Hon E.O Araka (1988) 7 SC (Pt III) 98. 
262 Texaco Overseas (Nig) v. Peomar Nig Ltd (2002) 12 SCM. 
263 Agbule v Warri Refinery & Petrochemical Co ltd (2012) 12 SC (Pt VII) 112. 
264 (2012) 2 SC (Pt 1) 145. 
265 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, section 5(1). 
266 United Spinners v Chartered Bank Limited (2001) 9 SCM. 
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appeal.267 Parties therefore resume the said action (from where they stopped) when 
the reason for the stay has been removed. It is submitted that by granting an order of 
stay, the court is more or less perpetuating an illegal action.268 
If we have said that the courts lack jurisdiction to determine any dispute which parties 
have agreed should be resolved by arbitration (and it is in fact a nullity under the law), 
can we legally speaking say there is a validly existing matter to stay? This is clearly 
not possible especially when we take into consideration the case of Attorney General of 
Kwara State v. Olawale,269 where the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction can only be 
assumed when the person bringing an action and the subject matter of the action are 
properly before the court.   
Assuming without conceding that an order of stay of proceeding has even been issued, 
it is trite law that you cannot build something on nothing. Flowing from this principle 
of law, it is in fact impossible to “resume” an action which did not exist in the eyes of 
the law. The said action is for all intents and purposes, dead on arrival. In the opinion 
of this writer, by purportedly granting an order of stay of proceedings, a court is by 
implication cloaking an otherwise invalid action with some form of validity. In Haliu 
Akilu v. Chief Gani Fawehinmi,270 the court held that a stay is not to be granted to a party 
who cannot after all is said and done, establish any prima facie claim in law.  It is 
submitted that it is this very claim in law that defeats the continued existence of the 
action in the first place as the existence of a dispute which is the subject matter of an 
arbitration is the very reason why the action was stayed by the court in the first place.  
What then should be the right approach of the court? It is submitted that the right 
approach of the court ought to be an order striking out the matter from court.  The 
Supreme Court has held in Tsokwa Motors (Nig) ltd v United Bank for Africa Plc that 
where a court is found to lack jurisdiction to entertain a particular matter, the proper 
order to make is a “striking out”.271 The court has also held that an order of strike out 
                                                          
267 Nika Fishing Co ltd v Lavina Corporation (2008) 6-7 SC (Pt II) 200. 
268 This writer admits that this practice is not only limited to Nigeria. For example, see Section 9 of the 
English Arbitration Act 1996. 
269 (1993) 1 SCNJ 208. 
270 (1989) 3 SC (Pt II) 1. 
271 (2008) 1 SCNJ 323. 
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implies that the case has been removed from the courts cause list. The decision does 
not constitute a determination of the rights of the parties. A decision of the court to 
strike out the case is a decision that the court will not hear the case.272  Either party is 
allowed to institute an action on the same issues when the impediment that caused 
the strike out in the first place has been cured. This is as against a dismissal of action 
where neither party is allowed to institute an action touching on any of the dismissed 
issues.273 
Admittedly, it is possible to argue that staying as against striking out the matter 
provides better security especially as it relates to limitation of time.  
5.6     The Number of Arbitrators 
According to Section 6 of the Act, parties to an arbitration have the choice to determine 
the number of arbitrators that will make up their tribunal. When they however fail to 
do this, the Act stipulates a default number of three. 
The reform Committee however suggests that this number be reduced to one 
arbitrator. The Committee in arriving at this conclusion referred to the conclusion 
reached by both the Departmental Advisory Committee in England and the 
UNCITRAL Working Group. While the DAC opined that a default provision which 
prescribes a three-person arbitrator panel would amount to unnecessary expense, the 
UNCITRAL Working Group advocated for a three-person tribunal in order to 
guarantee equal treatment of both parties. 
Cost remains a major consideration especially in a country like Nigeria which still has 
high concentrations of poverty. According to a BBC news report. “Poverty has risen 
in Nigeria with almost 100 million living on less than a $ 1 (£0.63) a day, despite 
economic growth…”274 A one-person tribunal is therefore more practical.275  
 
                                                          
272 Micheal Ezenwa v I.O Olalekan Kareem (1990) 5 SC (Pt II) 66. 
273 Nigerian Airways Limited v Lapite (1990) 11-12 SC 60. 
274 BBC editorial, ’Nigerians Living in Poverty rise to nearly 61%’ BBC News (13 February 2012) < 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17015873> accessed 20 November 2015. 
275 We discuss this issue at various points in this thesis- See Section 1.1.2 of Chapter Six, Section 3.2 of 
Chapter Six and Section 2.1.4 of Chapter Seven. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter, we have not only highlighted some of the problems of the Nigerian 
Arbitration Act, we have also made a number of recommendations, in a bid to 
improve the domestic arbitration practice in Nigeria.  
To develop a more effective and tailored domestic arbitration practice for Nigeria, we 
will in subsequent chapters examine related arbitration practices. For example, since 
the introduction of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act in 1988, a number of 
beneficial developments have occurred within the sphere of arbitration and from 
which the practice in Nigeria can learn a lesson or two. 
More immediately however, we will in the next chapter examine the customary 
arbitration practice in Nigeria.  This customary method was at a time in history the 
only practical method of resolving civil disputes in Nigeria.276 Of all the precolonial 
methods of resolving disputes, customary arbitration still remains a legally recognised 
mechanism in Nigeria.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
276 O. Ezediaro, ‘Guarantee and incentives for Foreign Investment in Nigeria’ (1971) 5 International law 
770, 775. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CUSTOMARY ARBITRATION IN MODERN NIGERIA 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Two of this thesis, we discussed in detail the problems encountered in the 
administration of justice by Nigerian courts. We concluded that chapter by 
recommending the development of a suitable domestic arbitration framework as a 
solution to these problems. This recommendation is the main aim of this PhD thesis.  
In order to achieve this recommendation, it is necessary to acknowledge and examine 
existing arbitration frameworks in Nigeria by way of background. Chapter Three 
therefore introduced a reader to the general principles and practice of arbitration and 
concluded by highlighting the existing arbitration frameworks in Nigeria. While in 
Chapter Four we critically examined the existing Arbitration and Conciliation Act 
2004 in Nigeria,1 in this chapter, we focus on the home grown arbitration practice 
called customary arbitration.2 
Two important things need to be emphasised right from the beginning of this 
discussion. The first is to reiterate the distinction made in Chapter Two between 
customary arbitration and other customary methods of dispute resolution in Nigeria. 
It should be recalled that we mentioned that of all the pre-colonial methods of 
resolving disputes in Nigeria,3 customary arbitration remains the only legally binding 
method in modern Nigeria. In fact, a successfully concluded customary arbitration 
proceeding constitutes an estoppel against future proceedings on the determined 
issues.4 No other customary method enjoys this privilege. Like arbitration in the 
traditional sense in which it is known, the aforementioned assertion is however 
subject to the proof of certain conditions.5 
                                                          
1 Chapter A18 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
2 This practice is regulated by case law and so our discussion on this subject will examine the practice 
as recognised by case law.  
3 It should be recalled that in Chapter Two, we mentioned that the pre-colonial methods of resolving 
dispute in Nigeria are the Kings’ Traditional Court, customary mediation and customary arbitration 
4Okparaji v Ohanu (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt 618) 280. 
5 We discuss this further in this chapter. 
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Another important point to note is that the modern version of this practice is relatively 
new and so academic discussions on the subject are rather sketchy. As Dr Igbokwe 
rightly pointed out, “until comparatively recently, not much effort has been made 
toward putting the law and practice of customary arbitration in a proper 
perspective”.6 He however rightly submitted that discussions picked up after the 
locus classicus case of Agu v Ikewibe,7 which laid the foundation for the modern 
practice of customary arbitration in Nigeria.8 Unfortunately most of these discussions 
have centered on a very controversial part of the judgement; the issue relating to the 
parties’ right to resile. The 2010 decision of the court in Agala v Okusin9 however seems 
to have settled this controversy and so it is hoped that more robust discussions would 
emerge on the subject.10 
This chapter is divided into four major parts.  The first part of this chapter introduces 
the reader to a more detailed discussion of the customary arbitration practice as it 
operated in pre-colonial Nigeria. In the second part, we proceed to modern Nigeria 
and highlight the initial controversy surrounding the existence of this practice in 
Nigeria. This controversy raged until the aforementioned case of Agu v Ikewibe.11  We 
analyse the decision of the Nigerian Supreme Court (“the Supreme Court”) in this case 
and highlight the issues arising therefrom. We also critically examine the opinions of 
writers on controversial aspects of the decision. With respect, this chapter will differ 
from this Supreme Court’s decision with reasons. In the third part of this work, we 
critically analyse recent developments in the law governing customary arbitration. We 
conclude this chapter by making a case for reforms. Specifically, we advocate for the 
incorporation of the case law on customary arbitration into the domestic arbitration 
framework of the Nigerian nation.12 
                                                          
6Virtus Chitoo Igbokwe, ‘The Law and Practice of Customary Arbitration in Nigeria: Agu v Ikewibe 
and Applicable law issues revisited’ (1997) 41 Journal of African Law 201, 202. 
7 (1991) 3 NWLR PT 180. 
8 ibid. 
9 (2010) 10 NWLR (PT 1202) 412. 
10 We discuss this decision in more detail in Section 2.4 of this chapter. 
11 (1991) 3 NWLR PT 180. 
12 Ghana did something similar in their recent Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010. We discuss this 
in Section 1.1.3 of Chapter Six.  
141 
 
1.0 BACKGROUND 
According to Professor Jan Paulsson, “the idea of arbitration is that of binding 
resolution of disputes accepted with serenity by those who bear its consequences 
because of their special trust in chosen decision makers”.13 This idea is not alien to 
Nigeria. In fact, prior to the colonization of Nigeria, arbitration was a predominant 
method of resolving civil disputes.14 According to Ezediaro, in many isolated 
communities, “referral of a dispute to one or more laymen for decision…was the only 
reasonable one, for the wise men or the chiefs were the only accessible judicial 
authorities”.15 This practice has since been referred to by the Supreme Court of Nigeria 
(“the Supreme Court”) as customary arbitration.16 
The Supreme Court in the case of Agu v Ikewibe17 defined customary arbitration as the 
“voluntary submission of the parties, to the decisions of the arbitrators, who are either 
the chiefs or elders of the community, and the agreement to be bound by such 
decisions or freedom to resile where unfavourable.”18 In his contribution, Edwin Ezike 
referred to it as “the settlement of a dispute by a neutral body other than a court of 
law, in a juridical manner with its firm anchorage on the customs and way of life of 
the people”.19 
                                                          
13 Jan Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2013) 1. 
14 B.O. Nwabueze, Machinery of Justice in Nigeria (Cambridge University Press 1963); Abdulmumini A. 
Oba, ‘Juju Oaths in Customary Law Arbitration and their legal validity in Nigerian Courts’ (2008) 52 
Journal of African Law 139, 140; Ephraim Akpata, The Nigerian Arbitration Law in Focus (West African 
Books Publishers, Laos 1997) 1; Oluwafemi A. Ladapo, ‘Where does Islamic Arbitration fit into the 
Judicially Recognised Ingredients of Customary Arbitration in the Nigerian Jurisprudence’ (2008) 8(2) 
African Journal on Conflict Resolution 103, 110. 
 Paul Idornigie, ‘Overview of ADR in Nigeria’ (2007) 73(1) Arbitration 73; Adesina Bello, ‘Customary 
and Modern Arbitration in Nigeria: A recycle of Old Frontiers’ (2014) 2(1) Journal of Research and 
Development 50, 53; Andrew Chukwuemerie, ‘The Internationalisation of African Customary law 
arbitration’ (2006) 14(2) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 143. 
15 O. Ezediaro, ‘Guarantee and incentives for Foreign Investment in Nigeria’ (1971) 5 International law 
770, 775. See also Andrew Chukwuemerie, ‘Salient Issues in the Law and Practice of Arbitration in 
Nigeria’ (2006) 14 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1,5. 
16Agu v Ikewibe (1991) 3 NWLR PT 180. 
17 ibid. 
18 We will see that this definition has been modified in later decisions. 
19 Edwin Obinna Ezike, ‘Halting the misconceptions relating to Customary Arbitration in Nigeria’ 
(2013) International Arbitration Law Review 1, 2. 
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Customary arbitration was a predominant method of resolving disputes in pre-
colonial Nigeria.20 Unlike the traditional court system, this system provided a flexible, 
simple and seemingly informal method of administering disputes in pre-colonial 
Nigeria.21 Parties under this process had a say in the way their disputes were 
administered and the idea behind this process was to ensure justice and maintain 
peace within the community. Customary arbitration was a post dispute mechanism.22 
The customary arbitration process was initiated when an aggrieved party (“claimant”) 
expressed his grievance to a neutral and respected elder.23 Elders were assumed to be 
very knowledgeable of the customs of the community.24 They were also assumed to 
be men of integrity, great wisdom and vast experience. Parties in a dispute were 
therefore expected to trust and tap from the rich wealth of knowledge and experience 
possessed by these elders.25 The reason is adequately illustrated in a Yoruba26 adage 
which states that “Bi omode ba laso t’agba, ko le ni akisa t’agba” which in literal terms 
means that “even if a child has as much clothing as an old man, he cannot have as many rags 
as the old man does”.  Customary arbitrators therefore possessed and exercised 
adjudicatory powers like their European and statutory counterparts.27 
It was the usual and rather unfortunate practice for only persons from the male gender 
to serve as arbitrators.28 This was because at that point in history, women were 
                                                          
20 O. Ezediaro (n 15) 775; Andrew Chukwuemerie, “Salient Issues in the Law and Practice of Arbitration 
in Nigeria” (2006) 14 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1,4. 
21 We draw a distinction between the pre-colonial methods in Section 1.0 of Chapter Two of this thesis.  
22 Gaius Ezejiofor, ‘The Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act: A Challenge to the Court’ (1993) 
Journal of Business Law, 82,84. 
23 Andrew Chukwuemerie, ‘Salient Issues in the Law and Practice if Arbitration in Nigeria’ (2006) 14 
African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1,4. 
24 L.A. Ayinla, ‘ADR and the Relevance of Native or Customary Arbitration in Nigeria’ (2009) 5 The 
University of Ilorin Law Journal, 254, 260; Andrew Chukwuemerie, ‘The Internationalisation of African 
Customary Law Arbitration’ (2006) 14(2) Africa Journal of International and Comparative Law 145, 150 
25 Anybody who disrespected an elder was regarded as a community troublemaker. For example, “Ai 
fagba fenikan ni o je aye o roju” when interpreted means “lack of respect of an elder is the root of 
community crisis”. 
26 Yoruba is the most widely spoken language in the South Western parts of Nigeria. 
27 George Elombi, ‘Customary Arbitration: A Ghanaian Trend Reversed in Nigeria’ (1993) 5 African 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 803, 807. 
28 Nonso Okereafoejeke, Law and Justice in Post-British Nigeria: Conflicts and interactions between Native 
and Foreign Systems of social control in Igbo (Greenwood Publishing 2002) 129. 
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regarded and treated as subordinate to men.29 Men were however very reluctant to 
involve themselves in issues involving women and therefore left those to the women 
to settle among themselves.  
Like arbitration in its contemporary sense, the consent of both parties was integral to 
the validity of the customary arbitration process. The elder selected by the claimant 
was therefore expected to call the other party (“respondent”) against whom an 
accusation had been made.30  The respondent at this point had the option to choose if 
he wanted the dispute to be administered by the elder selected by the claimant. If he 
chose to submit to this particular elder’s jurisdiction, all the parties involved will be 
expected to agree on a date, place and time for the hearing of the case.31 
Where the respondent disagreed with the claimant’s choice, both parties were 
expected to agree on a suitable elder. The elder eventually selected by both parties 
depended to a large extent on the relationship between them. For example, it was the 
usual practice to refer disputes between family members to the eldest male member 
of the family, who is usually the head of the family or lineage.32 This was because 
parties were many times reluctant to wash their dirty linen in public by inviting non-
members of the family into a family dispute.33 On the other hand, a dispute between 
members of a particular trade or profession was usually referred to the head of the 
trade group and/or his executives.34 Parties were willing to trust the judgement of 
their leaders because of the strict requirements needed to attain the position.  In a 
dispute between heads of a family, the dispute would be referred to a jointly selected 
head of another family. In a dispute between two communities, delegates from both 
                                                          
29 D.A Offiong, ‘Conflict Resolution among the Ibibio of Nigeria’ (1997) Vol 53 Journal of 
Anthropological Research 423, 428. 
30 Judith Fumnanya Rapu, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution of Indigenous African Disputes: An 
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Studies Journal 271, 294. 
31 Taslim O. Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law (Manchester University Press 1956) 217 
32Offiong (n 29) 438. 
33 O Adekile, ‘Legal Frameworks For Settling Marital Disputes through Reconciliation in Nigeria’ 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1503384> accessed 22 June 2014. 
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communities were selected to be members of the arbitration community with a top 
chief from a neutral community acting as presiding arbitrator.35 
Like in contemporary dispute resolution mechanisms, customary arbitrators were 
expected to accord parties a fair hearing.36 In fact, there is a Yoruba adage which when 
interpreted means that “wicked and iniquitous is he who decides a case upon the 
testimony of only one party to it”.37 Parties were also commonly entitled to some form 
of legal representation especially in disputes beyond the family level. 
An important feature of the pre-colonial arbitration system was the swearing of oaths. 
In Nigeria and indeed Africa, swearing on oath involves recourse to the power of a 
supernatural being. It was usual for parties to swear on a native and very dreaded god 
called “juju”.38  In an attempt to describe how the oath system worked, a writer 
submitted that “swearing on a dreaded juju is the commonest form of traditional 
oaths. Generally, the oaths are worded in such a way that the swearer invokes on 
himself a conditional curse. He tells the juju to punish him if he lies. Thereafter, all 
parties concerned with the lis (dispute) wait for a year. It is believed that anyone who 
swears falsely will be dead or smitten with grave misfortune within a year of taking 
the oath. If the dispute concerns land, the person who takes the oath enters and takes 
possession of the land. Should any misfortune befall him within the prescribed period, 
the property reverts to the other party. There is no need for any further judicial 
decision as his relatives will be too anxious to give up the property lest any further 
harm befalls them also. If he survives for a year after taking the oath without death or 
any serious illness, he retains the property as he is deemed to have told the truth. 
Where a party was ordered to proffer a juju for the other party to take an oath on and 
no juju is produced by that party, the other party is judged the truthful party.”39 This 
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36 L.A. Ayinla (n 24) 261. 
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38 Martin Chukwuka Okany, The Role of Customary Courts in Nigeria (Fourth Dimension Publishing Co 
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made the decision making process very easy as nobody was willing to risk the 
negative effects of this juju.  
When the arbitral process had been concluded, the arbitrators were expected to issue 
an award. It was very common for the arbitrators to “indulge in end-of trial judicial 
homilies to the parties”.40 These homilies were both instructive as well as edifying. 
The arbitrator’s decision was punctuated at appropriate stages with allusions to the 
legal principles involved. The arbitrator had the enormous responsibility of doing 
justice so as “to command the respect and approval of the overwhelming majority of 
the people”. 41 
Parties usually abided by the decision of the arbitrators. This as we have seen and will 
still see was as a result of a deep rooted respect for tradition and religion. It was 
believed that there were serious repercussions when an individual went against 
tradition by disobeying the words of an elder.  
However, the colonization of Africa, the rise in the influence of “foreign” religions 
(Christianity and Islam)42 and the westernization of Nigeria has reduced the influence 
of customary law, practice, beliefs and religion.43 As the learned Dr Oba rightly noted 
in his article, “before the colonial era, customary law operated freely within its area of 
influence as a complete and independent legal system. However, the arrival of the 
colonialists in the 19th century had a revolutionary impact on the pre-colonial systems 
of adjudication generally and the use of oaths in the judicial process in particular. For 
one thing, the judicial system introduced by the colonial masters gained ascendancy 
over traditional judicial systems, and customary law was enforced on terms dictated 
by the colonial authorities.”44 Furthermore, the Constitution and statutory laws 
existing in Nigeria have made customary law applicable only to the extent of its 
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consistency with any law in force in Nigeria.  We therefore see a slightly evolved 
system of arbitration in Nigeria today.  
Whatever the case is however, customary arbitration remains a valid and legally 
recognised method of resolving disputes in Nigeria.  
2.0 CUSTOMARY ARBITRATION IN MODERN NIGERIA 
2.1    Initial Controversies relating to the Existence and Validity of Customary 
Arbitration 
A fast-forward to post-colonial Nigeria will reveal that there were initial doubts about 
the existence of this practice in post-colonial Nigeria.  
A scholar like the late Professor Allot for example, vehemently argued against the 
existence of customary arbitration in Nigeria and indeed Africa.  He was of the 
opinion that what Africans regarded as arbitration was a system of negotiation.  His 
opinion was based on what he considered to be the absence of an established method 
of enforcing customary arbitration awards.45 In fact in a more recent article,46 he went 
ahead to criticise the Ghanaian courts for acknowledging the existence of customary 
arbitration in Ghana.47 
The Nigerian Court of Appeal (“The Court of Appeal”) in the case of Okpuruwu v 
Okpokam48 seemed to adopt Professor Allot’s opinion when a majority panel held that 
customary arbitration was not a recognised practice in Nigeria.49 The dispute in 
Okpuruwu v Okpokam50 was a claim of customary right of occupancy over a piece of 
land in Cross River State, Nigeria. Both parties jointly referred the dispute to a selected 
council of chiefs for a decision, consequent upon which an award was given in favour 
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of the plaintiff. In order to enforce his award, the plaintiff successfully instituted an 
action at the High Court for an enforcement order.  
The defendant being dissatisfied with both the award and the subsequent order of the 
High Court appealed to the Court of Appeal. It was his submission that it was wrong 
for the High Court judge to recognise an award emanating from a customary 
arbitration tribunal. He further submitted that customary arbitration was not 
recognised both under the Nigerian constitution and the customary law of the 
Nigerian people.51 The lead judge, Honourable Justice Uwaifo JCA (as he then was) in 
his judgement set aside the High Court’s decision. He noted “how most inappropriate 
it would seem to appear when a reference of a land dispute of some intricacy is made 
to a council of chiefs or so called customary arbitrators without judicial functions 
either by the court or on the initiatives of the parties…To talk of customary arbitration 
(having a binding force as a judgement) in this country is therefore somewhat a 
misnomer and certainly a misconception. I do not know of any community in Nigeria 
which regards the settlement by arbitration between disputing parties as part of its 
native law and custom”.  
It is worthy of note that the panel of judges sitting on the Okpuruwu v Okpokam52 case 
was split. Honourable Justice Oguntade JCA (as he then was) in his minority 
judgement held that he found himself “unable to accept the proposition that there is 
no concept known as customary arbitration in our jurisprudence…I do not think it is 
contrary to public policy and not in accordance with natural justice, equity and good 
conscience for parties to a dispute to submit to the adjudication of a third party in 
whom the disputants have confidence both as to impartiality and competence. The 
orthodox arbitration which has been accepted as part of the general law also operates 
on such principles of voluntary submission to the adjudication of a third party. I am 
unable to accept that native arbitration in any way derogates from the exercise by the 
regular courts of the powers vested in them by the 1979 (now 1999) constitution of 
Nigeria.” He went further to state that “In the pre-colonial times and before the advent 
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of the regular courts, our people (Nigerians) certainly had a simple and inexpensive 
way of adjudicating over disputes between them. They referred them to elders or a 
body set up for that purpose. The practice has over the years become strongly 
embedded in the system that they survive today as custom….” He however added 
that “…the decision of arbitration, whether native or orthodox, lacks intrinsic or 
inherent force until pronounced upon by competent judicial authority. So at the end 
of the day, it is the court that baptizes an arbitration decision, giving it in the process 
the power to operate as estoppel par rem judicatam…If the court notices that there has 
been infractions of the rules on natural justice in the arbitration process or there are 
errors on the face of the award, the court simply sets it aside”.53 Unfortunately, 
notwithstanding the correct submission made by Honourable Justice Oguntade, the 
majority decision of the court in Okpuruwu v Okpokam54 remained the law.55 This was 
the position until the decision of the Supreme Court in Agu v Ikewibe.56 
2.2 Agu v. Ikewibe: The Making of a Locus Classicus 
The dispute in Agu v Ikewibe57 was whether a disagreement over title to land had been 
validly resolved by customary arbitrators consisting of village elders. Counsel to the 
appellant relied substantially on the earlier decision in Okpuruwu v Okpokam58 and 
again submitted that customary arbitration was contrary to Section 6(1) and (5) of the 
1979 Nigerian Constitution,59 which according to him vested all forms of judicial power 
in the courts. The summary of the respondents’ argument on the other hand was that 
the said customary arbitration proceeding and award were valid. The High Court 
dismissed the respondents’ attempt to enforce the customary arbitration, after which 
the matter went on appeal. The Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the High 
Court and upheld the customary arbitration proceedings between the parties. The 
appellant being dissatisfied with the decision, appealed. 
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The Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s argument and overruled the decision of 
the Court of Appeal in Okpuruwu v. Okpokam.60 The Court by this decision put to rest 
the controversy surrounding the existence of customary arbitration and emphasized 
its place both under Nigeria’s customary law and within the Nigerian legal system.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Agu v Ikewibe61 is a milestone in Nigerian 
jurisprudence for many reasons. For one, it brought an end to the controversy 
surrounding the existence of the customary arbitration practice in Nigeria.62 The 
decision also enriched the academic debates on this subject. As previously mentioned, 
Dr Igbokwe pointed out that “until comparatively recently, not much effort has been 
made toward putting the law and practice of customary arbitration in a proper 
perspective.”63 He went ahead to point out that Agu v Ikewibe64 was the turning point.  
The decision also reaffirmed the place of customary law in Nigeria’s jurisprudence. 
The Supreme Court held that customary law was an existing law in Nigeria as it was 
saved by Section 274 of the 1979 Constitution.65 This section of the Constitution allowed 
for the application of customary law to the extent that it was not inconsistent with the 
Constitution or any other law in force in Nigeria.66 
The decision laid the foundation for the development of a modern customary 
arbitration practice. The decision changed the status of the customary arbitration 
practice from an unregulated practice to one now regulated by the Nigerian courts. 
For a customary arbitration to be legally binding in modern Nigeria, parties are 
required to approach a competent court of law for an enforcement order.67 It is 
submitted that the need to prove certain conditions in a court of law even after an 
arbitral award marks a fundamental difference between pre-colonial customary 
arbitration and its modern counterpart.  In other words, although the modern 
customary arbitration practice assumes the same process as the pre-colonial 
                                                          
60 (1988) 4 NWLR PT 90 554 at 586. 
61 (1991) 3 NWLR PT 180. 
62 Judith Fumnanya Rapu (n 30) 298; George Elombi (n 27) 803. 
63Virtus Chitoo Igbokwe (n 6) 202. 
64 (1991) 3 NWLR PT 180. 
65 The current provision is in Sections 315(3) and (4)(b) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
66See also the case of Adesubokan v Yinusa, Nigerian Lawyers Quarterly, Vol. VI. Nos 1-4, 186.  
67 Gaius Ezejiofor (n 22) 84. 
150 
 
customary arbitration process described above,68 the difference between both systems 
is that the modern process does not end with the arbitrator’s award. Legally speaking, 
the modern customary arbitration process only ends when the court issues or refuses 
to issue an enforcement order.  
In order to obtain an enforcement order from the court, certain conditions need to be 
established. These conditions were originally laid down in Agu v Ikewibe:69 
2.2.1 The Voluntary Submission of the Dispute to the Customary Arbitrators. 
An arbitrator’s jurisdiction can only be derived from the joint agreement of 
parties. We have seen in the course of this chapter that the process of obtaining 
the joint agreement of parties depends on the circumstances of the case. A 
respondent has the option of adopting the claimant’s choice of arbitrator. If for 
any reason the respondent is not satisfied with the claimant’s choice, both 
parties to the dispute will be expected to jointly select an arbitrator to 
administer their dispute.  
2.2.2  The Willingness of the Parties to be bound by the Award. 
The intention of parties to be bound by the decision of the arbitrator is one of 
the unique features of arbitration in any legal system of the world. This feature 
not only emphasises the role of an arbitrator in the arbitral process, it also 
distinguishes arbitration from systems of alternative dispute resolution like 
mediation and negotiation. This is because unlike a negotiator and mediator 
who have what can be regarded as persuasive authority over the parties, an 
arbitrator has a defined and enforceable authority.70 An arbitrator is not just 
assisting parties to reach an amicable settlement, he is actually resolving the 
dispute in the way he deems fit.71 This therefore explains why under customary 
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arbitration, only elders and persons of proven integrity are allowed to serve as 
arbitrators. One should also add that this condition stipulates that the 
willingness of the parties to abide by the decision of the arbitrators must exist 
from the very beginning of the proceedings.  
2.2.3 That Neither Party Resiled in the Course of or after the Proceeding. 
This condition is the most controversial of all the conditions prescribed in Agu 
v Ikewibe.72 It requires that the agreement and willingness discussed above 
continue to exist till the end of the proceeding. This implies that neither of the 
parties is allowed to withdraw from the proceeding if he so chooses.  
 
This position of the Supreme Court is contrary to the general principles of 
arbitration, which require a binding arbitration agreement.73 “Once parties 
have validly given their consent to arbitration, that consent cannot be 
unilaterally withdrawn...Even if the agreement forms part of the original 
contract between the parties and that contract comes to an end, the agreement 
to arbitrate survives”.74 The importance attached to an agreement to arbitrate 
continues throughout the proceeding even till the award is given and enforced.  
 
Gary Born in his contribution to this subject rightly submitted that “a defining 
characteristic of arbitration is that it produces a binding award that decides the 
parties’ dispute in a final manner and is subject only to limited grounds for 
challenge in national courts. Arbitration does not produce a non-binding, 
advisory recommendation, which the parties are free to accept or reject…”75 As 
was rightly noted by the learned authors of Redfern and Hunter on 
International Arbitration, this feature “distinguishes arbitration as a method of 
resolving disputes from other procedures, such as mediation and 
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conciliation…”76 When parties opt for arbitration, they not only waive their 
right of access to the courts, they also put their dispute beyond the jurisdiction 
of the court. The courts77 have made it a point of duty to grant interlocutory 
applications seeking to stay court proceedings initiated in total disregard of the 
agreement to arbitrate.78 
This third condition as stipulated in Agu v Ikewibe79 has led to a heated argument 
among academic writers. As Dr Igbokwe rightly noted, “although the Supreme 
Court settled the controversy surrounding the existence and constitutionality 
of customary arbitration, it seemingly deepened the debate as to ...whether the 
prior agreement of the parties to customary arbitration can be determined 
before and after the award. Can any of the parties resile from the arbitration at 
any point in the proceeding or reject the award if unfavourable?” 80 
This is discussed further in the course of this work.81 
2.2.4 That the Said Proceeding was conducted in accordance with the Custom, Trade 
or Business of the People. 
Since customary arbitration is a product of customary law, the court has a duty 
to ensure that the arbitration proceeding in question was conducted in 
accordance with the customary law of the parties involved. This helps to 
achieve some standardisation and also eliminates injustice. 
 
The process by which the court ensures that the arbitration proceeding was 
conducted in accordance with the custom, trade and business of the people is 
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not as straightforward as it may seem. This is because of the many people 
groups and customs that exist in Nigeria. The number of languages and 
cultures existing in Nigeria have been estimated to be about five hundred and 
twenty-one (521).82 A judge is obviously not expected to be conversant with 
that many cultures. There is therefore a need to prove the existence and 
substance of the said custom.83 In Joshua Ogunleye v Babatayo Oni,84 the Supreme 
Court held that in every litigation in the High Court where tenets of customary 
or native law is applied, same must be proven. Merely asserting that it is under 
native law and custom is not prima facie proof that it is indeed so.  
 
Section 16 of the Nigeria’s Evidence Act 201185 provides that a custom may only 
be adopted as part of the law governing a particular set of circumstances if it 
has been judicially noticed or it can be proven to exist by evidence.86 A 
judicially noticed fact is one which has become notorious by frequent proof in 
the courts or has been frequently noticed by the courts. By courts we mean a 
Superior Court of Record in Nigeria.87 The burden of proving a custom is on 
the person alleging its existence.88 The person has a duty not only to prove the 
existence of the custom but also to show its relevance to the case at hand.   
 
When a custom cannot be established as judicially noticed, it must be proven 
as a fact.89 One way by which the existence or nature of a custom can be proven 
is by giving in evidence, the opinion of persons who would likely know of its 
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existence.90 The Supreme Court has held that they must be “independent” 
witnesses.91 
 
Once the custom further to which the arbitration award was delivered has been 
established, the court has an added responsibility to ascertain if the said custom 
passes certain validity tests. According to Obilade,92 an applicable rule of 
customary law is not to be enforced by the courts unless it passes the tests. 
There are three of such tests. The court is expected to confirm that the 
customary law upon which the award is based; 
1. is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience;  
2. is not incompatible either directly or by implication with any law for the 
time being in force; and 
3. is not contrary to public policy. 
It is only if the said custom passes these tests that this condition can be said to 
have been fulfilled.  
2.3 Agu v Ikewibe: The Validity of Customary Arbitration in the Light of the General 
Principles of Arbitration. 
A fundamental question which arises in this discourse is whether the customary 
arbitration process as defined in Agu v Ikewibe93 is in accordance with the general 
principles of arbitration. This is especially in relation to the condition which gives 
parties the right to resile from a customary arbitration and/or award. 
A number of academics have over the years expressed conflicting opinions. For 
example, Dr Igbokwe in supporting the decision in Agu v Ikewibe94 argued against the 
need for a binding agreement or award as a requirement for a valid arbitration. He 
submitted that “the focus should be on the nature of the decision making process and 
not necessarily on its binding nature or enforcement.”95 He argued further that “the 
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introduction of external instruments of coercion for the enforcement of customary 
arbitral awards is an invitation to anarchy and a disruption of the peace and good 
neighbourliness prevalent in these village communities.”96 
Another commentator and lecturer of law, O.K. Edu, in supporting Igbokwe’s theory 
opined that parties were free to reject an arbitration proceeding and/or award because 
arbitration panels are not courts.97 He argued that the court is the only institution 
vested with judicial powers by the Constitution. He went further to opine that an 
award should only be binding if both parties indicate their willingness to be bound by 
the decision and that it was wrong to suggest that once a party had submitted to 
customary arbitration, they cannot reject any decision reached. Strangely, this view 
has been adopted by other Nigerian authors and writers.98 
On the other side of the coin is the renowned Professor Allot, who has always argued 
against the existence of customary arbitration in Nigeria and even Ghana.99 His 
opinion is based on the fundamental nature of a binding award, which in his opinion 
is lacking in what is regarded as customary arbitration in Nigerian jurisprudence.  In 
his opinion, what Nigerians refer to as customary arbitration is instead a system of 
negotiation.100 
It is submitted that the arguments put forward by both schools of thought lack proper 
backing, both under the principles of arbitration and under customary law.  
For example, those in Dr Igbokwe’s school of thought seem to have overlooked the 
fundamental nature of a binding agreement or award in general arbitration practice. 
In the course of this work,101 we have seen that one of the fundamental features of any 
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arbitration is a binding agreement and award.102 In other words, in every arbitration, 
the focus is not only on the decision making process but also on its binding nature and 
the enforcement process.  It is therefore unacceptable for anyone to suggest by way of 
a general proposition that any of the parties to an arbitration agreement can of his own 
volition opt out of an agreement that he had previously acceded to.  
On the other hand, unlike what Dr Igbokwe seems to suggest, Dr Oluduro rightly 
submitted that “allowing parties to resile midstream from proceedings voluntarily 
constituted by them to resolve their disputes or to reject the award made by such 
arbitral bodies where it is not favourable, will bring about chaos and confusion. It may 
lead to a situation where people will start to consider self-help as a better option, 
especially in this age of monumental congestions and delay in our courts. This practice 
is indeed alien and foreign to the culture of Nigeria. Every loser of an award will 
simply resort to disowning the awards as not binding on him, with the result that 
there will never be an end to such conflicts. “103 Professor Akanbi also opined that “a 
losing party may render the award of a hitherto valid customary arbitration 
unenforceable by claiming that he did not submit to arbitration voluntarily even 
though he participated all the way and only had an afterthought when he realised he 
might lose or had already lost.”104 
Admittedly, there may be exceptional situations which justify the modification of an 
arbitration agreement.105 It is however submitted that the validity of these exceptions 
should not be left to the whims and caprices of parties. Instead, this should be left to 
the courts to decide within very strict parameters. 
It is also submitted that Edu’s opinion that parties are free to reject customary 
arbitration proceedings and/or awards on the basis that they are not courts, is difficult 
to comprehend. This submission by the learned academic seems to suggest that only 
decisions of formal court are recognized as binding in Nigeria. This very general 
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statement is misleading as it is clear that Nigerian law recognizes the idea and practice 
of arbitration.106 In fact, Nigerian lawmakers have put in place an Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act, to govern issues relating to arbitration in Nigeria, which the courts 
have severally held to be binding.107 Section 5 of this Act particularly mandates the 
court to grant an application to stay any court proceedings brought in breach of an 
arbitration agreement. Section 34 of the same Act expressly ousts the jurisdiction of the 
Court in any matter related to arbitration. It is therefore clear that the law and by 
extension the courts recognise the jurisdiction, validity and binding nature of 
arbitration agreements.  This is especially so when one considers the fact that 
arbitration powers do not fall under the judicial powers bestowed upon the court by 
the Constitution of Nigeria.108 
Furthermore, the doctrine of party autonomy allows parties the freedom “…to 
construct their contractual relationship in the way they see fit”.109 A pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement is usually one of the terms of a contract which parties have a 
right to construct in whatever way they deem fit. The arbitration agreement actually 
derives its life from the head contract and is usually a term of the said contract. 
However, like a new born baby at birth, the arbitration agreement acquires a life of its 
own independent from its head contract.110 
In trying to justify the importance of a binding contract in Nigeria, the learned 
Nigerian writer, Professor I.E Sagay in his popularly acclaimed book, opined that “to 
ensure order, peace and security and the smooth and efficient operation of commerce, 
industry and economy, the law recognizes the need for the satisfaction of reasonable 
and well-founded expectations created by promises and agreement...Trade and 
commerce (and even life in general) would be chaotic if not impossible if the law 
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permitted a promisor to break his promise...”(Phrase in bracket is mine).111 The 
learned author went on to categorise contract law in Nigeria into two; formal contracts 
and simple contracts. While formal contracts are expected to be in writing, simple 
contracts do not necessarily need to be in writing. Simple contracts could be entered 
into orally.112 It is submitted that contracts made under customary law are good 
examples of simple contracts as they are usually made orally. 
One should point out that since customary arbitration agreements are reached after 
the dispute has arisen; arguments relating to the validity and rationality behind pre-
dispute agreements are not relevant here.113 As we have seen in our previous 
discussion on the customary arbitration process, the respondent has a right to reject 
the process already initiated by the claimant. If this happens, customary law mandates 
both parties to jointly decide on the method by which their dispute would be resolved.  
It is therefore clear that contrary to what Edu sought to argue international and even 
Nigerian law is not averse to a just agreement by parties to resolve their personal 
disputes outside the court room.114 It is also clear that except in very exceptional 
circumstances, it is contrary to the principles of contract law (and very unfair to the 
other party) for a party to a contractual relationship and by extension to the arbitration 
agreement clause resident therein, to claim not to be bound to a term that he had 
hitherto agreed to. Dr Ezike rightly submitted that “if a party voluntarily entered into 
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an agreement with another to submit a dispute for settlement by a particular person 
and accept the decision of such a tribunal, he has a moral and social obligation not to 
frustrate the powers by withdrawing midstream or rejecting the decision when it does 
not favour him”.115 
Such an unsatisfied party is however not left without an option under Nigerian law. 
By virtue of the provisions of the Constitution, any party who is dissatisfied with an 
award has the option of approaching the courts to express his grievance.116 It is 
submitted that an aggrieved party could for example argue that the award was not in 
line with the applicable customary law or trade practice of the parties. He could also 
raise issues like bias on the part of the arbitrators, mistake on his part or fraud 
committed by the other party (in relation to the arbitration agreement).117 
An aggrieved party also has the option of challenging the other party’s attempt to 
enforce the award.118 It should be recalled that for a party to be able to enforce his 
award, he still needs to approach the superior courts for an enforcement order. An 
aggrieved party could at this point argue that there was no voluntary submission by 
the parties to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, without which the arbitration is void. 
He could also argue that even though he participated in the proceedings, there was 
no intention to be bound by the decision of the “arbitrators”. In other words, all he 
needs to do is adduce evidence to show that proceedings were intended as a mediation 
or reconciliation process rather than an arbitration proceeding.119 
On the other side of the argument is the late Professor Allot, who held tenaciously to 
his view that Nigeria could not have had a system of customary arbitration.  Instead 
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he believed that what Nigeria had was a system of negotiation. This position as Judith 
Rapu rightly noted was based on the lack of a visible method of enforcement.120 
It is respectfully submitted that Professor Allot’s opinion was somewhat uninformed 
and therefore unacceptable.121 This is understandable in view of the fact that he was 
neither an indigene nor a resident of any of these traditional societies. This made him 
downplay the influence of tradition and superstition on the dispute resolution system 
in pre-colonial Nigeria, by adopting the view that parties had an unrestricted right to 
resile from their agreement. It is evident from our discussions of Nigerian case law 
and also academic discussions that this is definitely not an area of controversy.122 
Oluduro in response to Allot rightly submitted that, “Equating customary arbitration 
with mere negotiation for settlement is untenable…it is common for established native 
institutions, groups or bodies, or even non-established groups of persons, to be chosen 
by native disputants to adjudicate over such difference with a mandate to give binding 
decisions…”123 Customary arbitration is very much different from negotiation, which 
usually lacks the mutual consent of parties involved in the dispute and to which either 
of the disputing parties can withdraw at any given time from the negotiation 
process.124 As Nwakobi concluded, “it is very wrong for Allot to state that under the 
customary law, what is termed customary arbitration should rightly be termed mere 
negotiation for settlement. In Nigeria, customary arbitration exists independently of 
mere negotiation for settlement…”125  
Furthermore, customary law demands that elders (which as we have previously 
discussed were usually the arbitrators) be obeyed and respected at all times. There is 
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a Yoruba adage which when interpreted means that an “elder is always right”.  This 
as we have previously discussed was as a result of the wisdom and respect accorded 
to old age.  It was believed that any individual who disobeyed or disrespected an elder 
was calling the wrath of the gods upon himself. The disobedient party also risked 
being ostracised by the community.126 A combination of the aforementioned was the 
highest form of punishment available in a private dispute.  Parties therefore obeyed 
an award not necessarily because they wanted to, but because there was a law 
(customary law) that mandated them to.127 In other words, obedience was hinged on 
factors beyond the desire to maintain neighbourliness and societal peace. 
The colonisation of Nigeria, the influx of “foreign” religions (Christianity and Islam 
predominantly) and the advent of civilization has however whittled down the 
influence of the local traditional religion and custom in Nigeria.128 Unlike the local 
gods and religion that dispensed instant justice in public glare, the God(s) behind 
these “foreign” religions are perceived to be more merciful. Consequently, people 
now have no qualms about swearing falsely in the name of God. Furthermore, the 
reverence associated with old age is gradually being demystified. The subjugation of 
customary law by the English styled laws in Nigeria has indeed stunted the growth 
and development of customary law in Nigeria.129 The unwritten nature of customary 
law has definitely not helped matters. In an increasingly secular and developing 
world, there is a need to codify and develop a system of customary law with legs that 
can stand without the aid of religion and mere belief. 
 
It can also be argued that those in Professor Allot’s school of thought have failed to 
take into consideration all the steps that make up the modern customary arbitration 
process before reaching their conclusion about the non-existence of the practice in 
Nigeria. Their opinion is based on the erroneous belief that the customary arbitration 
process ends after the arbitrator’s award has been delivered, at which stage parties 
arguably still have the legal right to resile.  We have however seen under our 
                                                          
126 Nonso Okereafoejeke (n 28) 155. 
127 Andrew Chukwuemerie (n 68) 143. 
128 ibid. 
129Abdulmumini A. Oba (n 39) 140. 
162 
 
discussion on the general principles governing arbitration that enforcement is a key 
and final step in any arbitration process especially where the losing party refuses to 
abide by the award.130 We have also seen that under the law governing customary 
arbitration, a winning party has the right to approach the court for an enforcement 
order where the other party fails to abide by the award.  The winning party would not 
only have to prove the conditions prescribed in Agu v Ikewibe,131 he would also have 
to prove that the customs used in deciding the dispute are not contrary to the 
repugnancy doctrine or any relevant law in force. We know that if this is successfully 
done, the court issues an enforcement order validating the award as a judgement of 
the court. At this point, it becomes binding on the parties and any attempt to resile 
will not only be undermining the arbitration award but also the jurisdiction of the 
court. Simply put, since the arbitration process can be said to continue until it has been 
enforced, the customary arbitration process in Nigeria can only be said to be complete 
after the court has given a validation or enforcement order of the customary 
arbitration award. At this point, the award has the backing of the court and must be 
obeyed and treated like every other court order.132 
In reality therefore, parties cannot resile when the arbitral process is truly concluded. 
This argument admittedly leaves the question of what happens if a party resiles in the 
middle of the proceedings unanswered.  Strictly speaking, it would seem as if parties 
as at the time of Agu v Ikewibe133 still had a right to resile in the middle of the 
proceedings. This again raises issues as to the validity of the customary process in the 
light of established principles of arbitration. Furthermore, the issue of fairness 
becomes pertinent in view of the time and resources already expended on the failed 
process. In recognition of this problem, the Nigerian courts have in recent decisions 
attempted to address this lacuna.134 
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In tying up and concluding our discussions on the validity of the definition of 
customary law in Agu v Ikewibe,135 it is submitted that in as much as parties were (and 
still are) bound by the award of their arbitrators under customary law, the decision of 
the Supreme court in Agu v Ikewibe,136 which allowed parties to a customary arbitration 
to resile if they chose to, is an important factor which cannot be glossed over. As 
Tochukwu Maduka rightly noted,137 this decision is definitely contrary to the accepted 
principles of arbitration and so therefore disqualifies the customary arbitration 
practice defined in Agu v Ikewibe138 from attaining the full status of arbitration. It is 
submitted that it could at best be referred to as a quasi-arbitration practice. 
 
2.4 Recent Developments in the Law Governing Customary Arbitration in Nigeria. 
In the course of this work, we have seen that the case of Agu v Ikewibe,139 rather than 
resolve the controversy surrounding the existence and validity of customary 
arbitration, gave birth to a new and more intense controversy, especially in respect to 
the condition which enabled a party to resile from a customary arbitral process.140 
The Supreme Court in its more recent decisions however seems to have deviated from 
the principle in Agu v Ikewibe.141 For example, in the case of Igwego v Ezeugo,142 the 
Supreme Court “omitted” the controversial condition which gives parties the right to 
resile. The dispute in this case was over a parcel of land known as Ezeugo land situate 
at Umueze family of Adazi-Ani and clearly shown on the Plan E/GA.1054/75. The 
dispute was mutually referred to a traditional institution known as the Peace 
Committee for arbitration. The arbitrators’ decision, which was against the appellant, 
was upheld by both the High Court and the Court of the Appeal, subsequent upon 
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which he appealed again to the Supreme Court claiming that the decision of the Peace 
Committee could not stand as a ground for a plea of estoppel per rem Judicatam.  
Honourable Justice Nnaemeka-Agu in support of the majority decision of the court 
held that “where parties to a dispute voluntarily submit their dispute to a customary 
body of persons such as the Peace Committee in this case for adjudication and agree 
to be bound by the decision of the body on the issues in controversy between them, if 
the body goes into the matter, hears both sides and reaches a decision, the law takes 
the view that the parties to the dispute had chosen their own forum rather than the 
courts. None of the parties will be allowed later to back out of the decision if it does 
not favour him. He will be bound thereby and the successful party can plead the 
decision as estoppel”.  
It should be observed that the Supreme Court in Igwego’s case limited its 
pronouncements to the validity of an arbitration award and not the agreement itself. 
It would seem that the Supreme Court was only willing to enforce the arbitration 
agreement if the parties successfully went through the customary arbitration 
proceeding. It however did not address a situation where parties enter into a 
customary arbitration agreement and one of the parties refuses to submit to the 
arbitration proceeding. Was a party allowed to resile from his arbitration agreement 
by refusing to submit to the customary arbitration panel or could the court give an 
order mandating him to submit to the customary arbitration tribunal by virtue of his 
arbitration agreement?  
Without expressly addressing this question, the Supreme Court in Okparaji v Ohanu143 
somewhat expressed its willingness to enforce a customary arbitration agreement if 
given the opportunity to do so.  This case was a claim for customary declaration of 
title to land.  The court in this case held that “Nigerian law recognizes and accepts the 
validity and binding nature of arbitration under customary law, if it is established; 
1. that both parties submitted to the arbitration; 
2. that the parties accepted the terms of the arbitration and; 
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3. that they agreed to be bound by the decision of the arbitrators”.  
 
This decision obviously takes care of a situation where a party to a customary 
arbitration agreement suddenly becomes uncooperative and refuses to submit to an 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction and/or attend arbitration proceedings. Even though this has 
not been tested yet under Nigerian law, it seems safe to submit that going by the 
decision of the court in the Okparaji v Ohanu,144 a party to an arbitration agreement can 
successfully approach the court to obtain an order mandating an uncooperative party 
to participate in customary arbitration proceedings if he successfully shows the 
existence of the conditions stated in the case.  
The Supreme Court however seemed to take a step backwards in the case of Onyege v 
Ebere.145 This case was a claim for Customary right of Occupancy over a piece of land 
called Egbelu Ulogor. According to the respondents, their ancestors had pledged the 
land in question to the appellants for four hundred (400) manilas. For many years, the 
pledge went unredeemed until the respondent’s father assumed the position of the 
head of the family and attempted to pay back the debt. The appellant refused the 
respondent’s claim of ownership and so parties referred the dispute to the chief priest 
of the local god for arbitration.  Both parties were given an opportunity to present 
their case after which parties and their arbitrators agreed to swear an oath. While the 
respondent willing took oath before the local god, the appellant refused. The arbitrator 
subsequently gave the appellant eight (8) days to submit an acceptable god or juju for 
oath swearing. The appellant did this and the respondent swore an oath again and the 
waiting period began.146 The respondent survived the one (1) year waiting period after 
which he moved to take over possession of the land. The appellant refused this 
attempt and so the respondent approached the court. Justice Nikki Tobi held among 
other things that the Supreme Court “recognizes oath taking as a valid process under 
customary law arbitration”. He went on to hold that once parties adopt it as the process 
                                                          
144Ibid. 
145 (2004) 6 SCNJ. 
146 We mentioned earlier that there was always a waiting period after the oath swearing. This waiting 
period was to give room for the local god to strike the lying party. 
166 
 
of resolving their disputes, it was no longer open to any of them to resile from the 
arbitration proceedings (and by extension the agreement).  
This decision is definitely a step back from the decision in Okparaji v Ohanu.147 A 
mischievous party may decide to argue that this decision allows for parties who are 
not sworn on oath, to resile from their arbitration proceedings and/or award if they 
choose to.  The Onyege v Ebere148 decision takes us back to the problem in the Igwego v 
Ezeugo149 case because both decisions seem to hold that an arbitration agreement is 
only enforceable when a dispute has been submitted to an arbitral tribunal. They 
however differ in respect to how far the proceedings must have progressed before the 
agreement can be enforced. While Onyege v Ebere150 holds that parties cannot resile 
once they swear on oath (which is usually at the beginning), Igwego v Ezeugo151 seems 
to suggest that they can still resile until an award has been given.  
The decision of the Supreme Court in Agala v Okusin152 does not necessarily help 
matters. The dispute in this case had to do with a disagreement over the headship of 
the Okusin compound. It was the contention of the respondents that the appellant was 
not a chief of the Okusin compound and so could not be made the paramount head of 
the Okusin compound under the Kalabari native law and custom.153 The dispute was 
subsequently referred to arbitrators who ruled against the respondent. The 
respondents attempted to institute another arbitration proceeding, which was rejected 
by the appellant. This resulted in the present court action. The appellants in their 
amended statement of defence denied the respondents’ allegations, adding that at the 
initial arbitration, both parties paid the arbitration fees and were sworn on oath under 
pain of death. They therefore relied on the defence of waiver, estoppel per rem 
judicatam and estoppel by conduct.   
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Honourable Justice Ogbuagu in his judgement submitted that going by the provisions of 
Section 6(1) & (5) of both the 1979 and 1999 Constitution, it is the courts and not non 
judicial bodies that have the right to exercise judicial powers in Nigeria. He went 
further to hold that parties have a choice to either "…follow the normal channel for 
determination of any controversy through the machinery of the courts or to submit 
the matter voluntarily to a non-judicial body for a decision. If they choose the former; 
the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction on such a matter would constitute 
estopel per rem judicatam. Where they choose the latter and there is an intervention 
by a non-judicial body, then the court ought to be satisfied that a number of conditions 
precedent were satisfied …“154 
These conditions are: 
1. There must have been a voluntary submission of the dispute by the parties to 
the non-judicial body; 
2. The parties must have agreed to take the decision of the non-judicial body as 
final; 
3. The decision must be in accordance with the custom of the people or of their 
trade or business; and 
4. The arbitrators must have reached a decision and published their award. 
The learned jurist went ahead to state that “parties to disputes must remember that 
such persons or bodies … though highly placed and respected, are not judicial bodies. 
Before their decision on any matter in dispute between parties can be relied upon as 
estoppel, all the above requirements of a binding customary arbitration must be 
shown to have been observed".155 
It is clear from the foregoing cases that the decision of the court in Agu v Ikewibe156 is 
no longer good law. It is also clear that there is no controversy on the status of a 
customary arbitration agreement once an award has been delivered. One is however 
left in doubt as to the validity of a customary arbitration agreement before the 
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proceedings have begun. The question then arises as to how we may be able to 
reconcile the decision of the court in Okparaji v Ohanu157 with Agala v Okusin.158 
The Supreme Court in National Electric Power Authority v Mrs P.O Onah and 7ors 159 
held that “where there is no discernable ratio decidendi common to the decisions of a 
superior court and the court has handed down conflicting decisions, the lower court 
or court of co-ordinate jurisdiction is free to choose between the decisions which 
appear to it to be correct. “ 
Going by this, it is clear that until such a time as when we have a decision which 
consolidates Okparaji v Ohanu160 and Agala v Okusin161 into one, both decisions stand 
and the lower courts have a discretion to choose which of the decision they believe is 
right and will achieve the ends of justice in a particular matter.  It is suggested that the 
better and general position of the law should be that parties are bound by their oral 
agreement to arbitrate. This suggestion is to encourage certainty and prevent chaos.162 
A party who however believes he has justifiable reasons to resile from his arbitration 
agreement may be allowed to do so further to an order of the court only. 
In concluding this part of the chapter, it is submitted that going by the decisions of the 
court in Igwego v Ezeugo,163 Okparaji v Ohanu164 and Agala v Okusin,165 the customary 
quasi arbitration practice in Nigeria can be said to have evolved from a quasi-
arbitration practice into a full arbitration practice. A decision by the Supreme Court 
consolidating these decisions will however be helpful in dispelling any remaining 
doubts. 
 
                                                          
157 (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt 618) 290. 
158 (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt 1202) 412. 
159 (1997) 1 SCNJ 220. 
160 (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt 618) 290. 
161 (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt 1202) 412. 
162 Olubayo Oluduro (n 103) 324; Mustapha Akanbi (n 104) 72 
163 (1992) 7 SCNJ 284. 
164 (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt 618) 290. 
165 (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt 1202) 412. 
169 
 
3.0 CUSTOMARY ARBITRATION: A CASE FOR REFORMS 
Notwithstanding the many controversies surrounding the practice of customary 
arbitration in Nigeria, it is evident that this uncodified practice has always been a 
fundamental part of the dispute resolution system in Nigeria. The case of Agala v 
Okusin166 shows that customary arbitration still remains an existing, successful and 
legal binding method of resolving disputes in Nigeria.167 
It has grown from a traditional and unregulated practice to one under the guidance of 
Nigerian courts. However, customary arbitration agreements still remain largely 
unwritten and therefore beyond the purview of the governing arbitration framework 
in Nigeria, the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2004. As discussed in 
Chapter Four, Section 1 of the said Act168 provides that all arbitration agreements be in 
writing. Unfortunately, customary arbitration agreements are usually oral and this 
explains why the Supreme Court has severally required that the existence of a 
customary arbitration agreement be proven through evidence.169 
This omission is sad because this pre-existing practice is indigenous and therefore well 
suited to the peculiarities of Nigeria as a nation. As Professor Andrew Chukwuemerie 
rightly noted, “it would be suicidal in a sense to attempt stifling customary law 
arbitration or to foist alien rules upon it without such rules going through the people’s 
daily usage and culture to first of all gain acceptance”.170 Unfortunately, for reasons 
best known to them, Nigerian lawmakers chose to enact a replica of the UNCITRAL 
model law in Nigeria without taking into consideration existing practices. It is 
submitted that this failure to adapt the law to the cultural and political idiosyncrasies 
of the country has inhibited the growth and practice of a very functional domestic 
arbitration in Nigeria.171 
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As we will see in Chapter Six, Ghana a country with a similar cultural, legal and even 
colonial history as Nigeria, recently incorporated her successful and generally 
accepted customary arbitration practice into the country’s alternative dispute 
resolution statutory framework.172 As we will also see, the said framework was 
introduced in response to challenges encountered in the administration of justice at 
the Ghanaian courts.173 For example, Ghana like Nigeria also has overburdened courts 
and there was need to provide viable alternatives.174 
To aid the development of a successful domestic arbitration practice in Nigeria and 
by extension provide a viable alternative to litigation, it is submitted that there is  need 
to put into place an Arbitration Act that provides for all strata of the Nigerian society: 
the young and old, the rich and poor, the educated and uneducated. There is also a 
need to provide a framework that creates a balance between the idiosyncrasies of the 
Nigerian nation and the basic principles of arbitration. Rather than blindly adopting 
a model law, a country has a duty to ascertain its suitability and make adjustments as 
necessary. A cue should be taken from the United Kingdom which only adopted 
suitable parts of the Model law into the English Arbitration Act 1996.175 
Nigeria (and indeed Africa) needs to get her act together as her long desired and 
awaited change can only come from within. Stakeholders need to address these 
internal problems rather than attempting cosmetic changes. Adopting a model 
framework does not necessarily guarantee or foster a development of Nigeria’s 
arbitration practice. Professor Abiodun Alao during his recently delivered Inaugural 
lecture at Kings College rightly stated that “…Africa should take over the process of 
controlling its own narratives. Dogmatic acceptance of narratives from outside is not 
only banal and devoid of any logical thinking but actually wrong and potentially 
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<www.indisputably.org/?p=2592> accessed 28 January 2015, 
<http://jtighana.org/new/actdetails.php?id=21> accessed 15 January 2015. 
175 See Section 3.1 of Chapter Six.  
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harmfully”.176 Efforts should be made towards developing and consolidating local 
and existing frameworks before attempting to import new systems.  
 
                                                          
176  Abiodun Alao, ‘Africa: A Voice To Be Heard, Not A Problem To be Solved’ (Inaugural Lecture 
delivered at Kings College, London on April 26 2016) < 
http://blogs.premiumtimesng.com/2016/04/27/172515> accessed 30 April 2016.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
A DOMESTIC ARBITRATION ANALYSIS OF THE GHANAIAN ALTERNATIVE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT 2010, THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 2006, THE 
ENGLISH ARBITRATION ACT 1996 AND THE UNIFORM ACT ON 
ARBITRATION 1999 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Four, we described the domestic arbitration framework and practice in 
Nigeria. More importantly, we examined some of the controversial issues arising from 
the framework, which have in turn affected the development of arbitration in Nigeria. 
We concluded that chapter by making a case for reforms.  
Apart from the shortcomings of the existing arbitration framework in Nigeria as 
discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, it is argued that the domestic (and even the 
international) arbitration framework in Nigeria is also outdated. In the almost thirty 
years in which the Nigerian framework has been in existence, a number of beneficial 
changes, trends and developments have occurred within the sphere of arbitration, 
which have proven to be very useful in the practice of arbitration in other jurisdictions 
and from which the framework and practice in Nigeria would benefit immensely. For 
example, in order to properly tackle the issue of congestion plaguing its courts, the 
Ghanaian government recently replaced its 1961 Arbitration Act with a framework 
that amongst other things, incorporates its deeply rooted customary arbitration 
framework into its new statutory framework. Furthermore, the UNCITRAL Model 
Law which the Nigerian arbitration framework is modelled after has since been 
revised to suit the demands of commercial practice.  For these and other reasons, there 
is a need to revisit the Nigerian Arbitration framework.  
In our quest to suggest a new and practical framework for Nigeria, this chapter 
examines the domestic aspects of four more developed but relevant arbitration 
frameworks: the Ghanaian Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010, the UNCITRAL 
Model Law 2006, the English Arbitration Act 1996 and the Uniform Act on Arbitration 
1999. This discussion provides useful insight into developments that have occurred 
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within the field of arbitration and from which this thesis, indeed the Nigerian 
arbitration practice in general, can draw. 
This chapter is divided into four parts. In the first part, we examine the new arbitration 
framework in Ghana as contained in its Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010 (the 
ADR Act). Specifically, we justify this selection and provide a brief background of this 
Act. In the process of critically analysing this framework, we also distinguish between 
the Ghanaian and Nigerian arbitration frameworks. Among the many other 
provisions contained in the ADR Act, we specifically acknowledge the bold and 
pioneering efforts of the Ghanaian legislature in incorporating customary arbitration 
into its statutory framework. Hitherto, customary arbitration in Ghana and even 
Africa was regulated by case and customary law.   
Notwithstanding the fact that the Ghanaian ADR Act recognizes and incorporates 
customary arbitration into statute, it in a way differentiates customary arbitration 
from the other types of arbitration1 by providing for both practices in separate parts 
of the Act. In other words, while customary arbitration is provided for in Part Three 
of the Act, arbitration (in the general sense in which it is known) is provided for in 
Part One of the Act. Interestingly, both parts of the Act have similar provisions and so 
this writer questions the idea behind separating these two parts of the Act. A number 
of controversial issues arising from the ADR Act are also dealt with in this part. 
In Chapter Four, we pointed out that the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act is 
largely modelled after the 1985 version of the UNCITRAL Model Law. For this reason, 
we will not repeat the discussion on the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
Instead in the second part of this chapter, we critically analyse the relevant 
improvements that have been made to the 2006 version of the Model Law. This also 
provides a suitable background for the third part of this chapter. 
The third part of this chapter involves a comparative analysis of the Nigerian, 
Ghanaian, UNCITRAL and the English arbitration frameworks. It highlights the 
differences that exist between these frameworks, especially as they relate to domestic 
                                                          
1 Here we refer to arbitration in the traditional sense in which it is known all over the world. This 
includes domestic and international arbitration.  
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arbitration. In the course of this chapter, we submit that the English Arbitration Act 
provides the most detailed and practical arbitration framework of all the frameworks 
under consideration including the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
In the final part of this chapter, we introduce the Organization for the Harmonization 
of Business Law in Africa Treaty (“OHADA treaty”). This treaty was conceived to 
encourage the development of commercial relations in Africa as well as encourage 
legal certainty through the unification of business laws in Africa.2  We note that 
despite the best intentions of the promoters of this treaty, only seventeen Francophone 
countries have signed the treaty till date. One reason which we identified in this thesis 
is the fact that the OHADA treaty bases its framework on Civil law, a law incompatible 
with the legal system in many African countries. For example, Nigeria and Ghana 
amongst others, by virtue of their colonial history, practise common law. We conclude 
this chapter by critically analysing the Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999 (the common 
arbitration framework for the OHADA member States) as against the other arbitration 
frameworks which we have discussed in this thesis.   
1.0  THE ARBITRATION PRACTICE IN GHANA 
1.1     Background 
Nigeria and Ghana share a deeply rooted background dating back to the pre-colonial 
era. Not only were the people of what is now known as Nigeria and Ghana involved 
in trade relations among themselves, they also shared similar cultural beliefs and 
practices, a good example of which is the customary arbitration practice.  
Like Nigeria, Ghana is divided along ethnic lines. Furthermore, both countries are 
former colonies and products of the British government’s occupation of West Africa. 
As a result of the common geographical and colonial history of both countries, they 
also share a similar legal background. Not only does Common Law play a major part 
of the laws in these two countries, like many other African countries, some of the pre-
                                                          
2 See generally the Preamble of the OHADA Treaty. 
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existing customary laws and practices of both African countries remain a part of their 
legal framework.3 One of these local practices is the customary arbitration practice.  
Customary arbitration has existed long before the colonisation of both Nigeria and 
Ghana.4 Asouzu rightly noted that “every society must of necessity have a means of 
resolving conflicts among its constituents. The pre-colonial African communities were 
no exception. Before the conquest or annexation and consequent colonization of most 
African societies by alien powers, these societies had their informal dispute resolution 
methods, which they retained.”5 As we mentioned in Chapter Five of this thesis, 
customary arbitration was a predominant method of resolving disputes in many 
African communities. As far back as 1932, the courts had recognized this method of 
dispute resolution in Ghana. For example, in the Ghanaian case of Assampong v 
Amuaku and ors,6 the West African Court of Appeal held that where matters in dispute 
between parties are by mutual consent investigated by arbitrators at a meeting held 
in accordance with native law and custom, and a decision is given, it is binding on the 
parties and the court will enforce such a decision.7 
In another Ghanaian case, Opanin Asong Kwasi & ors v Joseph Richard Obuadang Larbi,8 
this principle was extended to include a situation in which parties submitted their 
dispute to customary arbitration and one of the parties resiled in the middle of the 
proceedings. In such situations, the courts have held that any decision reached by the 
arbitral tribunal will be binding, even on the party who purportedly resiled.  
Just as he did in relation to Nigeria, Professor Allot vehemently argued against the 
existence of the practice in Ghana.9  In his opinion, there was a difference between 
what the courts in Nigeria and Ghana said the customary law was and what the law 
                                                          
3 Virtus Chitoo Igbokwe, ‘The Law and Practice of Customary Arbitration in Nigeria: Agu v Ikewibe 
and Applicable law issues revisited’ (1997) 41 Journal of African Law 201,202. 
4 We discussed this in Section 1.0 of Chapter Two as well as in Chapter Five of this thesis.  
5 Amazu A. Asouzu, International Commercial Arbitration and African State (Cambridge University Press 
2001) 115. 
6 The West African Court of Appeal was a central appellate and final court for countries in pre-colonial 
West Africa, including both Ghana and Nigeria. 
7 (1932) 1 WACA 192. 
8 (1952) 13 WACA 76. 
9 We examined his controversial opinion in Section 3.0 of Chapter Five of this thesis.  
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actually was. According to the learned Professor, “put bluntly, whose law is it, and 
who is competent to declare it? Is it what I term judicial customary law, the law which 
the Judges have found or made; or is it the popular or practised customary law, the 
rules which people follow…?”10 Professor Allot goes on to add that “I myself, through 
intensive fieldwork in Ghana, had become familiar with the Akan customary law on 
the subject as administered by the indigenous institutions”.11 
Without revisiting issues that have been extensively discussed and resolved, the 
learned Professor Allot could not only be taken to have asserted that  he knew more 
about the customs and practices of the people of Ghana and Nigeria than local Judges 
who themselves were natives and had grown up within the customary system, he was 
also by implication suggesting that he knew more about the customary law of the 
Ghanaian (and Nigerian) people than the local chiefs who are expected by law to 
provide expert evidence on issues relating to customary law and practice.12 
Thankfully, whatever remaining controversy as to the existence and scope of 
customary arbitration has now been resolved with the incorporation of customary 
arbitration into the new Ghanaian ADR Act 2010. 
The legislative process for this ADR Act began as far back as 1998, when the Ghanaian 
government put together a taskforce to come up with a suitable alternative dispute 
resolution framework for Ghana, mainly in response to problems like those 
encountered in Nigeria. According to Kwadwo Sarkodie, this initiative was 
“motivated in part by concerns that the caseload of the Ghanaian courts was reaching 
unimaginable levels.”13 Professor Paul Kirgis submits that the trial courts in Ghana 
were far too few to adequately cover the entire country, thus emphasizing the need 
                                                          
10 Antony Allot, ‘Customary Arbitration in Nigeria: A comment on Agu v Ikewibe’ (1998) 42 Journal of 
African Law 231,233. 
11ibid. 
12 For example, Section 14(3) of the Nigerian Evidence Act 2011 provides that “Where a custom cannot 
be established as one judicially noticed, it may be established and adopted as part of the law governing 
particular circumstances by calling evidence to show that persons or class of persons concerned in the 
particular area regard the alleged custom as binding upon them”. 
13Kwadwo Sarkodie, ‘Arbitration in Ghana-The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010’ 
<www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/5ee12231-1295-
4559816789d93cdf2a06/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/91e048fe-67d4-4e3f-
9d108bbf9861e753/ArbitrationGhana_Sarkodie.pdf> accessed 28 January 2015. 
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for alternatives.14 Furthermore, the pre-existing statutory framework, the Arbitration 
Act 1961 (Act 38),15 which was largely influenced by the English Arbitration Act of 
1950,16 was outdated and in need of reform in order to adequately provide a viable 
alternative to litigation. Closely related is the fact that the Act was in need of revision 
and updating if it was to reflect and serve modern commercial needs.17 The end result 
of this twelve-year long process was the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010, 
which repealed and replaced the Arbitration Act 1961. 
2.0   A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GHANAIAN ARBITRATION PRACTICE AS 
AGAINST THE NIGERIAN PRACTICE. 
2.1    Background 
The arbitration practice in Ghana is governed by the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Act 2010 (“the ADR Act”).  This Act, which is divided into five major parts, provides 
for arbitration, mediation, customary arbitration, an Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Centre and miscellaneous matters, respectively. However, in analysing this Act, we 
focus our discussion on the parts dealing with arbitration: Parts One, Three and Four.  
2.2    Part One: Arbitration  
Part One provides for arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.18 It is this very 
part of the Act that replaces the Arbitration Act 1961. This part of the new Act is largely 
modelled after the English Arbitration Act 1996, as against the Nigerian Act which is 
largely modelled after the UNCITRAL Model Law.19 
Unlike the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which limits its scope to 
commercial disputes,20 the ADR Act provides “for the settlement of disputes (and not 
                                                          
14Paul kirgis, ‘Customary Arbitration in an Evolving Africa’ 1 <www.indisputably.org/?p=2592> 
accessed 28 January 2015. 
15Judicial Training Institute, ‘Acts, Decrees and Laws of Ghana’ 
<http://jtighana.org/new/actdetails.php?id=21> accessed 15 January 2015. 
16 Amazu A. Asouzu (n 5) 123. 
17 Kwadwo Sarkodie (n 13) 2. 
18 By arbitration, the Act means “arbitration” in its traditional sense. This part of the Act as we will 
come to see does not include customary arbitration. See Section 1.1.3 of this chapter.  
19Funke Adekoya, ‘LCIA and Ghana Arbitration Centre symposium: the new Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Act 2010’ 2 <http://uk.practicallaw.com/2-504-1004?service=arbitration> accessed 29 
January 2015; Kwadwo Sarkodie (n 13) 2. 
20 Preamble to the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 
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just commercial disputes) by arbitration, mediation and customary arbitration, to 
establish an Alternative Dispute Resolution Centre and to provide for related matters” 
(Phrase in bracket is mine).21 It is therefore clear that as against the Nigerian Act which 
limits its scope to commercial disputes, the purview of the Ghanaian Act extends to 
any arbitrable dispute, thus providing a real alternative to litigation in Ghana.  As we 
argued in Section 3.2 of Chapter Four, the Ghanaian approach is preferred.   
The question then is this; what matters are arbitrable in Ghana? To its credit (and again 
unlike the Nigerian framework), the Ghanaian Act by implication of Section 1 clearly 
states the matters which are within its jurisdiction.  Section 1 of the ADR Act provides 
that the Act applies to all matters except those relating to national or public interest, 
the environment, the enforcement and interpretation of the Constitution; or any other 
matter that by law cannot be settled by an alternative dispute resolution method.  
Kwadwo Sarkodie has rightly opined that “the concepts....are potentially broad and 
lacking in clear definition (they are not defined anywhere within the Act)”.22 For 
example, the Act provides little guidance as to what qualifies as a national or public 
interest. One could argue that issues of national interest cover all matters that affect 
the nation or community as a whole and these arguably include environmental issues 
like global warming, oil spillage and deforestation.  Environment and climate change 
professionals have for example submitted that “climate change is one of the most 
serious public health threats facing the nation…children, the elderly and communities 
living in poverty are most vulnerable”.23 The confusion however sets in when the Act 
mentions matters relating to the environment as another separate and different subject 
matter to issues of public or national interest. The problem then is where to draw the 
line between issues of public or national interest and environmental issues since the 
latter could be said to be a part of the former. Was the subsection on the environment 
just for emphasis or did the draftsman have a different idea from what popularly 
obtains? If the draftsman had a completely different idea from the traditional view, 
                                                          
21 Preamble to the Ghanaian ADR Act 2010. 
22 Kwadwo Sarkodie (n 13) 2. 
23Amanda MacMillan, ‘Global Warming 101’ NRDC (11 March 2016) 
<www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/> accessed 4 February 2015. 
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why not define same in the interpretation section to avoid controversy? If it was for 
emphasis sake, why not also emphasise issues like crime and public policy which can 
also be said to fall under issues of public and national interest? It is actually difficult 
to understand the mind-set of the draftsman.  
The Act deepens this controversy when it exempts “any other matter that by law 
cannot be settled by an alternative dispute resolution method.” (emphasis mine)24 As 
we will come to see in the course of this chapter, the Ghanaian draftsman made 
conscious efforts to reduce the involvement of the court in the process of arbitration 
in Ghana. For example, we see the Act ceding some of the usual powers of the courts 
to what it refers to as an appointing authority. It is however the position of this writer 
that by using the word “law” very loosely (and not statute), the Act unknowingly 
gives the same powers it sought to take away from the courts, back to the courts. This 
is because the word “law” when used very loosely includes laws ‘made’ by the court, 
which is case law.25 This in other words makes the situation worse as the courts have 
been given the right to appropriate virtually anything they deem fit from the 
jurisdiction of the Act, notwithstanding any agreement by parties to resolve their 
dispute via arbitration. The implication of this section of the Ghanaian Act is arguably 
similar to Section 2 of the Nigerian Act, which seems to allow a court to revoke a valid 
arbitration agreement.26 
This is bad precedent especially because the courts in general have in the past shown 
their reluctance to let go of some of their traditional powers to arbitration.27 No doubt 
the courts in many jurisdictions are now open to arbitration but we must not forget 
that this change was a gradual and very contentious process, one that spanned 
decades even in more developed jurisdictions like England.28 
                                                          
24 Ghanaian ADR Act, section 1. 
25. In cases like DPP v. Shaw (1962) AC 220 and the rape case of Regina v. R (1991) 4 All ER 481, we see 
the English courts performing law making functions albeit in limited situations. 
26 For a discussion on the Nigerian position, see Section 5.2 of Chapter Four.  
27 We discussed this in Section 1.0 of Chapter Three.  
28 Ernest Lorenzen, ‘Commercial Arbitration-International and Interstate Aspects’ (1934) Yale Law 
School Scholarship Series, Paper 4588 <http://dogotalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4588>  
716,717; Herbert Syme, ‘Arbitrability of Labour Disputes’ (1951) 5(3) Rutger Law Review 45, 458; Janet 
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As we have seen in Chapter Two of this thesis, one must not forget that many of the 
legal frameworks (the law and the judiciary) in Nigeria and even Ghana are 
anachronistic. Unfortunately, and as we have seen in Chapter Two, the National 
Judicial Institute (NJI) in Nigeria lacks the capacity to perform its statutory function 
of ensuring the continued education of all judicial officers at the same time.  
With this new provision, which arguably gives courts the power to make laws over 
issues relating to arbitration, this writer foresees new decisions of the court which 
restrict the purview of arbitration in certain areas. No wonder commercial lawyers 
like Kwadwo Sarkodie have opined that “the question of which matters fall within 
these categories will be the subject of extensive, and perhaps persistent, debate.”29 
Under Part One of the ADR Act, every arbitration agreement must be in writing. 
However, unlike the Nigerian Arbitration Act which requires a signature,30 the 
Ghanaian Act is more flexible in this regard as it does not require a signature.31 
Furthermore, in Ghana, a validly made arbitration agreement is only revocable by the 
agreement of the parties.32 This is as against the situation in Nigeria where the courts 
seem to have unlimited powers to revoke an arbitration agreement.33 
Interestingly, the outdated Nigerian Arbitration Act adopts a modern approach which 
is lacking in the Ghanaian ADR Act when it allows parties to incorporate an 
arbitration agreement from an external source into their contract. Section 1(2) of the 
Nigerian Act provides that “any reference in a contract to a document containing an 
arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if such contract is in writing 
and the reference is such as to make that clause part of the contract”. According to 
Tweeddale, a general reference to the said clause suffices to establish an intention to 
                                                          
Rosen, ‘Arbitration under Private International Law: The Doctrine of Seperability and Competence de 
la Competence’ (1994) 17(3) Fordhams International Law Journal 599, 617.  
29 Kwadwo Sarkodie (n 13) 2. 
30 Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, section 1. 
31 Ghanaian ADR Act 2010, section 2(3). 
32 ibid section 3(2). 
33 Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, section 2. 
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incorporate an external arbitration clause into parties’ contract.34 In other words, 
parties need not use any specific words of incorporation.  
The Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (CISG) Advisory 
Council, while interpreting the CISG,35 opined that the terms can only be said to have 
been incorporated where the parties have expressly or impliedly agreed to their 
inclusion at the time of the formation of the contract and the other party had a 
reasonable opportunity to take notice of the terms.36 In the Machinery case, the German 
Supreme Court opined that “it is generally required that the recipient of a contract 
offer that is supposed to be based on general terms and conditions have the possibility 
to become aware of them in a reasonable manner”.37 Knowledge of the incorporated 
terms may be inferred from negotiation between parties and/or trade practices.38 In 
establishing an arbitration agreement via incorporation therefore, parties must be 
proven to either be expressly or impliedly aware of their inclusion.  
Section 7 of the ADR Act also provides that “where a court before which an action is 
pending is of the view that the action or a part of the action can be resolved through 
arbitration, that court may with the consent of the parties in writing, despite that there 
is no arbitration agreement in respect of the matter in dispute, refer the action or any 
part of the action for arbitration”. On the surface, this section of the Act seems pro-
arbitration. However, it is the position of this writer that this section of the Act is to 
say the least, dictatorial and antithetical to arbitration. This writer questions the 
voluntariness of the consent purportedly obtained by the parties in such a situation. 
According to Dr Onyema, “practically, it is difficult to see how a party can withhold 
its consent under a Section 7 nudge by the court. It is suggested that in the light of the 
power (subtle as it is) wielded by a High Court Judge over parties in a matter before 
                                                          
34 Andrew Tweeddale, ‘Incorporation of Arbitration Clauses’ (2002) 68 Arbitration 1. 
35 It is also known as the Vienna Convention 1980, apparently because it was signed in Vienna in 1980. 
36 CISG-AC Opinion No. 13, Inclusion of Standard Terms under the CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Sieg 
Eiselen, College of Law, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa. Adopted by the CISG 
Advisory Council following its 17th meeting in Villanova, Pennsylvania, USA, on 20 January 2013. 
37German Machinery case (31 October 2001 Supreme Court) 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011031g1.html> accessed 8 March 2015.   
38Austrian Propane case (6 February 1996 Supreme Court) 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960206a3.html> accessed 8 March 2015. 
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it, it may not be practicable for a party to withhold its consent to such suggestion by 
the court. This clearly begs the question of the genuineness of the consent obtained 
from the parties which may be more forced than voluntary. It therefore appears that 
the legislator was more interested in the formality of obtaining a written consent than 
evidence of a genuine intention of the parties to arbitrate their dispute.”39 It will not 
be unreasonable for parties to expect that a Judge will be hostile to or biased against 
their submissions if they refuse to acquiesce to his or her “suggestion” to arbitrate.  
In terms of the arbitration procedure and proceedings, the Ghanaian framework 
allows parties to resolve their disputes either via ad hoc arbitration, under the rules of 
any institution of their choice or under the rules and auspices of the newly established 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Centre in Ghana.40 Furthermore, unlike the Nigerian 
Arbitration Act which imposes its own rules on domestic arbitration parties, Section 5 
(3) of the ADR Act provides that “where reference is made to a person or institution 
other than the Centre, the procedure and rules shall be as the parties and arbitrators 
determine”. In line with the spirit of arbitration therefore, the Ghanaian Act allows 
parties to determine the method by which their disputes will be administered.   
In composing the arbitration tribunal, the ADR Act again sticks with its underlying 
party autonomy principle when it allows parties to determine the number of 
arbitrators that will administer their dispute. The Act nonetheless inserts a proviso, 
which is that the number must not be an even number.41 Section 13(2) of the same Act 
concludes the section by providing for a default number of three arbitrators. The 
Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act similarly allows parties to determine the 
number of their arbitration panel, failing which it prescribes a default number of three 
arbitrators.42 The Nigerian Act does not however require a mandatory odd numbered 
tribunal. Technically therefore, parties under the jurisdiction of the Nigerian Act have 
the flexibility to appoint an even numbered arbitration tribunal.43 
                                                          
39Emilia Onyema, ‘The New Ghana ADR Act 2010: A critical Overview’ (2012) 28 Arbitration 
International 101, 114. 
40 Ghanaian ADR Act 2010, section 5(2). 
41 ibid, section 13(1). 
42 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, section 5. 
43 Of course this is not practical and so very unlikely. 
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The idea behind an odd numbered tribunal is not farfetched; it prevents a deadlock 
arising from equal voting rights, thus preventing controversy and ultimately court 
action.  As we will see later in this chapter and also in Chapter Seven, even the English 
Arbitration Act, by implication of certain provisions, discourages parties from 
submitting to an even numbered tribunal. Having to resort to court action clearly 
defeats the idea behind an arbitration in the first place. Notwithstanding the fact that 
it is unlikely that any experienced legal practitioner will agree to an even numbered 
tribunal, the Nigerian Act will do well to clearly prohibit even numbered panels. 
Section 15 of the ADR Act mandates an arbitrator to disclose in writing, any 
circumstance likely to give reasonable cause to doubt his/her independence or 
impartiality. The Ghanaian draftsman most likely borrowed this provision from 
arbitration institutions like the ICC’s International Court of Arbitration Rules (“ICC 
Arbitration rules”) and the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA rules). 
For example, Article 11(2) of the ICC’s Rules provides that “a prospective arbitrator shall 
disclose in writing to the secretariat, any facts or circumstances which might be of such 
a nature as to call into question the arbitrators’ independence in the eyes of the parties, 
as well as circumstances that could give rise to reasonable doubt as to the arbitrators’ 
impartiality. The secretariat shall provide such information to the parties in writing 
and fix a time limit for any comment from them”.44 Furthermore, by virtue of Article 
5.4 of the London Court of International Arbitration Rules, the arbitrator is also expected 
to make a statement as to his willingness and ability to ensure the expeditious and 
efficient conduct of the arbitration.45 
This no doubt is good practice especially since it requires much more than technical 
knowledge of the subject matter to properly administer a dispute. The arbitrator must 
not only be fair and just, he must also be seen to be fair and just. Because of the 
confidential nature of arbitration, information as to the arbitrators’ previous 
relationship with the parties or the subject matter of the dispute may not be within 
public domain, knowledge of which may influence parties’ choice of arbitrator.  
                                                          
44 ICC Arbitration Rules 2012; see also LCIA Rules, article 5.4. 
45 LCIA Rules 2014; See also ICC Arbitration Rules 2012, article 13 (1). 
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The Ghanaian Act introduces into its framework what it calls an arbitration 
management conference, which the arbitrator is expected to call within fourteen days 
after being appointed.46 In an apparent bid to save time and money, the Act allows 
this conference to be held either in person or through electronic media. During the 
conference, parties will be expected to discuss issues relating to the successful conduct 
of the arbitration.47 It should be pointed out that an institution like the ICC’s 
International Court of Arbitration, has a similar provision which allows parties to 
agree on the contents of the Terms of Reference and issues relating to procedure.48 As 
we argue in Section 2.1.5 of Chapter Seven, this provision will in the long run 
encourage a speedy, efficient and arguably a cheaper arbitration process.  
Interestingly, in Section 30 of the ADR Act, an arbitration institution, an appointing 
authority or any other individual is allowed to facilitate a conciliation conference as 
part of the arbitration process, on the condition that the arbitrator is not also appointed 
as conciliator. Confusion sets in when this section is considered against Section 47, 
which allows an arbitrator to encourage the “settlement of the dispute with the 
agreement of the parties”.49 However subsection 2 of that Section 47 provides that “the 
arbitrator may for the purposes of subsection (1), use mediation or other procedures 
at any time during the arbitral proceedings”. Unlike Section 30 of the ADR Act, Section 
47 of the same Act seems to allow an arbitrator to also serve as a mediator in the same 
proceeding. This method which is known as Med-Arb, touches on a number of ethical 
issues,50 especially because the arbitrator who assumes the position of a mediator may 
at some point have to revert to his position as a decision maker (an arbitrator) if the 
mediation proceeding fails. During a mediation process, the parties are expected to 
“bare it all” to the mediator, who in turn tries to help parties reach a mutually 
agreeable conclusion. It is not unreasonable to assume that important information 
which was disclosed to the mediator-arbitrator during the course of the mediation 
                                                          
46 Ghanaian ADR Act 2010, section 29. 
47 ibid. 
48 ICC Arbitration Rules 2012, article 24. 
49 Ghanaian ADR Act 2010, section 47(1). 
50 Susan Blake et al, A Practical Approach to Alternative Dispute Resolution (1st Edition, Oxford University 
Press 2011) 389. 
185 
 
proceedings will influence the mediator-turned-arbitrator when deciding the 
arbitration. As Redfern and Hunter have rightly asked, “how can an arbitrator who has 
previously held private discussions with the parties separately satisfy (or appear to 
satisfy) the requirement of impartiality and a fair hearing?”51 This Section 47 of the Act 
as well as the general practice where the same person acts as mediator and arbitrator 
in the same proceedings should be discouraged.52 
One recurrent problem in the Nigerian Arbitration Act, which was highlighted in 
Chapter Four, was the constant and unnecessary involvement of the courts in the 
arbitration process. The Ghanaian Act seems to have taken care of this problem by re-
assigning many of the tasks normally within the jurisdiction of the courts to what it 
calls an “appointing authority”. In other words, the appointing authority’s duties 
under the Ghanaian Act go beyond the traditional one of support or assistance.  For 
example, under this Act, a party who is dissatisfied with the arbitrators’ ruling on 
jurisdiction is able to appeal to the appointing authority.53 Furthermore, an arbitrator 
is also able to appeal to the appointing authority to determine issues relating to relief 
from any liability incurred as well as in respect of entitlement to fees or expenses.54 
The Act however does little to check and balance these powers of the appointing 
authority, who many times may be a private individual. The position and powers of 
an appointing authority under the Ghanaian Act ought to by default, be exercisable 
only by the Alternative Dispute Resolution Centre, in order to encourage a just, fair 
and standardised system. In designing how this would work in practice, a cue can be 
taken from the ICC’s Court of International Arbitration, which also performs similar 
decision making functions (to the Ghanaian appointing authority), although in a more 
organized and sophisticated fashion. The ICC’s Court’s jurisdiction goes beyond 
general administration and appointment of arbitrators.55 The ICC’s court for example 
is empowered to decide on issues relating to the validity of the agreement and the 
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53 Ghanaian ADR Act 2010, section 26. 
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jurisdiction of the tribunal,56 consolidate two or more arbitrations being conducted 
under the auspices of the ICC,57 administer issues relating to the challenge and 
replacement of arbitrators, determines issues relating to the cost of arbitration and fees 
of the arbitrators,58 administer issues dealing with extension of time applications as 
well as scrutinise awards,59 among many other functions. 
The ICC’s Court consists of a President, Vice Presidents and members (and alternate 
members of the Court).60 In practice however and considering the busy schedule of 
members, the ICC Court in the performance of its functions makes use of committees 
to perform its statutory functions.61 A typical committee consists of the President and 
two other members of the Court, who are appointed at the last plenary session of the 
court. The President (or in his absence, any of his Vice Presidents) is however allowed 
to make urgent decisions on behalf of the Court, provided that such decisions are 
reported to the Court at its next session.62 Countries like Ghana will do well to 
incorporate this ICC Court system model to prevent abuse, guarantee quality and 
certainty of decision as well as ensure justice in arbitral matters. 
Notwithstanding the Ghanaian Act’s attempt to keep the court out of the 
administration of arbitration, we still see instances where specific powers are 
restricted (and rightly so) to the Ghanaian court.63 For example, Section 28 of the ADR 
Act allows a party to an arbitration agreement who was not notified of an existing 
arbitration proceeding to challenge the proceedings in court on certain grounds. One 
of the said grounds for a Section 28 challenge relates to the question as to whether there 
is a valid arbitration agreement.64 This Section 28(1) (a) of the Act is in other words 
saying that the standing of one party to institute the said application against the other 
party, rests on the very agreement which he is claiming does not exist (and possibly 
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may not exist). The idea behind this section can be likened to the idea of the putative 
law of an arbitration agreement. This implies that any dispute as to the existence or 
validity of an arbitration agreement should be resolved by the law that would have 
governed the agreement if it was valid.65 
Other powers of the court include the power to revoke an arbitrator’s authority in 
certain defined circumstances.66 For example, an arbitrator’s authority can be revoked 
when there is reasonable cause to doubt the arbitrator’s impartiality or if the arbitrator 
is proven not to meet pre-agreed qualifications or experience.67 By virtue of Section 39 
of the ADR Act, the Ghanaian High Court has the power to support arbitral 
proceedings by making an order for the taking of evidence of witnesses or an order 
for the preservation of evidence amongst others.  The High Court also has the power 
to hear applications on preliminary questions of law, if the court is satisfied that the 
question substantially affects the rights of the other party.68 
The Ghanaian Act also delves into seemingly minute details which are not found in 
the Nigerian Act. The Act reflects modern realities when it allows parties to serve and 
exchange arbitration documents via email and facsimile among other methods of 
electronic communication.69 This will save time and cost as well as promote an 
efficient process. Section 42 of the ADR Act also allows parties to be represented by any 
counsel or person of their choice. This section of the Act also takes care of the 
controversy arising from the use of the title “legal practitioner” in the Nigerian Act.70 
Section 22 of the ADR Act makes provision for the arbitrators’ fees, while Section 23 of 
the said Act cloaks an arbitrator (and anyone who works with the arbitrator during the 
proceeding) with immunity from liability for any act or omission arising in the course 
of the discharge of his functions, unless the arbitrator (or anyone working with or for 
the arbitrator) is shown to have acted in bad faith. 
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2.3    Part Three: Customary Arbitration 
Part Three incorporates the Ghanaian customary arbitration practice into its legislative 
framework. It must be submitted that this incorporation is a bold and very laudable 
initiative by the Ghanaian government.71 As Asouzu noted, apart from Ghana, no 
other African arbitration statute has made any explicit provision for customary 
arbitration.72 By providing a legislative framework on arbitration, the Ghanaian 
government has not only validated the customary arbitration practice in Ghana, 
thereby ending any suspicion or controversy surrounding the existence of the practice 
in Ghana (and by extension Nigeria), it has more importantly incorporated a familiar 
and deeply rooted framework into its alternative dispute resolution framework, thus 
providing impetus to its efforts to reduce the workload of the court.  
A fundamental difference between Part One (arbitration) and Part Three (customary 
arbitration) in Ghana (and even in Nigeria) is in regards to the governing or applicable 
law of the arbitration. While under Part One, parties have the choice to resolve their 
dispute via the general laws of a particular jurisdiction (and/or other considerations 
as the parties may determine),73 under Part Three, the customary law (and trade 
practices) of a particular set of people, determine the basis and standard of the 
decision.74 Furthermore, while Part One requires a written arbitration agreement, 
under Part Three, an arbitration agreement need not be in writing.75 
In addition, there is a difference between what is arbitrable under Part One and Part 
Three of the Act. According to the Ghanaian Act, “a party to a dispute may submit the 
dispute to customary arbitration under this Part…Except as otherwise ordered by a 
court and subject to any other enactment in force, a person shall not; a) submit a 
criminal matter for customary arbitration; or b) serve as an arbitrator in a criminal 
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matter…”.76 In other words, only criminal matters are exempted from the scope of 
customary arbitration. On the other hand, we have seen that Part One has a different 
and more detailed list of what is not arbitrable. According to Section 1 of the Act, these 
matters include those relating to national or public interest, the environment, the 
enforcement and interpretation of the constitution; or any other matter that by law 
cannot be settled by an alternative dispute resolution method.  It is not out of place to 
imply from the aforementioned sections that matters which deal with national or 
public interest, the environment, the enforcement and interpretation of the 
constitution can be resolved through customary arbitration.  
Of course, one can argue that decisions and enactments that touch on arbitration 
extend to customary arbitration. This writer however opposes this argument in its 
entirety, on the basis that the ADR Act clearly sought to distinguish between these 
two systems of arbitration and does not establish any overlap in any way between 
them. Admittedly, the extension argument may apply in a country like Nigeria which 
has not made different provisions for arbitration and customary arbitration.  
However, to the extent that the Ghanaian draftsman provides two different parts for 
arbitration and customary arbitration and more importantly to the extent that these 
different parts define what is not arbitrable under each of their provisions 
respectively, each part is exclusively limited to its subject and so cannot be extended 
to cover the other. In other words, unless any other statute or law on arbitration in 
Ghana expressly includes customary arbitration, the use of the word “arbitration” 
cannot be said to include customary arbitration since the principal arbitration 
framework in the country seems to have separated it.  
Except in one or two other superficial cases (like the provision relating to the number 
of arbitrators and the writing requirement),77 the process of administering disputes 
under Part One and Part Three of the Act is more or less the same. For example, like 
Part One of the Act, Part Three provides that upon nomination, a customary arbitrator 
is expected to disclose any circumstance likely to give reasonable cause to doubt his 
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independence or impartiality during the proceedings.78 Parties under the Act may 
either opt to resolve their dispute via ad hoc79 or institutional arbitration (or through 
the rules and practice of the ADR centre).80 The court is also empowered to refer any 
dispute pending before it to customary arbitration.81 The appointment of the 
customary arbitrator may also be challenged based on the same considerations 
provided for in Part One of the Act.82 Section 109 of the Act not only provides that a 
customary arbitration award is binding between parties and any person claiming 
through them, it also provides that the said award need not be registered in a court 
for it to be binding. Like conventional arbitration, it may however be registered for 
the purposes of record and/or enforcement.83 Section 111 of the Act provides that a 
customary arbitration award is to be enforced like every other judgement of the court.  
This writer therefore questions the idea behind the different provisions for arbitration 
and customary arbitration, especially since it is clear from our discussion that apart 
from a few minor differences, the provisions governing arbitration in Part One and 
customary arbitration in Part Three are more or less the same. It is submitted that 
customary arbitration ought to have been incorporated into Part One of the Act.  For 
fundamental differences, if any, it is submitted that just as the arbitration frameworks 
in jurisdictions like Nigeria and England have the same framework for both domestic 
and international arbitration but makes separate provisions where necessary (for 
example in enforcement provisions), the same could have been done for customary 
arbitration. There is no point introducing a whole new part which virtually enunciates 
the same principles when the same can be incorporated into one.  
An omission of Part Three of the Act is the fact that it only envisages submission 
agreements; situations where the agreement to arbitrate is reached after the dispute 
has arisen.84 Section 90 of the Act provides that the claimant initiates the arbitration 
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when he reports the dispute to an arbitrator of his choice, who the respondent has the 
option to accept or reject. By this section, the Act seems to have ruled out the 
possibility of a pre-dispute agreement in customary arbitration, possibly because of 
the difficulty in proving their existence since many customary arbitration agreements 
are oral.  It must however be emphasized that there is nothing under either customary 
law or the Ghanaian statute and case law that precludes parties from making written 
customary arbitration agreements. It is therefore opined that as the awareness and 
level of education continues to increase in Ghana and even in Nigeria, both countries 
will probably grow into written arbitration agreement. Besides, as we have seen in 
Section 2.3 of Chapter Five of this thesis, oral contracts are recognised under the 
Nigerian and Ghanaian law; the same conditions ought to be extended to pre-dispute 
oral arbitration agreements.  
2.4     Part Four: Alternative Dispute Resolution Centre (“ADRC”) 
Part Four of the Ghanaian Act establishes and provides for an Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Centre (“the Centre”), a body corporate with perpetual succession and a 
common seal, to facilitate the practice of alternative dispute resolution in Ghana.  The 
Centre is run by a governing Board of ten members comprising of one representative 
of the Ghana Chamber of Commerce, the Ghana Bar Association, and the judiciary, 
amongst other organizations.85 Members of the Board are appointed and can be 
sacked by the President of Ghana.86 
Commentators have expressed dissatisfaction with the involvement of the 
government in the administration of the institution.87 At the London Court of 
International Arbitration and Ghana Arbitration Centre symposium which held in 
Ghana in 2010, Funke Adekoya, SAN while summarising some of the conclusions 
made during the forum, submitted that “while government support for the 
development of arbitration is commendable, this direct involvement by the 
government detracts from the arbitration friendly position that the country is trying 
to promote…local practitioners concluded that the extent of government was counter-
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productive and not in the interest of the growth of arbitration in the 
country…Practitioners indicated their intention to propose a drastic review of the Act, 
in order to strictly delimit the supervisory relationship of the government over the 
ADR centre”. The question then is whether the government’s involvement in the 
administration of the Centre fundamentally affects the “arbitration friendliness” of 
Ghana so much as to justify a drastic review of this part of the Act.  
No doubt, because of the private nature of arbitration, it is preferable to reduce to the 
barest minimum, the involvement of government in the administration of arbitration. 
It is however an exaggeration to suggest that the involvement of the President of 
Ghana in the appointment of Board members affects the reputation of the nation as 
arbitration friendly. When we talk of being arbitration friendly, we essentially refer to 
the willingness of the government and the courts of the land to recognize and enforce 
a lawfully made arbitration agreement and award.88 Section 3(2) of the ADR Act 
provides for the irrevocability of an arbitration agreement except by the agreement of 
the parties. This is as against Section 2 of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act.89 
The Ghanaian courts are also mandated not only to recognize any validly made 
arbitration agreement,90 but more importantly to enforce any resulting award.91 
In fact, the Act arguably takes its “arbitration friendliness” a step too far when it 
empowers the court to refer to arbitration (with the parties’ consent), any litigation 
which in its opinion can be resolved by arbitration.92 Furthermore, Section 116 of the 
Act provides that “the Centre shall not be under the direction or control of any person 
or authority in the performance of its function”. It is therefore submitted that to the 
extent that the Act has shown its unequivocal willingness to recognize and enforce 
any validly made arbitration agreement as well as arbitration awards (both domestic 
and international), and until such a time as the courts are shown to be adopting a 
contrary position to the provisions of the Act, it is erroneous to suggest that the mere 
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involvement of the President in the appointment of Board members affects the 
reputation of the nation as an arbitration friendly jurisdiction.  Besides it is difficult to 
see how the President’s involvement in the appointment of members of the Board 
affects the integrity of a party constituted arbitration panel and process.  
Moreover, the President’s involvement in the administration of the Centre is within 
prescribed boundaries. The Act clearly defines and/or limits the membership of the 
board to representatives from a list of credible organizations. In the exercise of this 
power, it will be expected that the President, in selecting members from each 
organisation, will take advice or nominations from the leadership of each 
organisation. Besides, it is usual for the President in many countries to be involved in 
the appointment of the Chief Justice of many countries. For example, in Article 148 of 
the Ghanaian Constitution, the President is empowered to appoint the Chief Justice of 
Ghana upon the recommendation of the Judicial Council.93 Furthermore in Nigeria, 
the President of Nigeria not only appoints the Chief Justice of Nigeria, he also appoints 
all the individual Justices of the Supreme Court, all the Justices of the Court of the 
Appeal, all the justices of the Federal High Court as well as the Justices of the National 
Industrial Court, upon the recommendation of the National Judicial Council.94 
Notwithstanding the Presidents’ involvement in the appointment process of these 
senior Judges, it is unreasonable to challenge the operation of the doctrine of 
separation of powers and/or the independence of the judiciary on the basis of this.  By 
extension, it is erroneous to suggest without any form of proof that the President’s 
involvement in the appointment of Board members affects the independence of the 
governing Board.  
Besides, it must be emphasised that the Centre was not created to administer 
arbitration alone, instead the purview of the Act extends to other forms of dispute 
resolution mechanisms like mediation. Assuming without conceding that the 
involvement of the President in the appointment of the governing board undermines 
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arbitration as a method of dispute resolution, it is submitted that the effect is negligible 
and not enough reason to advocate for a drastic or urgent review.  Until such a time 
as when the involvement of the President in the appointment of the Board members 
is seen to be inimical to the growth and practice of not only arbitration but also the 
other dispute resolution methods, this writer considers any calls for the review of this 
part of the Act unnecessary. Admittedly, in order to avoid controversy and abuse, it 
may be necessary for the Act to clearly lay down the procedure by which the President 
of Ghana would select the Board members. 
In order to achieve its objectives, the Centre provides facilities for the resolution of 
disputes through arbitration. It also keeps a register of arbitrators (which parties to an 
ad hoc arbitration may consult), provides guidelines on fees for arbitrators, conducts 
research and provides education on arbitration in general, among many other 
statutory functions.95 
By virtue of Section 5 and 90 of the Act, parties to an arbitration and customary 
arbitration under Part One and Part Three respectively, have the option to conduct 
their arbitration under the auspices and rules of the ADR Centre.96 Subject to parties’ 
agreement, the Centre handles all aspects relating to the administration of the 
arbitration.97 For example, parties may request that the Centre appoints a customary 
arbitrator on their behalf.98 The Centre is allowed to maintain a register of qualified 
arbitrators,99 which parties even in an ad hoc arbitration are allowed to have access to 
upon request.100 The ADR rules also provide for an arbitration management 
conference to afford parties the opportunity to agree on procedural issues amongst 
others.  
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3.0. THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 
3.1     Background 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), a 
subsidiary of the General Assembly of the United Nations, was established in 1966 to 
among other things, assist the United Nations to improve its legal frameworks on 
international trade.  The UNCITRAL has since its inception produced Model Laws in 
specialised areas like international sales of goods, electronic commerce, insolvency, 
security interests and international commercial dispute resolution (including 
arbitration and conciliation). The Model Law on International Arbitration was 
adopted by the UNCITRAL on 21st of June 1985.101 Caroline Cazenave and Marie 
Fernet referred to the law as “a ready-made law that serves as a model for States 
working to revise or adapt an arbitration law”.102 
The Model Law provides a unified legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement 
of disputes arising in international commercial relations.103 In its explanatory notes, 
UNCITRAL points out that the Model Law seeks to also address “considerable 
disparities in national laws on arbitration. The need for improvement and 
harmonization was based on findings that national laws were often inappropriate for 
international cases”.104 It is therefore clear that the Model Law sought to promote a 
kind of harmonised international arbitration framework.105 
Notwithstanding one of the primary intentions of the Model Law, which is to provide 
a model framework for international arbitration, it also to an extent provides a guide 
from which domestic arbitration frameworks can copy. The Commission is therefore 
right in observing that “while the Model Law was designed with international 
commercial arbitration in mind, it offers a set of basic rules that are not, in and of 
                                                          
101The General Assembly of the United Nation did not however adopt this law until the 11th of 
December 1985, when it had consulted with arbitration experts and institutions. 
102 Caroline Cazenave and Marie Fernet, ‘The Uniform Law on International Commercial Arbitration’ 
(2014) 3 International Business Law Review Journal 219. 
103 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 With amendments as 
adopted in 2006 <www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf> 
accessed 19 February 2015. 
104 ibid 25. 
105 Janet A Rosen, ‘Arbitration Under Private International Law: The Doctrine of Separability and 
Competence de la Competence’ (1993-1994) 17 Fordham International Law Journal 599,620. 
196 
 
themselves, unsuitable to any other type of arbitration.”106 This is because it 
incorporates important issues and principles in arbitration. Jurisdictions like Nigeria, 
Spain, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Venezuela, Ukraine, Turkey, Tunisia, Thailand, Singapore, 
among many others were quick to model their Arbitration Act’s after this particular 
version of the Model Law.  
On the 7th of July 2006, the Commission at its 34th session chose to update the existing 
Model Law to reflect the new trends within the sphere of commercial law. 
Unfortunately, and as we have mentioned, the Nigerian Act has not been adapted to 
reflect the changes in the new Model Law or better still to reflect the current trends in 
arbitration.  We now highlight some of the relevant changes to the Model Law.  
3.2    New Changes in the Model Law 2006 
One of the most important changes to the Model Law relates to the writing 
requirement. Article 7(2) of the old Model Law, just like the Nigerian framework, 
required that a valid agreement be written and signed by the parties to the agreement. 
However, as the Committee rightly noted, “…in a number of situations, the drafting 
of a written document was impossible or impractical. In such cases where the 
willingness of the parties to arbitrate was not in question, the validity of the arbitration 
should be recognized.”107 This observation influenced the newer version of Article 7 in 
the 2006 Model.  The new version of the article provides two options. The first option 
is more or less a reproduction of the old Article 7 of the Model Law. One significant 
addition to this Option one is that it defines a written arbitration agreement to include 
an oral agreement which is subsequently recorded in writing. Very importantly, the 
new Model Law removes the signature requirement from Option one.  
Option two of the new Model Law assumes a more flexible approach when it defines 
an arbitration agreement as an “agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration, all 
or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of 
a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not”.108  We therefore see the 
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Model Law dispensing with the writing requirement of an arbitration agreement.109 
Very important again is the fact that this provision is drafted in a way that allows  non-
commercial and/or non-contractual agreements to be resolved via arbitration.  The 
new Article 7 of the Model Law places more emphasis on the existence of an agreement 
which can be established from an examination of the facts and reduces the very 
unnecessary emphasis on form of the old Article 7,110 which as we have previously 
and severally pointed out in the course of this thesis, is unsuitable for a developing 
country like Nigeria.111 As was highlighted in Chapter Four of this thesis, the Nigerian 
arbitration practice will very well benefit from a less formalistic framework.112 It 
should be noted that Article 7(6) of the new Model Law also retains the incorporation 
provision found in the old Model Law.  
The new Article 7 of the Model Law has ripple effects on other parts of the Act. For 
example, under the old Model Law, a party who sought to enforce his arbitration 
award in court needed to attach copies of the arbitration agreement and award.113 
However, the new Article 35 dispenses with the requirement for a copy of the 
arbitration agreement in an application for the enforcement of an arbitration award.  
The relevance of this Option two of the new Article 7 within the sphere of international 
arbitration remains to be seen in view of Article IV of the New York Convention, which 
requires any party who seeks to enforce his international arbitration award in another 
jurisdiction, to submit a written version of the agreement. Until the New York 
Convention allows parties to an oral arbitration agreement to enforce same without 
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any strict writing requirement, the use and relevance of Option two in the practice of 
international arbitration is very limited (possibly not existing). Of course, this will 
probably never happen mainly because of the difficulties that will be associated in 
proving and enforcing oral agreements at an international level.  
At this point, one is tempted to ask why this flexible option was introduced into a 
model for international arbitration since as we have seen, the enforcement of an 
international arbitration award requires a written agreement. A plausible explanation 
is that the UNCITRAL is moving away from its traditional role of providing an 
international commercial arbitration model to a more encompassing model.  
Another very relevant variation of the Model Law is Article 17. Article 17 of the old 
Model Law empowered the tribunal to take interim measures to protect the subject 
matter of the dispute. However, the old Law did not define the extent or scope of this 
power. As Hew Dundas rightly noted, the question of interim measures has been 
around the arbitral community for many years but was brought sharply into focus by 
the 2006 revision to the Model Law.114  Since then, institutions like the International 
Chambers of Commerce (ICC),115 the London Court of International Arbitration 
(LCIA),116 the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC)117 and the 
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR)118 amongst many other arbitration 
institutions, have since incorporated same into their frameworks.  
The new Article 17 expands this power and goes into more detail about how this power 
should be exercised.119 A tribunal may issue an interim order: to maintain or restore 
the status quo pending the determination of the dispute, prevent a party from taking 
an action that will cause current or imminent harm to the arbitral process, preserve or 
freeze assets out of which an award may be satisfied from and preserve evidence that 
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may be relevant and material to the resolution of the dispute.120  The said provision 
goes on to list the conditions which an applicant for such an order must prove before 
the tribunal will grant such an order.121 Parties may however need to approach the 
court to recognize and enforce this order of the tribunal,122 which the courts of course 
have the right and discretion to either allow or refuse.123 
Under the new Model Law, courts also have the power to issue any of the 
aforementioned interims orders. According to Article 17J, “a court shall have the same 
power of issuing an interim measure in relation to arbitration proceedings…” Parties 
therefore have the choice between approaching the tribunal or the courts. However, 
as Professor Bantekas noted, only the courts have the power to issue enforceable 
orders.124 Approaching the court as a first resort may therefore be a more reasonable 
option, especially when the dispute between parties is contentious.125 For example, a 
respondent may be reluctant to abide by an order of the tribunal to freeze his assets, 
possibly because of the implication(s) which such an order may have on his business. 
In situations like the aforementioned, the coercive powers of the court may be needed 
to enforce such an order of the tribunal. In other words, rather than go through a two 
pronged application process, which will involve applying to the tribunal for an 
interim order and then applying to the court for a subsequent recognition and 
enforcement order, the more efficient approach may be to approach the court from the 
onset. On the other hand, a respondent may be indifferent to an order to maintain 
status quo to the extent that the order does not affect the smooth running of his 
business.  
One may also argue that another advantage of Article 17J of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
is the fact that it is able to provide interim relief for situations arising before the 
appointment of the arbitration tribunal.  Having in mind that one of the major 
preoccupations of the Model Law was to provide a law that reduces the involvement 
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of the court in arbitration proceedings, institutional rules like the ICC, LCIA and the 
SIAC126 provide a useful alternative through the provision of an emergency arbitrator, 
who by virtue of his position (and pending the appointment of the substantive panel), 
is able to make interim and/or conservatory orders.127 As Edgardo Munoz rightly 
noted, the emergency arbitrator provision was aimed at responding to parties demand 
to have the choice to avoid approaching State courts.128 
Baruch Baigel also argues that the emergency arbitrator provision provides parties 
with a quicker method of dealing with initial problems than the courts.129 This writer 
however asserts that this may not necessarily be true in all instances. For example, the 
process of appointing an emergency arbitrator may in fact be more time consuming 
than anticipated, especially when there is no express agreement to appoint one and/or 
when one of the parties is hell bent on frustrating this process by all means. 
Furthermore, more time may also be wasted if after an interim award delivered by the 
emergency arbitrator, one of the parties refuses to abide by the award and the interim 
award creditor has to still approach the court for an enforcement order. 
As we eventually submit in Chapter Seven, while the emergency arbitrator provision 
may in fact be a useful addition to the practice of international arbitration, the extra 
and unplanned expenses incurred by parties may in fact be a big downside of this 
innovative provision, especially in domestic arbitration and in a developing country 
as Nigeria. Having this in mind, one may argue that the ability of courts to make initial 
interim orders should remain a part, indeed the default provision in domestic 
arbitration. In other words, unless parties expressly allow the emergency arbitrator 
provision or by implication incorporate this provision by conducting their arbitration 
under the auspices of institutions like the ICC and LCIA, who have embedded the 
practice within their Rules, the court ought to by default be seised of the jurisdiction 
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to grant any order needed before the constitution of the tribunal. However, for 
disputes arising after the constitution of the tribunal, it is submitted that this again 
ought to be dependent on parties express or implied agreement. We discuss this issue 
in more detail in Chapter Seven of this thesis.130 
4.0 THE DOMESTIC ARBITRATION PRACTICE IN ENGLAND 
4.1     Background 
The English Arbitration Act 1996 (“the English Act”)131 has to a large extent 
contributed to the development of arbitration all over the world.132 Prior to this Act, 
the Departmental Advisory Committee (DAC) under the Chairmanship of Lord 
Mustill had advocated against adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law, and had instead 
advocated for a new and more improved English Arbitration Act.133 
Commenting on the English Act, Paul Newman pointed out that “the promoters of 
the new English legislation decided that although the UNCITRAL Model Law had 
many useful lessons, English law and practice were too well developed by case law 
precedents to justify the whole scale adoption of the Model Law. The exercise became 
one of consolidating the Arbitration Acts 1950-1979, modernising their language and 
inserting apposite features from the Model Law”.134 As Tobi Landau rightly noted, the 
promoters of the Act were more interested in devising a regime that satisfied common 
needs and interests as against one that catered solely for one particular type of 
arbitration at the expense of the other.135 
Looking at the reform process in retrospect, Alan Reid rightly opined that if indeed 
England was to preserve its pre-eminent place in the world of arbitration, any 
amendment to the English arbitration legislation had to be in line with developments 
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within the field of international commercial arbitration and to which the Model Law 
provided the most acceptable model.136 In coming up with the English Arbitration Act 
1996 therefore, the DAC also took into consideration, provisions of the Model Law.137  
England remains a preferred arbitration destination not only because of the quality of 
her arbitration law, but also because of her historical and political influence, her 
optimal geographical location as well as her developed legal and court system.138 In 
fact, according to Paolo Esposito, “…English law and the Judges who administer it are 
so highly regarded that the cases heard in the commercial court in recent years saw an 
approximate 50:50 split between English and foreign litigants…”.139  It has therefore 
proven to be a popular middle ground for international businesses.  
4.2     A Critical Analysis of the English Arbitration Act 1996 
Section 1 of the English Act clearly defines its underlying principles: to provide a fair, 
speedy and reasonably priced dispute resolution process, to allow parties determine 
the process and method by which their disputes will be resolved (subject to public 
interest issues) and finally to oust the jurisdiction of the courts from issues relating to 
arbitration (except in matters allowed by the Act).140 Tobi Landau submitted that 
“Section 1…directs that the provisions of the Act be interpreted purposively. 
Whenever any section leaves room for doubt on interpretation, reference must be 
made back to these principles, rather than embarking on a cold textual analysis of 
specific provisions in the abstract”.141 This section in other words provides a preamble 
to the Act and serves as a standard against which aspects of an English arbitration 
proceeding can be measured or evaluated. 
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The English Act requires that an arbitration agreement be in writing.142 In a developed 
jurisdiction like the United Kingdom (and unlike jurisdictions like Nigeria and 
Ghana), this writing requirement is not an unreasonable demand. In American Design 
Associates v DIA,143 the court held that clear words were needed to show the existence 
of an arbitration agreement.144 The English courts have however held that the 
agreement need not contain the word “arbitration” for it to be valid.145 In another 
English case, it was held that an agreement to submit to arbitration can be inferred 
from parties’ intention to submit their dispute to an individual for a binding decision. 
This intention will be established from a reasonable man’s point of view.146 Where the 
validity of an agreement is in question, the approach of the English court is to 
determine the validity of the agreement through the lens of the putative law, which 
like we have said, is the law which would have governed the arbitration agreement 
were it valid.  
Parties have the autonomy to determine certain aspects of their arbitration.147 This is 
however subject to a limited amount of judicial intervention needed to safeguard 
public interest.148 Georgios Zekos noted that “the court is regarded as the means of 
safe guarding and avoiding denial of justice in accordance with the definition and 
interpretation of public interest”.149 The English Act also stipulates certain mandatory 
provisions, which are to take effect notwithstanding parties’ intention and 
agreement.150 This implies that the mandatory rules contained in the English Act 
cannot even be displaced by institutional rules like those of the ICC and the LCIA.151 
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Mandatory provisions should be contrasted with default provisions. According to 
Toby Landau, “default provisions are set out in order to fill gaps and ensure that an 
arbitration runs smoothly where the parties have not so agreed (the reality being, of 
course that once a dispute has arisen, it is very likely that parties will be unable to 
agree on anything).”152 The DAC Committee in justifying the introduction of these 
special provisions submitted that “in general, the mandatory provisions are there in 
order to support and assist the arbitral process…” The introduction of these 
mandatory provisions is a fundamental difference between the English Act and the 
Model Law (as well as the other frameworks under consideration in this chapter).153 
Section 9 of the English Arbitration Act also incorporates the stay of proceedings 
provision found in all the arbitration frameworks.154 Section 9 (4) of the Act provides 
that “on an application (for stay of proceedings) under this section, the court shall 
grant a stay unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative 
or incapable of being performed” (Phrase in bracket mine). This section by implication 
mandates the court to confirm not only that the arbitration is valid but also that it is 
capable of being performed, before staying it and referring it to arbitration.155 If the 
court has confirmed that there is a valid and legally binding arbitration agreement 
which is capable of being performed, what then is the purpose of keeping the court 
case alive?156 Admittedly, it is possible to argue that an order of stay of proceeding is 
a safer approach especially since the existence of the court proceeding does not in any 
way affect the continuation of the arbitration and that it may be useful in case the 
decision is later reversed.  
Not every dispute in England is arbitrable. Unfortunately, the Act does not expressly 
define what is or is not arbitrable in England except to the extent that Section 1(b) of the 
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Act allows parties to determine the method by which their dispute will be 
administered (subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest). 
Section 6(1) of the Act also provides that both contractual and non-contractual matters 
are capable of being administered via arbitration. Furthermore, Section 81(1) (a) of the 
Act allows all arbitrable subject matters under Common Law to be administered under 
the Act. By implication of these sections, a multitude of non-contractual claims 
(including claims in tort, disputes involving competition law matters, disputes 
concerning intellectual property rights and certain statutory claims) are capable of 
settlement by arbitration. Generally, criminal matters and employment related 
matters are good examples of matters that are not arbitrable under English law.157 
English law recognizes the doctrine of separability.158 Lord Steyn in Lesotho Highlands 
Development Authority v Impregilo Spa, opined that the doctrine “is part of the very 
alphabet of arbitration law”.159 Like many other jurisdictions,160 the doctrine of 
separability in England suffered a chequered history.161 According to Adam Samuel, 
originally there used to be two main schools of thought on this issue; the one contract 
theory and collateral contract theory.162 While the former assumes that the contract 
and arbitration agreements are one and should therefore be governed by the law 
governing the contract, the latter holds that the arbitration clause is a separate 
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agreement collateral to the main contract. The separability doctrine has developed 
from a time when its existence was in doubt, to one where it is now established.163 
Even though the separability doctrine was reaffirmed in Heyman V Darwin,164 
Viscount Simon made obiter statements which suggested that any dispute relating to 
the existence and validity of the head contract (that is, the contract containing the 
arbitration clause), cannot be subject to arbitration. In his opinion, the party denying 
the existence of the contract is also denying that he submitted to arbitration and so the 
alleged invalidity of the contract also affects the validity of the arbitration agreement. 
Subsequent decisions seemed to follow the Viscount Simons approach.165 
The shift however began in Harbour Assurance v Kansa General International Insurance,166 
where all three Judges held that as long as the arbitration clause is not directly 
impeached, an arbitration clause is as a matter of law capable of surviving the 
invalidity of the contract, so that the arbitrator has jurisdiction to determine the initial 
invalidity of the contract. The aforementioned decision was reaffirmed in the case of 
Fiona Trust v Privalov,167 where the head contract was allegedly procured by fraud. The 
English Court held that the construction of an arbitration clause should start from the 
assumption that the parties as rational businessmen were likely to have intended that 
any dispute arising out of their relationship, including a dispute on the validity of the 
contract, should be resolved by arbitration unless the language of the agreement 
suggested otherwise. In the said case, the arbitration agreement did not contain 
anything that excluded any question relating to the validity of the contract. 
Accordingly, the court held that an arbitral tribunal was able to entertain the 
allegation of fraud surrounding the head contract.  The implication of this decision in 
summary is that the arbitration agreement itself must be directly impeached before it 
can be held to be invalid by an English court.168 
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The doctrine of separability has since been incorporated in the English Arbitration Act 
1996. Section 7 of the English Act provides that “an arbitration agreement which forms 
or was intended to form part of another agreement (whether or not in writing) shall 
not be regarded as invalid, non-existence or ineffective because that other agreement 
is invalid, or did not come into existence or has become ineffective, and it shall for that 
purpose be treated as a distinct agreement (emphasis mine).” From the foregoing, a 
debatable interpretation of the aforementioned section is that, unless there is a 
controversy as to the validity of the head contract, the arbitration agreement is for all 
intents and purposes a part of the head contract. In order to avoid any argument or 
controversial interpretation, the English legislature will do well to clearly enunciate 
the doctrine in any subsequent arbitration Act.169 We examine the doctrine of 
separability in more detail in Chapter Seven of this thesis.170 
As many other jurisdictions, the English Act empowers the arbitration tribunal to rule 
on its substantive jurisdiction. In other words, the Act incorporates the competence 
competence doctrine into the English framework.171  According to Richard Reuben, 
this doctrine “refers generally to the independent authority of the arbitrator to decide 
the limits of his or her own jurisdiction”.172  Jack Tsen-Ta Lee rightly submitted that 
the doctrine “is best seen as a rule of convenience designed to reduce unmeritorious 
challenges to an arbitrator’s jurisdiction”.173 Carl Svernlov also justified the doctrine 
when he opines that competence like separability, was instituted to prevent bad faith 
attempts by parties to delay or obstruct the arbitral proceeding through unnecessary 
applications to the court.174 
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The English Act does well by properly defining the scope of the competence doctrine. 
According to Section 30(1)(a)-(c) of the said Act, questions relating to the substantive 
jurisdiction of the tribunal include whether there is a valid arbitration agreement, 
whether the tribunal is properly constituted and finally, what matters have been 
submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreements.   
However, unlike the Model Law and the Nigerian Arbitration Act, the ability of the 
tribunal to determine the scope of its own jurisdiction is subject to judicial control.175 
For example, Section 67(1) of the English Act provides that “a party to arbitral 
proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) apply to the 
court…challenging any award of the arbitral tribunal as to its substantive 
jurisdiction”.176 Alan Reid argues that this provision “reflects the English legal 
system’s reluctance to accept complete exclusion of the court’s inherent 
jurisdiction”.177 We discuss the extent to which judicial intervention is justifiable later. 
The English Act also shows its superiority and perhaps its practicality by not only 
differing from the Model Law in a number of regards, but very importantly by 
pioneering certain provisions within the sphere of arbitration. Earlier on, we made 
reference to some of the considerations that influenced the United Kingdom in the 
process of coming up with its own framework.  Notwithstanding any undertones 
which may have influenced the decision of the United Kingdom to introduce a slightly 
different law, one must acknowledge the fact that by declining to wholly adopt the 
Model Law, they have contributed to the debate and practice of arbitration in general. 
For example, the English Act introduced an extension of time provision, which allows 
parties who are not able to initiate proceedings within the specified period of time, to 
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apply for an order of the court extending the time to commence their arbitration 
proceeding.178 The court is only expected to issue the said order if it is satisfied that 
the circumstances are such as were outside the reasonable contemplation of the parties 
when they agreed to the provision in question or that the conduct of one party makes 
it unjust to hold the other party to the strict terms of the provision in question.179 In 
Vosnoc v Transglobal Projects,180 the court refused an application seeking a declaration 
that a notice which merely informed the respondent of an intention to refer a dispute 
to arbitration was enough to signify the commencement of an arbitration. The court 
however granted an extension of time application because it was satisfied that the 
circumstances were outside the reasonable contemplation of the parties. This section 
of the English Act does not however affect the application of the Limitation Act.181 
This extension of time provision of the Act was most definitely influenced by the civil 
procedure practice of the courts in many jurisdictions. For example, Article 3.1 of the 
English Civil Procedure Rules empowers courts to extend the time within which a party 
to a litigation proceeding may take certain steps.182 The Rules of the Federal High 
Court of Nigeria also empower a Judge to “as often as he deems fit and either before 
or after the expiration of the time appointed by these or by any judgement or order of 
the court, extend or adjourn the time for doing any act or taking any proceeding.”183 
In Nipol Limited v Bioku Investment,184 the Nigerian Supreme Court stated that this 
power was mainly to prevent injustice to the parties and must never be granted suo 
motu.  
Interestingly, the Model Law does not make any such provision. Even though one 
could argue that Section 36 of the Nigerian Arbitration Act makes similar provisions to 
the extension of time provision in England, a distinction must be made between the 
provision of the English Act and the Nigerian Act in this respect. Section 36 of the 
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Nigerian Arbitration Act allows a tribunal to extend the time specified for the 
performance of any act under the Act. However, while the Nigerian framework 
contemplates a proceeding that has already been initiated (because the presence of an 
arbitrator implies an existing proceeding), Section 12 of the English Act obviously 
contemplates a situation where there is no pre-existing proceeding and a party to an 
arbitration agreement has failed to meet a pre-agreed commencement timeline or 
procedure.   
The question then is; what options are open to a party in Nigeria who fails to 
commence proceedings within a pre-agreed timeline? Of course parties always have 
the option to vary their agreement but what if the other party refuses to shift ground, 
can the courts under the UNCITRAL or in Nigeria extend the time?  
It is the position of this writer that under the UNCITRAL Model Law and in 
jurisdictions like Nigeria, the courts are unable to entertain extension of time 
applications. Article 5 of the Model Law, Section 6 of the ADR Act and Section 4 and 5 of 
the Nigerian Act clearly tie the hands of the court in such situations. The Model Law 
for example provides that “in matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene 
except where so provided in this Law”.185 In other words, the court has no powers 
outside the scope delineated by law. It is ironic that one of the sections inserted to 
prevent courts from tampering with parties’ choice of arbitration, makes it impossible 
for the court to save the very same arbitration in this instance. 
For extension of time applications arising during the course of the proceedings, 
English courts are also able to extend the time required to act.186 However, according 
to Section 79 (3) of the English Act, the court is only able to step in after parties have 
exhausted any other available recourse to the tribunal or to any arbitral (or other) 
institution or person that parties had previously agreed will exercise such powers. The 
court must also be convinced that substantial injustice would be done if it does not 
step in. Section 50 of the English Act also empowers the court to extend the time within 
which the tribunal should make its award upon an application by either the tribunal 
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or any of the parties. The court is only to issue such an order where it is apparent that 
substantial injustice will otherwise be done.187 
In terms of the composition of the arbitral tribunal, all the frameworks under 
consideration differ. While the Nigerian Arbitration Act, the Ghanaian framework 
and the UNCITRAL Model Law prescribe a default number of three arbitrators,188  the 
English Arbitration Act provides for a default number of one arbitrator.189 In Chapter 
Three, we pointed out that one of the widely acknowledged disadvantages of 
arbitration as against the litigation process is the high cost of conducting arbitration 
proceedings. Arbitrators’ fees are known to constitute a substantial part of arbitration 
expenses. The Model Law fails in this regard, knowing fully well that it provides a 
model not only for thriving economies but also for developing economies like Nigeria. 
A one-arbitrator tribunal will definitely go a long way in reducing the cost of 
arbitration. Unfortunately, a country like Nigeria, which still battles with high levels 
of poverty and unemployment, chose to incorporate the Model Law’s default number 
of three.  
The English Act also creates the position of the chairman or umpire for the tribunal.  
There is no mention of either of these positions in the Model Law and the Nigerian 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Just like the English Arbitration Act,190 the Ghanaian 
Act provides for the position of a chairman in the case of a three-person tribunal and 
provides a transparent method of appointing the chairman; the arbitrators nominated 
by the parties appoint a third arbitrator who will serve as chairman.191 This is a 
codification of the usual practice in international commercial arbitration.  
Unlike the Ghanaian Act, the English Act does not expressly prohibit even numbered 
tribunals, even though it seems to discourage it.  Section 15(2) of the English Act 
provides that “unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an agreement that the number 
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of arbitrators shall be two or any other even number shall be understood as requiring 
the appointment of an additional arbitrator as chairman of the tribunal.” This in other 
words allows parties to actually appoint an even numbered tribunal, thus giving room 
for confusion especially when read against some sections of the Act. For example, 
Section 20 (3) of the Act provides that decisions shall be made by all or a majority of the 
arbitrators, which includes the chairman. Subsection 4 goes ahead to provide that the 
view of the chairman shall prevail where there is neither unanimity nor a majority. 
Interestingly, the English Act does not rule out the possibility of a chairman in an even 
numbered tribunal. While it may arguably be acceptable to suggest that subsection 4 
provides a ready solution to a lack of majority arising in a four (4) man tribunal, it is 
clearly unacceptable to suggest that the chairman’s view will hold sway in a two-
person tribunal as it definitely defeats the purpose of appointing and paying for the 
services of a second arbitrator. The English Act will do well to either toe the line of the 
Ghanaian Act, which is arguably a more improved version of the English Act (at least 
in this regard) by prohibiting even numbered tribunals, or on the alternative by 
devising some other means of breaking a deadlock in a two-person tribunal apart from 
through the decision of the chairman. Redfern and Hunter rightly noted however that 
there is a need especially in highly contentious disputes, to have someone who can 
take the lead within the arbitral tribunal.192 
When the pre-agreed appointment process fails, all the arbitration frameworks under 
consideration provide for a resort to the court. However, while the Model Law193 and 
the Nigerian Act194 seem to give courts a free hand (subject of course to qualifications 
pre-agreed by the parties), the English and the Ghanaian Acts clearly define (and 
rightly so) the powers of the court in this instance.195 Section  18(3) of the English 
Arbitration Act allows the court to make any necessary appointment, revoke any 
appointment already made,196 direct that the tribunal shall be constituted by such 
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appointment (or any one or more of them) as have been made and to give directions 
as to the making of any necessary appointment.  Furthermore, the English Act rightly 
gives room for an appeal but only subject to the leave of the court.197 Unfortunately, 
the Model Law does not give parties the right to appeal this decision of the court.198 
It should be recalled that in Chapter Three, this writer criticised the well-established 
arbitration custom which allows parties to nominate their arbitrator (in a three-person 
tribunal). We mentioned that the practice enables parties (or their counsel) to go 
“forum shopping” to select an arbitrator who holds a view that is sympathetic to their 
case. We concluded by submitting that parties are able to circumvent the ends of 
“justice” by selecting an arbitrator who may be sympathetic to their case and not 
necessarily one that will be fair and just.199 
Even though not entirely satisfactory, the above mentioned position in England and 
Ghana possibly strikes this balance, since it allows parties to appoint their arbitrator 
while at the same time allowing the introduction of an independent third party, who 
by presiding over the proceeding neutralizes any element of bias that may arise. 
Under the English Arbitration Act, the arbitrator is immune from liability for any 
action or omission arising in the course of his work as an arbitrator, except same is 
done in bad faith.200 The English provision allows an arbitrator to perform his duties 
without any threat and harassment while at the same time providing a check on any 
arbitrator with unscrupulous tendencies, by introducing the bad faith bit. The Act by 
this section provides a good balance: on one side is the need to allow the arbitrator do 
their work without undue threat and harassment, on the other hand is the need to 
protect parties from unscrupulous arbitrators.201 Unfortunately, the Model Law and 
the Nigerian Act make no such provision. 
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The issue of consolidation of arbitration proceedings is another laudable innovation 
of the English Arbitration Act.202 The increase in commercial relationships and 
activities has also brought with it an increase in the number of multi-tiered contracts, 
each containing its own arbitration agreement. Taking into consideration the fact that 
consent is key to the validity of any arbitration agreement, there was the problem of 
how to reconcile or compress all the arbitration agreements or proceedings into one, 
in order to save cost and avoid conflicting decisions.203 The lack of a consolidation 
option was definitely a disadvantage of the arbitration practice especially as against 
the litigation process. Generally, courts are able to consolidate proceedings on similar 
subject matters. By and large, a consolidation order is granted when two or more 
matters are pending in the court and it either appears that they involve same questions 
of law or fact or where the reliefs being claimed are in respect of or arise out of the 
same or similar transaction or series of transactions.204 A consolidation of actions 
which do not have incidents of common law or fact or are not based on the same issues 
or do not relate to the same transaction, is bound to lead to intractable confusion and 
perhaps an exercise in futility.205 A consolidation order is essentially for the 
convenience of the parties who are saved both the time and cost of a repeated and 
contentious action in cases involving common issues, reliefs or parties.  
Ironically, the UNCITRAL Model Law, which was put into place to cater for 
international commercial disputes, many of which are usually multi-tiered and will 
no doubt benefit from a consolidation order, makes no room for this. Section 35 of the 
English Act allows parties to consolidate existing proceedings. One important 
distinction between consolidation under the English Arbitration Act and in litigation, 
is that an arbitration tribunal is unable to coerce parties into consolidating arbitration 
proceedings. This is of course in view of the fundamental nature of parties’ consent.  
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Another unique feature of the English Arbitration Act as against the other frameworks 
is the fact that courts in specific situations are also able to entertain preliminary points 
on jurisdiction.206 As many other provisions in the English Act, this provision balances 
the idea of curtailing the involvement of the courts in arbitration proceedings, with 
the need to protect the rights of parties. Section 32 of the English Act allows the court to 
administer issues relating to jurisdiction with the agreement of all the parties to the 
proceeding or with the permission of the tribunal. In the case of the latter, the court is 
mandated to ensure that the determination of the question is likely to produce 
substantial savings in cost, that the application was made without delay and there is 
good reason why the matter should be decided by the court.  
Compared to the other frameworks, the English Act seems to increase the involvement 
of the court in the arbitration process. Johan Steyn opined that under English law, 
courts have both auxiliary207 and supervisory powers208  by virtue of the English 
Arbitration Act.209 Commentators have however criticised the involvement of the 
court in arbitration. For example, Alan Reid has argued that judicial intervention is 
the antithesis of arbitration. He opined that rather than advocate for judicial 
intervention, increasing the professionalism of arbitrators through education and 
training is a better solution.210 
This writer however contends that judicial intervention in limited and statutorily 
defined instances as in the English Act, is not necessarily antithetical but may in fact 
provide a support mechanism to the arbitration process.211 The relationship between 
the court and the tribunal can be compared to a relay race with the panel and the court 
passing batons to each other, all in a bid to achieve parties’ wishes.212 
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Judicial intervention can only be said to be antithetical to arbitration when it seeks to 
defeat parties’ lawful intention to arbitrate their dispute. This is however not the case, 
at least under the English Arbitration Act. A good example is Section 24 of the English 
Act, which allows the court to remove an arbitrator if for instance his impartiality is in 
doubt. A partial arbiter will no doubt defeat the intention of parties (or at least one of 
the parties) for a fair and just process.  
In other words, unlike the Model Law213 and the Nigerian Arbitration Act, where only 
arbitrators are empowered by statute to deal with such an application,214 Section 24 of 
the English Arbitration Act gives courts the power to remove an arbitrator but based on 
very strict and clearly stated conditions. The point being made in this paragraph is 
that under a properly drafted framework as that of the United Kingdom, the 
involvement of the court is sometimes necessary and should only be triggered when 
the arbitration process is seen to be derailing or is as we have previously mentioned, 
contrary to public policy. 
The idea behind the UNCITRAL provision (which is what the Nigerian law is based 
on) is as we have previously mentioned, to reduce the involvement of the court in 
arbitration proceedings. The question then is this, using the reasonable man’s test, 
what is the likelihood of an arbiter being unfair on an application challenging his/her 
own appointment? It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that you cannot 
be a judge in your own cause.215 Inasmuch as we are trying to detach arbitration 
proceedings from the purview of the court, we cannot oust the jurisdiction of the law 
over arbitration since the latter is a creation of the former. This is where the ingenuity 
of the English Arbitration Act comes in.  Section 24 of the Act allows a party to apply to 
the court to remove the arbitrator. The Ghanaian Act introduces an interesting angle 
when it allows the tribunal decide such a challenge except where there is a sole 
arbitrator tribunal in which case parties have the option of either submitting their 
challenge to the appointing authority or to the courts.216 
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When an arbitral award has been delivered, the tribunal ordinarily becomes functus 
officio. Unlike the Model Law, which allows parties to apply to the tribunal to correct 
clerical or typographical errors in the award217 as well as to interpret any ambiguous 
part of the award,218 the English Act only allows the tribunal to “correct” the award.219 
Alan Reid has rightly noted that the English Arbitration Act approach is the correct 
one as “in practice…this interpretative power may be abused. A dominant party may 
browbeat a weaker party into accepting an Article 33(b) interpretative reference that 
in actual fact is an attempt to re-open the case and substitute the original award with 
a more beneficial award”.220 Meanwhile, it is submitted that the English draftsman 
may in subsequent editions of the Act do well to clarify what  “correct an award” in 
Section 57(1) entails, since this can arguably be said to also give the tribunal the power 
to re-open a case and correct more than just clerical or typographical mistakes.  
Other examples of where the English Act gives the court the power to act but within 
a very strict and defined scope include Section 68(1) of the said Act, which allows a party 
to apply to the court to challenge an award on grounds of serious irregularity which 
will cause serious injustice. Wendy Miles and Justen Li rightly noted that this 
mandatory right to challenge the award on the basis of serious irregularity is subject 
to a very high threshold.221 Section 68 (2) of the Act goes on to list the specific situations 
that qualify as serious irregularity.  This list which appears to be exhaustive222 must 
ultimately result into substantial injustice.223 Justice Cole in Vee Networks v Econet 
Wireless Ltd224 held that substantial injustice was not necessarily about a wrong 
conclusion but rather whether the arbitrator adopted an inappropriate means to reach 
the wrong conclusion. In other words, but for one of the situations listed in Section 
68(2) of the Act, the tribunal would have reached a different decision.  
                                                          
217 Revised Model Law 2006, article 33(a). 
218 ibid article 33(b). 
219 English Arbitration Act 1996, section 57. 
220 Alan Reid (n 136) 233. 
221 Wendy Miles and Justin Li, ‘Does England’s Expansive Grounds for Recourse Increase Delays and 
Interference in Arbitration’ (2014) 80(1) Arbitration 35,38. 
222 Robert Merkin, Arbitration Law (Abingdon: Informa 2013) Paragraph 20.7. 
223 See the English case of Egmatra v Marco Trading Corp (1998) CLC 1552, 1556. 
224 (2004) EWHC 2909 (Comm). 
218 
 
In Shuttari v Solicitors Indemnity Fund,225 an arbitrator who had repeatedly granted 
adjournments on the application of the plaintiff was held not to have acted irregularly 
when he refused to grant another application for adjournment made by the plaintiff 
even though the plaintiff claimed to have needed the time to present medical evidence 
in support of her case. In arriving at this decision, the Court of Appeal not only took 
into consideration the fact that the tribunal had in the past given the plaintiff enough 
time to present her case, all to no avail, but also the fact that the plaintiff had given no 
indication on the contents and purpose of the said medical report.  It was therefore 
not unreasonable to assume that it was yet another of the plaintiff’s delay tactics. 
The Act also gives parties the right to appeal an award on points of law.226 Andrew 
Tweeddale noted that challenges to an arbitrator’s award purely on an error of fact 
have rarely ever been permitted.227 Unlike Section 68, this is a non-mandatory 
provision of the law as it is not included within the mandatory schedule.228 Section 
82(1) of the English Arbitration Act defines questions of law to mean the law of England 
and Wales and so an application under Section 69 of the English Arbitration Act can only 
be based on English law.229 Such an application must be done with the agreement of 
all the parties or with the leave of court.230 In other words, parties are allowed to agree 
to opt out of their right to appeal on issues of points of law.  In practice, many parties 
opt out of this provision of the English Act.231 
Section 67 of the Act also allows parties to challenge an award on the basis of 
jurisdiction and provides two options of doing this: challenging any award of the 
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tribunal as to its substantive jurisdiction232 or seeking an order of the court declaring 
an award made by the tribunal on the merits to be of no effect in whole or in part, 
because the tribunal did not have substantive jurisdiction.233 In interpreting these two 
options, it was the view of the English court in LG Caltex Gas v China Petroleum234 that 
while Section 67(1) (a) of the English Act relates to a situation where an arbitrator made 
an award holding that he did not have jurisdiction, Section 67(1) (b) of the English Act 
covers situations where the arbitrator had held that he had substantive jurisdiction 
and proceeded to decide the dispute on the merits between the parties.  
Georgios Zekos has advocated for a special appeal mechanism within the arbitral 
process that will replace the process of appealing to the courts.235 There are a number 
of reasons why this suggestion is not practical. For one, the extra step will increase the 
costs of an already expensive arbitration process. On the other hand, an appeal to the 
courts provides a much cheaper option for parties, since the State would be bearing a 
part of the cost. Furthermore, the extent to which an award creditor will be willing to 
cooperate in a subsequent process is highly in doubt.236 Thus, in the absence of any 
agreement to that effect, the coercive powers of the court may in fact be useful in such 
post arbitration proceedings.  
5.0 THE OHADA TREATY: THE UNIFORM ACT ON ARBITRATION  
5.1     Background 
The Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa Treaty (OHADA 
Treaty) was conceived in 1993 to encourage the development of commercial relations 
as well as encourage legal certainty through the unification of business laws in 
Africa.237 According to Article 1 of the OHADA Treaty, this is to be achieved through 
the “elaboration and adoption of simple and modern common rules adopted to the 
situation of the economies…the implementation of appropriate legal proceedings…by 
encouraging the use of arbitration to settle contractual disputes”. Gaston Douajni 
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describes the OHADA as a “technical tool, which produces legal instruments in 
business law”.238 These common legal instruments in their various forms are known 
as Uniform Acts.239 The treaty came into force in 1995 but was later revised in 2008, 
subsequent upon which it again came into force in 2010.240 
A number of African writers have called for a harmonised international trade law in 
Africa.241   Ironically, despite the fact that the treaty opens up its membership to the 
whole of Africa,242 only seventeen African countries, all of which are former French 
colonies, have signed on to the Treaty.243 Dr Emilia Onyema rightly noted that “the 
Member States of OHADA have some relevant and deep commonalities such as 
French as the official language of most of the member states, membership of the franc 
zone as it relates to their currencies and French law as their received laws along with 
the civil law tradition”.244 All these have restricted the growth and membership of 
OHADA to French countries. No wonder S.K. Date-Bah submitted that the work of 
the OHADA is not sufficiently known in Anglophone Africa.245 
Sherif El Saadani opined that “the lack of awareness amongst African jurists, 
especially in non-francophone African States, is due to OHADA’s failures to convince 
them and their respective governments that it is the most promising harmonization 
project on the continent, and this lack of conviction affects not only jurists in non-
members States, but more surprisingly, also judges and lawyers in OHADA member 
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States”.246 Furthermore, the fact that the OHADA Treaty is itself substantially based 
on French and Civil Law does not help the acceptability of the Treaty by the rest of 
Africa.  Provisions like Article 42 of the OHADA Treaty, which stipulate French as the 
only official language of the OHADA, have made it difficult for Anglophone countries 
like Nigeria, South Africa and Ghana, despite any good intentions, to actually consider 
the OHADA Treaty on its merits.247 
Interestingly, this language issue also poses a problem even among members of the 
OHADA Treaty like Cameroon. Professor Enonchong248 submitted that “the problem 
with Article 42 is that it is manifestly incompatible with Article 1(3) of the Cameroonian 
Constitution, in which the bilingual nature of the State is enshrined”.249 The 
Constitution specifically requires every Cameroonian law to be published both in 
English and French.250 This arguably questions the constitutionality of the Treaty in 
Cameroon to the extent of its inconsistency with Article 1 of the Cameroonian 
Constitution. Taking this argument a step further, Professor Enonchong also argues 
that “the application of the Treaty in Cameroon discriminates against the English 
speaking Cameroonians and may amount to domination of the minority English 
speaking Cameroonians by the majority French speaking Cameroonians contrary to 
Articles 2, 13 and 19 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.”251 In other 
words, the Treaty arguably touches on issues of fundamental human rights.  
Ironically, the very idea behind the OHADA Treaty, which is to attract and aid 
investment activities within the OHADA region, is defeated by excluding English 
speaking investors from the scheme of things. Of course, there are English translations 
of the Treaty but as Professor Enonchong noted, “it is widely accepted that the English 
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translations are not always accurate or comprehensible. This makes it unsafe for 
English-speaking investors to rely on the English version of the Uniform Acts. 
Whereas French speaking investors around the world and their French speaking 
advisers have easy access to OHADA laws and may thereby be encouraged to invest 
in the OHADA zone, English speaking investors in Asia, Europe and North America 
are not being encouraged in the same way”.252 On this issue of language, Sherif El 
Saadani rightly opined that “the harmonization will never work from a continent-
wide perspective if OHADA retains French as its sole working language. The matter 
of language is unfortunately linked to the harmonization objective, since failure to 
acknowledge the diversity of languages in the African Continent may place the entire 
project at risk if this matter is not carefully handled”.253 
Ntongho also criticises OHADA for not taking into consideration the African culture 
and practices and instead basing its framework solely on the foreign French law.254 
She argues further that this omission has discouraged other African countries from 
joining OHADA. Dr Onyeama however disagrees with Ntongho’s latter assertion and 
argues that flowing from the colonial history of the African continent, most if not all 
of Africa has adopted either the foreign Common or Civil Law as their law and so the 
French system of law is not necessarily strange to the whole of Africa.255 In other 
words, unlike what Ntongho seems to suggest, the strangeness of French law can only 
be limited to common law Africa. Onyeama further opines that harmonisation of 
business laws in Africa may in fact be a tall or even impossible order primarily because 
of the diverse and competing legal systems in Africa. 
It is not right to argue that the “failure” of the OHADA is because it is based on a 
foreign law. Onyeama may have a good point when she points out the difficulty in 
arriving at a commonly acceptable law for Africa. If indeed the OHADA project must 
succeed, it must not only take into consideration the multi legal system in Africa, but 
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also the multi-cultural as well as language diversity in Africa.256 This is difficult but 
unlike what Onyema seems to suggest, definitely not impossible. Despite the 
competing interests and languages in Europe for example, they have been able to 
come up with common frameworks under the umbrella of the European Union.257 In 
structuring a framework for Africa, stakeholders may do well to take a cue from 
Ntongho’s criticism/suggestion and incorporate common features of law that cuts 
across Africa.  
As of today, there are nine Uniform Acts in OHADA. Gaston Douajni pointed out that 
these were created” …with the purpose of promoting investments in its member 
states…”258 We will however be focusing on the Uniform Act on Arbitration.  
5.2     The Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999 
The Uniform Act on Arbitration (UAA) came into force on the 11th of June 1999.  The 
Act provides a common legislation on arbitration, thus providing a framework for 
States with no specific legal text on arbitration and at the same time providing an 
updated framework for States with outdated frameworks.259 
Unlike the UNCITRAL Law, which is merely a model, the UAA has compulsory 
jurisdiction over any arbitration seated in any of the OHADA member States.260 In 
other words, it mandatorily applies to both commercial and civil disputes. This is 
unlike the Nigerian Arbitration Act and the UNCITRAL Model Law, which limits its 
scope to commercial disputes. As we have severally submitted, extending the scope 
of the arbitration framework beyond commercial disputes allows it to provide a real 
alternative to litigation, a system that resolves all types of disputes.  
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The UAA seems to leave the issue of arbitrability open ended to any right which 
parties have the capacity to dispose of.261 These basically includes rights which can be 
sold, waived, gifted or bequeathed away. Exceptions to this provision will vary 
depending on the jurisdiction in question. Common and obvious exceptions will 
include issues relating to criminal law and possibly public policy, which are generally 
agreed to be beyond the scope of arbitration. 
Under our previous discussion on the English Arbitration framework, we submitted 
that going by a strict interpretation of the English Act, the principle of separability 
only becomes relevant when the head contract is declared invalid. This arguably is a 
potential source of unnecessary controversy and litigation. The UAA is proactive in 
this regard as it clearly separates the main contract from the arbitration agreement 
when it states that “the arbitration agreement is independent of the main contract”.262 
Our previous argument therefore does not apply here.263 
Natural and artificial persons as well as State and State entities within the OHADA 
region can be parties to a valid arbitration agreement.264 Article 3 of the UAA provides 
that an “an arbitration agreement shall be in writing or by any other means permitting 
it to be evidenced, notably by reference made to a document stipulating it”. As 
Samassekou and Song noted, it is not clear how this provision should be interpreted.265 
Some writers seem to have interpreted this provision to include oral agreements. 
Frances Ulrich Ndinga-Yocka has for example submitted that “…under the OHADA 
UAA law, the arbitration agreement does not need to be materialised for it to be valid. 
It may be in writing or oral…For its writing form is not a condition of its validity but 
just an element that permits to prove its existence…”266 Samassekou and Song also 
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stated that “other means of entering into an arbitration agreement might be possible, 
for example by oral agreement before witnesses who could then attest…”267 
While on the surface, the aforementioned submissions seem probable, this writer 
argues that it is an incorrect interpretation of Article 3. One must point out that unlike 
other arbitration frameworks, the UAA does not state what its definition of writing 
includes.268 It is therefore this writers’ submission that when Article 3 of the UAA goes 
on to state that “…or by any other means permitting it to be evidenced, notably by 
reference made to a document stipulating it,” it is referring to agreements contained 
in means of communication like email, letters and fax, where there is a written 
evidence of the agreement. This position is further supported when one examines 
Article 31 of the UAA, which provides that “the existence of the award is established 
by the production of the original award accompanied by the arbitration agreement or 
copies of these documents satisfying the conditions required for their authenticity”. 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that documentary proof of an agreement is needed 
to enforce an arbitration award. It can also by extension be implied that Article 3 of the 
UAA requires documentary evidence of an agreement.269 
Again, as we have said previously, this strict requirement of form by a so called 
African framework is inimical to the growth of a vibrant domestic arbitration practice 
in Africa, indeed any underdeveloped country at all, especially when one considers 
the level of education in some of these places.270 Besides, as the Committee on the 
reform of the UNCITRAL Model law rightly noted, commercial law and relations has 
developed beyond a strict requirement of form. To the extent that the Treaty seeks to 
provide a business friendly framework, the writing requirement is counterproductive.  
As with many other Arbitration frameworks, parties are given a free hand to 
determine the process of constituting their arbitration tribunal. In the absence of this, 
                                                          
267 Mamoudou Samassekou and Lianbin Song (n 265) 243. 
268 It can be argued that the reason why other arbitration frameworks will specifically define writing to 
include communications contained in fax, letter and emails, is because these methods of 
communication do not fall into the traditional or usual definition of writing. 
269This writing requirement applies to both international and domestic arbitrations as the UAA does 
not distinguish between them. 
270 For example, we discuss the high level of illiteracy in Nigeria. See Section 5.1 of Chapter Four.  
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the UAA provides a default number of one or three arbitrators. In other words, the 
UAA is not clear about the default number of people that will make up the arbitration 
panel. Furthermore, rather than providing some form of general guideline that will 
assist parties in choosing between either of the two default numbers, the Act does not 
provide any guidance on how the actual number should be determined. So for 
example, in choosing between the two default numbers, do we look at the value of the 
dispute, the nationalities of parties or the nature of the dispute?271 
The UAA is affiliated with the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (“CCJA”), an 
arbitration institution with its own special set of procedural rules.272 Unlike the 
Nigerian Arbitration Act, parties under the jurisdiction of the UAA have the ability to 
choose the rules that will apply to their dispute.273 In other words, parties are not 
bound to apply the procedural rules of the CCJA.274 Furthermore, unlike the Ghanaian 
Act for example, the UAA does not prescribe the CCJA or its rules as a default. Parties 
may therefore opt for institutional arbitration under CCJA’s arbitration rules, the rules 
of other arbitration institutions or via an ad hoc process.275 Benoit Le Bars rightly notes 
that parties seeking to arbitrate under OHADA have the choice between the 
predictability and structure of institutional arbitration on the one hand, and the 
flexibility and freedom of ad hoc arbitration on the other.276 It must be noted also that 
unlike the ADRC, the CCJA is not a creation of the UAA but of the OHADA Treaty.  
Gaston Doujani opined that the arbitration culture within the OHADA cannot be 
considered to have become widespread since the introduction of the UAA.277  In an 
assessment report prepared in 2014 by Dr Wernel Jahnel for the African Development 
                                                          
271 See Section 4.1.4 of this chapter. 
272 Article 3 of the OHADA Treaty provides for five principal organs of OHADA, out of which the CCJA 
is one.  
273 Article 10 of the Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999. 
274 The Rules of the CCJA were adopted in April 1996, published in November 1997 but did not come 
into force until 1998. 
275 Emilia Onyema, ‘Arbitration Under the OHADA Regime’ (2008) 11(6) International Arbitration Law 
Review 205, 218. 
276 Benoit Le Bars, ‘Arbitrating in West and Central Africa: An Introduction to OHADA’ Kluwer 
Arbitration Blog (21 February  2013) <http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2013/02/21/arbitrating-in-
west-and-central-africa-an-introduction-to-ohada/ > accessed 26 March 2016. 
277 Gaston Kenfack Douajni, ‘Recent Developments in OHADA Arbitration’ (2006) 23(4) Journal of 
International Arbitration 363, 372. 
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Bank on arbitration institutions in Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt and Mauritius, it was revealed 
that since the establishment of the CCJA in 1998, it has only administered sixty-four 
arbitrations out of which it has successfully completed only about half of the said 
number. The remaining proceedings were terminated or withdrawn by the parties.278 
This report reflects how unpopular the arbitration framework is within the region.  
In addition, the CCJA is not only an arbitration institution but also a Supreme Court 
of some sort, with jurisdiction over all business disputes arising within the OHADA 
region.279  In other words, unlike regular arbitration institutions,280 which as Collin 
Namachanja rightly noted,281 provide mainly administrative support to the arbitral 
process, the CCJA combines both administrative and judicial functions in one. Where 
parties fail to prescribe or agree on the applicable arbitration rules, the UAA mandates 
the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in any way it deems fit.282 
It is unfortunate that the UAA involves national courts in the administration of 
arbitration especially when it has an institution like the CCJA with judicial powers.  
For example, Article 5 of the UAA provides that in situations where parties are unable 
to agree on a sole arbitrator or where the two arbitrators are unable to agree on a third 
arbitrator, the Act empowers the court to make the appointment.283 This is unlike the 
situation in a jurisdiction like Ghana, which as we have seen makes use of its ADRC 
as an appointing authority to intervene in situations like this. Similarly, institutions 
like the ICC Court of Arbitration, which the CCJA is in many ways modelled after,284 
                                                          
278 ADBF, Assessment Report of arbitration centres in Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt and Mauritius (10 April 
2014)<www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Procurement/Project-related-
Procurement/Assessment_Report_of_arbitration_centres_in_C%C3%B4te_d%E2%80%99Ivoire__Egy
pt_and_Mauritius.pdf> assessed 6 February 2016. 
279 Gaston Kenfack Douajni, ‘The Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in OHADA Member 
States’ (2003) 20(2) Journal of International Arbitration 205. 
280 By traditional institutions, we are referring to institutions like the International Chamber of 
Commerce, London Court of International Arbitration, Singapore International Arbitration Centre as 
well as national arbitral institutions like the Alternative Dispute Resolution Centre in Ghana.  
281 Collins Namachanja, ‘The Challenges facing arbitral institutions in Africa’ (2016) 82(1) Arbitration 
44, 45. 
282 Article 14 of the Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999. 
283 The Act does not specify any particular court and so it is up to member states to determine the 
particular court to perform this task and every other one. See Article 5(b) of the Uniform Act on 
Arbitration 1999.  
284 Gaston Kenfack Douajni (n 277) 370; See also Gaston Kenfack Douajni (n 258). 
228 
 
have incorporated procedures which enable the former to make appointments in 
specific situations.285 The point being made here is that many of the functions 
bestowed upon the courts could easily have been performed by the CCJA. 
Moreover, to the extent that the UAA allows the courts to act, it leaves the powers of 
the court open ended. Take for example the process of challenging the appointment 
of an arbitrator.286 Unlike the Nigerian,287 Ghanaian288 and English Acts289 which 
stipulate the grounds upon which the courts may exercise jurisdiction over a challenge 
application, the UAA in this regard leaves the scope of the courts authority open 
ended, thus giving room for abuse. Judicial intervention is not necessarily a bad thing. 
In fact, as we have argued, the courts provide a useful support to the arbitral 
process.290 This writer however submits that the exercise of judicial powers in the 
course of the arbitral process should be clearly defined.  
Under the UAA, the duty of the arbitrator to “disclose” is at his discretion.291 In other 
words, unlike the ICC’s Arbitration Rules or the Ghanaian Act, which mandates the 
arbitrator to complete a form providing information relating to his impartiality, 
independence and availability amongst others,292 the UAA only expects the arbitrator 
to disclose at his discretion. Notwithstanding the good intentions of an arbitrator, this 
writer submits that the decision as to the impartiality and independence of the 
arbitrator is not a decision that should be made by the arbitrator himself. It is a 
fundamental principle of fair hearing that you cannot be a judge in your own cause.  
Besides, as at the time of appointment, the information at the disposal of the arbitrator 
is not enough for him to make a true call as to any potential or actual conflict. At the 
stage of appointment, only parties have all the information relating to the dispute and 
so to the extent of this ignorance, prospective arbitrators cannot with all certainty, 
conduct a comprehensive conflict check on themselves.  
                                                          
285 See Article 10.3 of the CCJA Arbitration Rules. 
286 Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999, article 7. 
287 Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, section 8. 
288 Ghanaian ADR Act 2010, section 18. 
289 English Arbitration Act 1996, section 24.  
290 See Section 3.2 of Chapter Six. 
291 Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999, article 7. 
292 ICC Arbitration Rules, article 11(2). 
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One laudable provision in the UAA is Article 12, which prescribes a six months’ time 
limit within which every arbitration must be concluded.293 Upon expiry, this time can 
be extended by an agreement of all the parties or through an application made by any 
of the parties to the tribunal or court,294 failing which the arbitration abates.295 This 
provision helps to avoid the problem of delay which as we have seen,296 has come to 
be associated with the court system in many jurisdictions in Africa.   
Proper planning is needed to ensure that proceedings are concluded within the six-
month period. Unfortunately, the UAA fails to provide a process that will ensure 
proper time management. As we have seen, the Ghanaian ADR Act297 as well as ICC’s 
Arbitration Rules provide a good model in this regard. The ICC Arbitration Rules for 
example, provides for a case management conference during which important 
procedural issues will be agreed upon.298 This prevents the proceedings from 
suffering from unnecessary delays. In addition, the arbitration panel with the input 
and agreement of parties, is expected to come up with a procedural timetable, which 
clearly states the timeline within which all parties are to perform specific tasks.299 
Under the UAA, the decision of the tribunal is final300 and it serves as res judicata 
between the parties and the issues decided.301 Under the UAA, there are three major 
recourses against the award under the Act; first of all, third parties whose rights have 
been affected by the award but who were not called or involved in the arbitrations 
proceeding have the right to approach the arbitration tribunal to challenge the 
award.302 Since the validity of an arbitration agreement is hinged on parties’ 
agreement, one is tempted to ask if a third party can force himself to be a part of an 
arbitration agreement or proceeding, if the original parties are not in agreement with 
                                                          
293 The recently introduced Indian Arbitration Ordinance 2015 also provides that the award must be 
delivered within a period of twelve (12) months from the date in which the arbitrator received notice 
of their appointment. See Section 15 of the Indian Arbitration Ordinance 2015. 
294 Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999, article 12, paragraph 2. 
295 ibid article 16. 
296 See Section 3.1 of Chapter Two and Section 1.0.1 of this chapter.  
297 Ghanaian ADR Act 2010, section 29. 
298 ICC Arbitration Rules, article 24 (1). 
299 ibid article 24(2). 
300 Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999, article 25. 
301 ibid article 23. 
302 ibid article 25 Paragraph 4. 
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this position.303 As we have seen, the Ghanaian ADR Act makes similar provisions but 
differs from the UAA by making the court (and not the tribunal) the decision maker 
in this regard.304 This is the correct approach since everyone has a right to approach 
the court to seek protection. 
Secondly, after an award has been delivered, the UAA also allows any party who 
comes across any information which would have had serious impact on the award to 
bring same to the attention of the arbitration tribunal for an award revision.305 
Curiously, the Act does not provide a time frame within which this action must be 
done. This in other words implies that any party is allowed to challenge the award 
long after the dispute has been decided, with no real time limit. Not only is this open 
ended appeal process very dangerous, this writer wonders why the tribunal is still 
being allowed to delve into substantive issues after becoming functus officio. 
Appealing to the CCJA may be a more acceptable option in this regard.  
A petition for nullity can be made against the decision of the arbitration tribunal at the 
national courts of a member State. Article 26 of the UAA defines the scope of the petition 
by stating six grounds under which a petition for nullity can be brought.  For example, 
a petition for nullity would only be allowed where the existence or validity of the 
arbitration agreement is in question or where the arbitral tribunal was irregularly 
composed, amongst others.  Of all of them, the fifth ground, which refers to a violation 
of an international public policy issue, is probably the vaguest. As Justice Kekewich 
said in Davies v Davies,306 public policy is generally not easily explained.  Justice 
Burrough also opined that public policy is a very unruly horse and once you get 
astride it, you never know where it will carry you.307  In view of the multifarious 
nature of the OHADA jurisdiction, it is difficult to understand what will qualify as an 
                                                          
303 Recent developments in the U.S seem to suggest that by arguing equitable estoppel, third parties to 
an arbitration could be made to participate in arbitration proceeding. For example, in the City of Riverside 
v Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd WL 1028835 (Dist Ct. SD, 2014), the court held that where a non-
signatory knowingly exploits the agreement containing the arbitration clause despite the fact that he 
did not sign the agreement, he could be made subject to the arbitration agreement. 
304 Ghanaian ADR Act 2010, section 28. 
305 Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999, article 25 Paragraph 5. 
306 (1887) L.R 36 C.D 364. 
307 Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 252. 
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international public policy issue and so some form of guidance either in a revised 
version of the UAA or via a pronouncement of the CCJA will be useful.308 
In concluding, we should point out that the UAA creates a two-staged appellate 
system: the decision of the local courts in a petition for nullity, is further subject to an 
appeal to the CCJA.309 This in a way defeats one of the advantages of arbitration over 
litigation, a quicker process. Rather than create a two-staged appellate system, the 
UAA ought to establish a one stepped appeal process that ends at the CCJA.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter, we highlighted and critically discussed developments that have 
occurred within similar and/or relevant arbitration frameworks, between the time 
when the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act was introduced in 1988 and now. 
We touch on the Ghanaian ADR Act 2010, the revised Model Law 2006, the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 and the Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999.  
Significantly, we lauded the Ghanaian ADR Act for incorporating the rooted and very 
familiar customary arbitration practice into its framework. We also commended the 
UNCITRAL Model Law for introducing a more flexible definition of an arbitration 
agreement. In our discussion on the English Arbitration Act 1996, we among many 
other points justified the consolidation provision, which allows parties merge 
arbitrations with similar issues, relief and parties. Under our discussion on the 
Uniform Act on Arbitration, we also supported the introduction of a timeline within 
which arbitration proceedings should ordinarily be completed.  
On the other hand, we criticised a number of provisions in the said frameworks. For 
instance, we criticised the Ghanaian ADR Act for making separate provisions for 
arbitration (in the traditional sense) and customary arbitration. We also briefly 
discussed the ability of courts to grant interim measures as against the emerging 
emergency arbitrator provision. On the Uniform Act on Arbitration, we for example 
criticised the underutilisation of the existing CCJA institution and the over 
                                                          
308 Admittedly, this problem is not peculiar to the UAA as other frameworks also suffer from this 
ambiguity. See Section 2.1.3 of Chapter Seven. 
309 Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999, article 25. 
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involvement of the local courts in issues which can be easily be determined by the 
CCJA.  This discussion will prove to be very useful in our next and final chapter.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sums up all the work done in previous chapters.   
In Chapter Two of this thesis, we discussed the problems of the Nigerian judicial 
system and concluded by recommending arbitration as an effective solution to some 
of these problems. In Chapter Three, we introduced the reader to basic arbitration 
concepts and more importantly justified our selection of arbitration as against other 
existing methods of resolving disputes like mediation and negotiation. In Chapter 
Four and Five, we introduced and critically analysed the existing arbitration 
frameworks and practices in Nigeria: the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 
2004 and the customary arbitration framework.1  We concluded each of the 
aforementioned chapters by highlighting the gaps and shortcomings in the said 
frameworks.  In Chapter Six, we highlighted and critically analysed specific but 
relevant arbitration frameworks, in a bid to identify applicable developments that 
have occurred within the sphere of arbitration (since the Nigerian Act was introduced 
in 1988) and from which our recommended framework can draw a few lessons.  
In this concluding chapter, we recommend a framework which takes into 
consideration the peculiarities of the Nigerian nation and any relevant aspects of the 
pre-existing arbitration practices in Nigeria, as well as the recent trends and 
innovations that have occurred in relevant jurisdictions.  In coming up with this 
model, we will avoid tailoring our proposed model after any of the acclaimed 
arbitration frameworks. Instead we suggest a bespoke model that among others, 
incorporates the best practices and relevant aspects of the examined frameworks.  
The proposed framework is limited to domestic arbitration. This is as against the 
existing Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which combines both domestic 
and international arbitration into one framework. We argue that combining domestic 
and international arbitration in one framework inhibits an even development of 
                                                          
1 Chapter A18 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
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domestic arbitration in Nigeria. We also redefine the Nigerian domestic arbitration 
practice to include customary arbitration.  In other words, like Ghana we recommend 
a statutory arbitration framework that recognises and incorporates customary 
arbitration within its purview. However unlike Ghana, which provides different parts 
for customary arbitration and arbitration,2 we argue that there is no justification for 
this distinction and so we combine both practices in one framework. 
In order to aid the development of the domestic arbitration practice in Nigeria, we 
advocate for constitutional reforms, which will place issues relating to domestic 
arbitration solely within the exclusive legislative list.3 We also advocate for the 
establishment of a National Arbitration Centre (“NAC”) to facilitate the development 
and practice of domestic arbitration in Nigeria. This initiative, which will be run by a 
Board of Directors made up of representatives from stakeholder private organizations 
like the Nigerian Bar Association, National Association of Chambers of Commerce, 
Industries, Mines and Agriculture as well as a representative from the Nigerian 
Association of Small and Medium Enterprises, amongst others, will also involve the 
financial involvement of the government through the Ministry of Justice. We also 
advocate for the establishment of a special Superior Court of Record, which will be 
known as the Domestic Arbitration Court (“DAC”), which like the Common Court of 
Justice and Arbitration (CCJA)4 will deal with disputes or issues arising from domestic 
arbitration as well as international arbitrations with seats in Nigeria.  
In addition, in the course of developing a bespoke practice for Nigeria, we also touch 
on what have been regarded as the fundamental elements of arbitration:5 the 
agreement, the dispute, starting an arbitration, the arbitral proceeding as well as the 
tribunals’ final decision and its enforcement.  In the course of discussing these 
elements, we advocate for a number of changes as against the conventional practice 
in Nigeria (and even generally).  For example, we advocate for a flexible arbitration 
                                                          
2 Here and unless we say otherwise, arbitration refers to the practice in the traditional sense.  
3 The exclusive legislative list contains issues solely within the jurisdiction of the Federal legislative 
arm. See Section 4 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
4 We mentioned in Chapter Six that the Uniform Act on Arbitration of the OHADA Treaty sets up the 
CCJA to adjudicate business disputes arising within the OHADA region.  
5 Nigel Blackaby et al, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford Press, 2009) 14. 
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agreement that is able to accommodate both oral and written agreements, as against 
the present practice which requires a written and signed arbitration agreement.  
However, because of particular issues, which we highlight, we limit the application of 
oral arbitration agreements to disputes below a particular sum.  We also redefine the 
concept of submission agreement by borrowing a leaf from the customary arbitration 
practice in Nigeria.  We emphasise specific provisions in the Nigerian Act which 
violate parties’ autonomy and call for a change.  We extend the scope of the Nigerian 
arbitration framework by allowing non-commercial disputes to be arbitrable.  We 
however clearly identify the limits to our proposed framework. We also identify and 
deal with various issues arising during the appointment and arbitration process.  
At various times, we address the issue of cost, which is arguably one of the biggest 
disadvantages of arbitration. While we make recommendations in a bid to reduce cost, 
we admit that it may in fact be difficult to design an arbitration process that will be as 
cheap as the litigation process, (mostly because parties have more financial 
involvement in arbitration than litigation).  We believe that a cheap and cost effective 
process is possible, but this will to a large extent depend on parties’ cooperation.  For 
example, a short proceeding will be much cheaper than a long one, a one-person 
tribunal will be cheaper than a three-person tribunal, amongst many other examples. 
Besides, we submit that the purpose of this thesis will have been achieved if it provides 
a framework that is as cheap as possible as well as able to provide a viable alternative 
to a substantial number of people who are willing and able to make use of arbitration: 
this ultimately reduces the pressure on the courts and increases efficiency. 
Furthermore, we submit that a timely and efficient arbitration system in a country like 
Nigeria may in fact be cheaper than the existing and very problematic litigation 
process. Notwithstanding this position, we recommend provisions which will in the 
long run reduce the cost of arbitration for parties. For example, the aforementioned 
financial involvement of the government in the activities of the NAC will not only be 
part of the government’s much needed reforms within the judiciary, it will also to a 
large extent subsidize the overall cost of arbitration.  
We conclude this thesis by recapping the major points made therein.  
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1.0  THE PROPOSED DOMESTIC ARBITRATION FRAMEWORK 
1.1     The Need for a Bespoke Law.  
 Law is fluid and should ordinarily vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  It should be 
tailored towards the needs of the people for which it has been enacted. According to 
Baron de Monstesquieu, law “should be adapted in such a manner to the people for 
whom they are framed that it should be a great chance if those of one nation suit 
another…It should be in relation to the nature and principles of each 
government…They should have relation to the degree of liberty which the 
Constitution will bear; to the religion of the inhabitants, to their inclination, riches, 
number, commerce, manners and custom…It should be in relation to the climate of 
each country, to the quality of its soil, to its situation and extent.”6 
Besides, as the Supreme Court of Nigeria rightly noted in Salisu Yahaya v. The State,7 
apart from the issue of sovereignty, one of the underlying reasons English law, despite 
its similarity with Nigerian law, will normally not be binding on Nigerian courts, is 
based on the assumption that there is ordinarily an existing Nigerian equivalent, 
which is more relevant and applicable. Therefore, while model or established laws 
provide a useful guide on what law in its successful and finished form should look 
like, adopting same in the exact form is counterproductive; local lawmakers still have 
to ensure that it is adapted to suit the country’s specific needs.  
The reason for our aforementioned position is simple: these so called model 
frameworks were enacted with specific jurisdictions and/or needs in mind. For 
example, while it was the intention of the promoters of the UNCITRAL Law to 
provide a model law of acceptable standard for member nations to adopt, we have 
seen and will still see that the Model Law is more suitable for international arbitrations 
(and not domestic arbitration)8 and arguably, for countries with developed legal 
systems.  
                                                          
6 Charles De Secondant, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Thomas Nugent Trans. J.V. 
Prichard rev) 7 1914. 
7 (2002) 3 SCM 146. 
8 UNCITRAL Model Law 1985, article 1(1). 
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Ironically, even some of these developed countries have found the Model Law to be 
unsuitable. For instance, the United Kingdom in coming up with the English 
Arbitration Act 1996,9 critically considered the Model Law and found aspects of the 
Law to be unsuitable to her needs.10 It is therefore unfortunate that Nigeria like other 
African countries, chose to wholly adopt the said Law without considering its 
suitability to her situation.11 It is this omission that made a country like Nigeria, which 
today still has a high concentration of uneducated people, to as far back as 1988, adopt 
without any variation, a Model Law which insists on a signed agreement.12 
While we may argue that the English Arbitration Act 1996 provides a competing and 
very attractive alternative to the Model Law, one must not forget that the English law 
was proposed by the Departmental Advisory Committee, with the specific needs of 
the United Kingdom in mind.13 This was after a thorough consultation with relevant 
stakeholders within the English arbitration community. Paul Newman rightly opined 
that the promoters of the new English legislation decided that although the Model 
Law had many useful lessons, English law and practice were too well developed by 
judicial precedent to justify the wholescale adoption of the Model Law.14 The exercise 
therefore became one of consolidating the Arbitration Acts 1950-1979, modernising 
the language and inserting apposite features from the Model Law. In addition, the 
legal, political, social and even economic system in England is in many ways different 
and probably more developed than her Nigerian counterpart.15  It will be foolhardy 
for Nigeria to wholly propose or adopt the law of a country which was made under 
special circumstances and with a different level of economic and political 
development from Nigeria.  
                                                          
9 See Section 3.1 of Chapter Six. 
10 See the Department Advisory Committee’s report on the Arbitration Bill 1996. 
11African countries which have domesticated the Model Law include Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya and 
Zambia, amongst many others. 
12 See Section 1 of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 
13 See Section 3.1 of Chapter Six for a detailed discussion on this issue. 
14 Paul Newman, Alternative Dispute Resolution (CLT Professional Publishing Ltd 1999) 3. 
15 A substantial part of the Nigerian law is modelled after the received English law, which by themselves 
are very unsuitable for Nigeria. Assuming without conceding that these laws are suitable for Nigeria, 
while the United Kingdom has since adapted these laws to suit current realities, Nigeria remains stuck 
in the past. This has to a large extent affected the development of arbitration in Nigeria. 
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It is therefore very unfortunate that the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 
1988, like majority of the laws in Nigeria, was wholly adopted without taking into 
consideration the idiosyncrasies and peculiarities of the nation. In fact, a substantial 
part of Nigerian law is outdated and/or based on older versions of the English law.16 
For example, the existing Marriage Act 200417 was originally introduced in 1914 and 
is substantially based on the old English Marriage law in the United Kingdom.18 One 
of the many contentious parts of the said Marriage Act is the provision which 
criminalises bigamy.19 While this writer is totally against bigamy, it is on record that 
many top ranking Nigerians in authority are involved in bigamy. Bigamy is a 
culturally accepted and deeply rooted Nigerian (indeed African) practice and so 
victims are reluctant to make formal complaints. The point being made here is that 
law loses its value when irrelevant or generally unacceptable principles are enacted 
as law. This is one major factor that has contributed to the failure of the Arbitration 
Act, especially in the resolution of domestic arbitration disputes in Nigeria.20 
 
Therefore, while we examine relevant and successful arbitration frameworks in other 
jurisdictions, we only use this as a form of guide. In other words, we recommend a 
domestic arbitration framework,21 which not only takes into consideration the 
peculiarities of the Nigerian people but also the pre-existing arbitration practices in 
Nigeria as well as the recent trends and innovations that have occurred in relevant 
jurisdictions.  Our proposed framework is bespoke and tailored towards the needs 
and requirements of the Nigerian nation while also incorporating the best and 
relevant aspects of the frameworks, which we have examined in the course of this 
thesis. 
 
                                                          
16 Another good example (apart from the Marriage Act) is the existing Criminal Code Act in Nigeria 
(Cap 77 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004), which was originally introduced on the 1st of 
June 1916.   
17 Cap 218, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
18 See the Preamble to the said Nigerian Act. 
19 See Section 47 of the Marriage Act; See also Section 370 of the Criminal Code Act.  
20 See Section 5.0 of Chapter Four for a discussion on the problems of the arbitration system in Nigeria.  
21 As we will come to see under our discussions on arbitrability further on in this chapter, we define the 
scope of domestic arbitration in Nigeria. 
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1.2     Exclusive Legislative List 
In Chapter Four, we acknowledged an ongoing controversy on the legislative arm 
which presently has proper jurisdiction over issues relating to arbitration.22 The 
National Committee on the Reform and Harmonization of Arbitration and ADR Laws 
in Nigeria, in 2005 came to the conclusion that the power of the National Assembly 
could be implied from a combined interpretation of Item 62 and 68 of the exclusive 
legislative list and therefore international arbitration as a whole was within the 
jurisdiction of the National Assembly, while domestic arbitration was within the 
jurisdiction of the State House of Assembly.23 
Further to this conclusion, the committee came up with two draft law: the Federal 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act (“FACA”) and the Uniform State Arbitration and 
Conciliation Law (“USAC”). While the purview of the FACA was limited to 
international or inter-state arbitration, the USAC was put in place as a model domestic 
arbitration framework and which States were expected to adopt for application within 
their jurisdiction.  In terms of substance, both draft are more or less the same.24 
Like a number of Nigerian academics,25 we disagreed in part with the Committee’s 
conclusion and opined that while it is possible to argue that arbitration complements 
trade and commerce, it is wrong to suggest that it is in fact incidental or 
supplementary to trade and commerce because it is not a compulsory component of 
both. Clearly, it is unacceptable to assert that international arbitration is limited to 
trade and commerce since it can also be used in resolving non-commercial disputes.26 
                                                          
22 See Section 5.3 of Chapter Four. 
23 Item 62 empowers the National Assembly to legislate on “trade and commerce, and in particular a) 
trade and commerce between Nigerian and other countries…and trade and commerce between the 
States”.  Item 68 of the said second schedule empowers the National Assembly to make any law on 
“any matter incidental or supplementary to any matter mentioned elsewhere in this list”. 
24 Till date, the government has not implemented these recommendations.  
25Adewale Olawoyin, ‘Charting New Waters with Familiar Landmarks’ (2009) 26(3) Journal of 
International Arbitration 373, 380; Adebayo Adaralegbe, ‘Challenges in Enforcement of Arbitral Award 
in Capital-Importing States; The Nigerian Experience’ (2006) 23 Journal of International Arbitration 401, 
408. 
26 For example, there has been a rise in the practice of family arbitration in the United Kingdom. See 
Nigel Shepherd, ‘Top Judge Gives Green Light to Family Arbitration’ (2014) 1 Private Client Business 
Journal 65. We have the Court of Arbitration for Sports, which is used to resolve even the non-
commercial aspects of sports. We have also mentioned that it has proven to be useful in the resolution 
of construction disputes.  
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We concluded this argument by submitting that while domestic arbitration may very 
well be within the jurisdiction of the State’s House of Assembly,27 the existing 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act remains valid by virtue of Section 315 of the Nigerian 
Constitution28 and therefore the Nigerian Act still has jurisdiction over domestic 
arbitration proceedings, at least until such a time as the said Act is either repealed or 
replaced with a completely new Act.29 In other words, any amendment to the existing 
Act can only be undertaken by the National Assembly.  
This does not however prevent the State House of Assembly from exercising its right 
to make its domestic arbitration law for application within its jurisdiction.30 To the 
extent that our proposed framework is a strictly domestic arbitration law, the 
framework is clearly within the jurisdiction of the State House of Assembly. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing argument, we submit that allowing only the State 
House of Assembly to exercise jurisdiction over domestic arbitration proceedings will 
either inhibit the growth of domestic arbitration in Nigeria, or at the very best 
encourage an uneven development of domestic arbitration in Nigeria, since unlike the 
National Assembly, a State House of Assembly can only enact laws that will operate 
within its jurisdiction.31 Till date, only Lagos State, the commercial hub of the nation, 
has recently and successfully enacted an arbitration law in Nigeria. The emergence of 
this law must be linked to the rise in the number of international and commercially 
related transactions within the State. This explains why States that are less 
                                                          
27 This is the State’s legislative arm. 
28 Section 315(1) (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides that “…an existing 
law shall have effect…and shall be deemed to be an Act of the National Assembly”. Section 315(4)(b) 
of the Constitution goes ahead to define existing laws to mean “any rule of law or enactment or 
instrument whatsoever which is in force immediately before the date when this section comes into force 
or which having been passed or made before that date, comes into force after that date…” 
29In Attorney General of the Federation v. Attorney General of the 36 States (2002) 6 SCM 1, it was held that 
until an enactment by the National Assembly or indeed by a State Assembly, is repealed in clear terms 
or duly avoided by a court of law, it has the full force of law as an enactment duly and validly made by 
the appropriate legislature. 
30 If for any reason there is any consistency between an Act of the National Assembly and the Law of 
the House Assembly, the law is clear that the Act of the National Assembly takes precedence over the 
Law. See Attorney General of Ogun State v. Attorney General of the Federation (Consolidated) (1982)1-2 SC 
7. 
31 Section 4(2) and (3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
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industrialised and commercially inclined like Oyo, Osun, Ogun, Kebbi, amongst 
others, have failed to enact a standard arbitration law.  
For arbitration to be a real and viable solution to the problems of the court system in 
Nigeria, its practice must be widely and evenly spread across the entire country. In 
other words, an uneven development of arbitration does not suffice for our purpose. 
This is because the problems of the Nigerian court system are not limited to a 
particular region or a particular area of law.  For instance, the over clogged case list, 
the problem of delay as well as the issue of corruption and incompetence are not 
limited to any particular region. They are widespread in terms of location and subject 
matter. While attempts by States like Lagos may in fact reduce the pressure on their 
local courts, especially as it relates to commercial disputes, this still has little effect on 
the overall pressure at the central appellate courts.  This is significant because cases 
from other States as well as non arbitrable cases in Lagos (or cases where the parties 
opted for the court system instead) still end up in the central appellate courts.32 In 
effect, the only way to reduce the pressure as well as ensure an improved court system 
both at the courts of first instance and the appellate courts is to ensure that reforms 
and developments are evenly and comprehensively spread across the country.  This 
can only be ensured by the Federal Government of Nigeria.33 
Considering this point from another angle, allowing States to handle domestic 
arbitration proceedings will deprive the domestic practice of one of the most 
important advantages of international arbitration as against international litigation, 
which is the ease of enforcing international decisions arising by virtue of the New 
York Convention.34  Bringing this issue home, as we mentioned in Chapter Two, the 
                                                          
32 For example, in Chapter Two, we highlighted the rise in the number of cases being instituted at the 
Oyo State High Court. This increase in cases, alongside those emanating from Lagos State (which is 
arguably making efforts), still proceeds to the common central appellate courts, thus getting stuck in 
the jam at the central level. This in other words defeats the efforts made by States like Lagos. 
33 In fact, attempts at judicial reforms must be evenly spread across all the States especially since by 
virtue of the Federal Character principle, the appellate courts at the centre must as a matter of necessity 
appoint from all the States (and not necessarily the best, most knowledgeable or most experienced 
Judges from proactive States). It is therefore necessary to ensure that attempts at judicial reforms are 
subjected to the same standards.  
34 By States, we are referring to one of the thirty-six States in Nigeria and not the States in the context 
of the provisions of the New York Convention 1958. 
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decision of a State High Court is not directly enforceable in another State High Court.35 
It is subject to each States individual requirements. This position does not however 
apply to the various Federal courts resident in different States.36 The point being made 
here is that placing arbitration within the States jurisdiction will subject any award 
which is to be enforced outside the State where it was made, to the individual 
requirements of another Nigerian States arbitration framework. On the other hand, 
placing arbitration within the exclusive legislative list will aid an easy and quick 
enforcement process across the country (just like judgements of the Federal High 
Court, the National Industrial Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court),37 
thus encouraging the acceptability and development of arbitration in Nigeria.  
We therefore suggest that the proposed law be provided for within the exclusive 
legislative list of the Nigerian Constitution.  In other words, it is to be enacted as an 
Act of the National Assembly.38 
1.3    The Nigerian Arbitration Centre 
Before going into details about the process of maintaining arbitration under our 
proposed framework, we advocate for the establishment of a statutory company, 
which will be known as the Nigerian Arbitration Centre (“NAC”), to administer and 
promote the practice of domestic arbitration in Nigeria. The Nigerian government has 
in the past set up statutory companies, with the sole aim of providing technical but 
cost effective expertise and solution to specific problems plaguing the nation.  Only 
recently, the government set up the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria 
(“AMCON”) to acquire, manage and dispose the problem of non-performing loans in 
financial institutions, through a collaboration of the Ministry of Finance and the 
Central Bank of Nigeria but under the management of an independent and private 
                                                          
35 See Section 2.1 of Chapter Two; See also Rivers State Government of Nigeria & Anor v. Specialist Consult 
(2005) 3 SCM 140; Ogbuanyinya v Obi Okudo (1990) 7 SC (Pt 1) 68. 
36 This is because Federal courts are regarded as one, with jurisdiction throughout Nigeria. However, 
for convenience, the Federal High Court for example is divided into judicial divisions spread 
throughout Nigeria; See Section 249 (1) (2) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. See also Section 2.2 and 
2.3 of Chapter Two of this thesis for a discussion on the Federal courts in Nigeria.  
37 See Section 2.2 -2.6 of Chapter Two for a discussion on this issue. 
38 The National Assembly is the Federal legislative arm while the House of Assembly is the State’s 
legislative arm. See Sections 47 and 48 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
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Board of Directors. Under this arrangement, the government provides the financial 
support, especially as it relates to the payments of salaries of personnel,39 while the 
private sector through the Board of Directors provides the expertise needed.   
In the same vein, the proposed NAC will enjoy the financial backing of the Ministry 
of Justice but will be under the management of technocrats and professionals. The 
involvement of the government will no doubt and to a large extent reduce the cost of 
arbitration on parties. The government will also not be spending as much money as it 
would have spent if it had decided to appoint more Judges and build more courts, 
since parties who opt for arbitration will be bearing some of the cost of the process.  
Admittedly, the cost implications of arbitration for parties may at the initial stages be 
more when compared to the litigation process.40 However, as we will argue further on 
in this chapter, the situation in Nigeria is unique. Because of the problem of delay 
plaguing the Nigerian court system, an efficient and timely arbitration system may in 
fact be cheaper in the long run than the seemingly cheaper but complicated court 
process.  For example, a litigation spanning over ten years will not only in all 
likelihood be more expensive than a shorter and efficient arbitration process, the 
former will probably result in irreparable damage both to business and personal 
relationship of parties. 
In terms of administration, the everyday activities of the NAC will be undertaken by 
a Secretariat, which will be subject to the guidance and direction of a Board of 
Directors set up by law to govern the administration of the NAC. Adopting the 
situation in Ghana, members of the Board of Directors of the NAC will be appointed 
by the President of Nigeria. However, unlike the appointment process under the 
Ghanaian framework which seems to be arbitrary, under the NAC, the appointment 
will be made further to a nomination process made by relevant stakeholder 
organizations.  The Board will consist of: 
 
                                                          
39 We believe that the involvement of the government will to a large extent reduce the cost of arbitration 
on parties. 
40 In the course of this chapter, we will also be suggesting other methods of reducing costs. 
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1.3.1.   A Chairman  
The appointment of the chairman shall be made by the President of Nigeria, 
further to a nomination by other members of the Board of Directors.  In 
nominating a chairman, members must take into consideration his/her 
professional experience and specialised knowledge of law, arbitration and 
business, which must have been gathered over a period of at least ten years.41 
1.3.2.   One Nominated Representative of the Nigerian Bar Association (“NBA”)  
The Nigerian Bar Association is the national body of all lawyers in Nigeria.42 
The NBA will be expected to nominate three of its members to the Nigerian 
President, as its representatives on the Board. The Nigerian President will in 
turn be expected to appoint one out of the three nominees. 
 
The reason for including lawyers on the Board is not farfetched. The proposed 
framework is expected to provide a viable alternative to litigation. It takes 
knowledge of the litigation process to be able to provide a framework that 
avoids some of the pitfalls of litigation.43 Furthermore, unlike the other ADRs, 
the process and practice of arbitration requires the involvement of the law.  
 
1.3.3.  One Nominated Representative of the Nigerian Association of Chambers of    
Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture (“NACCIMA”).  
The NACCIMA is the umbrella organization for all City/State and Bilateral 
Chambers of Commerce within the Federal Republic of Nigeria.44 The 
organisation seeks to advance business and economic growth in Nigeria. The 
                                                          
41 Ten years is the minimum experience required to be appointed as a Judge of a Superior Court of 
Record as well as to attain the rank of a Senior Advocate of Nigeria. See for example Sections 249 and 
270 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
42 Official website of the Nigerian Bar Association <www.nigerianbar.org.ng/> accessed 2 January 
2016.  
43 Paul Idornigie, ‘Overview of ADR in Nigeria’ (2002) 73(1) Arbitration 73,76. 
44 Official website of the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and 
Agriculture <www.naccima.com/> accessed 2 January 2016. 
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organisation also ensures that governmental policies and actions aid the 
development of business activities in Nigeria. 
 
Unfortunately, as we have noted in Chapter Two and Four, the present legal 
system inhibits the development of business activities in Nigeria.45 For 
example, apart from the negative effects of corruption and incompetence on 
business disputes, the present requirement for writing and signature makes the 
existing arbitration framework unable to cater for specialised types of contracts 
like bills of lading, companies’ article of association and negotiable 
instruments, amongst others.46 Involving the NACCIMA in the administration 
of the NAC will to a large extent enable the organization provide an arbitration 
service that is practical and useful to the business community in general.  
The Nigerian President will be expected to appoint one out of three nominees 
to be put forward by the NACCIMA.  
1.3.4 One Nominated Representative of the Nigerian Association of Small and 
Medium Enterprises (“NASME”).  
The NASME brings together small and medium enterprise owners under one 
umbrella. The organization seeks to promote the development of micro, small 
and medium sized businesses in Nigeria.47  This is very important especially 
when ones considers the level of economic development in Nigeria. 
 
The relevance of the NASME cannot be overemphasised, especially since we 
seek to introduce a cost effective arbitration process. It is important to ensure 
that the framework appeals to the anticipated end users of the framework. One 
way of ensuring this is by involving the intended users in the administration 
of the process. Involving the NASME in the decision making and 
                                                          
45 See Section 3.0 of Chapter Three. 
46 This is because these agreements meet the writing and not the signature requirement as provided for  
in Section 1 of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act.  
47 Micro Capital Universe, Nigerian Association of Small and Medium Enterprises (NASME) 
<www.microcapital.org/microfinanceuniverse/tikiindex.php?page=Nigerian+Association+of+Small
+and+Medium+Enterprises+(NASME)> accessed 2 January 2016. 
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administration of the NAC will to a large extent enable the latter to come up 
with policies that will appeal to local business owners, as well as provide 
awareness on the use of arbitration in the resolution of micro, small and 
medium scaled domestic disputes. The Nigerian President will be expected to 
appoint one out of three nominees to be put forward by the NASME.  
1.3.5 One Nominated Representative of the Council of Traditional Rulers. 
This is the recognised association of traditional rulers in Nigeria. We previously 
mentioned that in pre-colonial times, traditional rulers exercised supreme 
powers over the inhabitants within their jurisdiction. However, colonialism 
and the development of Nigerian law in general has changed the trend.  Today, 
traditional rulers have no constitutionally recognised powers. 
 
In view of some of the problems of the present court system, there have been 
calls by academics for the bestowal of judicial powers on traditional rulers.48 
While we do not agree with this call, we concede that their knowledge and 
wealth of experience especially as it relates to customary law may in fact be 
useful in the customary arbitration process. As we will see later on in this 
chapter, we redefine domestic arbitration to include customary arbitration. 
The Council will be expected to nominate one member to act on the board.  
1.3.6    A Representative of the Federal Ministry of Justice 
A representative of the Ministry of Justice will be included as a member of the 
Board of Directors not only because of their financial involvement in the project 
but also because of their role in the administration of justice in general.49 
 
 
 
                                                          
48 R. Blench, S. Longtau, U. Hassan and M. Walsh, ‘The Role of Traditional Rulers in Conflict Prevention 
and Mediation in Nigeria: The final report (Report prepared for DFID 2006) 75  
<www.rogerblench.info/Conflict/TR%20Interim%20Report.pdf> accessed 2 January 2016. 
49 In the course of this chapter, we highlight some of the duties and functions of the proposed NAC. 
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1.4.    The Domestic Arbitration Court 
We advocate for the establishment of a Superior Court of Record known as the 
Domestic Arbitration Court, which will serve as a decision maker in disputes 
emanating from domestic arbitrations in Nigeria as well as provide any necessary 
support for international arbitrations with Nigerian seats.50  In this sense, the DAC 
will be similar to the CCJA and in a way, the ICC’s Court.51 Like the CCJA, the DAC 
will have sole and final jurisdiction over arbitration disputes in Nigeria.52 
 
As against the opinion that judicial intervention is the antithesis of arbitration,53 we 
believe and submit that an effective and supportive court system will to a large extent 
encourage the development of arbitration in Nigeria.54 In support of the former 
position, Thomas Carbonneau submits that, “the western, developed–state (and 
commercially predominant) view is that no matter its degree, judicial intervention in 
matters of trans-border or domestic arbitration is antagonistic to the autonomy and 
functionality of arbitration”.55 This writer however submits that there are a number of 
situations where a party independent of the entire proceeding is better suited to act as 
a decision maker. For example, by virtue of the fair hearing principle,56 it is opined 
that an independent third party is better suited to deal with jurisdictional challenges 
involving the arbitration tribunal. As we argued in a previous chapter57 (and will 
revisit shortly), an arbitrator technically has a stake and interest in the continuation of 
the proceeding, his fees and so he arguably has many reasons to perpetuate an 
                                                          
50 The extent of the courts’ involvement in international arbitration will depend on the applicable 
international arbitration framework. 
51 For example, Article 14 of the ICC Arbitration Rules 2012 provides that any challenge of an arbitrator 
on the basis of impartiality, independence or otherwise, shall be determined by the ICC Court of 
Arbitration and so while the ICC’s court may not be a court in the true sense of the word, we actually 
see the court performing specific but very limited decision making functions.  
52 This includes both domestic and international arbitration. 
53 Alan Reid, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and the English 
Arbitration Act: Are the Two Systems Poles Apart?’ (2004) 21(3) Journal of International Arbitration 
227,233. 
54 See Section 3.2 of Chapter Six. 
55 Thomas E Carbonneau, ‘The Exercise of Contract Freedom-the Making of Arbitration Agreements’ 
(2003) 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1189, 1194. 
56 This is encapsulated in the latin principle Nemo Judex in Causa Sua, which when translated in 
English means that you cannot be a judge in your own cause. 
57 See Section 5.2 of Chapter Three. 
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otherwise invalid arbitration. Furthermore at this point, a huge conflict of interests 
could arise as regard the arbitrators, since as we have mentioned in Chapter Three, 
parties would usually appoint arbitrators who they believe will be sympathetic to 
their case.58 In applications similar to this, we believe that the Domestic Arbitration 
Court is better suited to adjudicate.59 
Furthermore, as Lord Peter Goldsmith submitted, there is need to have a supportive 
but independent judiciary with demonstrable experience in arbitration.60 The 
existence of the DAC will dispense with the need to involve State High Courts in 
arbitration disputes.61 As we have discussed in Chapter Four, the development of 
arbitration in Nigeria, especially domestic arbitration, is a recent trend, one which 
many lawyers and Judges in Nigeria are still trying to understand.62 Unfortunately, as 
Olatawura rightly noted, many Judges in Africa lack the requisite knowledge of 
arbitration.63 As we have seen in Chapter Two, many of the courts have ill equipped 
libraries.64 Furthermore, arbitration as a subject remains untaught at the major law 
schools in Nigeria till date.65 
                                                          
58 For a more detailed and practical discussion on this issue, see- Jan Paulsson, ‘Moral Hazard in 
International Dispute Resolution’ (An Inaugural Lecture Delivered as Holder of the Michael R. Klein 
Distinguished Scholar Chair at the University of Miami School of Law on 29th April 2010). 
<www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12773749999020/paulsson_moral_hazard.pdf> accessed 30 
April 2010. 
59 In the course of this chapter, we highlight other situations where we believe it is necessary to involve 
the DAC. 
60 Lord Peter Goldsmith, ‘The London Principles 2015’ (2015) 81(4) Arbitration 407, 410. 
61 In Chapter two, we mentioned that the State High Court has the widest jurisdiction in Nigeria. It is 
this court which presently has jurisdiction over issues relating to arbitration in Nigeria. See Section 272 
of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
62 Until recently, even the courts in developed jurisdictions like the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America were reluctant to “share” their jurisdiction with arbitrators. See Earl S. Wolaver, ‘The 
Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration’ (1934) 2 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
132, 138-144;  Ernest Lorenzen, ‘Commercial Arbitration-International and Interstate Aspects’ (1934)  
Yale Law School Scholarship Series, Paper 4588  
<http://dogotalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4588> 716,717; Herbert Syme, ‘Arbitrability of 
Labour Disputes’ (1951) 5(3) Rutger Law Review  45, 458; Janet Rosen, ‘Arbitration under Private 
International Law: The Doctrine of Seperability and Competence de la Competence’ (1994) 17(3) 
Fordham International Law Journal 599, 617. 
63 Olakunle O. Olatawura, ‘Arbitration in Nigeria: From Theory to Practice’ (1996) 7(9) International 
Company and Commercial Law Review 325, 328; Collins Namachanja, ‘The challenges facing arbitral 
institutions in Africa’ (2016) 82(1) Arbitration 44, 51. 
64 See Section 3.3 of Chapter Two. 
65 See for example, the list of courses offered at the Faculty of Law, University of Ibadan (Nigeria’s 
premier university) <http://law.ui.edu.ng/courseprivate > accessed 12 June 2016. 
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To reduce the likelihood of erroneous decisions and encourage the smooth 
development of arbitration, there is need to ensure that decision makers on issues 
relating to arbitration possess the right mind-set and are equipped with the requisite 
knowledge and experience needed to decide issues effectively and efficiently.  James 
Allsop in his article rightly submits that this not only involves an understanding of 
the law and practice of arbitration, but also of the perspectives and approaches that 
facilitate the smooth working of the arbitral system.66 Any other attitude or position 
will stifle the development of domestic arbitration in Nigeria.  
Like every other Federal Court, we suggest that the DAC be comprised of a President 
and as many Judges as are deemed necessary.67 Potential members of the DAC will be 
subject to the same requirements and appointment process as that of other Federal 
Superior Courts of Record.68 In other words, a DAC Judge will be expected to have a 
minimum of ten years post call experience. Unlike Federal and State High Court 
Judges who are expected to have general experience but like National Industrial Court 
Judges who are expected to have labour law experience,69 a DAC Judge must have 
considerable experience acting as an arbitrator and/or arbitration lawyer. A Judge of 
the DAC will be appointed by the President of Nigeria upon the recommendation of 
the National Judicial Council and upon the confirmation of the Senate.70 
In the course of this chapter, we highlight some of the functions of the DAC.   
 
 
                                                          
66 James Allsop, ‘Courts and arbitrators as partners in the international dispute resolution project’ (2015) 
81(4) Arbitration 413, 436. 
67 We should point out in passing that this is not the first time that a special court has been set up to 
take care of specific kinds of issues in Nigeria.  For instance, we have the National Industrial Court 
(NIC), which was reintroduced to administer trade disputes between employers and employees, trade 
unions and workers, workers and even between trade unions. This was in response to the long (ranging 
between two and ten months) and periodic strikes spearhead by labour unions like the National Labour 
Congress (NLC) and the Academic Staff Union of Union (ASSU), during which economic and 
educational activities were grounded to a complete halt. 
68 See the Revised NJC Guidelines and Procedural Rules for the Appointment of Judicial Officers of All 
Superior Courts of Record in Nigeria, November 2014. 
69 See Sections 250(3) and Section 271(3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
70 ibid section 251 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
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2.0 STRUCTURE OF THE PROPOSED DOMESTIC ARBITRATION ACT. 
In terms of contents, we would approach this discussion from what Redfern and 
Hunter have regarded as the fundamental elements of arbitration.71 We however also 
include a Preamble section in the proposed framework. 
2.1    The Preamble 
Unlike the existing Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, we introduce a 
Preamble into the Proposed Domestic Arbitration Act (PDAA). We believe that since 
a Preamble states the objectives of the Act, it will serve as a useful reference point in 
controversial situations, where there is need to fill gaps in the law and/or interpret 
ambiguous aspects of the framework.72 In his discussion on the Preamble Section of the 
English Arbitration Act 1996, Tobi Landau submits that “…whenever any section leaves 
room for doubt on interpretation, reference must be made back to this principles, 
rather than embarking on a cold textual analysis of specific provisions in the 
abstract…”73 Our Preamble therefore sets the theme of this proposed framework.  
In view of the economic situation in Nigeria, we model our Preamble provision closely 
after Section 1 of the English Arbitration Act 1996, which has cost and efficiency as its 
focal points. The intention of the PDAA will therefore be to provide and promote the 
use of a cost effective domestic arbitration framework in Nigeria.  Parties have the 
unfettered right to determine the process by which their disputes will be 
administered, subject only to any mandatory provision, which we highlight in this 
thesis.  For example, any ambiguous or contentious part of this framework should be 
interpreted in a way that encourages the development of domestic arbitration as well 
as promotes a cost effective process. 
 
                                                          
71 Nigel Blackaby et al (n 5) 14. 
72 In Ogbonna v. Attorney General of Imo State (1992) 2 SCNJ 26, the Nigerian Supreme Court held that 
Preambles should only be relied upon to clarify ambiguity. However, where the provisions of the 
framework in question is clear and unambiguous, it should be given its ordinary meaning; See 
Obomhense v Erhanon (1993) 7 SCNJ 479, Dikko Yusuf & Anor v Olusegun Obasanjo & Ors (2004) 5 SCM 
174-175; Awuse v Odili (2003) 12 SCM 27. 
73 Tobi Landau, ‘United Kingdom: Arbitration Act of 1996’ (1997) 36(1) International Legal Materials 
155, 156. 
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2.2    The Agreement 
The significance of the agreement in arbitration proceedings cannot be overstated. As 
we have seen in Chapter Three, the arbitration agreement evidences the consent of the 
parties to submit their dispute to arbitration.74 While State courts derive their 
jurisdiction either from statutory provisions or a jurisdiction agreement, the 
arbitration tribunals’ jurisdiction is based solely on the parties’ agreement to submit 
their dispute to arbitration.75 The underlying idea behind arbitration and the 
enforceability of the agreement, is party autonomy.76 To constitute a proper arbitration 
procedure which can be enforced, there must be an agreement to submit the matter to 
arbitration.77 This agreement may either be included as a clause in the head contract 
or may be reached subsequent to the contract and/or dispute. A jurisdiction like 
China also specifically requires that certain information be included in the arbitration 
agreement. This includes the following: a clear intention to arbitrate, it should also 
state the matters within the scope of the arbitration as well as name the designated 
arbitration commission, if any.78 
2.2.1   A Flexible Arbitration Agreement 
As we have seen at various points in this thesis, the frameworks in many countries in 
Africa (and even the world in general)79 like Nigeria,80 Ghana,81 Egypt82 and the 
OHADA region,83 insist on a written arbitration agreement. Hong – Lin Yu rightly 
notes that a strict requirement of form can in certain instances be the antithesis of 
                                                          
74 See Section 3.0 of Chapter Three; See also Lew, Mistelis and Kroll, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2003) 100. 
75Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage (eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 1999) 1; See also Julian D.M Lew QC, ‘Introduction: Fundamental 
Problems in International Arbitration’ in Julian D.M Lew and Loukas A. Mistelis, Pervasive Problems in 
International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2006) 5. 
76 It has been referred to as the cornerstone of arbitration; See Christopher Lau and Christen Horlack, 
‘Party Autonomy-The Turning Point’ (2010) 4 Dispute Resolution International 121. 
77 Commerce Assurance Limited v. Alli (1992) 4 SCNJ 145. 
78 See Article 16 of the Chinese Arbitration Law 1994, which expects parties to clearly define the matters 
which should be submitted to arbitration.  
79 See for example, Section 5 of the English Arbitration Act 1996. 
80 Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, section 1. 
81 Ghanaian ADR Act 2010, section 2(3). 
82 Egyptian Arbitration Law, No 27 of 1994, article 12. 
83 Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999, article 3. 
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arbitration.84 For example, while the writing requirement in a developed and more 
enlightened jurisdiction like the United Kingdom may on the face of it seem very 
reasonable, proponents of the revised model law have rightly pointed out that the 
requirement and drafting of a written arbitration agreement were in a number of 
situations either unreasonable or virtually impossible.85 The revolution in 
communication and methods of contracting especially in the area of electronic 
commerce has created an urgent need to reconsider the notion of a written 
agreement.86 Unfortunately, Nigeria not only prescribes a written arbitration 
agreement, it also requires that the agreement must also be signed by parties, thus 
worsening an already bad requirement.87 
In a developing country such as Nigeria, which as we have seen in Chapter Four still 
suffers widespread illiteracy, the writing and signature requirements are to say the 
least, very unacceptable.88 This is especially as Nigerian law recognizes the validity of 
oral contracts.89 These mandatory requirements not only contradict the peculiarities 
of the Nigeria nation, they are also anachronistic and inconsistent with accepted 
arbitration practices.90 Furthermore, the writing and signature requirements 
automatically invalidates arbitration agreements contained in specialised types of 
contracts like bills of ladings, articles of associations and negotiable instruments, 
which even though are evidenced in writing, are usually not signed by parties.  
Flowing from the above, and taking into consideration the level of education in 
Nigeria, we adopt the more flexible definition of arbitration agreements encapsulated 
in Option two of Article 7 of the Revised Model law, which defines a valid arbitration 
                                                          
84 Hong-Lin Yu, ‘Written Arbitration Agreements – What Written Arbitration Agreements?’ (2013) 32(1) 
Civil Justice Quarterly 68, 69. 
85 See Section 3.2 of Chapter Six; See also UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration 1985 With amendments as adopted in 2006, 28 
<www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf> accessed 9 
September 2015. 
86 Di Anne-Marie Gobhams and Niccole Landi, ‘Arbitration Agreements: Written Form Requirements 
and New Means of Communication’ (2014) 4 Bocconi Legal Papers 221,222. 
87 See Section 1 of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 
88 See Section 5.1 of Chapter Four. 
89 This is especially as the Nigerian law recognizes the validity of oral contracts. See Section 125 of the 
Evidence Act 2011. 
90 See Section 5 of the English Arbitration Act 1996; Section 2(3) of the Ghanaian ADR Act 2010; Article 
12 of the Egyptian Arbitration Law, No 27 of 1994; Article 3 of the Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999. 
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agreement in a way that includes both oral and written arbitration agreements. The 
PDAA will therefore be able to cater for domestic arbitration agreements, both written 
and unwritten, as well as customary arbitrations, which many times arise from an 
unwritten agreement. Very importantly, by adopting this flexible approach, our 
proposed framework is able to cater for the large number of uneducated but wealthy 
Nigerian business men who still transact their businesses orally.91 
Besides, since the general policy of the courts is to hold parties to their bargain in cases 
where parties have agreed to resolve their disputes via arbitration92 and because 
arbitration is based on the mutual intent, convenience and commitment of parties to 
resolve their dispute via arbitration, the emphasis being placed by many frameworks 
on the form of the arbitration, is overrated and not very important as long there are 
alternative but credible ways of establishing the existence of the agreement.93 
Admittedly, parties’ rights of access to the court is a fundamental right94 and so 
caution must be applied in situations where there is controversy as to the existence of 
an oral arbitration agreement.95 Marie Ni Shuilleabhain opines that the writing 
requirement not only ensures certainty and by implication unnecessary litigation, it 
also prevents parties from committing the offence of perjury.96 In addition, Professor 
Ilias Bantekas also rightly points out that “the difficulty with oral agreements to 
arbitrate is that they provide a limited degree of legal certainty, particularly in the 
absence of any verifiable record of the agreement. In such cases, how does one prove 
or disprove the existence of an agreement to arbitrate?”97 
                                                          
91 The law in so-called developed countries, also recognises oral agreements in specific situations. In 
the United Kingdom for example, leases below three years can be entered into orally. Leases above 
three years should be evidenced in writing.  See Section 54 of the Law of Property Act 1925. The point 
being made here is that there are circumstances where the law has deemed an oral contract to be enough 
to bind parties. Of course, as the risks and interest increase, the law requires more proof, that is writing. 
92 The owners of the M.V Lupex v. Nigeria Overseas Chartering & Shipping Ltd (2003) 10 SCM 71 
93 Di Anne-Marie Gobhams and Niccole Landi (n 86) 236. 
94 Section 36 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.  
95 Laurence Boo, ‘The writing requirement in contemporary practice: is there really a need for change’ 
(2008) 2 Dispute Resolution International 75, 78. 
96 Marie Ni Shuilleabhain, ‘Formalities of Contracting: A Cost Benefit Analysis of Requirements that 
Contracts be Evidenced in Writing’ (2005) 27 Dublin University Law Journal 10, 15. 
97 Ilias Bantekas, An Introduction to International Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 2015) 73. 
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Different jurisdictions have approached this question from different angles. For 
example, in Scotland, the determination of an oral arbitration agreement is on a 
balance of probabilities. This requires the party alleging the existence of the agreement 
to prove that the fact in question is more likely than not, even if marginal so.98 
In answering Professor Bantekas’s question as it relates to this framework, we take a 
cue from the existing practice in Nigeria. We submit that the pre-existing rules of 
evidence applicable to the proof of oral contracts are also applicable to the proof of 
oral arbitration agreements. An oral arbitration agreement will therefore be expected 
to be proved by the evidence of anyone who saw99 or heard100 parties entering into an 
agreement. Like every other oral agreement in Nigeria, it will be up to the court to 
determine the weight that will be attached to such an evidence.  Applying the 
provisions of the Nigerian Evidence Act, the only time when an oral agreement will 
not be acceptable is where there is written evidence on the subject or issue that is 
sought to be proved.101 However as Laurence Boo rightly submitted, any doubt as to 
the voluntary surrender of this right must be decided in favour of the party who is 
challenging the validity of the arbitration agreement.102 
Notwithstanding the above, we prescribe a limit to the scope of oral agreements. 
Specifically, disputes involving a sum in excess of ten million naira103 will need to be 
evidenced by a written arbitration agreement.  We borrow a leaf from the Lagos State 
Magistrate Court Law of Lagos State, which gives Magistrate courts in Lagos State 
wide jurisdiction over a claim arising from any contract or tort but limits the scope of 
the court’s jurisdictions to disputes below ten million naira.104 This is in view of the 
                                                          
98 See the case of Miler v Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 All ER 372, 374. 
99 Evidence Act 2011, section 126(a). 
100 ibid section 126(b). 
101 ibid section 125; However, Section 128 of the said Evidence Act somewhat qualifies the said section 
by providing that the existence of a written memorandum is not enough to disprove an oral agreement, 
especially when the memorandum was not intended to have legal effect as a contract. 
102 Laurence Boo (n 95) 75. 
103 This is about twenty-four thousand, three hundred pounds (£24,300) pounds. While this amount 
seems meagre especially when converted to pounds, it must be pointed out that it is a lot of money by 
Nigerian standards. At the moment, the legal monthly minimum wage in Nigeria payable by the 
government is eighteen thousand naira (18,000), which when converted is about forty-two pounds 
(£42).  
104 Magistrate Court Law of Lagos State 2009, section 28. 
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level of risks associated with transactions of this magnitude. There is no doubt that 
writing still provides the best evidence of an arbitration agreement.  
We retain the existing Section 1 (2) of the existing Nigerian Arbitration Act, which allows 
parties to incorporate an arbitration agreement from an external source. By this, 
parties are also able to orally incorporate written arbitration agreements into their 
existing contractual arrangement.  As can be deduced from the foregoing, we place 
less emphasis on the form of the agreement as long as the existence of the agreement 
can be established through any means including written evidence.105 
In a situation where parties orally incorporate a written arbitration agreement, such 
an agreement will be categorised as a written arbitration agreement.  Where the 
validity of an agreement is in question, we adopt the approach in England and the 
Brussels 1 Regulation (Recast) as a guide. The approach in England is to determine the 
validity of the agreement through the lens of the putative law, that is, the law which 
would have governed the arbitration agreement if it were valid.   Similarly, the Brussels 
1 Regulation (Recast)106 also provides that any question as to whether a jurisdiction 
agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity, will be determined by the law 
of the member state identified in the jurisdiction agreement. By virtue of Article 25(5) 
of the Regulation, the provision of the head contract dealing with jurisdiction is 
regarded as separate and/or independent from the other terms of the contract.107 
Like the situation in many arbitration jurisdictions,108 we also recommend the deletion 
of the part of Section 2 of the Nigerian Arbitration Act, which allows courts to revoke 
parties’ arbitration agreement without their consent.109  We strongly believe that this 
                                                          
105 Stephen J. Choi, ‘The Problem of Arbitrator Agreement’ (2003) 36 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Laws 1233, 1235. 
106 See Article 25(1) of the Brussels 1 Regulation (Recast) on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters. The Regulation came into effect on the 
10th of January 2015.  
107 It would seem that the idea behind Article 25(5) of the Brussels 1 Regulation (Recast) is similar to 
that applied in the relationship between the head contract and the arbitration agreement. 
108 See for example Section 3(2) of the Ghanaian ADR Act 2010 and Section 9 of the English Arbitration 
Act 1996. 
109 Section 2 of the Nigerian Arbitration Act provides that an arbitration agreement can be revoked by 
leave of court or by the agreement of parties.  
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is a violation of parties’ right and autonomy to opt for arbitration.110 Similarly and like 
many jurisdictions,111 we also delete the discretionary and unlimited right of the 
Nigerian courts to decide whether or not to stay litigation proceedings even in the face 
of a validly made domestic arbitration agreement as provided in Section 5 of the Act.112 
Our position is based mainly on the court’s legal duty and obligation to protect the 
contractual rights and duties of parties as contained in their arbitration agreement, 
subject to the application of the principle of arbitrability.113 
2.2.2  Parties’ Capacity 
Because of the fundamental nature of the right of access to the court, it is important 
that parties to an arbitration agreement have the capacity to understand the import 
and significance of their decision to opt out of the protection and benefits of the 
court.114  In litigation, as a general rule, only natural adult persons and artificial 
persons, that is to say human beings and bodies corporate115 are competent to sue and 
be sued before any law court in Nigeria.116 Under Nigerian law, it is generally 
assumed that at eighteen, an individual is old enough to make right decisions.117 
Adopting this litigation principle for our present purpose, we submit that parties to a 
valid arbitration agreement must be eighteen and above. We strongly believe that 
because of the fundamental nature of parties’ right of access to the courts, it is 
                                                          
110 See Section 5.2 of Chapter Four for a detailed discussion on this issue. 
111 For example, see Section 9 of the English Arbitration Act 1996; See also, Channel Tunnel Group ltd v 
Balfour Beatty Construction ltd (1993) 2 WLR 262; David Wilsons Homes v Survey Service Ltd (2001) EWCA 
Civ 34. 
112 See Section 5.2 of Chapter Four. 
113 James Maples and Tim Goldfarb, ‘Antisuit Injunctions: Expanding Protection for Arbitration under 
English Law’ (2013) Dispute Resolution International 169. 
114 Generally, this question can be asked both at the beginning and the end of the arbitration.  For 
example, see Articles 8(1) and 36(1) (a) of the Revised Model Law 2006. Specifically, Article 36(1) (a) 
allows the court to refuse recognition and enforcement of an award if it can be proven that one of the 
parties to the said agreement is under some form of incapacity as defined by the applicable law.  
115 Admittedly, the ability of a company to enter into a valid agreement may arguably be subject to 
restrictions contained in the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the company. These may 
contain restrictions on the subject matter capable of being resolved via arbitration or the official capable 
of binding the company.  
116 See The Administrator/Executors of the Estate of General Sani Abacha v Samuel David Eke-Spiff (2009) 2-3 
SC (Pt II) 93; Ataguba & Co v Gura (2005) 2 SCM 47; Fawehinmi v NBA (1989) 4 SC (Pt 1)1. 
117 Under Nigerian law, age eighteen is the official adult age for most purposes.  For example, it is at 
age eighteen that a person is allowed to vote. See Section 12(1) (b) of the Electoral Act 2010 Government 
Notice No 365.  
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important that parties are old enough to understand the significance of opting out of 
the protection provided by the court. In addition, parties to an arbitration must also 
at the time of entering into the agreement have the mental capacity to understand the 
significance of their agreement.118  
This point on capacity is slightly different from the litigation practice where infants or 
people with limited capacity can institute proceedings through their guardians or 
representatives.119 The difference lies in the fact that unlike litigation, an agreement is 
fundamental to the existence of an arbitration and since infants and persons with 
limited capacity are unable to enter into a legally binding agreement, there is nothing 
for their guardian or representatives to act upon on their behalf. An acceptable 
exception will be when the mental incapacity occurred after the execution of the 
arbitration agreement or in a situation in which it can be proven that the arbitration 
agreement was made during a lucid moment. In that case, a personal representative 
may act on his/her behalf.  In relation to foreign companies, under Nigerian law 
foreign companies are capable of instituting cases before Nigerian courts and we see 
no real reason why this principle should not also apply to arbitration proceedings.120 
The courts in the United State have exceptionally recognised the rights of third parties 
(to an arbitration agreement) to institute arbitration proceedings against signatories to 
the arbitration agreement. For example, in Kastner v.Vanbesto Scandanavia AB and 
Iceberg Inc.,121 a court stayed a litigation proceeding (in favour of arbitration) filed 
against a third party (to an arbitration agreement) who happened to be a subsidiary 
of one of the parties to the arbitration agreement.  In arriving at this decision, the court 
took into consideration the relationship between all the parties, the dispute and the 
                                                          
118 This in other words excludes people with any form of mental disability except it can be proven that 
such an agreement was made during a lucid moment.  
119 See Order 13 Rules 9 &10 and Order 10 Rule 11 of the Lagos High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2012 
as well as Order 12 Rules 9 and 10 and Order 11 Rule 12 of the High Court of the FCT 2009. 
120 Saeby Jernstoberi Maskinfabric A/S v. Olaogun Enterprises Ltd (1999) 12 SCNJ; Bank of Baroda v Iyalabani 
Company Limited (2002) 12 SCM 29. 
121 (Case No 5 14-CV-14) 2014 WL 6682440, 2014 U.S, Dist. LEXIS 165915 (District of Vermont). 
258 
 
head contract, before referring parties to arbitration. Consequently, the claimant was 
equitably estopped from avoiding the arbitration against a third party.122 
While this development may in exceptional situations have its advantages,123 we 
submit that for the purposes of our proposed framework, it is difficult to prescribe a 
default and/or encompassing rule.  We therefore submit that the rights of third parties 
to invoke an arbitration agreement which they are not a party to should be determined 
by the DAC on a case by case basis. It is important to allow the DAC (and not the 
tribunal), especially at this initial stages, deal with such applications in order to enable 
the law and precedent in this area to develop in Nigeria.  
General situations and rules have emerged which we believe can assist the DAC in 
determining whether or not to join a third party.124 The most popular seems to be the 
Group of Companies doctrine, which appears to have been the underlying idea 
behind the decision in the aforementioned Kastner v.Vanbesto Scandanavia AB and 
Iceberg Inc.125 As a counter to this doctrine, it is possible to argue that it negates the 
corporate personality doctrine which seeks to contain liability to a particular corporate 
entity. In practice and as Redfern and Hunter noted, this will to a large extent depend 
on the construction of the agreement in dispute as well as the circumstances 
surrounding the formation and performance of the underlying contract.126 This again 
reaffirms our previous position that this issue of the joinder of third parties be 
determined on a case by case basis and not as a general rule. 
                                                          
122 Bull and Mink have advised that parties who wish to preserve their right to institute court claims 
against non-signatories to an arbitration agreement may wish to include language in their agreement 
which expressly limits their obligation to arbitrate against an entity other than the counterparty to the 
arbitration agreement. According to these commentators, such language may be helpful if it becomes 
necessary to convince the court that it would not be right in allowing a non-signatory to enforce the 
arbitration agreement against them. See Ryan Bull and Noah Mink, ‘Non Signatory Permitted to Invoke 
an Arbitration Agreement: Examples of the Application of Equitable Estoppel in the US’ (2016) 19(1) 
International Arbitration Law Review 4, 6. 
123 This will mostly revolve around issues of fairness as well as the circumstances of the case.  This issue 
is discussed in more detail in Nigel Blackaby et al (n 5) 86 -90. 
124 For example, we have the Group of Companies, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Third Party 
Beneficiaries of Rights under a Contract and the Assignment, Agency and Succession doctrines 
respectively. See Nigel Blackaby et al (n 5) 86 -90; Ilias Bantekas (n 97) 92-95. 
125 (Case No 5 14-CV-14) 2014 WL 6682440, 2014 U.S, Dist. LEXIS 165915 (District of Vermont). 
126 Nigel Blackaby et al (n 5) 86. 
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2.2.3  Separability of the Arbitration Agreement.127 
As we have highlighted at various points in this thesis, the doctrine of separability has 
suffered a chequered history.128 We pointed out that there used to be two major 
approaches or schools of thought on the doctrine: the one contract theory and 
collateral contract theory.129 While the former assumes that the contract and 
arbitration agreements are one and therefore should be governed by the law 
governing the contract, the latter holds that the arbitration clause is a separate 
agreement collateral to the main contract.130 
One other possible way of approaching the doctrine of separability is what this writer 
refers to as the hybrid separability approach.  By this approach, we assume that the 
contract and arbitration clause are governed by the same law but that the doctrine of 
separability should only apply if and when the legality or validity of the head contract 
is in question.131 Admittedly, the validity of this third approach is rooted in whether 
or not the arbitration agreement is able to stand on its own.  If it cannot, then both the 
                                                          
127 For a full discussion on the development and principle of the seperability doctrine, see Arthur 
Nussbaum, ‘The Separability Doctrine in America and Foreign Arbitration’(1934-1940) New York 
University Law Quarterly Review 609; Adam Samuel, ‘Separability in English Law- Should an 
Arbitration Clause be regarded as n agreement separate and collateral to a contract in which it is 
contained?’ (1986) 3(3) Journal of International Arbitration 95 ; Kaj Hober and Annette Magansson, ‘The 
Special State of Agreements to Arbitrate- The Separability Doctrine: Mandatory Stay of Litigation’ 
(2008) 2 Dispute Resolution International 56;  Rogers and Launders, ‘Separability: The indestructible 
Arbitration Clause’ (1994) 10 Arbitration International 71; Svernlou, ‘What isn’t, aint: The Current 
Status of the Doctrine of Separability’ (1991) 8 Journal of International Arbitration 37. 
128 See our previous discussion in Section 3.2 of Chapter Six for discussions on Harbour Assurance Co v 
Kansa General International Insurance Co (1992) as well as Fiona Trust v. Privalov (2006) EWHC 2583; In 
France, the doctrine was established in Societe Gosset v Societe Curapuli, Judgement of May 7 1963, Cans. 
Civ. Ire, 1963 Bull Civ 1, Nov 246, 208; In Russia, the doctrine was established in Sojuzneftexport v JOC 
Oil Company (1987) 2 International Arbitration Report. See also Adam Samuel, ‘Separability in English 
Law- Should an Arbitration Clause be regarded as n agreement separate and collateral to a contract in 
which it is contained?’ (1986) 3(3) Journal of International Arbitration 95, 98; Arthur Nussbaum, ‘The 
Separability Doctrine in America and Foreign Arbitration’ (1939-1940) 17 New York University Law 
Quarterly Review 609. 
129 See Section 4.2 of Chapter Six. 
130 Some legal systems like Sweden used to require that an arbitration agreement appear in a separate 
document signed by both contracting parties. See Hober, ‘The Doctrine of Separability Under Swedish 
Arbitration Law, Including Comments on the Position of American and Soviet Law’ (1983) 68 Swedish 
Law Journal 257, 259. 
131 As we argued in Section 3.2 of Chapter Six, this is one interpretation, though arguable, that can be 
made of Section 7 of the English Arbitration Act 1996. 
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collateral contract and our hybrid approach are defeated. If it can stand on its own, 
then there is really no use for the hybrid approach in the first place.  
The most acceptable conclusion seems to be that the arbitration agreement can and 
should stand on its own.  Philippa Charles puts it very nicely when she opined that 
the arbitration agreement is ring fenced from the contract within which it sits and 
should therefore be interpreted and applied on its own terms and not by reference to 
or in association with the other clauses of the host contract.132 The validity or invalidity 
of the arbitration agreement should therefore be determined by factors arising or 
relating to the arbitration agreement itself and not from the contract. 
The idea behind the doctrine of separability is simple:133 an agreement should not be 
made invalid by virtue of a problem with the contract.134 This is based on the premise 
that arbitration clauses which stipulate that disputes arising in relation to the contract 
be submitted to arbitration, impliedly endorse and support the doctrine.135 Lord 
Hoffman136 explained that “the construction of an arbitration clause should start from 
the assumption that the parties as rational businessmen are likely to have intended 
any dispute arising out of the relationship into which they have entered or purported 
to enter, to be decided by the same tribunal. The clause should be construed in 
accordance with this presumption unless the language makes it clear that certain 
questions were intended to be excluded from the arbitration jurisdiction.”137 
                                                          
132 Philipa Charles, ‘The Proper Law of the Arbitration Agreement’ (2014) 80(1) Arbitration 55, 56. 
133 Interestingly, the New York Convention 1958 does not expressly address the issue of separability. 
134 Zeb-Michael Curtis, ‘Rethinking Prima Paint Separability in Todays Changed Arbitration Regime: 
The case for Inseparability and Judicial Decision Making in the Context of Mental Incapacity Defences’ 
(2004-2008) 90 IOWA Law Review 1905, 1916; Kaj Hober and Annette Magansson, ‘The Special State of 
Agreements to Arbitrate - The Separability Doctrine: Mandatory Stay of Litigation’ (2008) 2 Dispute 
Resolution International 56. 
135 A. Gardner, ‘The Doctrine of Separability in Soviet Arbitration Law: An analysis of Sojuzneftexport 
v JOC Oil Co’ (1990) 28 Columbus Journal of Transnational Law 301, 304. 
136 Fiona Trust v. Privalov (2007) UKHL 40. 
137 This presumptive approach is said to be intended to give effect to the commercial purpose of 
arbitration agreements, namely to refer all disputes arising out of parties’ relationship to arbitration, 
rather than leaving same to the national courts. See Joachim Delaney and Katharina Lewis, ‘The 
Presumptive Approach to the Construction of Arbitration Agreements and the Principle of 
Separability- English Law Post Fiona Trust and Australian Law Contrasted’ (2008) 3 U.N.S.W.L.J 341, 
345. 
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In addition, Adam Samuel argued that an arbitration agreement in a contract contains 
a different type of obligation from other terms of the contract.138 For example, it does 
not have primary obligations. In other words, the application of the arbitration 
agreement does not relate to the performance of the contract. Instead an arbitration 
agreement evidences an intention by parties to resolve any dispute emanating or 
relating to the validity and/or operation of their contract via arbitration.139 
Furthermore, it does not contain secondary obligations.140 The contract and arbitration 
agreement serve different functions and so should be made to stand on their own.141 
The doctrine of separability has evolved into a useful tool that secures and protects 
not only parties’ agreement to arbitrate but also the efficacy of arbitration 
proceedings.142 Francis Okanigbuan rightly opined that “the separability doctrine 
enhances the confidence of parties in commercial transactions, on the basis that while 
disputes are inevitable, a quick and sustainable mechanism for resolving the same will 
at least suffice”.143 The doctrine therefore not only enhances the development of 
commercial relations, it also prevents the breakdown of law and order. No wonder it 
has become a popular feature of the arbitration framework in many jurisdictions.144 
                                                          
138 Adam Samuel, ‘Separability in English Law- Should an Arbitration Clause be regarded as n 
agreement separate and collateral to a contract in which it is contained?’ (1986) 3(3) Journal of 
International Arbitration 95, 109. 
139 This provides a pragmatic option of protecting parties’ intention to arbitrate; See Kaj Hober and 
Annette Magansson, ‘The Special State of Agreements to Arbitrate- The Separability Doctrine: 
Mandatory Stay of Litigation’ (2008) 2 Dispute Resolution International 56, 74. 
140 This refer to obligations arising as a result of a party’s failure to perform his/her primary obligations. 
Liquidated damages is a common example. 
141 The exception of course would be when the illegality affecting the head contract also extends to the 
arbitration agreement. For example, where both the contract and the arbitration agreement are found 
to have been procured by fraud. 
142 Kaj Hober and Annette Magansson (n 139) 56. 
143 Francis A. Okanigbuan, ‘Revisiting the Separability Doctrine and Parties Right to Litigation in 
Commercial Transactions’ (2015) 26(8) International Company and Commercial Law Review 255, 259. 
144 See Article 4 of the Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999; Section 7 of the English Arbitration Act 1996; 
Section 16 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996; Section 6 of the Brazilian Arbitration Act 
1996.  
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In conclusion, in line with the existing Nigerian Act145 as well as Nigerian case law,146 
we retain the approach which clearly provides for the independence of the arbitration 
agreement from the main contract.147 As discussed in previous parts, the doctrine 
suggests that the invalidity of the contract does not necessarily invalidate an 
embedded arbitration agreement.148 
2.2.4  Submission Agreements 
As we have seen in the course of this thesis, submission agreements refer to 
agreements to arbitrate which are reached after the dispute has arisen.149 While 
jurisdictions like Nigeria, England and Ghana recognise this practice, Tra Pham and 
Marie Hudson pointed out that under strict Islamic law, the binding effect of the 
                                                          
145 Section 12(2) of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act; Mark McNeill, ‘Doctrine of 
Separability and Consent to Arbitration’ (2008) 24(3) Arbitration International 475; Adam Samuel, 
‘Separability in English Law- Should an Arbitration Clause be regarded as n agreement separate and 
collateral to a contract in which it is contained?’ (1986) 3(3) Journal of International Arbitration 95; 
Adam Samuel, ‘Separability and Construing Arbitration Clauses: The House of Lords Decision in 
Premium Nafta and the Fiona Trust’ (2008) 24(3) Arbitration International 489; Peter Gross, 
‘Separability Comes of Age in England: Harbour v Kansa and Clause 3 of the Draft Bill’ (1995) 11(1) 
Arbitration International 85; Phillip Landolt, ‘The Inconvenience of Principle: Separability and 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz’ (2013) 30(5) Journal of International Arbitration 511; Carl M. Svernlov, ‘The 
Evolution of the Doctrine of Separability in England: Now Virtually Complete? The Doctrines of 
Separability of the Arbitration Agreement”and Competence de la Competence’ (1992) 9(3) Journal of 
International Arbitration 115; Joachim Delaney and Katharina Lewis, ‘The Presumptive Approach to 
the Construction of Arbitration Agreements and The Principle of Separability-English Law Post Fiona 
Trust and Australian Law Contrasted’ (2008) 3 U.N.S.W.L.J, 341. 
146 Royal Exchange Assurance v. Bentworth Finance (Nig) Ltd (1976) 11 SC 107; Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation V. Klifco Nigeria Limited (2011) 4 SC (Pt 1) 108 
147 The doctrine of separability has been justified on the following grounds - that it conforms with the 
intention of parties, that it protects the integrity of the arbitral process and that there is a legal 
presumption that two different agreements exist, amongst others. The doctrine has proven to be useful 
where a recalcitrant party initiates court proceedings in breach of an arbitration agreement.  See Janet 
A Rosen, ‘Arbitration Under Private International Law: The Doctrine of Separability and Competence 
de la Competence’ (1993-1994) 17 Fordham International Law Journal 599, 607; See also Jack Tsea-Ta 
Lee, ‘Separability, Competence-Competence and the Arbitrators Jurisdiction in Singapore’(1995) 7 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 421,422; Ayten Maitafayeva, ‘Doctrine of Separability in 
International Commercial Arbitration’ (2015) 1 Baku State University Law Review 93,98. 
148 A distinction should be made between invalid contracts and contracts which are allegedly non-
existent. A contract is invalid ab-initio when for example it violates public policy or if it is characterised 
by fraudulent execution or flawed formation. On the other hand, a contract is non-existent when for 
example there has not been a meeting of the minds or when one of the parties to the dispute was not 
party to the contract. See A. Gardner (n 135) 305. 
149 Domenico Di Pietro, ‘The Influence of the New Law on Arbitration Agreements and Arbitrato 
Irrituale’ (2007) 10(1) International Arbitration Law Review 18, 19; Philipa Charles, ‘The Proper Law of 
the Arbitration Agreement’ (2014) 80(1) Arbitration 55,56. 
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submission is still in question.150 In other words, although a submission agreement is 
allowed, it does not have a binding effect as parties can still withdraw their submission 
at any time before an award is finally delivered by the tribunal. This practice is very 
similar to the former customary arbitration principle as defined in Agu v Ikewibe.151 We 
critically dealt with arguments arising from this position in Chapter Five.  
 
In our proposed framework, we adopt a wider definition of submission agreements 
by borrowing a leaf from the customary arbitration practice in Nigeria: a submission 
agreement will also include a situation where the claimant without any prior 
arbitration agreement with the other party, submits a dispute to either an arbitrator of 
his choice or the National Arbitration Centre.152 This practice will clearly be useful in 
smaller disputes and/or disputes involving friends, business partners and members 
of a restricted industry. Unlike the situation in a country like Saudi Arabia, where 
parties to a submission agreement require the approval of the courts before their 
agreement can be enforced as valid,153 parties under our framework are able to enter 
into a valid arbitration on their own accord, since the Saudi Arabia approach clearly 
erodes parties’ autonomy to decide the method of resolving their disputes.154 
 
An agreement will only be said to have been established when the other party accepts 
and/or both parties unconditionally agree to submit to the jurisdiction of a particular 
arbitrator.155 In other words, under this special arrangement, the respondent can either 
accept the claimants’ suggestion to arbitrate as well as the latter’s nomination of 
arbitrator (unconditional acceptance), accept the claimants’ suggestion to arbitrate but 
reject the nominated arbitrator (conditional acceptance) or reject the idea of arbitration 
in its entirety.  Where the acceptance is conditional, both parties will be expected to 
                                                          
150 Tra T. Pham and Marie Hudson, ‘Arbitration Agreements Between Arab and European Trade 
Parties’ (1990) 1 International Business Law Journal 63, 64. 
151 (1991) 3 NWLR PT 180. 
152 We discuss this further in this chapter. 
153 See Article 6 of the Saudi Arbitration Law 2012. 
154 This provision is similar to the aforementioned Section 2 of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation 
Act, which enables the court revoke a validly made arbitration agreement. 
155 We clearly disagree with the position in Ghana as provided in Section 7 of the Ghanaian ADR Act 
2010, which allows the court to refer any dispute to arbitration on its own volition. This writer questions 
the voluntariness of the consent purportedly obtained from the parties under such circumstances. 
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agree on the mutually acceptable arbitrator(s).  It is only if and when parties agree on 
their arbitrator(s) that an unconditional agreement to arbitrate will be said to exist. 
Rather than reject the claimants’ nomination, the respondent may also appoint his 
own arbitrator, subsequent upon which both arbitrators will meet and appoint a third 
arbitrator. In such a situation, an agreement is reached when both parties successfully 
appoint their arbitrator(s) and not when the third arbitrator is appointed.156 
2.3    The Dispute 
2.3.1  A Strictly Domestic Arbitration Framework 
The proposed framework is limited in scope to domestic arbitration. This is as against 
the existing Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which combines both domestic 
and international arbitration in one framework. We submitted in Section 1.2 of this 
chapter that the present situation which puts domestic and international arbitration 
in one framework, inhibits the growth and practice of domestic arbitration in Nigeria. 
As we posited in Chapter Four, while the existing Nigerian Arbitration Act is arguably 
suitable for the country’s international arbitration practice because it is closely 
modelled after the UNCITRAL Model Law, the same cannot be said about domestic 
arbitration for reasons which we previously highlighted.157 Nigeria arguably has a fast 
developing international arbitration practice, especially when compared with her 
domestic arbitration practice which seems to be stagnant.158 
Moreover, the evidence on ground clearly suggests that there is a bias for international 
arbitration in Nigeria.159 For example, in the current Nigerian Arbitration and 
                                                          
156 See Section 1.0 of Chapter Five. 
157 See Section 1.1 of Chapter Four. 
158 In recognition of the developing market and arbitration opportunities in Nigeria and Africa, the 
International Chamber of Commerce organised her first African Regional Arbitration Conference in 
Lagos, Nigeria between 19 -21 of June 2016. From experience, this writer has also witnessed the growing 
international arbitration caseload emanating from Nigeria. The writer was a Trainee Counsel at the 
Common Law department of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Paris, worked at the 
arbitration department of the London offices of the international law firm, Hogan Lovells LLP as well 
as practised as a Barrister at a top tier dispute resolution law firm in Nigeria prior to his PhD. At the 
ICC and Hogan Lovells LLP, this writer was involved in a number of international arbitrations 
involving Nigerian companies. As a Barrister in Nigeria, while the firm was involved in a number of 
international arbitrations involving Nigerian clients, it had no existing domestic arbitration at the time.  
159 The bias is not only seen in Nigeria as it seems to be spread across all jurisdictions. For example, we 
saw in Section 2.0 of Chapter Five that while there are a lot of material (including laws) specifically 
defining and discussing international arbitration, there is little or no discussion on domestic arbitration. 
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Conciliation Act, while Section 4 of the Act mandates the court to stay any litigation 
proceeding in favour of a validly made international arbitration agreement, Section 5 
of the same Act gives courts the discretion to decide whether or not to stay such a 
domestic arbitration agreement. In addition, while parties to an international 
arbitration are given the discretion to decide the rules of procedure applicable to their 
arbitration, the Act again limits parties to a domestic arbitration, to the Nigerian 
Arbitration Rules.160 Again, it should be recalled that while there have been attempts 
in the past to reform the arbitration and ADR laws in Nigeria, those attempts, despite 
the best efforts of the Nigerian government, have unjustifiably been diverted to the 
development of international arbitration alone. For example, in Chapter Four, we saw 
that rather than focus on its mandate, the National Committee on the Reform and 
Harmonisation of Arbitration and ADR Laws in Nigeria seemed to be fixated on the 
idea of international arbitration.161 
Furthermore, domestic and international arbitrations, especially in a developing 
country like Nigeria, have completely different requirements. For example, while it 
may be within acceptable limits to advocate for a flexible agreement and award for 
the domestic arbitration practice in Nigeria, it will clearly not be acceptable to extend 
this argument to an international arbitration agreement with its seat in Nigeria, in 
view of the provisions of the New York Convention, which requires a written 
arbitration agreement for enforcement purposes.162 Rather than merge two very 
different practices in one framework, it is more efficient to separate them and focus 
on each of these practices, especially in a developing country where both systems have 
varying requirements. 
This writer strongly believes that to successfully encourage the development of 
arbitration in Nigeria, efforts should first be made to develop a thriving domestic 
arbitration practice before moving on to international arbitration practice. It is futile 
to attempt to build an international arbitration practice in Nigeria when the country 
does not even have a successful domestic practice. This is one reason why this writer 
                                                          
160 Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, section 15. 
161 See Section 4.0 of Chapter Four. 
162 See Article II and IV of the New York Convention 1958. 
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believes that the recently established Lagos Court of Arbitration (LCA), which focuses 
on international arbitration, is over ambitious, ill-conceived and not in the best interest 
of the State.163 It is farfetched to assume that international investors and business men 
will ignore tested institutions like the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) and the Singapore International 
Arbitration Centre (SIAC) and instead opt for the services of a new arbitration 
institution with little or no experience of arbitration, as well as a country with a 
budding commercial arbitration practice, without real and tested proof of capacity. 
 
Unfortunately, as Collins Namachanja rightly noted, rather than focus on the 
development of local talents as well as concentrate on building the domestic 
arbitration practices on ground, the trend and general practice in many African 
countries seems to be to import international and developed practices into a still 
developing continent.164 Little wonder many of the African institutions have handled 
far fewer cases than their counterparts in other jurisdictions.165 
 
The right approach should have been to focus on building a successful domestic 
arbitration practice. The experience garnered from building the domestic arbitration 
practice would have proven to be very useful in the development of an international 
arbitration version and will also convince investors of the capacity of the LCA as well 
as confirm the general and friendly disposition of the Nigerian courts to arbitration. 
An arbitration law and word of mouth alone are not enough to build an international 
arbitration practice. Charity they say begins at home. Admittedly, this argument 
                                                          
163 The Lagos Court of Arbitration was established in 2009 by the Lagos Court of Arbitration Law. For 
more details about the court, see the official website of the Lagos Court of Arbitration 
<http://lca.org.ng/about/> accessed 31 May 2016. 
164 Collins Namachanja, ‘The challenges facing arbitral institutions in Africa’ (2016) 82(1) Arbitration 
44, 48. 
165 See Steven Finizio and Thomas Fuhrich, ‘Expert View: Surveying Africa; Africa’s Advance’ (2014) 
Commercial Dispute Resolution (May/June 2014) 
<www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/expert-
view-surveying-africa-africas-advance-finizio-2014.pdf> accessed 5 February 2016. 
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about the gap between both domestic and international arbitration may not apply to 
developed jurisdictions like the United Kingdom.166 
 
2.3.2 Redefining Domestic Arbitration 
Flowing from the above, we adopt a wider definition of domestic arbitration, which 
will include customary arbitration.167 We have seen in Chapter Five and Chapter Six 
that customary arbitration not only has a deeply rooted history in Nigeria and Ghana 
respectively, but more importantly that it remains a legally recognised method of 
resolving domestic disputes in Nigeria.168  Particularly, we discover that in terms of 
practice and procedure, customary arbitration is in many ways very similar to the 
traditional idea of domestic arbitration.169 For example, under our discussion of 
customary arbitration, we saw that a validly made customary arbitration agreement 
is also binding, that parties have the autonomy to nominate their own arbitrators as 
well as the date, time and process by which their disputes will be administered, that 
a customary arbitration award is final and will serve as estoppel on the issues decided 
as between the parties to the arbitration, amongst many other similarities.170 
While in Chapter Six we lauded Ghana for taking the bold step of enacting a 
customary arbitration framework, we also submitted that enacting a separate 
customary arbitration framework is unnecessary,171 especially since many 
jurisdictions like Nigeria172 and the United Kingdom173 have been able to find a 
balance which incorporates the arguably different domestic and international 
arbitration framework in one.174  Like Ghana therefore, we recommend a statutory 
arbitration framework that recognises and incorporates customary arbitration. 
                                                          
166 Our definition of development extends to the level of education, infrastructural development as well 
as the cosmopolitan nature of the United Kingdom. 
167 We have seen in Chapter Five that the idea of domestic arbitration varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. We are therefore suggesting a domestic arbitration framework, which suits our purpose.  
168 Agu v Ikewibe (1991) 3 NWLR PT 180. 
169 Agala v Okusin (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt 1202) 412. 
170 See Section 2.1 and 2.2 of Chapter Five of this thesis. 
171 See Part Three of the Ghanaian ADR Act 2010. 
172 The Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2004. 
173 The English Arbitration Act 1996. 
174 See Section 1.1.2 of Chapter Six. 
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However unlike Ghana, which provides different sections or parts within its Act for 
arbitration (in the sense in which it is popularly known) and customary arbitration,175 
we suggest a common domestic arbitration framework that incorporates both 
domestic arbitration and customary arbitration into one common part, especially since 
both arbitration practices have similar provisions. To the extent that they differ 
however, we adopt the practice in jurisdictions with a common domestic and 
international framework, by highlighting and specifically providing for any 
irreconcilable differences between domestic and customary arbitration.  This 
approach will enable the Act to cater for a wider range of domestic disputes, which 
are presently beyond the purview of the existing Nigerian Arbitration Act, thus 
providing a real alternative to litigation. 
2.3.3 Arbitrability 
The concept of arbitrability varies from one jurisdiction to another.176 As we have seen 
in previous chapters, there are predominantly two reasons why certain subject matters 
are not arbitrable. First is the fact that parties to an arbitration agreement may intend 
that certain disputes arising in connection with their head contract should not be 
subject to arbitration. The second and more important reason is where the law of the 
forum prohibits certain disputes from being arbitrated.177 
This second category is arguably a limitation to party’s autonomy to decide the 
method of resolving their dispute.178 The idea behind this position is many times not 
farfetched. The Federal Court of Australia held in Comandale Marine Corp v Pan 
Australia Shipping Ply Ltd that the idea behind the concept of arbitrability is that there 
                                                          
175 Arbitration in its traditional sense is provided for in Part One of the Ghanaian ADR Act 2010 while 
customary arbitration is provided for in Part Three of the same Act. 
176 Alfred Oseko Nyanchoka, ‘The Scope of Arbitrability Under Kenyan Law’ (2013) 79(3) Arbitration 
273. 
177 For a detailed discussion on the concept of arbitrability especially as it relates to international 
arbitration, see Ilias Bantekas, ‘The Foundations of Arbitrability in International Commercial 
Arbitration’ (2008) 27 Australian Year Book of Internal Law’ 193; See also Kartikey Mahajan, ‘The 
Arbitrability of Fraud in India’ (2005) 81(1) Arbitration 48, 50. 
178 Francois Dessemontet, ‘Party Autonomy and the Law Applicable to the Arbitrability of IP Rights 
and Licensing Transactions’ (2013) 5 International Business Law Journal 421, 422. 
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are sufficient elements of legitimate public interest in the said subject matter, which 
make it very inappropriate to use a private dispute resolution system.179 
According to Francis Kellor, the lex fori should ordinarily have very little influence 
over the procedure and outcome of the arbitration, since the role of the law of the 
forum is merely to supplement and fill any gaps in parties’ agreement as well as 
provide a framework capable of regulating the conduct of arbitration.180 
Notwithstanding, we strongly agree with Jan Paulsson in his opinion of the need to 
balance the domestic importance of limiting certain matters of public interest to the 
courts as against reserving parties’ right to decide the mechanism and process of 
resolving their disputes.181 
Further to this (and contrary to the existing Nigerian Act), we advocate for a wider 
scope while still defining the scope of the proposed framework.182 In other words, this 
model framework adopts a wider definition of arbitrability.183 This is as against the 
existing position under the Act, which limits its scope to commercial disputes.184 Like 
Ghana, which as we have seen in Chapter Six suffers the same overburdened case list 
that Nigeria is presently suffering from,185 we extend the scope of the PDAA to 
accommodate even non-commercial disputes.186 As mentioned in Chapter Four, the 
present position in Nigeria presupposes that the usefulness of arbitration is limited to 
                                                          
179 (2006) FCAFC 192, 200. 
180 Frances Kellor, Arbitration in Action: A Code For Civil, Commercial and Industrial Arbitrations (New 
York, Hapier 1941) 35. 
181 Jan Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2013) 45. 
182 It should be recalled that in Chapter Six, we argued that the seemingly wide scope of the Ghanaian 
ADR Act makes it susceptible to manipulation and controversy. There is therefore a need to strike a 
balance between the over restrictive approach of the existing Nigerian Act and the liberal but arguably 
controversial approach of the Ghanaian framework.See Section 1.1.2 of Chapter Six. 
183  Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration note that many countries have adopted a wide 
approach to the concept of arbitrability. See Nigel Blackaby et al (n 5)124; See also Antoine Kirry, 
‘Arbitrability: Current Trends in Europe’ (1996) 12 Arb International 373, 375. 
184 The Preamble to the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 
185 Kwadwo Sarkodie, ‘Arbitration in Ghana-The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010’ 1 
<www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/5ee12231-1295-4559-8167 
89d93cdf2a06/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/91e048fe-67d4-4e3f-9d10 
8bbf9861e753/ArbitrationGhana_Sarkodie.pdf> 1 accessed 28 January 2015. 
186 See Section 1 of the Ghanaian ADR Act 2010. 
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commercial issues, which is not true. For example, there is a rise in the practice of 
family arbitration in the United Kingdom. 187 
Very interestingly, most of the commonly used superior courts in Nigeria are courts 
of general jurisdiction. In other words, apart from issues relating to labour, customary 
and sharia law, all other subject matters including criminal law issues are resolved by 
the same courts at various levels.188 For arbitration to provide a real alternative to 
litigation therefore, it must not only be able to avoid the pitfalls of the litigation 
practice in Nigeria, it must also be able to cater for almost the same categories of 
disputes as the litigation practice. By extending the scope of the PDAA beyond 
commercial disputes, the framework is able to cater for more categories of disputes, 
thereby providing a real and viable alternative to litigation.  Furthermore, the courts 
in States like Oyo, Ondo and Ekiti, among others, which primarily have land disputes, 
will have some relief from existing pressure.  
Notwithstanding our desire to provide a viable alternative to litigation, certain 
matters which are within the jurisdiction of the courts are clearly placed beyond the 
scope of the PDAA for different reasons. For example, issues relating to criminal law, 
and policy are for obvious reasons placed beyond the purview of arbitration.189 Taking 
a cue from the English court’s decision in Deutsche Schachtbau v National Oil,190 
disputes involving public policy will be those with elements of illegality as well as 
disputes in which the enforcement of the award would clearly be injurious and/or 
wholly offensive to a reasonable member of the public. Any question or controversy 
arising from this public policy exemption will be resolved by the DAC. 
Even though election disputes also make up a bulk of cases at the Nigerian courts, we 
make them inarbitrable. Like issues relating to crime and public policy, issues relating 
to government, democracy and the rights of the people to choose their leaders, are 
issues which should not involve a private or compromise process. Like crime, these 
                                                          
187 See Nigel Shepherd (n 26) 65 
188 See Section 2.0 of Chapter Two for a discussion on the jurisdiction of Superior Courts in Nigeria. 
189 As we argued in Section 1.1.2 of Chapter Six, such issues include environmental law and so unlike 
the Ghanaian Act, we do not create a separate head for environmental law issues here. 
190 (1987) 3 WLR 38. 
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are issues which directly affect the public and do more than interfere with the private 
rights of citizens.191 This should as a matter of necessity involve the active participation 
of the State for many reasons, one of which relates to the issue of enforcement. As we 
mentioned in Chapter Two, in a country like Nigeria where parties who rig elections 
are sworn in pending the decision of the court on any petition, it many times requires 
the involvement of State apparatuses like the police (and at times even the Nigerian 
armed forces) to enforce a decision of the court to remove a sitting government official. 
A private arbitrator obviously does not and should not have such powers to command 
security agencies to enforce an arbitration award. 
2.4     Starting an arbitration: the appointment of an arbitral tribunal. 
2.4.1  Issues Relating to Party Autonomy 
 In Chapter Four, we argued that Section 15 of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation 
Act, which mandates and limits parties in a domestic arbitration proceeding to the use 
of  the Nigerian Arbitration Rules, is not only discriminatory,192 it also violates parties’ 
rights and autonomy to decide the process by which their dispute may be resolved.193 
Greater degrees of flexibility as well as party autonomy are one of the biggest 
advantages of arbitration, especially as against the litigation method.194 
 Further to the point made above, we recommend that parties in an ad hoc arbitration 
be allowed to decide the rules by which their arbitration will be administered. In 
regards to institutional arbitration,195 parties may initiate their arbitration by filing 
their notice of arbitration at the NAC, which as a matter of default will be resolved via 
the rules of the NAC.196 However, unlike institutions like the ICC and the LCIA but 
                                                          
191 David Ormerod, QC and Karl Laird, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law (14th Edition, Oxford University 
Press 2015) 5. 
192 This is discriminatory because parties to an international arbitration are not subjected to that same 
limitation. Section 53 of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act allows parties choose the 
Procedural Rules that will administer their arbitration. As we have seen at various points, this is just 
one of the many discriminatory provisions in the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act.  
193 This is definitely not a very common practice; see Section 5(2) of the Ghanaian ADR Act 2010. 
194 Christopher Lau and Christi Horlack, ‘Party Autonomy–The Turning Point’ (2010) 4 Dispute 
Resolution International 121. 
195 By institutional arbitration, we are referring to arbitration provided via structures provided by NAC. 
196 This is the position at foremost institutions like the ICC Court of Arbitration and the London Court 
of International Arbitration. 
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like the CCJA197 and even the Alternative Dispute Resolution Centre in Ghana,198 the 
NAC will be able to provide support for disputes under other established arbitration 
Rules. This position has been taken mainly because of the intended purpose of the 
NAC, which is to assist the government in providing an efficient and viable alternative 
mechanism to litigation. This implies that unlike the ICC and the LCIA but like CCJA, 
the NAC will be less of a business and profit making organization. Parties may 
therefore use the NAC solely as an appointing authority, while conducting their 
arbitration ad hoc or under any other agreed procedural Rule.   
 In addition, as against the very problematic position in Nigeria,199 we adopt the 
Ghanaian practice, which allows parties to be represented by any person of their 
choice, thus avoiding the problems associated with the existing Nigerian provision.200 
The implication of this provision is that parties are no longer under compulsion to 
appoint a Nigerian lawyer (or any lawyer at all) to represent their interests. This new 
provision supports the party autonomy doctrine underlying the arbitration practice.   
Besides, widening the pool from which parties can choose their representation may in 
fact have the effect of reducing the time spent on arbitration, since parties will be free 
to appoint non lawyers who have expertise knowledge on the issues in dispute to 
represent their interest. Professor Akanbi rightly submits that lawyers have stripped 
the arbitration practice of its acclaimed flexibility as they tend to prosecute or defend 
arbitration proceedings like court actions.201 Furthermore, litigation lawyers are well 
known for their delay tactics and frivolous applications, which they sometimes use to 
frustrate the process202 or simply to get ahead of their opponent in proceedings.203 To 
                                                          
197 See Article 10 of the Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999. 
198 Ghanaian ADR Act 2010, section 5(2) (3). 
199 In Section 2.1 of Chapter Four, we argued that the combined implication of Article 4 of the 
Arbitration Rules, Section 18 of the Interpretation Act and Sections 24 and 2 of the Legal Practitioners 
Act is that only Nigerian qualified lawyers can represent parties in an arbitration. 
200 Ghanaian ADR Act 2010, section 42. 
201 Mustapha Akanbi, ‘Challenging of arbitration proceedings under the Nigerian Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act of 1988: Some Practical Considerations’ (2012) 78(4) Arbitration 325, 329. 
202 Alain Freion, ‘Delaying Tactics in Arbitration’ (2004) 59(4) Dispute Resolution Journal 46. 
203 Emilia Onyema, ‘Selection of Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration’ 9  
<http;//eprints.soas.ac.uk/4424/1/selection_of_arbitrators.pdf> accessed 25 January 2016. 
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some others, it is simply another opportunity to demonstrate their legal prowess.204 
As Collins Namachanja noted, these have the effect of increasing costs,205 especially in 
situations in which the arbitrator is paid per hour. Widening the pool from which 
parties can seek representation, will help to reduce to the barest minimum, the influx 
of litigation practices in arbitration, reduce delay as well as ensure competition. These 
will arguably have implications on the cost of arbitration. 
2.4.2  Oral Notice of Arbitration and the Filing Process 
We also advocate for the incorporation of oral notices of arbitration into the Nigerian 
arbitration framework. In other words, parties will be able to commence their 
arbitration via an oral notice, which the NAC may subsequently reduce to writing. 
This provision will be directly related to the aforementioned provision on oral 
agreements; only arbitrations that are allowed to be evidenced orally can be 
commenced via an oral notice.  In other words, only disputes below ten million naira 
can be validly instituted via oral notice.   
Notwithstanding the aforementioned point, parties to an oral arbitration agreement 
need not commence their dispute resolution process via an oral notice if they so choose 
or agree not to.  Oral notice will however prove to be useful in the resolution of simple 
disputes, which need not be complicated by a writing requirement and unnecessary 
form. We also believe that to the extent that we redefine domestic arbitration to 
include customary arbitration, oral notices will encourage the growth and use of 
arbitration in the less developed areas of Nigeria as well as among the uneducated but 
wealthy business men in Nigeria. 
One thing which we will also introduce into the domestic arbitration practice is the 
option of electronic filing.  Interestingly, as we have noted in a previous chapter, 
developing jurisdictions like Ghana have incorporated this practice into their 
arbitration framework. Unfortunately, not even the court system in Nigeria has 
                                                          
204 K.I. Laibuta, ‘ADR in Africa: Contending with Multiple Legal Orders for Wholesome Dispute 
Resolution’ (2016) 82(1) Arbitration, 63, 65. 
205 Collins Namachanja (n 164) 48. 
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adopted the electronic filing system.206  Introducing the electronic filing system will 
not only aid an efficient dispute resolution process, it will also aid a cheaper, faster 
and more environmentally friendly process since the process will involve the use of 
less paper.207 Nonetheless, we will retain the paper filing system for parties who are 
not conversant with the internet and technology. 
As we mentioned under our discussions on the NAC, the organization will establish 
a wide physical presence around the country.  Like the Federal High Court of Nigeria 
for example, parties will be able to file their paper notices of arbitration as well as 
conduct their arbitration at any of the branches of the NAC closest to them. This will 
encourage a speedy, cost effective and very efficient arbitration system. Any 
disagreement as to where the proceedings should be held will be resolved by the 
tribunal having regard to issues like cost, location of the subject matters and the 
parties.  
We also adopt the frontloading system practised in many jurisdictions including the 
civil procedure in many States in Nigeria.208 Under the civil procedure rules of many 
courts in Nigeria, parties are mandated to frontload their Statements of Claim and 
Defence, Witness Statements on Oath, Affidavits, Written Addresses among other 
court documents.209 This framework will take advantage of the flexibility and speed 
available through the frontloading of arbitration documents. Parties will therefore be 
expected to frontload arbitration documents.  At this point, parties may elect to have 
the tribunal decide their dispute based on their documentary submissions alone.210 
                                                          
206 Nigerian courts still operate analogue-based systems except in few States like Lagos. For example, 
Judges still take long hand notes. 
207 Environmental activists have in recent times raised alarm about the need to take better care of the 
environment in order to arrest the acceleration of environmental decline and ensure sustainable 
development.    
208 Front loading is the process of filing litigation documents at the court registry ahead of trial in a bid 
to give the court and the other party prior knowledge of documents intended to be relied on, in the 
course of proceedings. In a bid to reduce the length of trial, the Civil Procedure Rules in many States in 
Nigeria have incorporated this procedure into their Rules.  
209 See for example, Order 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure of Lagos State 2012. 
210 Section 29B (3(A) of the recent Indian Arbitration Ordinance 2015 introduces a similar fast track 
process wherein parties may decide that their dispute be decided on the basis of their written pleadings, 
documents and submissions.  Under the fast track process, the tribunal will be expected to deliver an 
award six months after the appointment of the arbitrator(s). See Section 29(B) (4) of the Indian 
Arbitration Ordinance 2015.  
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Professor Ilias Bantekas rightly suggests that the significance of an actual oral hearing 
is in fact exaggerated, especially when one takes into consideration the savings that 
can be made via a documentary process.211 Parties will save a lot on solicitors’ fees as 
well as on accommodation, transportation and logistics cost.212 
As against the aforementioned documentary approach, parties may on the other hand 
choose to also have oral hearings and arguments based on the frontloaded documents. 
Even under this second approach, we strongly believe that the frontloading system 
will not only aid a quick and fast process,213 it will also reduce the actual time needed 
and expended on oral presentations, since most of parties’ arguments will already be 
clearly stated in the frontloaded documents. Oral presentations will therefore only be 
needed and useful in order to clear areas of ambiguity and/or confusion.  
2.4.3. The Arbitration Tribunal 
It is generally agreed that the success of an arbitration many times depends on the 
arbitration tribunal, so parties are very careful when selecting their panel.214  
Unfortunately, the arbitrators’ fees and incidental expenses have to a large extent 
contributed to the high cost of arbitration.215  It is therefore not out of place to submit 
that a one-person tribunal will definitely be cheaper than a three person tribunal.216 
Besides, because a one-person tribunal will involve less deliberation as compared to a 
                                                          
211 Ilias Bantekas (n 97) 161. 
212 Nobert Horn also argues that problems which the e- arbitration process may actually face are not 
necessarily different from those which many be found in the regular arbitration process. See Nobert 
Horn, ‘Arbitration and Electronic Communication: Public Policy’ (2009) 12(5) International Arbitration 
Law Review 107,114.  
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214 William Park, ‘Arbitrators and Accuracy’ (2010) 1 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 25; 
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of International Arbitration: The Selection of Arbitrators’ in Reymond and Bucher (eds), Swiss Essays on 
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three-person tribunal, parties save more time and by extension money when they opt 
for a one-person tribunal.217 
 
As we mentioned in Chapter Six, it is therefore ironic that Nigeria and Ghana,218 which 
still have high levels of poverty, prescribe a three-person tribunal,219 while the United 
Kingdom, where standard of living is generally higher, adopts the relatively cheaper 
option of a one-person tribunal.220 
 
Of course, we admit that there is need to balance the high cost associated with 
arbitration, with the need to achieve a just and fair process.221 Further to this 
consideration, we adopt the position under the UAA of the OHADA, which prescribes 
an alternate one or three person arbitral tribunal system.222 However, unlike the UAA 
which does not qualify or state when either of the former systems should be used thus 
giving room for confusion, we recommend that as a matter of default, any dispute 
below ten million naira should be administered via the one arbitrator system.  On the 
other hand, we suggest that any dispute beyond ten million naira will be subject to a 
default three-person arbitral system.223 We are working on the premise that disputes 
of a certain worth will involve more risk and that parties in such disputes will prefer 
and have the capacity to fund a three person tribunal, especially since a three-person 
tribunal should ideally deliver a more reasoned award, mainly because of the debates, 
                                                          
217 Doug Jones, ‘Techniques in Managing the Process of Arbitration’ (2012) 78(2) Arbitration 140,143; 
See also Nigel Blackaby et al (n 5) 237. 
218 See Section 6(1) of the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2004 and Section 13 (2) of the 
Ghanaian Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010.  
219 According to statistics recently released by the Vice President of Nigeria, over one hundred million 
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Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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277 
 
interactions and cross-fertilization of ideas that must have occurred among the 
arbitrators.224 
Flowing from the above, the default number of arbitrators will either be one or three, 
depending on the value of the dispute. Parties will of course be allowed to review 
these default number of arbitrators, subject to the fact that even numbered tribunals 
will not be allowed, in order to eliminate the possibility of inconclusive awards, thus 
defeating the decision to arbtitrate and ultimately resulting to litigation.225 Further to 
this possibility, the English Act discourages even numbered tribunals,226 while some 
other jurisdictions like Ghana227 expressly prohibit even numbered tribunals.228 The 
latter is definitely the recommended approach.229 
In Chapters Three and Six, we argued that the direct involvement of parties in the 
appointment of arbitrators affects the sanctity of the arbitral process.230 It is not 
unreasonable to assert that parties will seek to appoint arbitrators who will be 
sympathetic to their respective submissions, a position which may not necessarily be 
the just or right approach.231 As Mark Alcolt rightly noted, there have been a number 
of situations where it has been alleged that arbitrators have acted the script of their 
designators.232 Onyeama adds that in practice, party appointed arbitrators usually 
consult their appointing parties before appointing a chairman of the panel.233 Van den 
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Portugal among others. 
229 See Section 1.1.2 of Chapter Six for more discussion on this issue. 
230 See Section 5.2 of Chapter Three and Section 4.2 of Chapter Six. 
231 See Doak Bishop and Lucy reed, ‘Practical Considerations for Interviewing, Selecting and 
Challenging Party Appointed Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1998) 14(4) 
Arbitration International 395; Tom Arnold (n 215); M. Scott Donahey, ‘The Independence and 
Neutrality of Arbitrators’ (1992) 9(4) Journal of International Arbitration 31, 34; Martin Hunter, ‘Ethics 
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Berg also notes that most of the time, dissenting opinions in an award are delivered 
by the arbitrator appointed by the party that lost the case in whole or in part.234 
In response to this, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration235 noted that 
notwithstanding the possibility that a party nominated arbitrator may actually be 
inclined to support his/her appointing party, this should ordinarily not prevent such 
an individual from doing the right thing.236 Our reaction to this is that it is in fact easier 
said than done.237 It is difficult for this writer to accept a proposition that is based on 
personal integrity and mind-set. While there are no doubt many upright people 
around, there are also many people of poor moral standing. James Madison, in the 
Federalist Papers No 10 rightly noted that that “as long as the reason of man continues 
fallible…and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed…”.238 As 
it is often said, even the devil does not know the intentions of man. It is difficult to 
separate the wheat from the chaff hence the preference for a safer approach especially 
in a country like Nigeria is necessary.   
Furthermore, as Jan Paulson rightly noted, “the fact that dissenting arbitrators are 
nearly always those who have been appointed by the party aggrieved by the majority 
decision does not in and of itself point to a failure of ethics. It may simply be that the 
appointing party has made an accurate reading of how its nominee is likely to view 
certain propositions of law or circumstances of fact. The problem is that the 
                                                          
234 Van den Berg, ‘Dissenting Opinions by Party Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration’ in 
Arsanjani, Karz Cogan, Sloane and Wiessner (eds), Looking to the Future: Essays in Honour of W’ Michael 
Reisman (Koninklijke Brill 2010) 821 -843; See also Alan Redfern, ‘Dissenting Opinions in International 
Commercial Arbitration: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’ (2004) 20 Arbitration International 22. 
235Nigel Blackaby et al (n 5) 25 
236 See also Brower and Rosenberg, ‘The Death of the Two Headed Nightingale: Why the Paulsson-Van 
den Berg Presumption that Party-Appointed Arbitrators are untrustworthy is Wrong’ (2013) 29 
Arbitration International 7. 
237 Interestingly, Professor Hunter in a previous article admitted that he is particular about picking 
arbitrators who are favourably inclined to his position. This position is not in itself a bad one, instead 
it is a realistic one. See Martin Hunter, ‘Ethics of the International Arbitration’ (1987) 53 Arbitration 219, 
223 
238 The Federalist Papers were essays written by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay in 
the Mid 1780s. The papers can be viewed at <www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/> accessed 
10 January 2016 
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inevitability of such calculations prove that unilateral appointments are inconsistent 
with the fundamental premise of arbitration: mutual confidence in arbitrators”.239 
In order to avoid this problem, as a default provision we adopt the approach in 
Ghana240 by introducing into the Nigerian arbitration framework the position of an 
appointing authority. Parties will be able to agree on their appointing authority. 
Where parties fail to agree on an appointing authority, the NAC will act as the 
appointing authority. In exercising this power, the appointing authority will be 
expected to take into consideration the nature of the dispute as well as the agreement 
and/or any requirements stipulated by the parties.  
In addition, where parties have more than one arbitrator, we also introduce into the 
Nigerian arbitration practice the position of a chairman who will also serve as the head 
of the tribunal. The process of appointing the chairman will vary, depending on the 
appointment process adopted. In a three-person tribunal constituted by the NAC, the 
arbitrators appointed will be expected to appoint a chairman from among themselves. 
However, where parties opt to appoint their arbitrators, we adopt the practice in many 
jurisdictions, where each party appoints his arbitrator and the two arbitrators appoint 
the third, who will also act as chairman. The appointment of the chairman via this 
second method will neutralise whatever permutations may have been made by either 
side to influence the proceeding via their arbitrators.  Besides, as Doug Jones rightly 
noted, in a three-person tribunal where two arbitrators have been appointed by the 
parties, the award is arguably the view of the chairman.241 
Furthermore, we incorporate the practice in Ghana242 and under institutional rules 
like the ICC Rules,243 which makes it mandatory for potential arbitrators to provide 
details about their present diary and general workload as well as any information that 
may give rise to any question as to conflict of interest and/or bias.244 As Professor Park 
rightly opined “…someone who meets the bill with respect to experience and 
                                                          
239 Jan Paulsson (n 58). 
240 See Ghanaian ADR Act 2010, section 26. 
241 Doug Jones (n 217) 143. 
242 Ghanaian Arbitration 2010 Act, section 15. 
243 ICC Arbitration Rules 2012, article 11(2). 
244 See Section 1.1.2 of Chapter Six. 
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qualifications may have commitments that interfere with early hearings”.245 Redfern 
and Hunter on International Arbitration also noted that, ascertaining a prospective 
arbitrator’s availability (by asking concrete, rather than general questions about 
competing commitments) before making an appointment may be as important in 
ensuring an efficient and effective process as establishing his or her experience.246 We 
therefore submit that any doubt as to whether or not disclosure of certain facts are (or 
would be) relevant should be resolved in favour of more disclosure.247 
In light of this, we reject the practice under the UAA, which seems to give arbitrators 
the discretion to decide whether or not to disclose any information.  For example, in 
Scandinavian Reinsurance Company v. St Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co,248 the courts 
in the United States vacated an arbitration award because two arbitrators had failed 
to disclose their involvement in a pre-existing but similar arbitration. The successful 
party not only argued that the arbitrators had a duty to disclose their involvement in 
the first proceeding but also that their involvement in the first proceeding influenced 
their decision in the subsequent arbitration proceeding. In order to reduce these 
unnecessary and very avoidable controversies, there is need to encourage as much 
disclosure as possible on the part of the arbitrators.249 
This provision is important in order to reduce the likelihood of delays arising from 
the appointment of a busy arbitrator. Besides, as at the time of appointment, the 
information at the disposal of the arbitrator is not usually enough to make a potential 
or actual decision as to personal conflict. Only the parties have all the information and 
so should be the ones to decide issues relating to conflict. By mandating the arbitrators 
to give a general indication of their existing workload therefore, parties are able to 
speculate and avoid the possibility of bias or conflicts, which arbitrators at the point 
of appointment, may or may not be aware of. Any dispute relating to the appointment 
                                                          
245 William Park, ‘Arbitration in Autumn’ (2011) 1 International Dispute Settlement Journal 287 
246Nigel Blackaby et al (n 5) 249. 
247 Article 3 of the IBA Guidelines on Conflict of Interest in International Arbitration 2014 provides a 
useful guideline on this issue.  
248 (732 F Supp 2d 293 (SDNY 2010), REVD, 668 F 3d 60 (2d Cir 2012). 
249 Mark H. Alcolt (n 232) 5. 
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of the arbitrators will be resolved by the appointing authority and in the absence of 
one, the DAC.250 
We adopt a recent practice of new generation arbitration institutions like the 
Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC)251 and countries like Ghana,252 
where the institution compiles and maintains a list of reputable arbitrators with varied 
trainings, experiences and with diverse nationalities. This provides parties with 
proven and ready options to choose from. The existence of this list will also serve as a 
form of recognition for persons who have distinguished themselves within the sphere 
of arbitration and will by extension encourage personal development among 
arbitrators (and potential arbitrators). While the Board of Directors of the NAC will 
have the discretion to invite persons who in their opinion have distinguished 
themselves within the sphere of arbitration to join the list, qualified members of the 
public will also be allowed to apply to the NAC to be included on this list.  
As a default and basic provision, it is proposed that members of this list have at least 
a law degree. This is mainly because one cannot discount the relevance and 
application of the law in the resolution of disputes via arbitration. Furthermore, as a 
default provision, potential arbitrators must have five and ten years post qualification 
experience, for disputes valued below or at ten million and above ten million 
respectively.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, in view of the fundamental party 
autonomy principle, parties may choose to nominate non-lawyers or lawyers who do 
not meet the prescribed qualification to serve as their arbitrator(s).   
Admittedly, parties especially in commercial transactions sometimes prefer 
arbitration because it offers them a practical solution as against a strictly legal solution. 
It has also been argued that parties to an arbitration agreement are constructors of 
their dispute resolution mechanism and so they can be presumed to know who and 
                                                          
250 This is one of the situations (alluded to under our discussion on the DAC) where it is necessary to 
have an independent third party decide. 
251 Website of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre <www.siac.org.sg/our-arbitrators> 
accessed 20 November 2015. 
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what would be most suitable to resolve their dispute.253 Rather than concentrate on 
the real issues in dispute, lawyers acting as arbitrators are said to be easily distracted 
by issues relating to the technical rules of evidence and procedure, thus making the 
process unnecessarily complicated.254 Therefore, some have argued that business 
executives and professionals are more suited to administer commercial arbitrations.255 
By virtue of their experiences, the aforementioned are said to possess the right 
managerial and administrative skills as well as the technical knowledge to properly 
resolve commercial disputes.256  They are said to be able to approach both legal and 
practical problems without “the baggage of national legal culture”. 257 
While there is value in the aforementioned arguments, we believe that a slight 
exception should be made in this proposed framework, primarily because its 
application will extend beyond commercial and sophisticated transactions. It is 
intended to apply to both literate and illiterate parties in commercial and non-
commercial, sophisticated and simple, as well as large and small disputes.  As we saw 
in Chapter Five, a substantial number of people in Nigeria remain uneducated and 
largely unaware of their legal rights and entitlements.  
Law and the judicial system in general provide a useful and reasonable standard on 
what is right and fair.258 Parties must be aware of these rights and also capable of 
understanding the implication(s) of opting out of the security provided by the law.  A 
good and acceptable analogy can be made with the restriction on parties’ capacity to 
enter into a lawful contract as well as opt out of their right of access to the court.  In 
such circumstances, the law seeks to protect the weak or vulnerable from exploitation.  
                                                          
253 Toby Landau, ‘Composition and Establishment of the Tribunal’ (1998) 9 Am. Rev. Int. Arb 45; Emilia 
Onyema (n 203) 1. 
254 Michael J. Ahschuler, ‘Arbitrating Before a Non Attorney Construction Industry Neutral’ (2009) 
Dispute Resolution Journal 15. 
255 James E. Meason and Alison G.Smith, ‘Non Lawyers in International Commercial Arbitration: 
Gathering Splinters on the Bench’ (1991) 12 (1) North-Western Journal of International Law and 
Business 25, 44-45. 
256 ibid. 
257 Eur Lng Geoffrey M. Beresford Hartwell, ‘Arbitration Procedures: Achieving Efficiency Without 
Sacrificing Due Process’ (A Paper presented at a session of the Working Group II at the 14th ICCA 
Congress on 5th May, 1998 in Paris, France)  
<www.nadr.co.uk/articles/published/arbitration/ExpertiseRelevance.pdf> accessed 25 January 2016   
258 Admittedly, this assertion may not apply in all instances.  
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Similarly in this instance, we believe that the State has a duty to protect the weak and 
ignorant from an exploitative counterpart. There are some basic principles of law put 
in place to protect the weaker party as well as ensure the fair and just resolution of 
disputes. A good example is the audi alterem partem principle. It is important that 
neutrals especially in disputes which possibly may involve a weaker party, are aware 
of and apply these principles.259  Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration 
rightly noted that “even where the dispute is relatively simple, difficult problems of 
procedure and of conflict of law can regularly arise.  These are problems that a lawyer 
with suitable procedural and legal experience is generally better equipped to handle 
than a person whose expertise lies in another area”.260 In order to create a balance 
between the need for a practical solution on one hand and a legal solution on the other, 
parties may decide to appoint in house (non-practising) lawyers.  
Notwithstanding the foregoing argument, we reiterate that parties may choose to 
nominate non-lawyers or lawyers who do not meet the prescribed qualification to 
serve as their arbitrator(s).  This opt in/opt out provision allows parties who prefer 
practical solutions as against the hybrid or strictly legal solutions, to opt out of the 
said protection or standard provided for by the law.  
Our proposed framework will also encourage not only practising lawyers, but also 
members of the academia who teach or research in specialised areas of the law, in-
house lawyers working in specialised industries and very importantly, traditional 
chiefs,261 to act as arbitrators. Arbitrators will be allowed to have a scale of fees, which 
along with a brief resume, will be maintained by the NAC and will be available for 
parties to view and choose from. This will not only encourage arbitrators to constantly 
and continuously expand their knowledge and experience, it arguably will have the 
effect of breaking monopoly and by implication also reduce the cost of domestic 
                                                          
259 Besides, it has become the practice in many industries to have legal departments, with in house (non-
practising) lawyers reviewing the so-called technical documents. This particular set of business 
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260Nigel Blackaby et al (n 5) 246 
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arbitration in Nigeria.262 The NAC will be mandated to ensure a periodic training 
exercise for members on the list. This is because in the performance of his duties, an 
arbitrator not only has to exercise a series of management skills, he usually has to 
evaluate evidence.263 These are skills which require constant training.264 In addition, 
an arbitrator needs to be kept apprised of any changes that have been made to the 
relevant substantive and procedural law.   
In line with our desire to reduce the cost of arbitration to the barest minimum, one 
recent practice which we do not incorporate is the emergency arbitrator provision.265 
Article 29(1) of the ICC Arbitration Rules for example provides that “a party that needs 
urgent interim or conservatory measures that cannot await the constitution of an 
arbitral tribunal (emergency measures) may make an application for such 
measures”.266 As can be deduced from above, the emergency provision provides an 
option to parties to deal with very urgent matters arising from their contract prior to 
the constitution of the tribunal.267 While the emergency arbitrator’s provision provides 
a useful and very efficient option for parties,268 it is submitted that it is more practical 
in international arbitration proceedings and/or contentious disputes with very high 
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sums at stake. Spending extra and very large sums of money on emergency arbitrators 
where much lower sums are in dispute or at stake is not practical.  The DAC being a 
special but Superior Court of Record provides a cheaper, faster and more practical 
option to the emergency arbitrator provision in domestic arbitration.269 Under the 
suggested procedure, parties do not have to expend extra funds on arbitration fees. 
Furthermore, parties do not have to go through the process of vetting and appointing 
a suitable arbitrator twice. Instead, parties can simply approach the DAC and obtain 
a quick and fast order of the court with far less stress than via an emergency 
arbitrator.270 
2.5   The Arbitral Proceedings 
2.5.1 The Role of ADR 
The arbitrators, but more especially the NAC, will have the duty to ensure that parties 
explore every avenue to resolve their dispute in a more amicable and less contentious 
manner before opting for the more contentious arbitration process. Parties will 
therefore be expected to explore less contentious methods of resolving disputes, like 
mediation and negotiation, before opting for the more contentious arbitration.271 This 
is in line with the civil procedure practice in many States in Nigeria (and many other 
jurisdictions), which require parties and their counsel to explore ADR before opting 
for litigation.272 As part of their originating papers, parties will be expected to sign a 
statement averring that they have made all attempts to resolve their dispute with no 
success.273 This will apply to every arbitration undertaken via the NAC.  
Notwithstanding any difficulties associated with this, it is submitted that a successful 
ADR has the potential to save parties substantial cost and time. 
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While we encourage hybrid processes like the Med-Arb, we discourage the same 
individual from participating in both mechanisms, for ethical reasons. We argued in 
Chapter Three that it is difficult to agree that an arbitrator who listened to parties bare 
the weaknesses of their respective cases during mediation, will be fair enough to 
decide the dispute based on the facts presented by each of the parties in the arbitration 
and without recourse (consciously or unconsciously) to information  garnered during 
the mediation.274 In addition, we also advocate against the practice in Ghana, which 
allows the courts to refer to arbitration, a matter which in its opinion is best suited for 
this practice, since like we highlighted in Chapter Six, the question as to the existence 
of consent is debatable.  
2.5.2  Case Management Conference 
Before any real work is done on the arbitration, we adopt the practice in jurisdictions 
like Ghana,275 as well as the practice under the rules of the ICC276 by advocating for 
the introduction of Case Management Conferences, Terms of Reference and the 
Procedural Timetable, with the goal of encouraging a speedy and cost effective 
process in the long run.  In order to save cost, and taking a cue from the practice in 
Ghana, we suggest that this conference be held either in person or via electronic 
media.277 As Nuel Bunni rightly noted, case management conferences allow parties to 
identify and deal with knotty issues right from the beginning,278 and so the arbitrators 
are able to focus on the substance of the dispute, thus saving a lot of time and cost 
within an already contentious process.279 We admit that case management conferences 
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may not be worth it in smaller disputes and so parties are able to opt out of this 
provision if they so desire. 
2.5.3  Applicable Language and Law 
Parties will be expected to agree on the language in which their proceedings will be 
conducted. Where parties fail to agree on a language, the applicable language will be 
determined by the tribunal. This is because while English language remains the 
official language in Nigeria, and may very well be a common denominator between 
parties, other considerations may exist which may make another language more 
suitable in domestic proceedings. For example, we have in a previous chapter 
submitted that Nigeria is made up of 500 different tribes and cultures.  Furthermore, 
as we have emphasised, the level of education in Nigeria is still rather on the low side. 
The Nigerian law also recognizes oral contracts, many of which are conducted in local 
dialects. For these reasons, we submit that rather than foist a particular language on 
parties, the issue of language especially in regards to domestic arbitration proceedings 
should be decided on a case by case basis. 
In view of the fact that this is suggested as a domestic arbitration framework, a lot of 
the previous discussion on choice of law are not relevant here. One must add that for 
the purposes of customary law, this should ordinarily not be a problem as it can be 
assumed that only parties sharing similar customary and cultural roots will ordinarily 
opt for customary arbitration. However, in the very rare situation in which parties 
have failed or are unable to agree on an applicable customary law, we do not prescribe 
any default law.  Instead we stipulate that the applicable law will be as determined by 
the tribunal, after taking into consideration factors like the State of origin and/or 
residence of parties as well as the nature of the dispute, amongst others. 280 
2.5.4  Duration, Time limit and Extension of Time Provisions 
We adopt the practice in OHADA’s UAA by prescribing a six months duration within 
which the arbitration process should ordinarily be concluded.281 Tom Arnold rightly 
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submits that proceedings may actually progress faster if parties are working towards 
a deadline.282 This provision in conjunction with the aforementioned Case 
Management Conference, Procedural Time Table, and Terms of Reference, will help 
to ensure that proceedings are conducted in an efficient fashion and that disputes are 
determined in a timely manner, thus reducing the likelihood of delays and backlogs.283 
The effects of a timely dispute resolution process, especially in a jurisdiction like 
Nigeria, extend beyond issues of justice and fairness. Ironically, while cost is said to 
be one of the biggest banes of arbitration, it is submitted that a timely arbitration 
system in a country like Nigeria may in fact be cheaper than a decade long litigation 
process. When one examines the amount of resources spent on legal fees, 
transportation costs and filing fees among others, over a period of ten years and still 
with no end in sight, we realise that it may in fact be cheaper and definitely more 
efficient, to opt for a speedier and more effective dispute resolution process rather 
than one which on the face of it looks cheap but on a closer look and in the long run, 
is in fact more expensive. Perhaps in the end, the cooperation and availability of all 
the parties in the proceedings, is the single greatest factor affecting the cost of 
arbitration.284 
While in a previous paragraph we advocated for a procedural timetable to ensure 
certainty as well as aid an efficient process, we concede that there are unforeseen and 
unplanned situations where it may be necessary to extend the time within which 
parties are expected to act. We incorporate the extension of time procedures found in 
many civil litigation frameworks and which has also crept into the practice of 
arbitration. For example, under the English Arbitration Act, parties who are not able 
to initiate proceedings within the agreed period are allowed to apply to the court for 
an order of the court extending the time to commence their proceedings.285 
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In our framework however, we make a distinction between extension of time 
applications made before the commencement of the arbitration286 and those required 
in the course of the proceeding.287 For an extension of time application made before 
the commencement of the proceeding, parties will be able to make an application to 
the DAC, seeking an order extending the time within which they are to act.   
On the other hand, an application for extension of time arising during the course of 
the proceeding must be made to the tribunal.  In both situations, an order extending 
time would only be granted where the court or the tribunal is satisfied that the 
circumstances leading to the lapse of time were outside the reasonable contemplation 
of the parties when they agreed on the provision relating to time. The court may also 
extend time if in its opinion, it will be just to extend same or that the conduct of one 
party makes it unjust to hold the other party to the strict terms of the provision.288 
2.5.5. Consolidation and Third Party Proceeding 
Finally on the subject of proceedings, we allow parties to consolidate two or more 
proceedings with similar subject matter.289 As we mentioned in Chapter Six,290 this is 
one of the advantages which the litigation practice has over arbitration.291 In response 
and as we have previously seen, frameworks in jurisdictions like the United Kingdom 
have incorporated the practice into their arbitration practice.292 The Supreme Court of 
Nigeria has rightly opined that a consolidation order is essentially for the convenience 
of the parties as it saves them the time and cost expended on litigation, in cases 
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involving common questions.293 It also avoids the possibility of conflicting decisions 
on the same issue.294 
Like the ICC’s Court of Arbitration, the NAC will be empowered to entertain and 
supervise the process of consolidating similar proceedings. Furthermore, third parties 
to the arbitration agreement and proceedings will be allowed to be a part of the 
arbitration proceedings, by making an application to the NAC.295 The NAC will of 
course need to obtain the written consent of the existing parties before joining third 
parties to an existing proceeding.  Any disagreement or controversy arising from this 
consolidation process will be dealt with by the DAC.  
In granting an order of consolidation, the decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in 
Naboth Okwuagbala & ors v Margaret Ikwueme & ors296 on an application to consolidate 
similar court proceedings is instructive.  In this case, the court held that an order of 
consolidation will only be granted if the judge is satisfied that the issues in the suit 
can be resolved in one joint proceeding rather than in separate proceedings.  In 
arriving at this decision, the court held that the Judge must be satisfied that; 1) some 
common questions of law or fact arise in both or all the causes or matters; 2) the rights 
to reliefs are claimed in respect of or arise out of the same transaction or series of 
transaction; or 3) that for some other reason, it is desirable to make an order of 
consolidation.   
It is important to emphasize that because an agreement is integral to the validity of an 
arbitration, all parties to the proceedings must agree to the consolidation process.297 
This is as against the position in a jurisdiction like Hong Kong, where the court is 
allowed to order the consolidation of arbitrations with common questions of law or 
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to coerce parties to consolidate their proceedings.  The committee was of the opinion that it would 
amount to a negation of the principle of party autonomy to give the tribunal or the court, the power to 
order consolidation of concurrent hearings. See Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration 
Law, Report on the Arbitration Bill (February 1996) para 180. 
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fact, where the dispute arises from the same transaction or series of transaction as well 
as in situations where the court deems it necessary to consolidate proceedings.298 In 
other words, unlike litigation and in a jurisdiction like Hong Kong where the court is 
able to coerce parties to consolidate proceedings, parties must consent to the 
consolidation process.  Fremuth-Wold and Schuck have pointed out that consent may 
be express or implied. For example, it may be implied when all the parties in a 
particular dispute or transaction appoint the same arbitrator(s).299 
2.6     The Tribunal’s Final Decision and its Enforcement 
Upon the conclusion of the arbitration, the tribunal will be expected to deliver a final 
decision, after which it becomes functus officio. The general rule has and will remain 
that where parties opt for arbitration, they cannot, when the award is unfavourable, 
object to the decision either upon issues of law or fact.300 At this point, any issue that 
has been decided upon by the tribunal operates as res judicata and cannot be revisited 
either by an arbitration tribunal or the court.301 
Unlike the position under the Model Law, which also gives the tribunal the power to 
interpret the award, we adopt the argument that this power to interpret its award 
inadvertently gives the tribunal the ability to revisit its award.302 Instead of this 
approach of the Model Law therefore, we adopt the English approach, which arguably 
only allows the tribunal to correct clerical or typographical errors. Any question as to 
the interpretation of the award should be addressed to the DAC.  
This framework will require the tribunal to, as a matter of default, deliver a written 
award, a copy of which should be submitted to the NAC. This is important in order 
to avoid present and future controversy as to the exact decision of the tribunal. The 
NAC will be expected to keep a record of the decision. While not a compulsory aspect 
of the arbitration process, we retain the existing position, which allows parties to 
                                                          
298 Hong Kong Arbitration, Schedule 2, Section 2. Note however that this is an opt-in provision. 
299 Alice Fremuth-Wolf and Yoanna Schuck, ‘The New Arbitration Rule of the Vienna International 
Arbitral Centre of Vienna (Vienna Rules 2013)’ (2013) 16(6) International Arbitration Law Review 198, 
202. 
300 See the decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Taylor Woodrow of Nigeria Limited v Suddeutsche 
Etna-Werk Gmbh (1993) 4 SCNJ 32. 
301 Raz Pal Gazi v FCDA (2001) 7 SCM 195. 
302 See Section 4.2 of Chapter Six. 
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apply to the court (the DAC in this instance) to obtain a recognition and enforcement 
order of the award, thus aiding its enforcement like any other judgement of a superior 
court, peradventure the award debtor fails to abide by the award.  
As against the position of the Nigeria law, which states that the time limitation for the 
enforcement of an award begins to run from the day the cause of action arose and not 
from the date the implied promise to abide by the award is breached,303 we adopt the 
position in England as embodied in the Agromet Motoimport ltd v Maulden Engineering 
Co (Beds) ltd.304 In other words, where an action has to be brought to enforce an 
arbitration award, for the purpose of limitation, the cause of action accrues on the date 
when the other party fails to honour the award.305 
Even though an appeal on the substance of the arbitration award will technically not 
be allowed, parties will be able to challenge the award on the basis of jurisdiction. We 
make a distinction between a challenge on the basis of the tribunals’ lack of 
jurisdiction on one hand and the challenge of the award on the basis that it goes 
beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitration agreement on the other hand. While the 
former affects the validity of the whole award, the latter only touches on the validity 
of the aspect of the award that goes beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. Article 
34(2) of the Model Law 2006 provides useful guidance to the tribunal on how to answer 
questions relating to jurisdiction. For example, Article 34(2) (a) (I) of the aforementioned 
Law allows the tribunal to set aside an award where one of the parties to the agreement 
was under some form of incapacity as at the time of entering into the agreement. Such 
a situation obviously concerns the jurisdiction of the arbitration.306 
                                                          
303 For a discussion on this, see Section 3.6 of Chapter Four. See also the case of City Engineering Nigeria 
Ltd v. Federal Housing Authority (1997-1998) All NLR 1. 
304 (1985) 1 W.L.R 762. 
305 See Section 3.6 of Chapter Four for an analysis of this issue. 
306 See Article 34 (2) of the Revised Model Law 2006 for a list of factors which a tribunal under this 
framework may take into consideration.  
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The Nigerian Act,307 Ghanaian Act,308Uniform Act on Arbitration,309 Model Law310 and 
even the English Arbitration Act311 all allow the tribunal to rule on any question 
relating to its jurisdiction. This seems to be the generally accepted approach, which 
has come to take root in arbitration practice.312 However unlike the approach in 
Nigeria, Ghana, the Model Law and the OHADA region, parties have a further right 
to appeal the decision of the tribunal in England.313 
In our proposed framework, we recommend the approach in England, which enables 
the tribunal to entertain any jurisdictional challenge occurring in the course of the 
proceedings, subject to a right of appeal to the DAC. This is because while we are 
reluctant to tamper with the established competence doctrine, we believe that this 
doctrine should be balanced with the fair hearing principle – “nemo judex in causa 
sua”.314 It is submitted that because of the monetary compensation which arbitrator(s) 
have to benefit if the matter goes on, the tribunal arguably has a cause in the 
jurisdiction objection, and so any decision of the tribunal on this matter should be 
subject to some form of oversight function.315 
Furthermore, Nigeria like many other nations of the world is unfortunately plagued 
by corruption.316 In Chapter Two, we saw that this plague has infiltrated the Nigerian 
judiciary, an arm of government which ordinarily should only be made up of persons 
of the highest integrity. Allowing checks and balances on the powers of the arbitrator 
will to a large extent prevent arbitrary or corrupt tendencies. The DAC being a special 
                                                          
307 Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, section 12. 
308 Ghanaian ADR Act 2010, section 24. 
309 Uniform Act on Arbitration 1999, article 11. 
310 Revised Model Law 2006, article 16(1). 
311 English Arbitration Act 1996, section 30(1). 
312 The Competence doctrine empowers the tribunal to rule over issues relating to its jurisdiction. For a 
detailed discussion of the doctrine, see Francisco Gonzalez De Cossio, ‘The Compétence-Compétence 
Principle, Revisited’ (2007) 24(3) Journal of International Arbitration 231; Janet Rossen, ‘Arbitration 
under Private International Law: The Doctrine of Separability and Competence de la Competence’ 
(1994) 17(3) Fordham International Law Journal 599. 
313 English Arbitration Act 1996, section 30(2). 
314 This Latin principle when translated to English means that you cannot be a judge in your own cause. 
315 See Section 4.2 of Chapter Six. 
316 In 2014, Nigeria was ranked the third most corrupt country in West Africa and the one hundred and 
thirty sixth (136th) in the world by Transparency International <www.transparency.org/country/ > 
accessed 20 November 2015.  
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arbitration court, is in the best position to perform this function.317  Parties will be 
expected to raise whatever objections they have to the arbitrators’ jurisdiction as soon 
as it comes to their notice, failing which it will be assumed that they have acquiesced 
to the situation or by conduct agreed to either extend the arbitrators’ jurisdiction or 
extend the scope of their arbitration agreement.  
The other part of the jurisdictional challenge will be when the award goes beyond the 
scope of the arbitration agreement. In such a situation, the DAC will be the proper 
forum for this kind of challenge. The Supreme Court of Nigeria opined in Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation v Lutin Investment Ltd & Anor318 that the tribunal has the 
jurisdiction to decide only what has been submitted by the parties for determination. 
Further to this decision and depending on the circumstances of the case, the court may 
decide to cut out all parts of the arbitration award that are beyond or inconsistent with 
the arbitration agreement and/or the law.319  For example, in a country like Nigeria 
with many municipal laws, in a situation in which parties expressly oust the 
application of a particular law, any part of the award that is based on an inapplicable 
law would be held to be invalid. A notice of appeal must be filed within one month of 
the decision in question failing which this right of appeal elapses.  
Other acceptable challenges will be when a party alleges that the arbitration was 
conducted improperly or that there has been failure to comply with certain aspects of 
the arbitration agreement.  This provision will provide a form of check on the powers 
of the arbitrator. This is important especially in a country where impunity and 
corruption seems to be the order of the day even within the judiciary.320 It is important 
that the State ensures that the seemingly wide powers of the tribunal is checked and 
that parties are protected from unscrupulous arbitrators.  
 
                                                          
317 It is submitted that the position of a Judge is different from that of an Arbitrator. The difference lies 
in the fact that a Judge ordinarily does not have any direct or indirect, pecuniary or otherwise interest 
in the continued existence or outcome of the case. 
318 (2006) 1 SCNJ 131. 
319 Issues that are inconsistent with the law would include issues stated in statute to be beyond the 
scope of arbitration.  
320 We discussed this point extensively in Section 3.4 of Chapter Two. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter, we have come up with a bespoke domestic arbitration framework for 
Nigeria. While in some instances, we retained the existing practice and case law in 
Nigeria, in many others, we drew on the experiences of other countries like Ghana, 
England and the OHADA region.  We also made some recommendations independent 
of these frameworks, which we believe will promote domestic arbitration in Nigeria. 
In many instances, we advocated for a total repeal of existing statutory provisions.  
For example, we advocated against Section 2 of the Nigerian Arbitration Act, which 
allows courts revoke parties’ arbitration agreement without their consent. In other 
words, we withdrew the powers of the Nigerian court to revoke a valid and reproach 
free arbitration agreement. Similarly, we withdrew the discretionary and unlimited 
right of the Nigerian courts to decide whether or not to stay litigation proceedings 
even in the face of a validly made domestic arbitration agreement.  
In some other situations, we advocated for more flexible provisions and procedures, 
in line with the level of development in Nigeria.  For instance, we submitted that 
unlike the existing Act as well as the provisions of the Ghanaian, the UAA and even 
the English Arbitration Act, the literacy level in Nigeria does not support a strictly 
written and signed arbitration agreement. We therefore incorporated the more flexible 
option as provided in Option two of Article 7 of the Revised Model Law, which also 
allows oral arbitration agreements. Admittedly, writing is still the most reliable 
method of evidencing parties’ agreement, so caution must be applied. We therefore 
limited the scope of oral agreements to disputes of a particular value. 
In some other instances, we introduced new structures in order to aid the 
development of the domestic arbitration practice in Nigeria.  For instance, we 
advocated for the establishment of a Nigerian Arbitration Centre.  Unlike its Ghanaian 
equivalent and in order to reduce cost, a perceived disadvantage of arbitration, we 
advocated for the financial involvement of the government in the administration of 
the Centre.  Furthermore, in order to make the activities of the NAC more relevant 
and appropriate for her proposed end users, we made representatives of these end 
user organisations members of the Board of Directors.  Unlike the situation in Ghana, 
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we advocated for a more transparent appointment process to the Board in order to 
prevent nepotism and favouritism.  We also advocated for a special arbitration court 
to cater for arbitration disputes in Nigeria, both domestic and international. Not only 
will this special court reduce erroneous or anti arbitration decisions by the regular 
court, it will also prove to be useful and practical in resolving arbitration disputes as 
well as provide State support for the arbitration process in general. For example, 
parties in simple pre-arbitration disputes need not expend huge sums to appoint an 
emergency arbitrator. Furthermore, an award creditor also has the support of the State 
in case the award debtor fails to voluntarily abide by the award. 
We also borrowed a leaf from the customary arbitration practice in Nigeria. For 
example, under our proposed framework, a submission agreement will include a 
situation where the claimant without any prior agreement with the other party to the 
dispute, submits a dispute to either an arbitrator of his choice or the NAC. A 
submission agreement will be said to exist if the other party accepts or in the case of a 
variation, both parties agree to the variation made by the respondent.  
Finally, in some situations, we recommended a new process independent of all the 
frameworks under consideration. For instance, we made a case against the existing 
unified international and domestic arbitration Act and instead advocated for a special 
domestic arbitration law in Nigeria. Also like Ghana, we incorporated customary 
arbitration into our suggested framework. However, unlike the Ghanaian ADR Act, 
which has two different parts for arbitration and customary arbitration, we opine and 
show the reader that there is no justification for this distinction. In our framework 
therefore, domestic arbitration is redefined to include customary arbitration. 
The result of all these is a specially tailored arbitration law, that takes into 
consideration the legal and social idiosyncrasies of Nigeria as well as established and 
proven arbitration principles practised in other jurisdictions.  We strongly believe that 
this framework when adopted will promote the development of domestic arbitration 
in Nigeria and by implication provide a viable alternative to the ailing litigation 
practice in Nigeria.  
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